
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THE BOOK OF THE COVENANT

By JULIAN MORGENSTERN, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio

I

INTRODUCTION

THE basic problem in the critical study of the Book of the Covenant is altogether different from that attendant upon our investigation of the Kenite Document. Here it is the problem of the determination of the various strata of a document, which, it is manifest almost on the surface, is composite, and of the historic and religious significance of these various strata and of the composite document as a whole.

The hypotheses which have been advanced regarding the literary history of the Book of the Covenant cover a wide range indeed, though by no means as extensive as in the case of the Kenite Document. There is a practical unanimity of opinion among Biblical scholars that the Book of the Covenant is a part of the Elohist Code; but not all are clear as to whether they regard it as an integral part of this Code, or as an older piece of writing incorporated by editorial processes into E. The hypothesis most generally accepted is that developed by Baentsch,[1] that the Book of the Covenant is pre-prophetic in character, and was compiled in the Northern Kingdom towards the end of the 9th or in the early part of the 8th century B.C., and was later incorporated editorially into E. He contends, and undoubtedly correctly, that the cultural background of the laws of C is not at all that of the desert and of the age of Moses, but is rather that of the Northern Kingdom and of an age when the agricultural life and the social and religious institutions had already experienced a considerable development. Moreover, Baentsch recognizes that those laws which parallel the laws of K are, in the main

[1] *Das Bundesbuch*, 1892, and *Handkommentar zu Exodus, Leviticus und Numeri*, 1903.

at least, later than and dependent upon their K parallels. This fact, too, precludes an all too early date.

On the other hand, a judgment in extreme opposition to this is offered by Eerdmans.[2] He holds that the Book of the Covenant is a literary unit and the product of the Mosaic age. His arguments are almost entirely negative in character, i. e. he regards the evidence cited by Baentsch and others for a later date and for composition in the Northern Kingdom as invalid, or at least as of little or no significance, and maintains that the religious, social and cultural background of C could be quite as much that of the age of Moses as of a later time. He offers little or no positive evidence, however, to establish his contention that C is the actual product of the age of Moses.

Two interesting variations of the generally accepted hypothesis of Baentsch and others have been advanced. Kuenen[3] suggested, that the Book of the Covenant does not stand in its original position, that actually it represents Moses' last revelation of law to Israel just before his death, and must have stood originally where Deuteronomy stands now, and that it was removed from this, its first and logical place, and inserted in its present position by Deuteronomic writers or editors who coveted its original position for their own code. It is indeed a daring and suggestive hypothesis, and the standing of its author as a Biblical scholar, as well as certain significant statements in the early chapters of Deuteronomy, which we shall have to consider in detail in the proper place, entitle this hypothesis to at least respectful consideration. Quite interesting, although advanced haltingly and entirely as a hypothesis unsupported by direct evidence, is the suggestion of Carpenter[4] that the Book of the Covenant, with its laws of various kinds, ought to be correlated with the different laws which, according to Ex. 18. 16, Moses communicated to Israel at the Tent of Meeting. Paralleling this hypothesis

[2] *Alttestamentliche Studien*, III, 121–131.

[3] Cited by Carpenter and Harford, *The Composition of the Hexateuch*, 208 f. I have not been able to locate the original of this citation.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 209.

somewhat is that of Reuss,[5] that the Book of the Covenant is the product of the Southern Kingdom and of the reign of Jehosaphat. He bases his hypothesis upon a literal acceptance of the tradition recorded in II Chron. 17. 7—9 and 19. 5 ff. as historical, and an altogether gratuitous identification of the "Book of the Law of Yahwe" of 17. 9 with the Book of the Covenant. In similar manner, and with equal lack of evidence, Stade[6] maintains that the Book of the Covenant was compiled in the Southern Kingdom, but during the reign of Manasseh, and therefore preceded by but a few years the Deuteronomic Code, which is, in turn, partly dependent upon it.

Furthermore, since Baentsch's important monograph appeared,[7] Biblical scholars, with apparently the single outstanding exception of Eerdmans, have agreed that the Book of the Covenant is not a literary unit, but is composed of two distinct strata, the one consisting of the "words" (דברים), Ex. 20. 23–26; 22. 27–30, and 23. 10–19, coupled with a brief narrative setting in 24. 3–8, and the other consisting of the remaining laws of this Book, designated by the general title "judgments" (משפטים), and contained in 21. 1—22. 26 and 23. 1–9. However, not all the laws of this latter group are actually "judgments"; rather, the original group of "judgments" has been supplemented by a considerable number of other laws, some of them of a peculiar and quite distinctive form, and in large part Deuteronomic in content and spirit and of editorial character.

In the article which immediately precedes this in this series of studies,[8] we have had occasion to discuss in detail the close relationship between the laws of the Kenite Document and their parallels in the Book of the Covenant. We have concluded that in the main the K version of these laws is the older, and in its present wording is closer to the original version of these laws than is the version in C. We have con-

[5] *Die Geschichte der Heiligen Schrift des Alten Testaments*, 231–234.
[6] *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, I, 635–638.
[7] *Das Bundesbuch*, 1892.
[8] "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 1–138.

cluded, moreover, that the Kenite Document was composed in the Southern Kingdom in 899 B.C., under Kenite or Rechabite influence, and constituted the literary basis or program of the religious reformation in the fifteenth year of Asa. We have likewise concluded that the Kenite Document, or at least the laws thereof, its most essential part, were transmitted to the Northern Kingdom by Jonadab ben Rechab fifty-seven years later, were modified somewhat to adapt them to the more advanced economic and cultural conditions obtaining there at that time, and constituted the basis of the religious portion of the reformation and political revolution sponsored by Elisha, Jehu and Jonadab ben Rechab in 842 B.C. This conclusion implies, of course, that the Book of the Covenant is not a literary unit, that only those laws, the "words," unmistakable in form and content, which parallel or are manifestly of the same class as the laws of K, and also, of course, the narrative setting, are integral in this document, and that all the remaining laws are secondary and insertions into the main document. This article will endeavor to present further evidence in support of these conclusions and also to develop these conclusions further along lines of far-reaching significance for the study of Israel's history, and particularly of its religious, social and economic evolution.

As with our study of the Kenite Document, it will be well to begin our analysis of the Book of the Covenant with a detailed consideration of its narrative setting, before we undertake the analysis of its laws.

II

Exodus 24. 3–8

Scholars have long recognized that Ex. 23. 20–33 have no relation whatsoever to C, but are partly Elohistic and partly Deuteronomic. 24. 1–2 and 9–11 are unmistakably J. Moreover vv. 9–11 are obviously the direct continuation of vv. 1–2; vv. 3–8, which have no manifest connection either with what precedes or what follows, disturb this continuity.

The relation of vv. 3–8, however, to the Book of the Covenant is almost self-evident. These verses tell of a covenant entered into between Yahwe and Israel upon the basis of a body of דברים, "words," impliedly just spoken by Yahwe to Moses, and now in turn communicated by Moses to Israel. Israel, hearing these words, by formal declaration accepts them and obligates itself to keep them. Then through the performance of the proper blood-rite an everlasting, binding covenant is solemnized between the Deity and the people.

It is clear at a glance that this narrative parallels in practically every essential detail the account of the solemnization of the covenant which, we have seen, must have stood once in K, and of which a fragment is preserved in Ex. 34. 27 f.[9] This fragment there tells how, at Yahwe's bidding, Moses writes down the "words" which Yahwe had just spoken to him, and which he was, in turn, to communicate to Israel, and of which this written document was to be the permanent record. As we have seen, the remainder of the K account of the actual solemnization of the covenant has been lost, or, more likely, has been purposely suppressed by the J editors, who incorporated K into their document.

The narrative in Ex. 24. 3–8 parallels this narrative of K exactly. This is in itself cogent proof, on the one hand, that these verses belong to C, and, on the other hand, of the close relationship existing between K and C, at least in the latter's original form.

Careful examination of these verses reveals one disturbing element, viz. v. 3. This verse tells that Moses came and recited to the people all the "words" of Yahwe and all the "judgments," and the people, hearing these, answered promptly and unanimously, "All the 'words' which Yahwe hath spoken, we will do." It is clear that the several statements of this verse are out of place here; they come too soon in the narrative, and, moreover, are repeated later, and with greater exactness in their proper place in the narrative. Thus, for example, the first statement, that Moses came to the people, manifestly from the place of Yahwe's revelation of the laws

[9] Cf. "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 95 ff.

to him, comes too soon. For v. 4 tells that Moses wrote down all the "words" of Yahwe, and this was impliedly at Yahwe's bidding and in His presence, just as the parallel narrative in Ex. 34. 27 f. tells. Furthermore, v. 7 tells in the proper place in the narrative, that after having made all necessary preparations for the formal solemnization of the covenant, Moses read the laws to the people from the book or scroll in which he had inscribed them. And there, too, and likewise in its proper place in the narrative, we are told that the people formally accepted the covenant with the words, "All that Yahwe hath spoken we will do and we will obey." Clearly v. 7 b is the original of that which is anticipated and repeated unduly and in improper place in v. 3 b.

One further and very significant discrepancy exists between v. 3 and the remainder of the narrative. V. 3 tells that Moses recites to the people not only the "words" of Yahwe but also the "judgments." It is self-evident that משפטים is used here in a technical sense, and refers to that particular group of laws beginning in 21. 2, and designated specifically in 21. 1 by this term. This is further and very convincing evidence that 24. 3–8 must be correlated with the laws of C, and not with any other body of laws, as, for example, the Ten Commandments in 20. 2–17, as has been not infrequently maintained. But it is significant that outside of this one passage, the remainder of the narrative makes reference only to the "words," and is completely silent with regard to the "judgments," even in places where there was quite as much reason to mention the "judgments" along with the "words" as in v. 3 a. Thus v. 4 states explicitly that Moses wrote down the "words," but is silent as to the "judgments," and v. 7 a implies that it is the written record of the "words," which constitutes the "Book of the Covenant." And even more significant, v. 8 says explicitly that Yahwe makes the covenant with Israel upon the basis of "all these 'words,'" and makes no mention of the "judgments" whatsoever.[10]

[10] Significantly enough, even v. 3 b mentions only the "words" as the actual basis of the covenant, and, despite the specific reference thereto in 3 a, is entirely silent as to the "judgments."

But one conclusion can be drawn from all this evidence, viz. that v. 3 is not original here, but is editorial, and was inserted here for some specific purpose, which seemingly has to do with that particular group of laws designated technically as the "judgments." What this purpose may have been we shall determine later. Moreover, it is clear that with v. 3 omitted, vv. 4–8 offer a narrative complete in all essential details, and with unity more pronounced than with v. 3 retained.

In vv. 4–8 it is possible, and in fact quite probable, that v. 4 b, telling of the erection of the twelve stone pillars to correspond to the twelve tribes of Israel, is a gloss. Not that it is out of harmony with the rest of the narrative or with the religious principles and institutions obtaining at the time of the composition of the Book of the Covenant, but solely because these twelve stone pillars play no rôle at all in the narrative. Originally, as we know from abundant evidence, sacred stone pillars served in early Semitic religion as the abodes of local deities or spirits or else, in later stages of religious evolution, as the symbols of deities. These deities were, of course, largely, if not entirely non-Yahwistic in character. But in this portion of the C narrative the altar alone is the symbol of Yahwe. Upon it the sacrifices are offered as a matter of course, and likewise upon it Moses pours one half of the blood of the covenant, while the other half is sprinkled upon the people. And since Yahwe and the people are the two contracting parties in this covenant, upon whom, according to the implied customary ritual of blood covenant, the blood of the covenant-sacrifice was poured, and since one half of the blood was sprinkled upon the people and the other half upon the altar, it follows that the altar here, and it alone, was regarded as the concrete symbol of Yahwe. Manifestly, therefore, there is no essential rôle in the narrative for the twelve pillars. Moreover, since the covenant is explicitly established with all Israel as one people, there is not the slightest reason or excuse for representing the people in any way as a federation of twelve tribes, twelve subordinate units. These considerations make it extremely probable that v. 4 b is not a part of the original C narrative.

But unquestionably this gloss was inserted here at a comparatively early date. For it is inconceivable that such a reference to twelve sacred stone pillars set up alongside of an altar of Yahwe, and in connection with the solemnization of a religious ceremony of such basic significance in the religion of Israel, should have been made later than Deuteronomy.[11] The gloss is unquestionably pre-Deuteronomic, and must therefore be assigned in all likelihood to those Elohist editors who, as we shall see, incorporated the Book of the Covenant into their document. This conclusion suggests a ready and simple explanation of this insertion. The classic Elohist account of the solemnization of a covenant between Yahwe and Israel is found in Josh. 24. There there is no mention of altar, sacrifice or sprinkling of covenant-blood. But there, as here, Joshua writes down the words or terms of the covenant in the "Book of the Law of God"[12] and then sets up a great stone. That this was a sacred stone may be inferred from the fact, recorded in v. 26, that it stood in the sanctuary[13] of Yahwe. This stone is represented by the Elohist authors of this passage as the eternal sign or witness of the covenant just entered into by Yahwe and Israel. Quite similarly these same Elohist writers tell that the twelve stones, which, at Joshua's command, the people take up from the temporarily dry bed of the Jordan, and set up at Gilgal on the western bank of the river, were to symbolize the twelve tribes of Israel, and to serve as a constant sign of the miracle wrought by Yahwe in their behalf.[14]

Undoubtedly the Elohist editors of the Book of the Covenant must have missed in this account of the solemnization of the covenant one element which to them seemed all important, the sacred stone pillar or pillars, which were to be unto Israel the eternal witnesses of their covenant with

[11] Cf. Deut. 16. 22.

[12] It is rather surprising that Reuss did not correlate this "Book of the Law of God," instead of the Book of the Covenant, with the "Book of the Law of Yahwe" of II Chron. 17. 9.

[13] במקדש, literally, "in the sacred precincts"; cf. the Arabic *ḥimā*, and Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], index under *ḥimā*.

[14] Josh. 4. 3, 9, 20.

Yahwe. Accordingly they inserted a reference to such pillars at what seemed to them the logical place, and just as in connection with the Gilgal episode, so here too they made these pillars twelve in number to conform to the twelve tribes of Israel. Recognizing Ex. 24.4b as the work of RE, and therefore omitting it from the main narrative, we find that this narrative now reads with perfect completeness and smoothness.[15]

A few facts in this narrative of interest and of some significance for this study may be pointed out. Moses is here the chief, or rather, the sole functionary. Yahwe has already communicated the "words" to him; he now writes them down, and then reads them to the people from his written record. He is therefore the intermediary between Yahwe and Israel. There are no priests as yet, nor is the offering of sacrifices as yet the function of priests. Instead the youths of Israel offer the sacrifices, but Moses alone functions in the covenant-ceremony proper. The sacrifice consists of bullocks, certainly not the standard sacrifice of a people dwelling, even though temporarily, in the desert. Cows and bullocks are rather uncommon domestic animals in the desert, owing to their need of comparatively frequent watering. Camels, sheep and goats are instead the regular domestic animals of the desert, and those regularly offered as sacrifice. On the other hand, bullocks, because of their size and correspondingly large value, represent the highest type of sacrifice among Semitic agricultural peoples. In the Biblical ritual they play just this rôle. Manifestly, therefore, the point of view in these verses is that of the settled, agricultural life of Palestine, rather than that of the desert and of the age of Moses.

It is not without significance too that Moses first sprinkles half of the blood upon the altar, then reads the "words" to the people and hears their formal acceptance of the covenant,

[15] Perhaps, too, these twelve pillars, corresponding to the traditional twelve tribes, serve an additional purpose, to represent, in accordance with basic prophetic doctrine, that Yahwe was the God of all Israel, and not merely of either the Northern or the Southern Kingdom alone, and that His covenant was with entire Israel, and not only with a part thereof.

and only then sprinkles the other half of the blood upon them. One might at first expect that the blood would be sprinkled upon both altar and people at the same time. But a moment's thought makes the reason for the procedure here clear. As we have seen, the altar here is the concrete and visible symbol of Yahwe. It is Yahwe who has, impliedly at least, proposed, and who therefore need make no further declaration of His readiness to enter into the covenant. Accordingly, the covenant-blood can be sprinkled upon the altar immediately, and the people understand the full implication of this rite. But the "words," which as yet the people have not heard, must first be read to them by Moses, and must be formally accepted by them before the covenant-blood can be sprinkled upon them. But even before the people have actually heard the "words," they have been made to realize, by the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar, that Yahwe, on His part, is ready to enter into covenant with them, and that the matter therefore awaits only their affirmation.

Manifestly, too, the narrative is not altogether complete. Its conclusion has been lost; but this we can easily supply. For unquestionably, in accordance with the principles of early Semitic religious practice, the animals here sacrificed not only provided the blood for the covenant-ceremony, but likewise constituted a covenant-sacrifice, participated in by the people as the guests of the Deity. In fact just this is implied in the designation of these sacrifices in v. 5 as *zᵉbaḥim šelamim*. This sacrificial meal constituted an additional rite of solemnization of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel, supplementing the sprinkling of the blood.

Finally, it should be noted that the "words" are here inscribed, not upon stone tablets, but upon a scroll. This is in significant contrast to the parallel statement, in Ex. 34. 27 f., that at Yahwe's command Moses inscribed the "words" of the covenant, according to K, upon two tablets. But, as we have suggested,[16] it is quite probable that the reference

[16] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 97.

to the two stone tablets there is editorial; and in such case it would be equally probable that the original K narrative told, or at least understood, that, just as here, the "words" there were likewise written by Moses upon a scroll.

The obvious relation to and dependence upon the Kenite Document of the Book of the Covenant raise the important question whether the latter did not have originally a larger narrative setting than merely Ex. 24. 4–8. We have seen that the original Kenite code of laws was embedded in a narrative setting of considerable extent, which must have told of the early life of Moses, his flight from Egypt and marriage into the Kenite tribe; of his first contact with Yahwe and the charge laid upon him to go back to Egypt and bring his brethren out from there to the sacred mountain in the desert where Yahwe was dwelling; of Moses' fulfillment of this charge, of Yahwe's command to him to lead the people away from there, of the revelation of the divine name and of the "words," of the solemnization of the covenant upon the basis of these "words," of the erection of the "tent of meeting" and the institution of revelation by means of the oracle; of the visit of Moses' brother-in-law and the appointment of the judges at his suggestion, of Moses' plea to his brother-in-law to be Israel's guide through the desert and of Hobab's finally yielding to this plea; of the brief journey of the people through the desert and their approach to, conquest of and settlement in the extreme southern part of Palestine. Without this narrative the K account of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel would have been incomplete and not altogether comprehensible.

Now it is quite probable that the Book of the Covenant may have contained originally a similar, and even parallel narrative introduction and conclusion. For here too the account of the solemnization alone is quite as incomplete and incomprehensible without the appropriate narrative setting, recounting the events leading up to the solemnization of the covenant, and the incidents following upon this, whereby Yahwe fulfilled His part of the covenant. The very abruptness with which the "words" in Ex. 20.23 begin, and the

fact that, as we have seen,[17] the first "word" has been suppressed in favor of the editorial v. 22, and the additional fact that, again as we have seen,[18] the revelation of a code of "words" designed to be the basis of a covenant between a deity and a people which had, impliedly, not known nor worshiped him before, necessitated a statement, brief though it may have been, of the actual name of the deity, in order that the people might thereafter worship him specifically by name, make it quite certain that the Book of the Covenant must have possessed originally a narrative setting of some extent, even though this may not have equalled in range of content the original narrative setting of the Kenite Document. Unfortunately, however, the entire narrative introduction of C has apparently been suppressed by the Elohist editors in favor of their own narrative.[19]

[17] *Ibid.*, 71.

[18] *Ibid.*, 31 f.

[19] It is, of course, not impossible, nor even improbable, that some small fragments of the original narrative introduction of the Book of the Covenant may be preserved in the early chapters of Exodus, just as, as we have seen (*ibid.*, 51–54, 119–135), was the case with K. We would expect to find such fragments of the C narrative in passages ordinarily assigned to E. It is by no means impossible that the nucleus of Ex. 3. 1–15 (cf. my "The Elohist Narrative in Exodus 3. 1–15," *AJSL*, XXXVII [1921], 242–262), may come from C, although, if so, it has probably been considerably reworked by Elohist editors. There is nothing in the present text to forbid this hypothesis, although, it must be admitted, there is likewise little direct evidence in support of it. Indirectly, however, a number of significant details in that narrative favor this hypothesis. Certainly the conception of Yahwe dwelling in the סנה upon the sacred mountain, is very old, and parallels appropriately the K conception of Yahwe dwelling upon the sacred mountain with the cave of revelation thereon. This ancient, local conception of Deity would be more natural and appropriate in the older Book of the Covenant than in the younger Elohist Code. Furthermore, the representation of the Deity of this mountain as the God of Moses' חתן, as we have had to emend the אביך of v. 6 and the אבתיכם of v. 15, conforms exactly to the conception of the Deity which we have found characteristic of K. The same conclusion holds true of the designation here of the people merely as the בני ישראל, and not yet as Yahwe's people; for, as we have seen, this was likewise the procedure in K, and not until the covenant had been solemnized, could Israel be rightfully designated as "Yahwe's people." Moreover, understanding that the C narrative, like that of K, was anticipating the coming of Israel, after its deliverance from Egypt, to the sacred mountain in the desert and the establish-

Unquestionably the Book of the Covenant must have contained originally an account of Israel's coming to the sacred place and of the events leading immediately to the revelation of the "words" and the solemnization of the covenant. For in the light of the manifest parallelism of C with K, it is impossible to conceive that C could have told of the revelation of the "words" and the solemnization of the covenant without some appropriate motivation. But what that may have been, and whether it paralleled in any way the account which must once have stood in K, viz. the original form of the golden calf story,[20] it is impossible to tell, although this is by no means impossible or improbable.

We have seen, too, that the K narrative told of Israel's journey from the sacred mountain of Yahwe under the leadership of Moses and with the guidance of Moses' brother-in-law, Hobab, until they entered, conquered and settled down in southern Palestine. Presumably therefore the C narrative must have contained some parallel *motif* of divinely appointed guidance of Israel through the desert. And here expectation is not disappointed. The Pentateuch records five different, contradictory and mutually exclusive accounts of

ing of the covenant there between it and Yahwe, the statement of v. 12b becomes much more intelligible, viz. that when Moses should have brought the people out from Egypt they would worship Yahwe at this mountain. Nor is it entirely out of possible accord with the narrative introduction of C that Yahwe should have revealed His real name to Moses at this, His first contact with him, rather than later, as in K, just before the actual solemnization of the covenant.

This evidence is, of course, too indirect and insufficient to posit absolutely that the nucleus of the narrative of Ex. 3. 1–15 was drawn from C, but it does suffice to make the hypothesis attractive.

Not improbably, too, certain elements of the plague narrative may have been drawn from the original introduction to C, but if so, it is hardly possible to identify them, for they would seem to be rather elements of the narrative itself, than of the present literary form thereof. Nor is it possible to assign any portion of Ex. 19 or 20. 1–21 to C. We must therefore conclude that by far the greater part, if not actually all of the original introduction of C has been suppressed by the Elohist editors in favor of their own narrative, or if not this, then that it has been lost in some other way. But that there was originally a narrative introduction to C similar to that of K, though not necessarily of the same extent, we need not hesitate to believe.

[20] Cf. "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 106ff.

the way in which Israel was guided through the desert.[21] Four of these five accounts have been assigned to specific sources on the ground of abundant and convincing evidence. The account of the guidance by Hobab has been assigned to K, that by the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night to J, that by the angel or messenger of Yahwe to E, and that by the *kebod Yahwe* to P. But one account remains unassigned, as yet, viz. the account in Num. 10. 33 b.

III

Numbers 10. 33b

This half-verse says that "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe was journeying on a three days stretch in advance of Israel in order to spy out a resting-place for them." The half-verse is appended to the K account of the selection of Hobab as Israel's guide. Manifestly it not only has nothing to do with this narrative, but is absolutely contradictory to it. If Israel was guided by Hobab, there was no need nor possibility of its being guided by the ark; and *vice versa*, if it was guided by the ark, there was no need nor possibility of Hobab's guidance. Manifestly the two accounts must come from different sources. And this consideration suggests too that this little narrative of Israel's guidance by the ark must come from some source entirely independent of not only K, but also of J, E and P. What source can this be? Either we must posit some source, or at least some tradition, entirely independent of K, J, E or P, and also of C, or we must attempt to correlate this fragmentary narrative with C.[22] Certainly the latter seems the more reasonable procedure; and, as we shall see, it has much evidence in its favor.

[21] Cf. my "Biblical Theophanies," *ZA*, XXV (1912), 139–193 and XXVIII (1915), 15–60; also my "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 41 f.

[22] It is, of course, needless to discuss the possibility of assigning this narrative to D, the only remaining document of the Hexateuch, since, as is generally recognized, D has no independent account of the Exodus and the wilderness wanderings, but is dependent entirely upon the traditions of the older sources, particularly E.

In its present connection v. 33 b seems to be harmonized with the K account of Hobab's guidance, immediately preceding, by the insertion of the words, דרך שלשת ימים. These words seem to imply in this connection that Hobab was Israel's actual and immediate guide, ever present with it and pointing out the way it must go, while the ark kept a three days journey in advance of the host of Israel, in order to search out for it a resting-place, presumably in this connection the nightly camping-place. For if the actual guide of Israel was Hobab, then it must have been he and no other person or agency, such as the ark, who determined and brought Israel to its final goal. Therefore in this connection מנוחה could not designate the final goal of its journeying, and could accordingly mean only the nightly camping-place.[23]

But a moment's thought shows the incongruity of this idea. What sense could there be in having the ark journey on three days in advance of the host of Israel, even for the purpose of fixing the nightly camping-places? It was one of the necessary functions of the guide to determine before the beginning of the day's march, just where the people would encamp at night. Moreover, with the ark constantly three

[23] Just this is the reinterpretation of this passage which Deut. 1. 33 gives, when it says that Yahwe was going before Israel along the way through the desert in order to spy out for it a place where it might encamp. For unquestionably the use of the word לתור here, as well as the general connection, indicate a dependence of this passage upon Num. 10. 33b. Manifestly the Deuteronomist did not read דרך שלשת ימים in his version of Num. 10. 33b, for otherwise he could not have told that Yahwe journeyed on immediately ahead of Israel to spy out its nightly camping-place. Manifestly too, he deliberately suppressed all reference to the ark, and substituted for it Yahwe Himself. His reason for this we shall learn later.

Quite obviously the association of the ark with Israel's מנוחה, the goal of its journeying through the desert and the land of its permanent sojourn, with Yahwe dwelling in its midst in the Temple, is reflected in Ps. 132. 8, קומה יהוה למנוחתך אתה וארון עזך, and in I Chron. 28. 2, where the Temple is called בית מנוחה לארון. In both these passages, and also in Ps. 132. 14, מנוחה means a permanent dwelling-place, and not a place of temporary sojourn, such as a nightly camping-place would be. Unquestionably these three passages, so obviously dependent upon Num. 10. 33b, likewise did not read דרך שלשת ימים there, and accordingly interpreted מנוחה in this verse, just as we have done, as the permanent goal of Israel's journey through the desert, the land promised to it by Yahwe.

days in advance of Israel, how could its connection and means of communication with Israel be maintained? And finally, if the entire journey from the Mountain of Yahwe to the goal of Israel's journeying in southern Palestine, according to the K narrative, was one of but three days, then certainly there was no place for the ark three days in advance of Israel's host; for it would have been at the very goal of the journey even before Israel had set out, and there would have been no need for it to travel on further, as the term נָסַע implies. Quite certainly the words דרך שלשת ימים have no place here, and are a very disturbing insertion into the original text.[24] Either they are the unintentional result of dittography resulting from the rereading of the same words in the first half of the verse, or they are a harmonistic insertion, designed to soften somewhat the otherwise absolute contradiction existing between v. 33 b and the narrative of Hobab's guidance immediately preceding it.

For with these words omitted this contradiction becomes much more absolute and glaring. The half-verse now states explicitly that the ark of the covenant of Yahwe was journeying on before Israel in order to search out for it a resting-place, i. e. the final goal of its journeying. How long this journeying and this manner of guidance endured, is not stated nor implied in any way. Nor is there the slightest implication of where this goal lay, whether in southern Palestine or farther to the north or east, or whether the approach of Israel to its final home in Palestine was through the south, as in the K narrative, or through the country to the east of the Jordan. Only one thing this verse does imply, and this very positively, that Israel journeyed on steadily under the guidance of the ark until it reached the final goal of its journeying. This tradition knows absolutely nothing of an interrupted journey and of a forty years sojourn and wandering in the desert, but only of a direct, unbroken journey from the place of revelation and solemnization of the covenant to the final destination, the land which, this half-verse implies, Yahwe must have promised to them. In other words, this

[24] So practically all modern commentators.

half-verse too tells, or at least implies, that Yahwe immediately and without the slightest delay fulfilled His part of His covenant with Israel. In this it agrees completely with the K narrative, and disagrees with the younger J and E narrative of the forty years of wandering in the wilderness.

Here a question of extreme significance for this study must be answered: how was it possible for an object such as the ark actually was, to guide the people by determining the road which they must follow through the trackless desert, until they reached their goal? To this question v. 33 b gives no answer whatsoever other than to imply that this was, of course, divine guidance, that in other words, there was some direct relationship between Yahwe and the ark and between this guidance by the ark and the fulfillment of Yahwe's covenant-obligation to Israel. More than this, however, this little half-verse does not tell.

Fortunately, however, one passage in the Bible sheds abundant light upon this question. It is the narrative in I Sam. 4–6 of the capture of the ark by the Philistines and of its experiences while in their possession, or rather of their experiences with it. A number of calamities which befell them just while the ark was among them raised the suspicion in the minds of the Philistines that, even though they had captured the ark, it was by no means as impotent as they had inferred, but was still a powerful deity, or in some way associated with a powerful deity, who could work his hostile will upon them even while in their midst in their very land. The continued presence of such a powerful and hostile deity among them was dangerous, and might, if too long protracted, threaten even their complete annihilation. It behooved them to rid themselves of the ark as speedily as possible, provided, of course, that it was really the powerful and hostile god that they suspected. But of this they were not altogether certain. After all, misfortunes similar to these had befallen them before, although seemingly not simultaneously, and not under just such conditions. It might be chance and no more, and the ark therefore might have no connection whatsoever with these calamities and their

coincidence. In such case it would be folly to lose for no reason whatever a trophy of victory so precious as the ark of Israel. Accordingly the Philistines resolved very naturally to put the ark to a test to determine whether it was in truth a deity, as they suspected, and, of course, the one who had brought these calamities upon them, or whether it was a mere inanimate and therefore powerless object, which could in no wise be responsible for their misfortune.

What was the test? They put the ark in a new wagon, drawn by cows which had never before been yoked. For if the ark was truly a powerful deity, it must be treated with all honor. For this same reason they gave it proper tribute, which they put in the wagon alongside of the ark. Thereupon they let the wagon, with the ark upon it and the cows pulling it, go and watched carefully to see which road it would take; for the test which they proposed was this, if the ark would take the road leading up to Beth Shemesh, i. e. back into the land of Israel, they would know that it was truly a god, indeed a powerful deity, who had brought all these calamities upon them, and of whom therefore they would be well rid. But if it did not take this road, but remained, no matter by what other road the cows might go, in the land of the Philistines, they would know that it was no deity at all, but only an inanimate object, which had no relation whatever to their misfortunes; and since it would still be in their own land, it would be easy for them to regain, or rather to keep possession of it. This was the test.

Now on the surface this test seems to have been just a mere matter of chance which road the cows would take. There were two or more roads leading away from Ekron, or whichever Philistine city was the last abiding-place of the ark, one of which led up to Beth Shemesh, and the other or others led in various directions through the Philistine country. The chances therefore were even, or two to one, or perhaps more, according to the number of roads leading through Philistia, that the cows would remain in Philistine country and the ark be pronounced an irresponsible, inanimate object. Such seems on the surface to have been the character of the test.

But just this was what the test was not. It was not a matter of chance at all. It should be noted first that these cows had never been yoked before, i. e. had never been trained to pull a wagon. Ordinarily, therefore, in this their first experience under the yoke, they would in all likelihood not pull together, but rather pulling unevenly and ofttimes against each other, the wagon would not move or would be pulled hither and thither without getting anywhere, certainly not as far as Beth Shemesh. In the second place, as v. 7 states explicitly, they were cows which had recently given birth and were now suckling their calves. The calves were shut up at home, so that they could not follow their mothers. The natural instinct of the cows, therefore, would have been to turn right around and go back to their calves. Manifestly the Philistines designedly made it as difficult as possible for the ark to reach Beth Shemesh. But, as v. 12 states in significant detail, the cows took the straight road along the highway to Beth Shemesh, lowing as they went along, but turning neither to the right nor to the left, until they came to the Israelite village. Now the lowing of the cows, mentioned explicitly, is significant. They were, of course, lowing for their young, presumably in answer to the lowing of the latter to them. It implies that their strong instinct was to turn around and go back to their calves, and that they would have done this, had they been able. But some power or force made this impossible for them, and drove them unerringly and irresistibly along the road which it had chosen. And it reached its appointed goal despite all these obstacles which the Philistines had purposely put in its way. This irresistible power or force was the ark, or emanated from the ark. The test proposed and executed by the Philistines therefore was the ability of the ark to select for itself a specified road leading to a fixed goal, and, in the face of their inexperience and natural unwillingness, to drive the cows pulling the wagon upon which it rested along this road of its own choosing until it should reach its goal. And seeing the final outcome of the test, which they had themselves proposed, the Philistines were satisfied that this ark was indeed the cause

of all their misfortunes, and were happy to be thus rid of this powerful and dangerous deity.

Here then is a specific case, recorded in the Bible, and unquestionably of great antiquity, of the ark selecting the road it wanted to go, and driving its bearers, or whatever means of locomotion may have been employed, irresistibly along this road.[25]

Now exactly some such procedure as this is implied in Num. 10. 33 b. However, since cows or oxen are domestic animals comparatively rare in the desert, and since likewise transportation by means of wagons is rendered difficult, if not practically impossible, by the character of the desert terrain, we must picture the ark as carried along upon the shoulders of bearers properly qualified for that task. But it was not these bearers nor their leader who determined the direction which the ark should take, but it was the ark itself, or the power resident within the ark, which discharged this function.[26] These facts, and, as we shall establish, the

[25] Interesting reminiscences of this tradition are preserved in the Midrash and show that the Rabbis of old had a strong feeling for the original meaning of the narrative of I Sam. 6. *Bammidbar Rabba* XXI, 12 tells that when the Philistines were about to put the ark in the wagon, it raised itself up and set itself upon the wagon. And IV, 19 tells that the ark was able of old to carry its carriers as well as itself, that, in other words, it could drive its carriers along the road which it wished to go.

[26] This concept is by no means uncommon in Semitic religious practice and folk-lore. According to Macrobius (*Saturnalia*, I, 23, 10) " the Syrians used to worship the sun, under the name of Jove, whom they called Δία Ἡλιουπολίτην, with most elaborate ceremonies in the city known as Heliopolis... For an image of the Heliopolitan god was carried about in a litter, just as the images of the gods are borne in the celebration of the Circensian games, and many nobles of the province, with shaven heads and having practiced chastity for a long time, would carry it, and would be borne along by the divine spirit, not by their own volition but just as if the god was driving his bearers."

In quite the same manner, according to Lucian (*De Dea Syra*, 36f. [ed. Jacobitz, 358]) the image of Apollo at Hierapolis would drive its priestly bearers backward and forward, hither and thither, and by the direction in which it would drive them it would foretell future events. It would likewise at times lift itself from off their shoulders and rise into the air and remain suspended there for some time entirely of its own accord.

In modern Semitic folk-practice similar powers are frequently ascribed to the corpses of saints or other holy persons, especially while being borne to their

manifestly important rôle which the ark played in the narrative of the Book of the Covenant, compel us to consider the history of the ark in full detail.

last resting-places. Thus Klunzinger relates (*Upper Egypt, Its People and Products*, 393), "The body of such saints, when on its way to its last resting-place, has such a mysterious power on those that carry the bier that they can do nothing of themselves, but are compelled to follow a certain route, and bury the saint in whatever spot he may choose. An old negro slave in Kosseir, well-known for his long, harmless, pious life, having died towards evening, would not, on any account, have himself buried the same evening, and the bearers, in spite of all their shouting of *la ilah ill Allah*, could not bring the corpse to the graveyard. It remained, therefore, all night in the house (though the people do not like to keep a corpse a night), watched by a multitude of people praying. Next morning also it could not be buried for a long time; the blessed dead compelled the bearers to go through all the streets of the town, till at last, on the recommendation of the more enlightened governor, the higher officials carried the bier to the grave; even the Turkish soldiers could not accomplish it. The whole town was in uproar. The Mohammedans say the angels exercise this coercive power, the Christians believe it is the devil. Deceit or practical joking is not always to be surmised in such cases; on the occasion just mentioned almost the whole male population tried what they could do, and among them many staid and serious men. It is the firm belief of these people that the deceased saint or the angels cause the pressure, and then they feel it too. Even in Cairo such occurrences are common as well as in the other parts of the country. Among the ancient Egyptians also the processions of the images of their deities did not direct themselves at pleasure, but by divine inspiration."

Another instance of this same belief and practice, recorded by Lane (*An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, 479 [edition of 1890]) illustrates well the supposed power of the corpse to resist being carried elsewhere than whither it wishes to go, as well as the manifestly modern belief that it is possible to deceive the corpse, if this be advisable. "Very often, it is said, a welee impels the bearers of his corpse to a particular spot... The following anecdote, describing an ingenious mode of puzzling a dead saint in a case of this kind, was related to me by one of my friends... Some men were lately bearing the corpse of a welee to a tomb prepared for it in the great cemetery on the north of the metropolis; but, on arriving at the gate called Báb en-Nasr, which leads to this cemetery, they found themselves unable to proceed farther from the cause above mentioned. 'It seems,' said one of the bearers, 'that the sheykh is determined not to be buried in the cemetery of Báb en-Nasr: and what shall we do?' They were all much perplexed: but being as obstinate as the saint himself, they did not immediately yield to his caprice. Retreating a few paces, and then advancing with a quick step, they thought, by such an impetus, to force the corpse through the gateway; but their efforts were unsuccessful; and the same experiment they repeated in vain several times. They then placed the bier on the ground to rest and consult; and one of them, beckoning away his comrades to a distance beyond the hearing of the dead saint, said to them, 'Let us take up

IV

The Ark of Yahwe

In recent years this subject has been repeatedly investigated by eminent Biblical scholars, and the conclusions reached by them have been presented in a number of notable monographs.[27] In general each monograph demonstrates satisfactorily the shortcomings and inadequacies of all previously presented hypotheses with regard to the origin, history and

the bier again, and turn it round quickly several times till the sheykh becomes giddy; he then will not know in what direction we are going, and we may take him easily through the gate.' This they did; the saint was puzzled as they expected; and quietly buried in the place which he had so striven to avoid."

Commenting upon a similar instance in modern Palestinian folk-lore, Canaan (" Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, VII [1927], 24, note 5) says, " In many cases the first miracle performed by a *welî* after his death is in the way his body behaves while carried for burial. It may get so heavy that those carrying the coffin (*suḥliyeh*) have to stop and put down their load. On other occasions it becomes very light or even ... may fly from their shoulders." (Cf. also Canaan, " Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, IV [1924], 52.) This is precisely the same procedure as that of the afore-mentioned statue of Apollo at Hierapolis.

An especially interesting and significant instance of this particular superstition is cited by Certeux and Carnoy (*L'Algérie Traditionnelle*, 110); " Before dying Sidi Mohammed ben Alya had indicated his tomb, at the spot called Ṛerizem-el-Hotob. But the camel, which carried his corpse in a kind of palanquin, ambled in the direction of Temad, without either cries or blows being able to turn it from its course. Piously, therefore, a new decision of the marabout was assumed, and he was buried at Temad."

Other instances of this superstition are cited by Kelly (*Syria and the Holy Land*, 20) and Jaussen (*Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, 105). That it was not merely corpses that were thought to possess this power, but that it might be inherent in any holy object, may be inferred from a tradition recorded by Dapper (*Asia*, I, 30b, edition of 1681) that on one occasion at Damascus oxen were unable to move a wagon containing holy earth, impliedly because it was contrary to the will of the saint or holy power associated with that earth. (Cf. also Snouck-Hurgronje, *Mekka*, II, 65.)

[27] The most important of these monographs which have appeared during the present century are Dibelius, *Die Lade Jahves* (1906); Gunkel, " Die Lade Jahves ein Thronsitz," *ZMR*, 1906; Sevensma, *De Ark Gods*, 1908 (not accessible to me); Arnold, *Ephod and Ark* (1917); Hartmann, " Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, XXXVII (1917–1918), 209–245; Gressmann, *Die Lade Jahves*, 1920; Budde, " Ephod und Lade," *ZAW*, XXXIX (1922), 1–42; Torczyner, " Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," in *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 219–297.

character of the ark and its contents and related objects, and then proceeds to advance a more or less new hypothesis, the weaknesses of which in turn are exposed with equally cogent arguments by the monograph next appearing. All these monographs deal, as a matter of course, with practically the same Biblical evidence, although quite naturally they stress the importance of different points, and thus arrive at their divergent conclusions. Each hypothesis, it is generally admitted, has some measure of truth; and yet not one has been found altogether convincing and acceptable. This is apparently due to one fundamental fallacy underlying the argument and conclusions of most, if not all of these scholars. It is that almost unconsciously they take it for granted that the ark was exactly the same thing, or was conceived of in exactly the same manner, throughout its entire history, at the end thereof as at the beginning, and that therefore the conclusions to be drawn with regard to it from the picture of the ark, with its two cherubim and other equipment, in the Priestly Code and other late, post-exilic writings, have quite the same significance for the history of the ark and its origins as has the evidence of the earliest records of the ark in Biblical literature. Particularly Dibelius, Gressmann and Torczyner have been led far astray by their failure to guard themselves sufficiently against this fallacy.

One fact of far-reaching significance must be kept carefully in mind here, viz. that in all likelihood the ark had disappeared by the time of the Babylonian Exile, and was therefore not present in the second Temple. This is to be inferred from the fact that in his detailed plan for the rebuilt Temple Ezekiel makes no provision whatsoever for the ark or for a place for it.[28] Even more significant is the explicit statement of Jer. 3. 16, generally recognized by Biblical scholars as a passage of post-exilic composition inserted into its present position, "It shall be when ye shall have multiplied and become fruitful in the land, that in those days—it is the

[28] So far as I can determine, Volz (*Die biblischen Altertümer*, 11 f.) was the first to call attention to the significance of Ezekiel's lack of provision for the ark in his plan of the rebuilt Temple.

oracle of Yahwe—the people shall say no more, 'the ark of the covenant of Yahwe,' nor shall it come into their thought, nor shall they remember it, nor shall they miss it, nor shall they make another."[29] Such an utterance would be altogether impossible were the ark, or even an ark, a substitute for the original ark, extant in the Temple. Furthermore I Mac. 1. 21–23 tells that when Antiochus invaded Jerusalem he carried away from the Temple "the golden altar, and the candlestick for the light and all its accessories, and the table of the shewbread, and the cups, and the bowls, and the golden censers, and the veil, and the crowns, and the golden adornment on the façade of the Temple, and he scaled it off. Moreover, he took the silver, and the gold, and the choice vessels; he took also the hidden treasures which he found."[29a] Manifestly Antiochus carried off every object of value upon which he could lay his hand, penetrating for this purpose as far as the very holy of holies. He even carried off the veil which separated this from the body of the Temple. Golden objects seem to have excited his cupidity especially. It is therefore extremely significant that in this long list of the holiest utensils in the Temple cult, the ark, which, according to the tradition of the Priestly Code, was covered with the golden *kapporet*, is not mentioned, particularly since, with the removal of the veil, it would have been exposed to view. There can be only one conclusion from this, viz. that Antiochus found no ark in the Temple. Significantly too, despite the explicit legislation for the ark in the Pentateuch, the Rabbis of old were apparently aware that the ark was not present in the second Temple.[30] This evidence seems to be cumulative and conclusive.

[29] For a quite different translation of this important and oft-cited passage, cf. Arnold, *op. cit.*, 73, and Budde's criticism thereof, *op. cit.*, 19 ff.

[29a] Cf. also II Mac. 5 15 f. and Josephus, *Antiquities*, XII, 5, 3.

[30] Cf. Lauterbach, "A Significant Controversy between the Sadducees and the Pharisees," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 184 and the references to Rabbinic literature cited by him there. This tradition that the ark originally stood upon the sacred stone, As-Sakhra, in the Temple of Solomon, that it had, in fact, been placed there by Joshua at Moses' command, and that it remained there until God became angry at Israel, and the Temple, i.e. undoubtedly the first Temple, was destroyed, whereupon the ark disappeared, passed over to Islam, and is recorded by As-Suyuti (cf. the translation of Reynolds, 108 and 118).

And other considerations of far-reaching significance for the history of the ark corroborate this conclusion. We may be sure that the ark was not present in the second Temple not merely because it had disappeared after the destruction of the first Temple, presumably having been carried away to Babylon as a trophy of victory, but for another reason as well, because, apparently, even before the destruction of the first Temple the ark had lost much of its original significance and had fallen somewhat into disrepute. For certainly, if the ark had continued to enjoy uninterruptedly the reputation which it enjoyed unquestionably as late as the time of David, and which is again attributed to it both in the Priestly Code and in the account of the dedication of Solomon's Temple in I Ki. 8, it goes without saying that Ezekiel must have made some provision for it in his plan of the rebuilt Temple, or have taken some cognizance of it, or at least of its absence. Instead he ignored it in the most off-hand manner, quite as if to him the ark were something of no importance whatsoever, of which he did not even think, when he made his plans for the rebuilt Temple.

This too is the undeniable implication of Deut. 1. 33 and 42. For, as we have seen, v. 33 is directly dependent upon Num. 10. 33 b, and the reference to the ark and its leadership of Israel there has obviously been purposely suppressed here. This is the case also in v. 42. For this verse is, in turn, dependent upon Num. 14. 42 and 44. This latter verse says explicitly that when Israel sought to enter Palestine from the south, in the battle with the native inhabitants of the land the ark of the covenant of Yahwe and Moses did not move from the camp; they were therefore not present in the actual battle, and this, it is implied, and in fact actually stated in v. 42, was the reason for Israel's defeat. It is significant that in v. 44 the ark is mentioned first and Moses second, quite as if, what is undoubtedly the actual implication, the ark was the initiating force and Moses were but the secondary, dependent and attendant functionary. In other words, the ark is represented here as playing exactly the same rôle as in I Sam. 4–6, while Moses plays the rôle of attendant priest,

just as do the sons of Eli in I Sam. 4. Just because of this specific rôle which the ark plays in v. 44, Moses is represented in v. 42 as warning Israel not to engage in battle, for Yahwe will not be present with them, and therefore they are sure to lose the battle; the presence of the ark in the army of Israel is synonymous with the presence of Yahwe there, and is the sure guarantee of victory, precisely as is implied in I Sam. 4. But in Deut. 1. 42 all mention of the ark is scrupulously suppressed, and only the colorless statement is left, that Yahwe will not be present with Israel in the battle, a statement which is, of course, the same as that of Num. 14. 42, but lacks entirely the amplifying and concrete statement of Num. 14. 44.[30a]

Undoubtedly the suppression of all reference to the ark by the author of Deut. 1 was not accidental, but was conscious and motivated by some definite reason. It is obvious that for the author of Deut. 1, who certainly lived and wrote in the early post-exilic period, i. e. in the early period of the second Temple, the ark did not enjoy the same reputation nor play the same rôle as it did in the early period of Israel's history, at least up to the time of David. Nay more, to him the ark must have been more than an object of indifferent significance; he must have had some strong and positive objection to it, for otherwise he would not have been so scrupulous in suppressing all reference to it. To him it must have seemed an object which did not accord at all with the pure, uncontaminated worship of Yahwe as he understood and interpreted it. Manifestly he put it in the same category as he put Hobab or Jethro and the "tent of meeting" and the oracle of Yahwe associated with it in the Kenite Document, all reference to which in the original narrative in Ex. 18, as we have seen,[31] he likewise suppressed in vv. 9–18 of this same chapter. Clearly he regarded the ark of the covenant of Yahwe, just as he regarded "the tent of meeting" and the oracle of Yahwe connected with it and the rôle of Hobab in relation thereto, as not of true and proper Yahwistic

[30a] Note also that according to Deut. 23. 15, likewise a post-exilic passage, Yahwe is present in the military camp of Israel, but, very significantly, here too His presence is not symbolized by the ark.

[31] "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 133, note 121.

origin. He must have looked upon them all as non-Yahwistic, and therefore as idolatrous, or at least as semi-idolatrous, in origin and character. This conception of them, and this alone, would account adequately for his manifestly purposed suppression of all reference to them. We can easily understand why he should have looked upon the "tent of meeting" and its oracle and upon Hobab's connection with them as non-Yahwistic; it was because of their Kenite, and to him therefore non-Israelite origin. Manifestly to him only that could be specifically Yahwistic which was distinctively Israelitish and of independent, unqualified Mosaic origin. But why should he have put the ark, specifically designated as "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe," in the same category? This question is, obviously, of great moment for this study. The answer will be given in due time.

It is clear from all this evidence that at a certain period in Israel's history the ark lost very much of its original significance and reputation, and came to be looked upon with little or no regard, at least by a considerable and influential group of Israel's religious thinkers and spokesmen. It is clear too that this decline in the reputation of the ark must have begun in the pre-exilic period, for otherwise Ezekiel would not have ignored it completely, nor would the author of Deut. 1, in the early post-exilic period, have suppressed all reference to it, nor the author of Jer. 3. 16, apparently, judging by the content of his message, a contemporary of, or else, at the latest, living but shortly after Zechariah, have pictured the ark as not present in the second Temple nor as being needed or desired there. This process of decline in the reputation of the ark, due probably to a growing conviction that it was not of true Yahwistic origin, must have begun during the period before the exile. Just when and how this conviction arose, we shall endeavor to determine.

Certainly the oldest Biblical references to the ark[32] agree absolutely in representing it as discharging two specific functions, that of choosing the way which it wished to go,

[32] Num. 10. 33b, 35–36; 14. 44; Jud. 20. 27b (perhaps a late, harmonistic gloss); I Sam. 46; II Sam. 6. 1–20; 11. 11; 15. 24–29.

and that of going into battle with the army of Israel and giving it victory over its enemies. Even II Sam. 15. 24–29 seems to imply that Zadok brought the ark from Jerusalem in order that it might accompany David upon his flight and thus assure him of ultimate victory over his rebellious son.[33] These two important functions the ark was able to discharge, all the evidence indicates, because of a positive divine power resident in it. And all these earliest sources agree in identifying this divine power with Yahwe. Of this more later.

The next Biblical reference to the ark in point of time, seemingly, is Deut. 10. 1–5. This passage is generally recognized as not an integral part of the original Deuteronomic Code, but as belonging to the secondary introduction thereto; it was therefore in all likelihood composed either during the exile or, what is more probable, in the early post-exilic period.[34] The passage represents Moses as making, at Yahwe's explicit command, a wooden ark or box, in which the second set of stone tablets with the ten commandments inscribed upon them, were to be deposited. This command Moses carried out punctiliously. It is certain, however, that this narrative is not original with this Deuteronomic writer, but was borrowed by him, perhaps with some characteristic modification, from a JE original. This fact is generally recognized by Biblical scholars. However, our present Biblical text contains no statement whatsoever of the original of this narrative. The usual claim of Biblical scholars is that this original account of the making of the ark by Moses must have stood in Ex. 33 immediately following v. 6, and that the ornaments of the people there mentioned must have provided the material from which the ark was made, or at least with which it was finished and decorated.[35] This hypothesis is plausible;

[33] Cf. Budde's very apposite discussion of the rôle of the ark in this passage; *op. cit.*, 24 f.

[34] This passage is unquestionably, as is generally recognized by Biblical scholars, not the work of the same Deuteronomic writer as the author of Deut. 1. Manifestly these two writers had different and even contradictory conceptions of and attitudes toward the ark.

[35] Cf. Gressmann, *op. cit.*, 22 ff.

certainly it has more to commend it than the parallel hypothesis that the "tent of meeting" was made from these ornaments.[36]

Actually the content of the narrative in Deut. 10. 1–5 seems to imply that the original narrative of the making of the ark by Moses, upon which it is dependent, stood rather in connection with Ex. 34. 1–5. For it tells of Yahwe's command to Moses to make the ark only in connection with and following the command to prepare the second set of stone tablets. Accordingly Moses makes the ark at the same time that he prepares the second tablets; he then ascends the mountain; Yahwe writes the ten commandments upon the second set of tablets and gives them back to Moses; Moses then returns to the camp and deposits the tablets in the ark, precisely as Yahwe had commanded him.[37] Just this must

[36] Cf. "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 119f.

[37] Deut. 10. 5 is of particular interest in this connection. It is self-apparent that the last words of the sentence, באשר צוני יהוה, modify ואשם, and not ויהיו שם, immediately preceding. These two words therefore disturb the connection and are manifestly a late insertion into the text. But they must have been inserted for some particular purpose. They can be translated only, "and they are there," and not at all "and they were there," for this last would have no meaning whatsoever. But translated "and they are there," they can have only one specific meaning and purpose. They serve as a direct and positive affirmation, almost, it would seem, in the face of a doubt or question, that the tablets of the Ten Commandments were still present in the ark in the days, not merely of the original Deuteronomic author of this verse, but also of the late glossator who inserted these words here. These words, therefore, constitute an affirmation both that there was, supposedly, an ark in the Temple in the days of this glossator, and that, as he believed implicitly, the two tablets were still deposited in it. This is, of course, the point of view of the late Priestly writers. This points to quite a late date for this gloss.

This same conclusion holds true with I Ki. 8. 8b. There the words ויהיו שם עד היום הזה are manifestly a very late gloss, expressing the strong belief of the glossator, and intended also to convince his readers, that the staves of the ark, and therefore, of course, the ark itself were present in the innermost part of the Temple, even though they could not be seen by the people at large, or, for that matter, by any one other than the high-priest, when he entered the holy of holies once a year, on Yom Kippur. But again the fact that this glossator too seems to have felt compelled to insist in this manner that the ark was still present in the Temple in his day, even though it could not be seen, indicates that he must have had to contend with a prevalent and persistent doubt of this, a doubt founded in all likelihood upon actual fact.

have been the full content of the narrative of which Ex. 34. 1–5 was the introduction, and of which these five verses alone survive. The remainder must have been suppressed either by the J 2 editors who incorporated a portion of the Kenite Document, as we have seen, with the J narrative at just this particular point, although for what reason they should have felt obliged to suppress this statement it is difficult to imagine. Or, perhaps more probably, it may have been suppressed by later Priestly editors in favor of their own, quite different account of the making of the ark and of the occasion for it and the purpose which it was to serve.

But while it is almost certain that the author of Deut. 10. 1–5 must have found the JE narrative of the making of the ark linked with Ex. 34. 1–5, it is by no means impossible that it may have been connected originally with Ex. 33. 6 also. For, as we have said, the ornaments here mentioned could not possibly have been used for the making of the "tent of meeting," but they may well have been employed in the making of the ark. Moreover, as we have shown,[38] Ex. 33. 7–11, or rather the Kenite nucleus of this passage, originally stood in the Kenite Document in the position which is now occupied by the secondary narrative of Moses with the shining face, in 34. 29 ff., and was transposed from this position and amplified into its present form by late J 2 editors. Manifestly therefore the account of the making of the "tent of meeting" could have had no primary connection with the incident recorded in 33. 6.

But equally 33. 5 b–6 has no connection whatsoever with, and even contradicts absolutely the statement of v. 4, that the people did not put on their ornaments. Nor have vv. 5 b–6 any apparent connection with vv. 1–3, nor with the main content of Ex. 32. In fact they seem to parallel, and therefore to contradict, the narrative of Ex. 32. For 32. 2–3 tells that the people had already stripped of their ornaments and that out of them Aaron had made the golden calf. Seemingly 33. 5 b–6 stands by itself without any apparent connection with anything that precedes or anything

[38] "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 121 ff.

that follows. And yet these verses obviously imply that out of the ornaments which the people stripped off Moses did make something. Moreover, not only 33. 7–11, but also, as we have seen,[39] vv. 12–23 were inserted into their present position by the J 2 editors who incorporated fragments of the Kenite Document with J. Consequently before this incorporation Ex. 33. 5 b—6 probably stood in immediate juxtaposition to 34. 1—5, with its original account of the making of the ark; or perhaps better, since, as we have seen, 33. 5 b—6 has no immediate connection with either the J or E narratives, strata of which are present in Ex. 32 and 33. 1 b–4, 33. 5 b–6 may have been connected with an account of the making of the ark, which was originally not related at all to the narrative in 34. 1–5, and which came only through editorial processes to have connection with this narrative.

The import of all this is self-apparent. As is recognized by almost all modern Biblical scholars, Ex. 35. 1–Num. 10. 28 are the work of Priestly writers and are therefore late. Consequently in the pre-exilic period Num. 10. 29 must have followed immediately upon Ex. 34. 35. Therefore the reference to the ark in Num. 10. 33 b followed in the pre-exilic form of the Hexateuch almost immediately after Ex. 33. 5 b 6. In Num. 10. 33 b the ark appears very abruptly and even startlingly. It is inconceivable that this mention of the ark should not have been preceded by some account of its making by Moses. And if, as we contend, and as we shall endeavor to demonstrate conclusively, Num. 10. 33 b was originally a part of the Book of the Covenant, then it would follow that the Book of the Covenant must have contained likewise an account of the making of the ark, and that accordingly Ex. 33. 5 b–6, which has no apparent connection with anything that precedes it immediately, or with either the J or E codes proper, was likewise originally a part of C.[39a]

Nay more, since the Book of the Covenant tells of the covenant established between Yahwe and Israel on the basis of a little code of "words," which were written by Moses

[39] *Ibid.*, 5 ff.

[39a] In v. 6 the last two words, מהר חורב, must be then the work of *RE*.

upon a scroll, and since this scroll was manifestly of primary importance as the concrete record and witness of this covenant, and therefore was presumably to be preserved most carefully, it is but natural to assume that the Book of the Covenant told of the making of the ark by Moses primarily to be the place of deposit of the sacred scroll of the covenant. This would mean, in turn, that the earliest form of the tradition that the ark was the depository of the sacred record of the covenant-"words," whether inscribed upon a scroll or upon stones, was contained in C, that it was C which first made of the old ark the ארון ברית יהוה, "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe," and that the later accounts of J, E, D and P developed out of this original. In such case then it would follow that to the authors of C the ark discharged two independent, and not easily reconcilable functions; on the one hand, it was the depository of the scroll of the covenant; on the other hand, it was, through the divine power resident in it, the guide of Israel through the desert. Manifestly this latter represents the older conception of the power and function of the ark, while the former is a conception new, secondary, and likewise original with C. Impliedly it represents a modification by the authors of C of the older conception of the ark, the beginning of that process of reinterpretation of the character and functions of the ark and of its eventual decline in reputation and regard, the culmination of which we have found in Ezekiel's silence with regard to the ark, in the suppression of all reference to it in Deut. 1. 33 and 42 and in the judgment pronounced upon it in Jer. 3. 16.

But it is equally certain that the late post-exilic period witnessed a significant revival of the prestige of the ark and of the rôle which it played in the religious theory and practice of Israel. For in the Priestly Code the ark is represented as the most holy object, the very center of Israel's religious life.[40] And the question naturally arises, why this revival? Moreover, since, as we have seen, the evidence is quite conclusive that there was no ark in the

[40] Ex. 25. 10–22.

second Temple, at least not in the century more or less immediately following its erection in the early post-exilic period, it follows that the Priestly writers probably had no direct and authentic knowledge of the original ark and its appearance. Undoubtedly they had valuable traditions which guided them in their plan of reconstruction of the ark, and these traditions must have fixed for them its general shape and character. But in the two hundred years, more or less, that must have intervened between the actual disappearance of the ark and the oldest Priestly account of it, even the most reliable traditions had doubtless become somewhat vague, and ample room was left therefore for considerable exercise of the imagination on the part of Priestly writers and for modification of old traditions with regard to the form and function of the ark in order to conform to and further Priestly purpose in thus reviving the institution and prestige of the ark.

Now in the Priestly Code the ark discharges two distinct functions, each absolutely unrelated to the other, but also equally unrelated to the significant functions which the ark was believed to discharge in the earliest period of its history. On the one hand the ark is still the receptacle for the two stone tablets upon which the Ten Commandments are inscribed. And on the other hand, the ark is now the throne of Yahwe, upon which He sits in divine solitude and majesty in the holy of holies, having taken up His permanent residence in Israel's midst; and there He meets with Israel, or rather with Israel's divinely appointed representative, the high-priest, on the one occasion in the year when the latter was permitted to enter into the divine presence. Seemingly this representation of the ark as the divine throne is something new and original with the Priestly Code, and does not accord at all with the earlier conceptions of the ark. Certainly the ark is not depicted as the divine throne or seat of Yahwe in a single authentic passage earlier than the Priestly Code or writings dependent upon this. There is therefore not the slightest ground for regarding this conception of the ark as of any great antiquity and historicity.

Moreover, it is clear that actually this conception of the ark as the throne of Yahwe is the only significant rôle which it plays in the scheme of the Priestly Code, and that its other role, as the receptacle of the tablets of the Decalogue, is of no practical significance whatever in this scheme, and is but a concession to or survival from older tradition.[41]

[41] In the Priestly Code the most general name for the ark is ארון העדות, "the ark of testimony." This name is, of course, derived from the traditional presence of the two tablets with the Ten Commandments upon them in the ark. The tablets themselves are called לחת העדות, "the tablets of testimony" (Ex. 31. 18; 32. 15; 34. 29), while the Ten Commandments inscribed upon them are designated as "the testimony," העדות (Ex. 25. 16, 21). The same term likewise designates both the ark and its contents (Ex. 16. 34; 30. 36; Num. 17. 19, 25). Consequently, because of the presence of the ark, with the stone tablets inside, in the sanctuary, the latter is called repeatedly either משכן העדות (Ex. 38. 21; Num. 1. 50, 53; 10. 11) or אהל העדות (Num. 9. 15; 17. 22, 23; 18. 2; II Chron. 26. 6), and the veil before the ark, separating the holy of holies from the rest of the tabernacle, is called פרכת העדות, "the veil of testimony" (Lev. 24. 3). The term עדות in these various combinations is found only in P or in Biblical writings later than P and composed under Priestly influence (cf., for example, Ps. 19. 8, where עדות is used in parallelism with תורה). It implies, of course, that the ark, or, more exactly, the two tablets present in the ark, upon which the Ten Commandments, the basis of Yahwe's covenant with Israel, were inscribed, were to bear testimony, testimony, of course, to the eternal covenant which Yahwe had established with Israel, or at least to the character of Yahwe's peculiar relations with Israel.

But while the term עדות, used either independently or in these various combinations, is found only in P, and with such frequency that it follows that the idea which it conveys must be basic in P, none the less it is certain, on the one hand, that the idea itself is not original in P, and, on the other hand, that in P it is used in an altogether conventional sense, and that the P writers had no adequate understanding of its true implication. For, were the ark, or rather the stone tablets within the ark, to serve as testimony of Yahwe's relations with Israel, it would follow that they must have been exhibited to Israel on occasion, either at some regular moment or moments during the year, or else whenever the need warranted. In just this manner the hairs from the beard of the prophet, kept in a silver case in the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem, are exhibited on each recurring 27th of Ramâḍân, the traditional *lêlatu-l-Qadr* (Canaan, "Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, IV [1924], 82, note 1). But just such exhibit of the tablets of testimony is not only forbidden by the Priestly conception of and attitude toward them, but likewise it was in all likelihood made impossible by a practical consideration.

For to the Priestly theologians the ark and its contents were sacrosanct. They stood in the holy of holies, which could never be entered by a lay

V

The Three Periods in the History of the Ark

This evidence establishes firmly that there were three distinct periods in the history of the ark and of the functions

Israelite, nor even by an ordinary priest or Levite, but only by the high-priest, and that only once a year, and only when he was enveloped in an artificial cloud of incense, prescribed purposely in order that he might not see too much during his very brief sojourn within the holy of holies (cf. Lauterbach, "A Significant Controversy between the Sadducees and the Pharisees," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 173–205). In other words, although the ark and its contents were to serve as testimony unto Israel, they never were and never could be exhibited to Israel in order to discharge this function. And in the second place, even had this function been permissible, it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not altogether impossible, because of the presence of the golden *kapporeṯ* upon the ark. It is true that nowhere is it stated that the opening of the ark was from above, and not from one of its sides, nor is there any direct evidence pointing to a definite answer to this question. Yet on the one hand, the presence of the staves, by which the ark was carried, would seem to preclude the possibility of the opening of the ark being in at least its two long sides, and on the other hand, the association in the detailed description of the ark in Ex. 25. 10–22 of the depositing of the two tablets of testimony in the ark and the placing of the *kapporeṯ* on top of the ark seems to imply that the tablets were deposited in the ark through an opening in the top, and not on the side, and that immediately after the tablets had been thus deposited, the *kapporeṯ* was placed upon this opening as a cover. This, too, is the implication of the statement in Ex. 40. 3 that the *kapporeṯ* covered, or stopped up the opening (וּסְכֹתָ; cf. Torczyner, *op. cit.*, 239–247) of the ark. It is likewise implied in the etymological significance of the term *kapporeṯ*; for whether "to cover" (and thereby at the same time "to conceal") be a primary or a secondary meaning of the stem כפר (*ibid.*, 246 and Gesenius-Buhl, 359), unquestionably the fundamental meaning of *kapporeṯ* was "covering"; and this meaning it could have best if conceived of, not merely as resting upon, but as actually filling up the opening in the top of the ark through which the contents had been inserted. But in such case the tablets of testimony within the ark could have been exhibited to the people, and thereby alone have discharged their function as testimony of the covenant, only if the heavy golden *kapporeṯ* were removed. And not only would this have been a difficult procedure, but it would have been wholly incompatible with the dominant conception of the Priestly Code, that the *kapporeṯ* was the seat of Yahwe, where He sat permanently enthroned in the midst of Israel.

It is clear, therefore, that the Priestly writers, despite the frequency of their use of the term, employed עדות only in a conventional sense, and with little understanding of or feeling for its literal meaning. Manifestly the conception of the Ten Commandments as the testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel was not original with them, but must have been borrowed by them from some older source or tradition.

which it was thought to discharge. In the period before the composition of the Book of the Covenant the ark was conceived of as leading Israel upon the march and selecting the way which it should go and of going into battle with the armies of Israel and giving it victory over its enemies. These functions it was thought to discharge because of a certain divine power resident in it. The presence of this divine power in the ark caused it to be popularly regarded as a deity, or perhaps better, as containing a deity, or if not this,

In all likelihood they coined the term עֵדוּת, for the ending וּת probably points to late, Aramaic influence in the formation of the word. The natural forerunner of the term in classical Hebrew was, in all likelihood, עֵדָה, or in the plural, as generally used, עֵדוֹת. This word is used by Deuteronomic writers (Deut. 4. 45; 6. 17, 20) as one of the common terms for law, although it does not refer to the Ten Commandments specifically. In Ps. 132. 12, however, it is coordinated with ברית. Etymologically the term עדה or עדות represents the laws as the testimony or testimonies of Yahwe's relations with Israel. And while it is true that Deuteronomy does not apply this term specifically to the Decalogue, none the less it is difficult to conceive of the origin of the term other than in relation to the Ten Commandments regarded as the primary testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. That this idea is characteristically Deuteronomic is proved by the injunction of Deut. 31. 26, that the Levitical priests shall deposit the " book of the law," i.e. Deuteronomy, represented as the legislation secondary to and supplementing the primary legislation of the Ten Commandments (cf. Deut. 4. 1–13 with 14 ff.) beside the ark as a witness unto Israel. Manifestly therefore to these Deuteronomic writers the ark itself was primarily the place of deposit of the basic testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. Accordingly Deuteronomic writers likewise represented Samuel as depositing the book or scroll, in which he had recorded for Israel the plan of royal government sanctioned by Yahwe, " before Yahwe," i.e. unquestionably before the ark (I Sam. 10. 25; for לפני יהוה in Deuteronomic writings equivalent to " before the ark," cf. Josh. 4. 13; 6. 8), forgetful of the fact that, according to the older tradition, the ark was at this time no longer in Samuel's custody. This motif Priestly writers seem to have borrowed from their Deuteronomic forerunners, when they represented various sacred objects as deposited beside the ark; cf. Ex. 16. 34; Num. 17. 19, 25.

Furthermore, it is altogether probable that the JE original of the Deuteronomic narrative of Moses' making the ark and depositing the two tablets in it, also conceived of the tablets as deposited there, not merely for safekeeping, but that they might serve as permanent witness of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. And it is quite probable that this was the conception even of C, that in it too the Book of the Covenant was represented as deposited in the ark, not only for safekeeping, but also to serve as a witness of Yahwe's covenant with Israel, made upon the basis of the " words " contained in the Book.

then at least as a kind of tribal or national fetish or cult-object.

In the period beginning apparently with the composition of the Book of the Covenant and continuing through that of secondary strata of the Book of Deuteronomy, the ark came to be regarded generally as the depository of the record of the laws basic to Yahwe's covenant with Israel, whether written down in the scroll of the Book of the Covenant, or inscribed upon the two tablets of stone of J, E, D and P. Moreover, as we have seen, toward the end of this period, the real, historical ark had not only disappeared in all likelihood, but it had also forfeited so much of its earlier reputation for power and sanctity that its absence was not even looked upon with regret.

And finally, in the third period of its history, the period represented by the Priestly Code, and not even by the earlier strata thereof, the Holiness and Torah strata, but rather by the later strata, the Grundschrift, so-called, and secondary strata of this, the ark, although traditionally and conventionally still thought of as the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, was none the less now regarded primarily as the throne of Yahwe, upon which, in the holy of holies, He sat permanently enthroned in the midst of Israel.

Manifestly these three conceptions of the ark and its functions have little or nothing in common, but represent three distinct developments more or less exclusive of and antagonistic to each other. These three conceptions of the ark and its functions go hand in hand with three different stages in the evolution of the conception of Yahwe in Israel. Unquestionably these different and evolving conceptions of the ark and its functions were the offshoots of just this changing and evolving conception of Yahwe.

A

THE SECOND PERIOD

As we have said, the second period in the history of the ark began apparently with the composition of the Book

of the Covenant. Certainly as late as the reign of David the ark was still popularly regarded in its old light, was still thought to go into battle with the armies of Israel and give them victory. For this reason the ark is represented in II Sam. 11. 11 as accompanying Joab and the army in the siege of Rabbat Ammon,[42] and for the same reason, as we have seen, Zadok and Ebiathar brought out the ark to accompany David upon his flight before Absalom.[43] How long this old conception of the ark and its functions may have continued to hold sway in popular thought, it is impossible to determine for lack of evidence bearing upon the rôle of the ark in the period intervening between the reign of David and the composition of the Book of the Covenant.[44]

During this period, however, the conception of Yahwe and His worship by Israel underwent serious and far-reaching modification. The Temple at Jerusalem was erected, to serve as the national sanctuary of Yahwe, now conceived of as

[42] Cf. Budde's very pertinent discussion of this passage (*op. cit.*, 21ff.) in refutation of Arnold's interpretation of it.

[43] II Sam. 15. 24ff. Cf. also Budde's discussion of this passage (*op. cit.*, 24ff.), again in refutation of Arnold.

[44] An inference with regard to this question may perhaps be drawn from a comparison of Num. 14. 42 and 44 with Deut. 1. 42ff. In the former account of Israel's battle with the native inhabitants of southern Palestine, the ark, symbolizing the presence of Yahwe, does not go into battle with Israel's army, and in consequence Israel is defeated. But, as we have already seen, this entire *motif* has been suppressed in the Deuteronomic version of this incident, and the ark is not mentioned. Since Num. 14. 40ff. is unquestionably J, we may perhaps infer that J at least preserved a lively reminiscence of the function of the ark as the symbol of Yahwe's presence and the guarantor of victory in battle, but that by Deuteronomic times this had either been forgotten completely or else, as we have suggested, a conscious attempt was made to root out this tradition of the ark from the religious belief of the people. Certainly the rôle played by the ark in the narratives of the crossing of the Jordan and the conquest of Jericho, in Josh. 3, 4 and 6, is a late and artificial reminiscence of the old conception of the ark as the divine power which indicated the road which Israel should take, on this occasion through the hitherto concealed and therefore entirely unknown bed of the Jordan (cf. 3. 4), and which likewise gave Israel victory in battle. These passages are all the work of late Deuteronomic and Priestly redactors (cf. Steuernagel's analysis of these chapters in his *Commentary*, in the Nowack *Handkommentar* series). They have therefore no independent value whatever for the determination of the history of the ark.

Israel's national god. We have seen[45] that the religious reformation in the reign of Asa was, in all likelihood, directed in part against the Temple at Jerusalem, still a comparatively recent institution in 899 B.C., and, in opposition to the Temple, aimed to revive the old "tent of meeting," intimately associated with the early religious history of Moses, the tribe of Judah and the Kenites, as the only proper and divinely appointed place and medium of worship of Yahwe by Israel. In this respect, of course, the reformation failed and the Temple at Jerusalem continued to be looked upon as the center of true Yahwe worship in Israel.

But that the Temple at Jerusalem was regarded at this time as the actual residence of Yahwe, is open to serious question. Certainly Elijah, at about 870 B.C., did not look upon the Temple in this light, but, in full accord with the principles which animated the reformation of Asa, a generation before his time, he thought of Yahwe as still dwelling upon the mountain in the desert, where those tribes which had escaped from Egypt under the leadership of Moses had first come into contact and entered into covenant with Him. It is obviously a matter of prime importance for the study of the history of the ark to determine just when the concept did arise that Yahwe had taken up His sole and permanent residence in the Temple.

At first glance the question seems simple of answer. Amos 1. 2 represents Yahwe as roaring from Zion and sending forth His voice from Jerusalem. The authenticity of this verse has been doubted by some scholars, but upon altogether uncertain grounds. Certainly the verse conceives of the Temple at Jerusalem as Yahwe's abiding-place. Is. 8. 18 b is even more explicit, for it speaks of Yahwe as "He who dwells upon Mt. Zion." The authenticity of this phrase too has been questioned by some scholars, but again their argument is inconclusive. And it is admitted by all that the contrast between the waters of Siloah and the Euphrates, i. e. between Yahwe and Assyria as the objects of Israel's faith and reliance, would be entirely without point, did it not imply a direct relationship

[45] "The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 123 ff.

between Yahwe and the Pool of Siloah, just below the Temple Mount, such a relationship as the sojourn of Yahwe in the Temple would suggest. This is probably the implication of Is. 28. 16 also. Likewise in Is. 1. 12 appearing before Yahwe in the Temple and treading down His courts, unquestionably imply the residence of Yahwe in the Temple at Jerusalem, provided of course that, as seems to be the case, the prophet has in mind only the Temple at Jerusalem, and not local shrines as well. Apparently too the popular expression. "Is not Yahwe in our midst?," in Mic. 3. 11, implies His residence in the Temple at Jerusalem; and this seems to be confirmed by the designation of Zion as "the mountain of the house" in the next verse.

But this seems to exhaust the list of passages in pre-Jeremian prophetic literature which point directly to the residence of Yahwe in the Temple at Jerusalem.[46] And it is

[46] I Ki. 8. 12f. might be cited as an exception to this statement, and particularly in the fuller form of the verses as emended according to LXX. It is usually contended by scholars that these verses are very old, the fragment of an ancient poem. Unquestionably in comparison with the setting, partly Deuteronomic and partly Priestly, in which these two verses occur, they are old. The fact too that, as the LXX version states, the poem, of which these verses are a fragment, was included originally in an old collection of poems, either a so-called "Book of Song," as the LXX text reads, or, as has been suggested by scholars, the Book of Yashar, points to a certain relative antiquity for the poem. But that the poem was actually of very great antiquity, and particularly that it actually goes back to Solomon, is doubtful. In the fuller form of the verses, as emended according to LXX, a contrast is drawn between Yahwe and the sun. Yahwe has set the sun in the heaven, but He Himself has chosen to dwell in darkness. This last, of course, refers to the concept that Yahwe dwelt within the *d'bir* of the Temple. The contrast between Yahwe and the sun is indeed strange and significant. Why it should have been made, and particularly at the time of the erection of the Temple, or even shortly thereafter, it is difficult to imagine. Yahwe is here represented as the lord and creator of the sun; the sun is His agent or instrument. Such a concept is not only not early, but it has a decidedly theological ring. We shall see shortly that as the result of natural, syncretistic processes, after the settlement of Israel in Palestine, Yahwe was gradually invested with the attributes of a solar deity, but that, beginning with the Deuteronomic reformation, a systematic attempt was made to divest Him of all solar attributes, and with this, of course, to represent Him as a truly universal deity, therefore the creator and lord of the sun as well as of all other phenomena of the universe. These verses smack so

difficult indeed to avoid the impression that this list is singularly small and inconclusive. For had the idea that Yahwe actually dwelt solely and permanently in the Temple been firmly rooted in the belief of the people in the days of Amos, Hosea and particularly Isaiah, there would have been innumerable occasions to refer to it explicitly. Consequently the manifest paucity of these references raises a serious doubt with regard to the degree to which this idea had at this time spread and taken deep root in the belief and practice of the people.

And this doubt is confirmed by a number of very serious considerations. Is. 29. 3 pictures Yahwe as camping about Jerusalem and besieging it; and only with difficulty can this picture be made to conform to the idea of Yahwe dwelling permanently within the Temple. Is. 31. 4 is even more explicit and significant in this regard, for it describes Yahwe as descending to wage war against Mount Zion. Necessarily we must ask, descending from where? And to this question Mic. 1. 2, 3, 12 furnish the clear answer; Yahwe comes forth from His heavenly temple or palace and descends upon the earth, so that the mountains melt beneath Him and the valleys are cleft asunder; and with Him evil descends against the gate of Jerusalem. This too seems to be the implication of Hos. 5. 14, that Yahwe will desert Israel and Judah and return to His place, i. e., presumably, heaven. Moreover, with significant frequency and regularity the J code represents Yahwe as coming down to earth to establish contact with mortals, whether it be to observe the Tower of Babel and to scatter the people and confound their speech,[47] or to confer with Moses in the sight of all the people.[48] Manifestly the implication here is that Yahwe dwells in heaven and descends

strongly of this Deuteronomic theology that it is practically impossible to ascribe an earlier origin to them. They apply perfectly to the second Temple and its dedication, but not at all to the first Temple. We can not therefore interpret these two verses as indicative of an early, pre-Deuteronomic belief that Yahwe actually resided in the Temple at Jerusalem.

[47] Gen. 11. 5, 7; cf. Gen. 18. 21; Ex. 3. 8.

[48] Ex. 19. 11, 18, 20; 33. 9; 34. 5; Num. 11. 25; 12. 5; LXX to Deut. 31. 15.

only occasionally to commune with mortals, and especially with Israel, either to reveal His law and will unto them or to visit His wrath upon them.

Here then we have two apparently contradictory and mutually exclusive concepts of Yahwe's dwelling-place, both seemingly current in the same period, and both even finding forceful expression in the utterances of the same two prophets, Isaiah and Micah. Is it possible that these two conflicting concepts were satisfactorily harmonized in the belief of the people; in other words, could the people have conceived of Yahwe at one and the same time as dwelling in heaven and likewise in the Temple at Jerusalem in their very midst? Is. 6 suggests the answer, and in a manner of utmost significance for this study.

This stirring vision represents the young prophet as beholding Yahwe seated upon a lofty throne in the Temple,[49] surrounded by a number of attendant angels, or winged, divine creatures. It is not immediately clear whether the narrative implies that Yahwe dwells permanently in the Temple, though ordinarily invisible to mortals, and only on this one particular occasion permits Himself to be seen by the young prophet, or whether it implies that Yahwe had just entered the Temple when the prophet beheld Him. The former is the traditional and almost universally accepted interpretation. In fact the latter seems not to have occurred to any one. Yet a moment's thought shows that the picture here of Yahwe in the Temple is not at all that which is general in Biblical literature. Yahwe sits enthroned here apparently not in the innermost recesses of the Temple, in the *debir* or the "holy of holies," in solitary grandeur, but out in the body of the Temple, so that the train of His robe fills the entire Temple.

Moreover, the reference to the quaking threshold seems to imply that Yahwe had just passed over it through the door of the Temple; therefore the threshold still quakes; for

[49] For a full and clear discussion of the question whether Isaiah saw Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem or in the heavenly temple, as Jewish tradition and also a few modern commentators would have it, and convincing proof that it was the Temple at Jerusalem, cf. Gray, *Isaiah*, I, 105 f. (*International Critical Commentary* series).

the passage can scarcely mean that the threshold quaked permanently because Yahwe dwelt within the Temple. Manifestly the picture here implies one of two things, either that Yahwe had just come forth into the body of the Temple from the "holy of holies" in the innermost part of the Temple, in which He resided permanently, or that He had just entered the Temple from without, coming in over the threshold, which quaked at His majestic passing; in this latter case coming down, of course, from heaven where He was thought to have His true and permanent abode. There can not be the least doubt as to which of these two implications is correct. Nowhere in Biblical literature or in ancient Jewish tradition do we find the slightest trace of a belief that Yahwe ever came forth from the "holy of holies" to take His place in the body of the Temple. But we have had a number of references in Biblical writings of this very period speaking of Yahwe's descent from heaven. And the J code in particular tells explicitly of Yahwe's descent from heaven either on the top of Mt. Sinai, to reveal the Decalogue, or at the very door of the tabernacle to commune with Moses. Unquestionably the implication of this narrative is that Yahwe has just descended from heaven, accompanied by His train of heavenly attendants, and has just entered the Temple through the open gate, so that the threshold is still quaking at the moment when the prophet beholds Yahwe.

And if this interpretation of this interesting narrative be correct, it suggests the answer to our question as to how it was possible to conceive of Yahwe as dwelling in heaven and on occasion descending therefrom, yet at the same time being present in the Temple at Jerusalem in such manner that the people could believe that Yahwe was in their midst, that Amos could speak of Yahwe as roaring from Zion and sending forth His voice from Jerusalem, and that Isaiah could personify Yahwe as the waters of Siloah. It seems to imply that Yahwe's true dwelling-place was in heaven, but that upon some regular annual occasion He descended therefrom and entered the Temple and there He sat enthroned for a time surrounded by His heavenly host. And besides this He could, upon

special occasions, descend from heaven, either to commune with His people through His chosen servants or to visit His divine wrath upon them. What could have been the regular, annual occasion of Yahwe's descent from heaven and entrance into the Temple?

The chapter apparently gives not the slightest indication of the particular occasion of this vision. The natural and customary inference is that it was upon no particular occasion, but merely a chance occurrence that the young Isaiah, happening in the most ordinary manner to be in the Temple, beheld this august vision. Yet it is self-evident that the entire incident has more point and force if it is thought to have happened upon a certain particular occasion, an occasion directly related in some way to the content of the vision and its import to the youthful prophet, rather than if it had happened at a chance, insignificant moment.[50]

[50] It is self-evident that I Ki. 22. 19ff. presents a close parallel to Is. 6. In both the prophet sees a vision of Yahwe enthroned and attended by heavenly beings. And in both passages a message comes to the prophet from the Deity, designed to bring about the destruction of the object against whom the vision is directed, in the one case Ahab, the king, in the other case the entire nation of Israel. This parallelism is so close and striking that it is impossible to escape the conclusion of direct dependence of the one upon the other. Nor can there be any question that Is. 6 is the original and I Ki. 22. 19ff. the dependent vision. This would imply, of course, that I Ki. 22. 19ff. being dependent upon Is. 6, must be later than 740 B.C., and in all likelihood later by not a few years; accordingly it must be secondary in I Ki. 22, as quite a number of authoritative Biblical scholars have maintained (cf. Kittel, *Commentary*, in Nowack's *Handkommentar* series, 174). This conclusion is corroborated by one consideration of much importance for this study. Does I Ki. 22. 19ff., like Is. 6, envision Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem or in heaven? Unquestionably the latter. For, on the one hand, it would have been altogether incongruous for an official, professional prophet of the Northern Kingdom during the reign of Ahab to have envisioned Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem. Moreover, a moment's thought shows that this is no real vision, actually beheld by the prophet with ordinary sight, as that in Is. 6 undoubtedly was, but instead it is either a literary, fictitious vision, or, at the most, a psychical vision, something which the prophet saw, or believed that he saw, not with his physical, but only with his mind's eye, as it were. This is proved by the preceding vision in v. 17, where the prophet also sees, and this certainly only in a psychical state, all Israel leaderless and scattered. From this it is clear that the dependence of I Ki. 22. 19ff. upon Is. 6, while real, is so only in external

In a very interesting passage the Talmud[51] records the surprising fact that the Temple at Jerusalem was so located and built that on the two annual equinoctial days the first rays of the rising sun would shine directly through the eastern gate. Considerable evidence, to be gathered from a great variety of sources, shows that this eastern gate was kept fast closed all through the year, but was opened on these two particular days for just this especial purpose. The entrance of these first rays of the rising sun upon the two equinoctial days through the eastern gate and directly into the very heart of the Temple, was thought to symbolize the coming of Yahwe and His presence within the Temple, at least on those days. For this reason the day of the fall equinox was celebrated in ancient Israel as the New Year's Day. It was accordingly the day when Yahwe was thought to sit in the midst of His heavenly court and administer justice and decide the destinies of Israel, and perhaps of other nations also, for the ensuing year.

It was the coming of the first rays of the rising sun on the mornings of the two equinoctial days, and especially of the fall equinox, that was known as the coming of the *kebod Yahwe*, "the glory of Yahwe." Ezek. 43. 2 ff. gives the most concrete picture of this. On the New Year's Day the prophet sees in his vision the *kebod Yahwe*, or as he calls it there, the *kebod 'elohe Yisra'el*, coming from the east, with a sound like the noise of mighty waters, and as it comes along the earth is lit up by its radiance.[52] He sees

circumstances in the framework of the vision, and not at all in its inner concepts and content. This consideration likewise makes it certain that Yahwe is here envisioned enthroned, not in the Temple at Jerusalem, as in Is. 6, but in heaven. This is, of course, a concept frequently alluded to in late Biblical passages, such as Is. 66. 1; Job. 2. 1. This fact too corroborates the conclusion that I Ki. 22. 19 ff. is late.

[51] Jer. Erubin, V, 22 c.

[52] מכבודו. For כבוד = "radiance," cf. Is. 10. 16 f., where כבדו stands, on the one hand, in parallelism with אור ישראל, and on the other hand, in contrast with יקד כיקוד אש; Zech. 2. 9, where Yahwe declares that He will be a wall of fire (חומת אש) round about the city (of course in order to protect it against danger from without) and radiance (כבוד) within (i.e. shining benignantly and without harm upon its inhabitants); Is. 60. 1 ff., "Arise, shine, for thy light (i.e. Yahwe)

it approach the Temple and enter by the eastern gate and take up its permanent residence within the Temple. There-

is come, and the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe* has risen (like the sun, זרח) upon thee. Behold, darkness covereth the earth, and deep darkness the nations; but upon thee doth Yahwe rise (like the sun, יזרח), and His radiance (or His *kabod*, i.e. the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, which amounts to the same thing) is revealed (or hath revealed itself) unto thee. And nations shall go toward thy light (i.e. Yahwe), and kings toward thy radiant sunrise" (literally, "toward the radiance or brilliance of thy sunrising"). The parallelism here shows clearly that this is but a poetic equivalent for the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, i.e. for Yahwe represented by the first rays of the rising sun. Moreover, the background of the picture here is the celebration of the interesting ceremonies of the *simḥat bet haš'ebah*, in connection with the Succoth-festival (cf. Sukkah, V). Until the time of Ezra, and even for a time thereafter, this was the old New Year's Day celebration (cf. my "The Three Calendars of Ancient Israel," *HUCA*, I [1924], 22–58). Unquestionably the sunrise here referred to, correlated with the manifestation of Yahwe's presence, is the sunrise upon the day of the fall equinox, the New Year's Day. Is. 59. 19 likewise correlates the radiance of Yahwe, or the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, with the east, the place of sunrise, while at the same time, and singularly enough, it correlates the "name of Yahwe," likewise a manifestation of the Deity, with the west. Furthermore, Ex. 16. 10 (belonging to P2, and therefore coming from the late post-exilic period) represents Israel, but recently emerged from Egypt and marching eastward through the desert, looking towards the desert, i.e. of course towards the east, and beholding the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*.

In all these passages כבוד, standing by itself, has unquestionably the meaning "radiance," or else, used in the technical term *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, is obviously associated with the radiance of the first rays of the rising sun upon the day of the fall equinox, the New Year's Day. Consequently in this compound term כבוד could be best and most literally translated "radiance" of Yahwe. Accordingly we must translate Is. 6. 3 (and with it, of course, the dependent passage Ps. 72. 19) "the whole earth is filled with His radiance." Likewise Ps. 57. 6, 12; 108. 6, "Be high above the heavens, O God; over all the earth be Thy radiance"; and Ps. 113. 4, "Exalted above all nations is Yahwe; His radiance is over the heavens." Also in Is. 4. 5 כבוד must either be translated "radiance," or, perhaps better be regarded as a contraction of the fuller expression *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*; for here too the background of the picture is the characteristic Priestly representation of the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, a flaming apparition, visible to Israel at night, but in form subdued, and therefore harmless to the vision, either by the darkness of the night, or, as here, because enveloped in smoke, but during the day enveloped in the cloud, and therefore itself invisible to Israel (cf. Ex. 24. 15–18; 40. 34–38). Perhaps also in Is. 24. 23 כבוד should be translated "radiance," and the picture here be contrasted with that of Ex. 24. 10. Not improbably also in Is. 30. 27 כָּבֵד should be translated "radiant" or "gleaming." The passage is difficult indeed, and neither ancient versions nor modern commentators have been able to make anything satisfactory out of it. For כבד משאה LXX seems to have read בְּכָבוֹד אֲשֶׁרֶת ושמחו. And since Targum paraphrases the end of the same verse ושמחה כאשא אבלא,

fore the prophet is charged to see that henceforth the eastern gate is kept closed forever, i. e., never again to be reopened, as formerly, on the two annual equinoctial days. The old ceremony of the opening of the gates for the day, and the solemn closing of them at the end of the day's ceremonies, the prophet very manifestly seeks to abrogate. This is, of course, because he is fully aware of the original idolatrous rites connected with the worship of the sun at this open eastern gate,[53] and in order to counteract the impression that they have aught to do with the pure worship of Yahwe. But he has also a second motive in thus prescribing that this eastern gate must be kept closed forever; thereby he symbolizes concretely to the people of Israel that Yahwe is now actually dwelling permanently in their midst, that He is there, in the Temple, no longer merely upon the New Year's Day, but throughout the entire year, at all times, permanently.

But while Ezekiel thus makes extensive use of the idea and ceremonial of the coming of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* into the Temple[54] at Jerusalem on the New Year's Day, it is by no

we must infer that LXX probably understood כבוד here as meaning "radiance," like that of a consuming fire. Certainly the "light of the seven days," in v. 26 refers to the illuminations in the Temple and throughout the entire city, and in fact through the whole land of Palestine, during the seven days of the ceremonies of the *simḥaṯ beṯ haŝo'ebah*, i. e. the seven days of the Succoth-festival; and v. 29 makes explicit and rather detailed reference to these same ceremonies. Probably therefore, whatever be the actual meaning of v. 27, the background is also that of these same festival rites, with their association with the first rays of the rising sun upon the day of the fall equinox and the consequent coming of the *kᵉbod Yahwe*. כָּבֹד here is apparently in parallelism with בָּא, and therefore has been traditionally vocalized as a participle. All this evidence points to the probability of the translation "radiant."

In this connection it is interesting and significant to note that Charlier ("Ein astronomischer Beitrag zur Exegese des Alten Testaments," *ZDMG*, 58 [1904], 392 f.), working upon altogether independent grounds, arrived at the same conclusion that the *kᵉbod Yahwe* must be correlated with the first rays of the rising sun upon the days of the equinox.

[53] Cf. Ezek. 8. 16 ff. and Sukkah, V, 4.

[54] This entire subject of the *k bod Yahwe* and its coming into the Temple through the eastern gate on the New Year's Day is one of exceeding importance for the history of the religion of Israel. But, as the few points discussed in note 52 indicate, it is entirely too vast in extent and too complex to be treated here in detail. This must await another occasion.

means original with him. Ezek. 8. 16 ff. proves that this was an old ceremony in the Temple at Jerusalem, probably but loosely coordinated with the worship of Yahwe. What Ezekiel, although perhaps half unconsciously, aimed to do, was, as we have just intimated, to divest the ceremony of its most obvious and objectionable non-Yahwistic elements and give it a proper and legitimate place in the Yahwe-Temple and cult.

The antiquity of the institution is further attested by the realization that it constituted likewise the basis of the picture in Is. 6 and the occasion of the young prophet's vision in the Temple. There too we have Yahwe and His *kabod*, His radiance, filling the entire world. He is seated upon a high throne in the Temple, surrounded by the seraphim, winged, angelic creatures, manifestly the forerunners of the cherubim of Ezekiel. Probably, as the name *serafim* indicates, they were conceived of as fiery beings, shining with a radiance comparable to, but no doubt inferior to, and perhaps emanating by reflection from Yahwe. Here too, just as in all accounts of the manifestation of the *kebod Yahwe*, the sanctuary is filled with smoke, or, what amounts to the same thing, with cloud.[55] And here too, just as in other accounts, the prophet fears that he must die, for he has beheld Yahwe; and ordinarily for a mortal to gaze upon Yahwe, even in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, meant death.[56]

And what is Yahwe doing here in the Temple on this New Year's Day? Apparently judging the peoples and pronouncing their destinies for the ensuing year. For when, in v. 8, the prophet, his lips purified by the coal from off the altar, is made to hear clearly and to understand the full import of what Yahwe is saying, the words are, "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?," i. e. who shall be our agent, to carry out our plan and thus fulfill the destiny of Israel appointed for that year? And what this destiny is, is stated clearly in vv. 9 ff., the complete destruction of the nation and desolation

[55] Ex. 40. 35; I Ki. 8. 10f.; Is. 4. 5; Ezek. 10. 4.

[56] Cf. Gen. 32. 31; Ex. 33. 20; Num. 16. 20, 35; Jud. 13. 22; also my "Moses with the Shining Face," *HUCA*, II (1925), 1–27.

of the land. But since, in accordance with the prophetic teaching of the day,[56a] before Israel might be destroyed by Yahwe it must be warned of its impending doom and summoned to repent, this shall be the mission of the ardent, young devotee. But likewise, since Israel's destiny of doom has been fixed by Yahwe and His divine court, and its destruction is therefore inevitable, the mission of the prophet must be fruitless, even though it be indispensable; accordingly he must speak to a people fat of heart, heavy of ear and sealed of eye, a people therefore which can not repent and return to Yahwe and thus escape its sentence of doom.

Unquestionably the background of this picture represents Yahwe seated in the Temple, in the midst of His divine attendants, holding court upon the New Year's Day and fixing the destiny of Israel for the ensuing year. It is altogether probable that the picture is based, in considerable part at least, upon a Babylonian original, for in Babylonian literature Bel-Marduk is frequently represented as discharging this function upon just this occasion.[57] Moreover, on this day the Babylonian deities, and particularly Marduk, were thought to enter their temples in solemn procession. Undoubtedly the seraphim here, just as the cherubim of Ezekiel and of post-exilic literature, are largely, although probably not entirely, nor necessarily directly, an outgrowth of Babylonian representations of heavenly beings of secondary rank, the attendants of the gods.[58]

But Is. 6 does not necessarily conceive of Yahwe as actually dwelling within the Temple, and therefore constantly enthroned upon the high seat upon which the prophet beheld Him. Rather in all likelihood, very much like Marduk in the Babylonian New Year's Day ceremonial,[59] He was conceived of in the time of Isaiah as coming into the Temple only on this one day and only for the purpose of there holding His

[56a] Cf. Amos 3. 7.

[57] Cf. Zimmern, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*[3], 515; Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, I, 503.

[58] Cf. note 71, below.

[59] Cf. Zimmern, *Das babylonische Neujahrsfest*; Langdon, *The Babylonian Epic of Creation.*

divine court and pronouncing the destiny of Israel for the year. It is indeed significant that this passage calls the Temple only by the colorless name, ההיכל, a name which also came to Israel from the Babylonians, and that apparently it is not called by the more specific name, בית יהוה, "house" or "dwelling-place of Yahwe," in a single authenticated passage earlier than Jeremiah.[60]

In other words, this narrative establishes no more than that Isaiah does see Yahwe enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem, and this apparently upon the New Year's Day. But this evidence alone is insufficient to determine whether Yahwe was actually regarded by the prophet as residing permanently in the Temple, or as merely having entered there, of course in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, for just that one day, in order to there hold His divine court and fix the destinies of Israel, and perhaps of other nations also, for the new year.

[60] Unless perhaps in Mic. 3. 12. But there הבית, in the term הר הבית, might refer to the royal palace as well as to the Temple. Moreover, of all the eighteen passages in Jeremiah in which the term בית יהוה is used, not a single one comes from the period of his prophetic activity preceding the Deuteronomic reformation in 621 B. C. The term is used very rarely in pre-Jeremian writings, and never refers specifically to the Temple at Jerusalem. Scholars are agreed that the term בית יהוה in Hos. 8. 1, and probably also in 9. 15, refers to the entire land of Palestine. And in Hos. 9. 4 the expression refers to any sanctuary of Yahwe, and particularly to the Yahwe-sanctuaries of the Northern Kingdom. In II Sam. 12. 20, clause αγ, in which the term occurs, is manifestly a late, disturbing gloss. In Josh. 6. 24 the term is likewise recognized by all scholars as an anachronism and therefore a gloss. I have shown too ("The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 50) that Ex. 23. 19 and 34. 36, in which the term occurs, are both Deuteronomic. In Jud. 19. 18 the expression is also, in the opinion of all scholars, the result either of incorrect copying or of glossation. Is. 2. 2, 3, 5; 37. 1; 38. 20, 22; Mic. 4. 1 are all generally recognized as late. This leaves I Sam. 1. 24; 3. 15 as the only passages of the entire Bible earlier than Jeremiah in which the expression בית יהוה may be authentic. But even here, just as in Hos. 9. 4, it refers, not to the Temple at Jerusalem, but to the sanctuary at Shiloh, likewise in the Northern Kingdom. And inasmuch as 1. 9 and 3. 3 call this same sanctuary, ההיכל, the temptation is strong to regard this as the older term, in common use in the pre-Deuteronomic period. Just this is the term employed in Is. 6. 1 to designate the Temple at Jerusalem. Finally, Jer. 7. 4 seems to imply very positively that still in the days of the prophet the popular designation for the Temple at Jerusalem was היכל יהוה, as in Is. 6. 1, and not בית יהוה.

Certainly a century later, by the time of Jeremiah, the popular belief was that Yahwe dwelt permanently in the Temple. This is indicated not only, as has been intimated, by the designation of the Temple as בית יהוה, "the house of Yahwe," which becomes common from that time on, but also by the emphatic manner in which Deuteronomic writers represent the Temple at Jerusalem as the place which Yahwe had chosen, לשכן שמו שם, "to cause His name to dwell there."

But it is equally certain that this emphatic representation of the Temple as the place where Yahwe's name, i. e. of course, Yahwe Himself, dwells is with these Deuteronomic writers, in part at least, propagandistic, conforming to and enforcing the Deuteronomic program of the destruction of the local shrines throughout the country, with the Jerusalem Temple alone left as the sole place of Yahwe worship, the only place where He might be found. In fact it is difficult to believe that, so long as many sanctuaries existed in the land, all of them, regardless of possible Canaanite origins, looked upon popularly as Yahwe shrines and seats of Yahwe worship, the Temple at Jerusalem should have been generally regarded as the sole, actual abode of Yahwe, the one place where He was thought to dwell permanently. Such a concept could logically have developed only after and as a direct outgrowth of the Deuteronomic program of the destruction of all local sanctuaries other than the Temple at Jerusalem. But with only one sanctuary consecrated to Him, what more natural than that Yahwe should have speedily come to be regarded as actually dwelling permanently in that one sanctuary, in its innermost recesses? This argument is substantiated by the fact which we have already noted, that apparently not until Jeremiah, i. e. not until the Deuteronomic period, does the term בית יהוה, "house of Yahwe," become the regular designation for the Temple at Jerusalem.

This conclusion is borne out also by other considerations, secondary in character, it is true, yet of considerable significance in this connection. Ezekiel, too, unquestionably conceived of Yahwe as dwelling permanently within the Temple, for, in 10. 19 ff. and 11. 22 f. he sees the Deity, in the form

of the *kebod 'elohe Yisra'el*, leaving the Temple, now doomed to destruction, going out through the eastern gate and journeying eastward over the Mount of Olives. Obviously Ezekiel could not have pictured Yahwe leaving the Temple in this manner, if he had not conceived of Him as actually dwelling there permanently. This conclusion is confirmed, as has already been intimated, by the sequel to this picture in chapters 40 ff. where the prophet gives in detail his vision of the rebuilt Temple and of the return therein of the Deity, still in the form of the *kebod 'elohe Yisra'el*, entering through the same eastern gate through which He had departed from the old Temple. The vision then concludes with the charge that this eastern gate must be kept closed forever, not only, manifestly, that no mortal being may thereafter presume to enter by the same gate as that through which the Deity had entered, but also, as we have already suggested, because, so the prophet means to imply, having taken up His permanent abode there, Yahwe will never again forsake His Temple, will never again have occasion to go out through this eastern gate. And dwelling permanently there, the Temple has now become the place of Yahwe's throne and of the resting-place of the soles of His feet.[61]

But it is quite certain that even to Ezekiel there is something of novelty about this conception of Yahwe dwelling permanently in the Temple and never again coming in or going out through the eastern gate. For, on the one hand, the prophet is compelled to legislate about the matter, and to prescribe that the eastern gate must henceforth be kept closed forever, i. e. it must never again be opened, in accordance with past custom, upon the two equinoctial days. As has been suggested, through this prescription the prophet aimed to terminate completely an old, important and long practiced ceremony, that of greeting the first rays of the rising sun upon the equinoctial days, and particularly upon the New Year's Day, a ceremony which He recognized as distinctly non-Yahwistic, and which he regarded as particularly abhorrent to Yahwe. And, on the other hand, as 8. 16 shows,

[61] Ezek. 43. 7.

this ceremony was actually practiced in the Temple at Jerusalem down to the actual moment of its destruction in 586 B.C.

But with this ceremony, representing the coming of Yahwe into the Temple with the first rays of the rising sun upon each recurring New Year's Day, persisting to this late date, it is difficult to believe that the conception of Yahwe dwelling permanently in the Temple had as yet taken firm root in the belief of the people by the time of the destruction of the Temple. It would seem rather that during the century or century and a half preceding the destruction of the Temple two partially contradictory ideas were struggling for dominance in the popular belief, the old idea of the annual entrance of Yahwe into the Temple, in the form of the *kᵉbod Yahwe*, the first rays of the rising sun, upon the New Year's Day, and the new conception, apparently supported by the prophetic group and the Deuteronomic writers, and strongly enforced by the Deuteronomic reformation and the destruction of the local sanctuaries, that the Temple at Jerusalem was the actual abode of Yahwe, His house or home, where He sat permanently enthroned in the midst of Israel.

The struggle between these two contradictory concepts continued down to the very destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C., however with the younger concept of the Temple as the permanent dwelling-place of Yahwe apparently gaining ground steadily, even though slowly. It was Ezekiel who finally decided the conflict by denouncing the old ceremony as non-Yahwistic, and by legislating that henceforth the eastern gate might never again be opened. Thereby he put an end in a very practical manner to the observance of the old sun-rite. Actually therefore it was not until the second Temple and the post-exilic period that the new concept of the Temple as the sole and permanent residence of Yahwe came to hold undisputed sway.[62] Haggai and Zechariah were

[62] However, even in post-Biblical times certain survivals of the old ceremony of the opening and closing of the eastern gate of the Temple, and other rites attendant upon the coming of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* upon the New Year's Day, continued in folk-practice, and even in official religion. I have already pointed out the rôle which the closed eastern gate played in the

apparently the first therefore who, without being troubled by any contradictory and competing idea, could unqualifiedly represent the Temple at Jerusalem as the dwelling-place of

ceremonies of the *simḥaṭ beṭ hašo'ebah* during the Succoth-festival (Sukkah, V, 4). During the Latin Kingdom in Jerusalem (1099–1187 A.D.) on two annual festivals, Palm Sunday and the Festival of the Cross, the eastern gate of the Temple area, the so-called Golden Gate, which had been sealed up during the period of Moslem possession of the city (637–1099), was opened at dawn and closed again at sunset, to remain closed during the entire remainder of the year (on the evidence of John of Würzburg, who visited Jerusalem in 1137). These two festivals are late, Christianized forms of the earlier Canaanite and Israelite equinoctial festivals, and are celebrated still today almost at the exact time of the two equinoxes (cf. my "The Three Calendars of Ancient Israel," *HUCA*, I [1924], 48 f., note 47).

In the Jewish liturgy the closing portion of the ritual for Yom Kippur is known as *Neilah*, "closing," or in its full form, *Ne'ilaṭ Haša'ar*, "the closing of the gate," and the liturgy for this service contains frequent reference to the closing of the gate at sunset. The origin of this peculiar symbolism has never been adequately determined. But when we remember that not until near the very end of the Biblical period was the institution of the Day of Atonement established (*ibid.*, 22–43), and that until this time the 10th day of the seventh month had been steadily observed as the New Year's Day, the day therefore upon which the eastern gate of the Temple was opened at dawn and closed at sunset, it is clear that the *Neilah*-service of Yom Kippur rests upon a distinct reminiscence of the old, idolatrous rite celebrated upon this day.

Quite obviously too Ps. 24. 7–10 with its apostrophe to the gates to lift themselves up, i.e. of course, to open, so that Yahwe, the "King of Glory," or perhaps better in the light of this study, "the radiant King," i.e. Yahwe coming in the form of the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, might enter, finds its explanation in the ceremony of opening the eastern gate of the Temple on the New Year's Day. Quite significantly both LXX and Vulg. have the introductory record, missing in M.T., that this psalm was for Sunday, while Pesh. has the fuller statement, that it was for the first day, i.e. Sunday, when God finished the work of creation. Certainly this last is an elaboration of the original statement of LXX and Vulg. And why this particular psalm should have been designated as for Sunday, and likewise why reference to this fact should be omitted in M.T., is clear when we remember that in the pre-Pharisean form of the Jewish calendar the New Year's Day, as well as all other significant festival days, fell upon Sunday. (Cf. my "The Origin of Maṣṣoth and the Maṣṣoth-Festival," *AJT*, XXI [1917], 279, and my "Additional Notes on 'The Three Calendars of Ancient Israel,'" *HUCA*, III [1926], 87–100.) This entire subject of the solar ceremonies connected with the eastern gate of the Temple at Jerusalem is obviously of far-reaching importance for the history of Judaism and of Christianity also. But it is likewise of such complexity and magnitude that it will require independent treatment. This study I shall publish at the earliest opportunity.

Yahwe to which He was about to return, still in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*,[63] in order to take up His permanent residence there in Israel's midst. Therefore Haggai could compare the Temple as Yahwe's residence with the houses in which the people themselves dwelt.[64] And Zechariah could represent Yahwe as returning to Jerusalem, to His house, and dwelling there in Israel's midst, where eventually all the nations of the earth would seek and find Him.[65]

This argument, with its important conclusions, is borne out by one further, significant piece of evidence. If, in accordance with the old belief, Yahwe was thought to come into the Temple on the morning of each recurring New Year's Day, the question arises, how was He conceived as coming; how was He transported thither? The presence in the Temple of the horses and chariots of the sun, destroyed by Josiah at the very beginning of the Deuteronomic reformation,[66] suggests the answer. Certainly these horses and chariots of the sun were present in Yahwe's Temple for no vain purpose nor as mere monuments of the cult of some foreign deity accorded a measure of worship by Israel during this period. These chariots and horses of the sun sprang unquestionably from the cult of some foreign deity, perhaps the Babylonian Shamash or else, and perhaps more probably, some West-Semitic form of the sun-god. But they must have been integrated with the worship of Yahwe in the Temple at Jeru-

[63] Cf. Hag. 1. 8 and my "On Leviticus 10. 3" in *Oriental Studies Dedicated to Paul Haupt*, 101, note 5. [64] 1. 4, 9.

[65] 1. 16; 8. 3, 21 ff. Moreover Zechariah apparently conceived of Yahwe as dwelling, during the period between 586 and 516 B.C., during which time the Temple lay in ruins, in a place far to the east (to be inferred from the fact that the chariots coming out from the presence of Yahwe [Zech. 6. 5] go towards the north, the west [reading for אל־אחריהם, אל־האחרון, or perhaps, by analogy with the parallel expressions, אל ארץ האחרון] and the south), behind the two copper mountains. Manifestly this is the place of sunrise. The picture is clearly based upon a Babylonian original, for in Babylonian art the representation of Shamash, the sun-god, coming forth from between two mountains, is extremely common (cf. Ward, *The Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, 87 ff. [illustrations 244–269]; Jastrow, *Bildermappe zur Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 170, 171). These two mountains depicted upon these Babylonian seals were probably conceived of as copper, since burnished copper is universally symbolic of the sun, because of its color and reflective qualities. [66] II Ki. 23. 11.

salem in such manner that they had come to seem a quite essential part of His cult. Now what functions could they have discharged, or what could their symbolism have been in the syncretistic Yahwe-cult in the Temple in that day? There can be little doubt that Yahwe was thought to come from the east and to enter the Temple riding in His chariot, the chariot of the sun, drawn by the horses of the sun.

This picture probably suggested to Ezekiel his very confused and obscure conception of the manner in which the *kebod Yahwe* was carried along, both when it withdrew from the old, doomed Temple and when it approached to enter the new Temple. It would be fruitless to attempt to analyze Ezekiel's picture in detail. It suffices to remember that rabbinic tradition conceived of it as a chariot, or rather as *the* chariot, i. e. of course, the chariot of Yahwe.[67] And in fact pre-rabbinic, late Biblical tradition identified the cherubim of the ark of the Priestly Code and of later Biblical writings with this chariot, which, it was believed, had stood in the Temple from the day of its erection by Solomon.[68] Moreover, since Ezekiel speaks of the four wheels,[69] associated with the four chariots, the chariot or chariots of the sun in the Temple at Jerusalem were probably of the four-wheeled kind.[70] Mani-

[67] Cf. Torczyner, "Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 227 ff. [68] I Chron. 28. 18. [69] 1. 15–21; 10. 9–17.

[70] Cf. the illustrations in Ward, *op. cit.*, nos. 976–979 (pp. 310 ff.). According to Ward these seal-cylinders are all of Syro-Hittite origin, and with the Syrian or Phoenician element outweighing the Hittite. This fact may well point to some Phoenician, or at least general West-Semitic elements in this worship of Yahwe with the attributes of a solar deity in the Temple at Jerusalem, and especially in this particular detail of the manifestly composite picture of Ezekiel. Significantly enough in no Babylonian seal inscription, so far as I have been able to discover, is the sun-god depicted riding in a chariot. The customary symbol of the sun-god travelling across the heavens is the winged disc of the sun (cf. Ward, *op. cit.*, illustrations 670, 673, 678, 679, 682, 684, 685, 687, 692, 695, 714, 718; Jastrow, *op. cit.*, 49, 50, 51, 56, 216, 217). It is, of course, this Babylonian representation of the winged disc of the sun to which Mal. 3. 20 refers, "Unto you who fear My name, the sun of righteousness shall arise with healing on its wings." (Recent discoveries made in the excavations at Ur and in Drak tend to disprove the above conclusion that four-wheeled chariots were known only to the Western Semites.)

festly therefore, even though Ezekiel conceived of Yahwe as dwelling permanently in the Temple at Jerusalem, and endeavored strenuously to strengthen this concept in the popular imagination and doctrine, and at the same time to root out the old belief in the coming into the Temple of Yahwe, invested with the attributes of a solar deity, in His chariot on the morning of each recurring New Year's Day, nevertheless he could not free even himself entirely from the old symbolism. When compelled to describe the departure of Yahwe from the old Temple, and later His return to the new Temple, he had no alternative but to have recourse to the traditional, popular conception of Yahwe transported in a chariot. But at the same time, though probably inadvertently, he confused his picture not a little by the introduction of various additional, but ofttimes parallel and superfluous elements, most of them seemingly, such as the figures of the cherubim, borrowed, though perhaps not altogether directly, from Babylonian pictography.[71]

[71] Cf. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, 55, 57, 63a, 63c; also 31, 32, 35, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63b, 63g, 63h, 64; Ward, *op. cit.*, 42, 1149. It is noteworthy that in Jastrow, 55, 63a and 63c, and also in both illustrations cited from Ward, the figures, which we may well call cherubim, have six wings, two upper wings, that may be regarded as covering the face, two lower wings, which actually do cover the feet and the entire lower part of the body, and two wings standing out from the shoulders, manifestly designed for flying. In the other illustrations cited above, only the first and last pairs of wings are definitely represented in their regular form. The pair of wings covering the lower part of the body has been conventionalized into a decoration or fringe of the skirt hanging from the waist to the feet, but in every case having a decidedly wing-like appearance. Undoubtedly this decoration or fringe is but the conventional substitute for the older and more original third pair of wings. But these cherubim are identical with the seraphim of Is. 6. 2 in this most essential respect of the six wings. This is, in fact, the one, outstanding detail of the appearance of the seraphim which Is. 6. 2 mentions. Unquestionably the figures of the seraphim of Is. 6 were borrowed more or less directly from these Babylonian cherubim, and point to immediate Babylonian influence in the prophet's picture, and with this, of course, in his conception of the manner and purpose of Yahwe's entrance into the Temple on New Year's Day.

On the other hand, as we have already pointed out, Ezekiel's picture of the cherubim and of the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe* carried along by them, seems to be a bit more composite and to betray indications not only of Babylonian, but also of West-Semitic, and likewise of Egyptian influence. For unquestionably, as Gressmann has suggested (*Die Lade Jahves*, 50f.) the eyes in the wheels (Ezek.

This significant fact too points to the conclusion that the conception of Yahwe carried along in a chariot was still extremely lively in Ezekiel's day. But this picture of Yahwe must be linked up with the conception of Him as not yet dwelling permanently and solely in the Temple at Jerusalem, and therefore requiring a vehicle of transportation, in which He would come regularly on the morning of each recurring New Year's Day, coming from the east in the rôle of a solar deity, to exercise judgment in the midst of His heavenly host and to determine the destinies of Israel, and perhaps of other nations also, for the year just beginning.[72] Just this is the picture of Yahwe in Is. 6.

All this evidence, although secondary in character, is none the less of extreme interest and importance for the history of the religion of Israel. Above all it corroborates our previous conclusion that Isaiah did not yet definitely conceive of the Temple at Jerusalem as the actual, permanent dwelling-place of Yahwe, that this conception, although by no means unheard of before, began to gain ground steadily only with the Deuteronomic reformation at the end of the 7th century B.C., and that it did not become the dominant conception in the religious belief and practice of Israel until the early post-exilic period and the erection of the second Temple. It was Ezekiel apparently, in the latest stages of his prophetic ministry, who contributed most to the final triumph of this youngest concept of Yahwe and of His relation to the Temple at Jerusalem.

The three stages in the development of the conception of Yahwe in ancient Israel, which must be correlated with the three stages in the evolution of the conception of the ark are then, (1) the first stage, in which early, more or less primitive, local or tribal conceptions of Yahwe are gradually coalescing under the influence of evolving national life, and the con-

10. 12) represent an adaptation of the Horus-eye, not infrequently met with in Egyptian pictography.

[72] In the Babylonian religion Shamash, the sun-god *par excellence*, regularly plays the rôle of the divine judge (Zimmern, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*,[3] 368; Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, cf. index, II, 1098), even though it was Marduk, or, in some texts, Nebo, who fixed the destinies upon the New Year's Day (Zimmern, *op. cit.*, 515).

ception of a single, national Yahwe is slowly evolving; (2) the second stage, in which Yahwe, yielding to the syncretizing influence of agricultural environment and culture and its related Baal-worship, and perhaps also to growing Assyro-Babylonian cultural influence, is endowed with various attributes of a solar deity and, associated particularly intimately with the national sanctuary, the Temple at Jerusalem, is conceived of as coming there on each recurrent New Year's Day to administer justice and to fix the destinies of Israel, and with it, in all likelihood, the destinies of all other nations with which Israel had relations;[73] (3) the third stage, beginning with the Deuteronomic reformation, when, as the result of prophetic attempts at purification of the religion of Israel of all non-Yahwistic elements, Yahwe is, at least outwardly and superficially, divested of the most obvious and objectionable attributes of a solar deity, and comes now to be regarded as dwelling permanently and solely in the Temple at Jerusalem, enthroned in its innermost recesses, in the midst of His people Israel.

With these three stages in the evolution of the conception of Yahwe in ancient Israel the three stages in the evolution of the conception of the ark and its functions, which we have

[73] The thought suggests itself that the conception of the Day of Yahwe sprang, in part at least, out of this celebration of the entrance of Yahwe, in the form of the radiant *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*, into the Temple at Jerusalem on the New Year's Day in order to hold His divine court and to fix the destinies of Israel and the other nations. The earliest picture of the Day of Yahwe which we have, and in many respects also the most vivid, is that of Amos 5. 18 ff. The context there is rather loose and not a little bit obscure. But assuming the unity of the passage, which is, however, not absolutely certain, the popular belief of the time of Amos seems to have been that the Day of Yahwe was to be a day of festival (so also Sellin, *Das Zwölfprophetenbuch*, vol. XII of his *Kommentar zum Alten Testament* series, 193), a day of sacrifice (so also Zeph. 1. 7 f.) and merry-making, and apparently of carrying the images or symbols of the gods in solemn procession, presumably into the Temple. It was also a day of light and radiance, such as would naturally be associated with the coming of the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe*. Above all else it was the day of Yahwe's judgment upon and fixing the destinies of Israel and of all nations (vv. 19 and 24; cf. also Is. 2. 4; Mi. 4. 3; Zeph. 3. 8; Joel 4. 1 ff.). All these elements in this conception of the Day of Yahwe find their most simple and natural explanation in the assumption of outgrowth out of the celebration of Yahwe's entrance in the form of the *k*ᵉ*bod Yahwe* into the Temple upon the New Year's Day.

noted, go hand in hand. In the first stage Yahwe was conceived of primarily as a local or tribal deity, with the conception slowly expanding and evolving into that of an intertribal, and eventually into that of a national deity. This last conception of Yahwe naturally could eventuate completely only with the actual evolution of the nation itself under David. During this stage we find the ark likewise still conceived of in its most primitive form, as a box containing something, whatever it may have been, thought to be charged with divine power. By virtue of this power, carried into battle against Israel's foes, it could give victory to its people, or in the midst of a foreign, hostile nation it could discomfit its enemies, or once more restored to its own people, it could bring blessing to the inmates of the house in which it stood, or it could select of its own accord the way it wished to go and lead its people in safety along this way through the desert until they eventually arrived at the goal which it had appointed for them.

In the second period, which, we have seen, continued down to the Deuteronomic reformation, and which was actually not completely superseded until the end of the Babylonian exile, the conception of Yahwe underwent various changes and modifications. During this entire period Israel was subjected constantly to strong foreign cultural influences. The result was a steady process of syncretization of Yahwe with various foreign deities, and of His worship with strange cults. Actually this process had begun in the preceding period in the natural fusion of the old, tribal, desert Yahwe with the many Canaanitish Baals. This process had apparently gone on quietly, steadily and largely unconsciously on the part of the people almost from the moment of Israel's settlement in Canaan and adoption of the Canaanitish agricultural life and culture. Apparently certain fundamental elements of the Canaanitish, agricultural, Baal cult, such as the three annual agricultural festivals, Matzoth, Qatsir and Asif, and also the Sabbath, had become so thoroughly integrated in the established Yahwe-worship already in the early period of national existence, following the reign of David, that even the most ardent champions of the supposedly old and pure Yahwe-worship

failed to realize their true, non-Yahwistic origin, and so included due provision for their observance in their first systematic formulation of fundamental and approved Yahweworship.[74]

But with the reign of Solomon, with its strongly centralized and efficient system of government, with its developing economic prosperity, increasing commercial activity and expanding contacts and relations with foreign nations and cultures, the conception of Yahwe tended to undergo further modification and syncretization. The national sanctuary at Jerusalem, but recently erected as the central shrine of Israel's national god, became likewise, and almost immediately, the seat of the worship in Israel of various foreign deities. Naturally the cults of these deities, for the most part more developed, elaborate and complex than the still comparatively simple cult of Yahwe, influenced considerably both the worship and also the conception of Yahwe, and tended to introduce into them new, and by no means always logical, consistent and perfectly harmonizable elements and ideas. It was this condition which in large part gave rise to the prophetic group or party, whose basic principle was the championship of the traditional, even though not always actually the historically true, original and simple desert worship of Yahwe. We have seen that the first, organized and systematic attempt of this party to carry out its program was made in the Southern Kingdom in 899 B.C., with the reformation of Asa.[75] It was directed against the worship of Yahwe in the form of images or idols, fostered by the court party. Apparently it sought even to revive and substitute the old "tent of meeting" of the tribe of Judah for the Temple at Jerusalem. We have seen that this reformation succeeded only in part, that it did apparently counteract successfully the prevalent idol-worship of the day, and did likewise formulate a positive program of orthodox Yahwe-worship. But in its apparent endeavor to substitute the old "tent of meeting" for the new and elaborate Temple it failed completely.

[74] Cf. "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 63f. and 73–79.
[75] *Ibid.*, 98–119 and 123–127.

Nor were these prophetic activities, with their steadfast opposition to foreign, non-Yahwistic cults, confined only to the Southern Kingdom, nor did they center only around the Temple at Jerusalem. A bare third of a century after the reformation of Asa in the Southern Kingdom we find Elijah waging the same contest against the worship of the Phoenician Baal in the Northern Kingdom, and his work carried on after his death by his successor, Elisha.

During this period the foreign cultural influences to which both the Northern and the Southern Kingdoms were subjected, were many and varied. The Phoenician influence apparently was the first to make itself felt. It was largely through Phoenician merchants that the commercial activities of the reigns of David and Solomon were fostered, and it was after the model of Phoenician merchant fleets in the Mediterranean that Solomon organized his commercial expeditions to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean countries.[76] The Temple at Jerusalem was erected by Phoenician architects and artisans, with materials largely brought from Phoenicia, and after the model of Phoenician temples. Small wonder that the reformers in the days of Asa looked upon it more or less askance, and doubted, or even denied, its true Yahwe-character. This Phoenician culture was apparently itself more or less composite, with native elements considerably influenced by Egyptian, Hittite and Assyro-Babylonian cultures and religious concepts and practices. The period of direct and dominant Phoenician cultural influence in Israel, in both the Northern and Southern Kingdoms extended from the reigns of David and Solomon through the reigns of the entire dynasty of Omri. It reached its climax during and after the reign of Ahab under the guidance of the strong-minded and energetic Jezebel. It was this Phoenician cultural influence which was combatted uncompromisingly and largely unsuccessfully by Elijah, and less uncompromisingly but, outwardly at least, more successfully by Elisha. The culmination of the conflict was, of course, the revolution of Elisha and Jehu, with the murder of the entire

[76] II Ki. 9. 26–28; 10. 22.

house of Ahab and the attendant religious reformation in 842 B.C. The outcome was a nominal, but altogether superficial, and from the political and economic standpoints disastrous, triumph for the champions of the supposedly old and pure Yahwe-worship. Actually, as was to be expected, elements of the superior Phoenician culture had penetrated too deeply into Israelite life and thought, and taken too firm root, to be easily and speedily eradicated.

At just about the time of the Elisha-Jehu revolution and reformation the contact of Israel with Assyria became immediate, and apparently the influence of Assyro-Babylonian culture direct and of steady growth. Unfortunately the period of almost a century following immediately upon this revolution has left few authentic historical records. Not until the prophetic writings near the end of this period do we begin to get a clear picture of the religious, social and economic life of the two kingdoms. Then we find that during this period the cultural life of the people of both Northern and Southern Kingdoms had undergone a very considerable change and taken a decided step forward.

Now for the first time we meet, in Is. 6, the picture of Yahwe with His *kabod*, His radiance, enthroned in the Temple at Jerusalem upon the New Year's Day, surrounded by His seraphim, angelic creatures, and holding court and deciding the destinies of Israel and the nations for the ensuing year. This is our earliest record of the concept of Yahwe in the form of the *kebod Yahwe* of later Biblical writings and of the *shechina* of Rabbinic literature and theology; and seemingly in Is. 6 this concept is still somewhat incipient in character. We have seen that many and the most dominant of the elements of this picture have their precedents and parallels in Babylonian theology and literature, and that the picture as a whole, even though not necessarily in all its details, is undoubtedly dependent upon a Babylonian original. We find but few traces of any of the elements of this picture in the records of the belief and practice of earlier periods of Israelite history.[77]

[77] Unless perhaps in the fact that the Temple at Jerusalem, like many of its Phoenician models (as for example the great temple at Hierapolis

Unquestionably it was a concept of Yahwe which had developed during just this period and very largely under the influence of Babylonian religious belief and practice.

As has been said, this picture of Yahwe is predominantly that of a sun-god. Yahwe is here invested with the attributes and is represented as discharging certain of the functions of Babylonian solar deities, particularly Shamash and Marduk. All this had little relationship with the original, simple concept of Yahwe during the desert period of Israel's history or the early sojourn in Palestine. Yahwe had travelled a long road indeed, and undergone a far-reaching and momentous development and transformation in concept and mode of worship since that early, primitive day. Of all this the prophets must have been more or less conscious, even though apparently the great pre-exilic prophets, with Hosea as a possible partial exception, troubled themselves less about these matters apparently than they did about the to them far more significant and serious,

[Lucian, *De Dea Syra*, 29 ⟨ed. Jacobitz, III, 355⟩]; cf. also Robinson, *Biblical Researches in Palestine and in the Adjacent Regions*, III, 417, 426, 437, 507ff. [the two great temples at Baalbek]; Porter, *Five Years in Damascus*, I, 294; Blau, "Early Christian Archaeology from the Jewish Point of View," *HUCA*, III [1926], 171) faced the east. Some traces may perhaps also be found in the tradition of Elijah's bringing down fire from heaven (I Ki. 18) and in David's bringing up the ark to Jerusalem (II Sam. 6; I Chron. 16); for there is considerable evidence that both of these incidents happened in connection with the celebration of the Asif- or Succoth-festival and the New Year's Day following immediately thereupon. This matter is, however, of such extent and complexity that it must await separate treatment elsewhere. But at the very most all this would indicate only that some elements of the eventual picture of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* coming into the Temple on the New Year's Day were of Canaanite, Phoenician or West-Semitic origin, and that they had entered, as was but natural, since this was in itself a festival of Canaanite or common West-Semitic origin, into the celebration of the Asif-festival and the New Year's Day already in the days of David, Solomon and Elijah, and were not even discountenanced by the latter prophet. But this does not alter the fact that the particular picture of Yahwe, enveloped in the *kabod* and with the Temple filled with cloud or smoke, sitting as judge and arbiter of the destinies of nations, surrounded by the heavenly court, on the New Year's Day, has its most immediate and striking parallel, and unquestionably in many details also its direct antecedent, in Babylonian theology and literature, and that in this picture, composite as it obviously is, already in the days of Isaiah Babylonian elements seem to have predominated.

inward, spiritual transgressions of the true worship of Yahwe. None the less these facts and conditions must have influenced the program of the prophetic party as a group directly and considerably during this period. Unquestionably it helped to formulate the anti-foreign policy of Isaiah, and it likewise animated the reform movement in the reign of Hezekiah, which culminated in the destruction of the brazen serpent in the Temple.[78]

The eradication of solar elements in the cult of Yahwe in the Temple at Jerusalem was likewise a part of the program of the Deuteronomic reformation, as the reference in II Ki. 23. 11 to the chariots and horses of the sun indicates. And, as we have seen, it was Ezekiel, a more superficial, conventional and formal prophet, with less insight into the inward, spiritual implications of his prophetic mission, who denounced the significant ceremony of the greeting of the rising sun upon the New Year's Day uncompromisingly, and who eventually, finding it too firmly rooted in popular belief and practice to be completely eradicated, sought, and apparently with considerable success, to reinterpret the character of this rite and its underlying concepts and to legitimize it and incorporate it positively into the recognized prophetic conception of Yahwe and His worship. As has been said, the reaction of the Deuteronomic writers and of Ezekiel to the foreign, syncretizing influences

[78] II Ki. 18. 4. This does not mean necessarily that the brazen serpent was itself the product of this period. A very probable conjecture is that it was originally, precisely like the ark, an old, tribal cult object, which David had deposited is his national sanctuary at Jerusalem for the same reason that he brought the ark thither, to give to the members of all the tribes concrete and ocular proof that Yahwe was now truly a national, and no longer merely a tribal deity, that He was now the summation of all the old tribal gods. Thereby David sought to contribute to the popular regard for the Temple at Jerusalem as the national sanctuary and place of pilgrimage for all the tribes, and thus to strengthen the unity of his nation.

The brazen serpent in the Temple may very profitably be compared with the dove and gazelle images in the Ka'aba in the "days of ignorance" (cf. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*,[2] 298). Likewise the presence of many idols in the Ka'aba in the period immediately preceding Mohammed, in all likelihood the images or cult-objects of various, old, tribal deities, gave to the Ka'aba the character of an intertribal sanctuary. In this it presents an interesting and significant parallel to David's sanctuary at Jerusalem and his manifest purpose

and the developing conception and representation of Yahwe as a solar deity brought to an end this second period in the evolution of the conception of Yahwe in Israel.

A moment's thought makes it clear that in this rapidly developing conception and representation of Yahwe predominantly as a solar deity during this entire second period there was little room for the ark to play anything of its original rôle, or for that matter any rôle at all. And not this alone, but another important consideration enters here. Whatever may have been the actual motives of David in bringing up the ark to Jerusalem and depositing it in his tent-sanctuary, there can not be the slightest doubt that, deposited there, and subsequently in the more elaborate national sanctuary, the Temple, it necessarily came gradually to lose very much of its old significance. There is not the slightest evidence nor reason to believe that after it had been deposited in the Temple the ark was ever again taken from there and carried into battle in order to give Israel victory over its enemies. Certainly it never again had occasion or opportunity to select the way it wanted to go or to lead Israel upon a long, difficult and uncertain journey. Nor could it have long continued to be regarded as the very seat or container in the Temple of the potent, divine power associated with the being of Yahwe. In the vision of Isaiah the ark plays no rôle whatsoever, and Yahwe is seated, not upon it, but upon a high chair or throne. Nor is the ark mentioned at all, with regard to its place or rôle in the Temple during this period, in any of the writings of this time. Nor can the ark be integrated in any conceivable way with the picture which seems to have been dominant during this period, of Yahwe coming into the Temple in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, the first rays of the

to represent this as intertribal and national in character. Furthermore, the removal of these idols from the Ka'aba, following Mohammed's new preachment, is likewise not without significant parallelism with the reformation of Hezekiah, and even more with the Deuteronomic reformation. And the sparing of the Ka'aba, the sacred stone itself, and the new interpretation and rôle given to it in the ritual of Islam also parallel significantly and illuminatingly the sparing of the ark in these reformations and the new interpretation given to it in the subsequent religion of Israel.

rising sun upon the New Year's Day, and there holding His divine court. And, as we have seen, in his scheme of the rebuilt Temple Ezekiel makes no provision whatsoever for the ark, quite as if it was an object of no particular consequence; in Deut. 1. 33 and 42 reference to the ark is purposely suppressed, just as if it was regarded as not altogether in accord with basic Deuteronomic principles of Yahwe-concept and worship; and Jer. 3. 16 speaks of it as having been an object of considerable religious significance in the popular belief of a former day, but of no real significance at all, and therefore entirely dispensable, in the more advanced, enlightened and true conception of Yahwe and His worship of the day of the author of this passage; in fact the implication of the verse is that the worship of Yahwe is purer and the religion of Israel truer without the ark than with it. Seemingly the authors of Deut. 1. 33 and 42 and of Jer. 3. 16 attributed to the ark much the same non-Yahwistic significance as that which the brazen serpent enjoyed at the time of the reformation of Hezekiah.

Therefore because of the syncretistic conception of Yahwe which developed so rapidly during this period, and the utter incompatibility with it of the old conception of the ark and its functions, one of two things had to happen to the ark; either it had to lose its significance as a sacred object entirely, and suffer a fate identical with that of the brazen serpent in the Temple, viz. prophetic denunciation and destruction, or it had to undergo a process of reinterpretation of far-reaching compass and significance. Actually both fates befell it in the course of time; and not only the ark, but, at an earlier period, the brazen serpent likewise. For unquestionably the tradition of the serpents in the wilderness and of the making of the brazen serpent by Moses, recorded in Num. 21. 6–9, sprang up just because of the presence of the brazen serpent in the Temple from of old, and represented an attempt, even though vain, to justify and legitimize its presence there and thereby to save it from the fate of destruction which eventually overtook it in the reign of Hezekiah.

The ark, too, underwent both experiences of original reinterpretation and eventual disappearance, even though not,

so far as our records indicate, of actual and purposed destruction in some prophetic reformation. The fact that in all probability the ark survived in the Temple so much longer than did the brazen serpent, and apparently became an object only of prophetic disregard and mild disapproval rather than of actual denunciation and destruction, can be best explained by two important considerations, viz. that it underwent a more plausible and positive reinterpretation than the brazen serpent possibly could, and also that it contained no actual image or idol, such as the brazen serpent or the *mifleṣeṯ* of Maachah were, to which prophetic principles and program could take direct and serious exception. This last consideration offers a potent argument that, whatever the ark may have contained, it was certainly not an image of any kind.[79]

Now what was this process of reinterpretation of the character and functions of the ark during this second period of the evolution of the conception of Yahwe? It came to be regarded as the depository of the traditional two tablets of stone upon which the Ten Commandments were written. We have also seen that this process of reinterpretation seemingly began fairly early in this period, with the composition of the Book of the Covenant. But it is equally clear that this process of reinterpretation must have been rather slow and gradual and could not have taken final shape until the tradition of the Ten Commandments written upon the two stone tablets had definitely evolved. We have seen[80] that it is not at all certain whether the original Kenite Code contained ten or eight laws or "words." But certainly the nucleus of the Book of the Covenant consisted of ten "words," no more and no less.[81] But, as Ex. 24. 7 states explicitly, the Book of the Covenant represented these as written, not upon two stone tablets, but upon a scroll, in the customary manner of writing. Just when and how this last form of the tradition, viz. that of the two stone tablets, developed and what its probable antecedents may have been, we shall endeavor to determine later.

[79] Contrary to the insistent, but altogether unproved argument of Gressmann, *Die Lade Jahves*, 21 ff.

[80] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 95 ff.

[81] *Ibid.*, 92–95.

It is apparent too that during this entire period, and even long thereafter, the ark continued to be regarded as the proper place for the deposit of various sacred objects for permanent safe-keeping and for witnessing to the power of Yahwe and to His peculiar solicitude for Israel. But under the influence of the tradition in its final form, that the ark was the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, and that these were objects of incomparable and inviolate sanctity, the principle seems to have evolved that other objects, no matter how sacred their character, might no longer be deposited in, but only alongside of the ark. Therefore Deut. 31. 26 commands that a copy of the Deuteronomic Torah, inscribed upon a scroll, be deposited beside the ark, and Ex. 16. 33 f. and Num. 17. 25, parts of secondary strata of the Priestly Code, make the same provision for the vessel of manna and Aaron's rod.

And with the ark now popularly regarded as containing the Book of the Covenant, or, in the final form of the tradition, the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, it acquired a new and positive significance, entirely unrelated to its original character and function, and with a valid and even dignified place in the prophetic tradition and program. For the prophetic tradition was that Yahwe had not always been Israel's god, but had become so only through adoption, through a covenant entered into between Him and Israel in the desert, after He had delivered Israel from Egypt. As we have seen,[82] whatever Yahwe's relations to the various tribes of Israel may have been originally, it was primarily the Yahwe of the tribe of Judah who, due to the dominant rôle which this tribe played under the leadership of David in the final establishment of the nation, and which it continued to play thereafter, particularly during the momentous reigns of David and Solomon, that the Yahwe of Judah came to contribute the most essential features to the conception of Yahwe as Israel's god. And, as we have also seen, it was Judah, with the closely associated tribes of Simon and Levi, which had come out of Egypt under the leadership of Moses, and

[82] *Ibid.*, 135 ff.

at the mountain in the desert had entered into covenant with Yahwe. And not this alone, but as we have also seen, Yahwe had been originally the god of the Kenites, and this tribe or clan had attached itself to the southern group of tribes, and continued until the days of Jeremiah to so live and worship that still even then they were regarded as the true devotees of Yahwe and of His proper worship. It was therefore from Judah, and with a Kenite background, that the idea of the covenant as the basis of the relationship between Yahwe and Israel had entered into prophetic tradition and come to play so important a rôle in the prophetic program.

And as the depository of the scroll, or in the final form of the tradition, the two stone tablets, upon which the laws basic to the covenant, themselves of prophetic origin, were inscribed, the ark naturally became in the eyes of the people of the Northern Kingdom, and even of active and leading spirits in the prophetic party, the symbol of the covenant, the constant reminder of the origin and nature of Yahwe's relations with Israel. As such it served a definite and positive purpose, discharged a distinct, even though a passive function; it was the eternal, ever-present, insistent witness unto Israel of Yahwe's covenant with it. This justified its presence in the Temple, even in the very holy of holies, where tradition, if not actual historic fact, placed it; and this rôle, altogether positive in its relation to Yahwe, and in no way smacking of idolatrous association, undoubtedly saved the ark during this period from the fate of the brazen serpent. It was now no longer merely the ארון יהוה, "the ark of Yahwe"; it had now become truly the ארון ברית יהוה, "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe."[83] But as the "ark of the covenant of

[83] We find in the Bible three general names for the ark. As is to be expected, they correspond to the three stages in the evolution of the conception of the ark and its functions. In the oldest literary strata of the Bible the ark is regularly designated as ארון יהוה (I Sam. 4. 6; 5. 3, 4; 6. 1ff.; II Sam. 6. 9ff.) or ארון האלהים (I Sam. 4. 4ff.; 5. 2; 14. 18; II Sam. 6. 2ff.; 15. 24, 25, 29), or occasionally ארון אלהי ישראל (I Sam. 5. 7, 8, 10, 11). Not infrequently in these same passages the fuller and later terms ארון ברית יהוה or ארון הברית are met with, but there is in every case good reason to believe that ברית is here a later insertion (cf. Smith, *Samuel*, in *International Critical Commentary* 33,) and not original. It

Yahwe" it had, of course, lost every trace of its original character as a source of active, divine power, as the container

is clear too that the editors who inserted this term did so in order to make the name of the ark everywhere conform to the later official designation current in their day and conforming to their theology. But it is equally clear that they were not entirely consistent and thorough in this editorial process. When we come, however, to the writings of the Deuteronomic period we find this later designation of the ark used with great frequency and consistency (Deut. 10. 8; 31. 9, 25, 26; Josh. 3 *passim*; 4. 18; 7. 6; 8. 33; Jud. 20. 27b; I Ki. 3. 15; 6. 19; 8. 1ff.; Jer. 3. 16). Furthermore, we find occasionally in writings of the post-exilic period or in insertions into passages of the older literature, where the term is again manifestly the result of editorial, theological redaction, a third and fuller designation of the ark, although with some variations, ארון ברית יהוה צבאות ישב הכרובים (I Sam. 4. 4; II Sam. 6. 2; I Chron. 13. 6).

It is self-evident that this last designation of the ark could not have developed until the picture had been clearly formulated of Yahwe enthroned in the Temple, above or between the cherubim. But, as we have seen, it was Ezekiel apparently, who first developed this picture. It is true that the seraphim of Is. 6 offered him stimulating antecedents; but these seraphim of Is. 6 are apparently not the bearers nor protectors of the throne of Yahwe, as in Ezekiel's and subsequent pictures, but are rather His attendants and the members of His heavenly court. Outside of Ezekiel the oldest Biblical reference to the cherubim is found in Gen. 3. 24; but even that passage is undoubtedly post-exilic, as the manifest dependence of the doctrine of universalism expressed in the J portions of Gen. 1–11 upon the doctrine of universalism of Deutero-Isaiah, together with other evidence, indicates. There is consequently in the entire Bible not a single, assured pre-Ezekelian, and therefore pre-exilic, reference to cherubim, and least of all to cherubim in association with the ark or the throne of Yahwe in the Temple. This is convincing evidence that the name ארון ברית יהוה צבאות ישב הכרובים is late, and the product of the third period of evolution of the conception of the ark and its functions, when it had come to be regarded primarily as the base of the *kapporeṯ* and Yahwe's seat upon this (refuting Dibelius, *Die Lade Jahves*, 72ff.; Gressmann, *Die Lade Jahves*, 6ff.; Torczyner, " Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 239ff.).

Quite similarly the name ארון הברית is descriptive of the function which the ark was thought to discharge, as we have seen, in the second period of its evolution, as the receptacle of the two tablets of stone upon which, according to the tradition, the Decalogue, the basis of Yahwe's covenant with Israel, was inscribed. (For ברית = the tablets of the Decalogue cf. I Ki. 8. 21.) As the depository of these monuments of and witnesses to this covenant it was naturally designated as " the ark of the covenant of Yahwe." And this designation served an additional and significant purpose; for it tended to refute the old, and now outgrown and rejected, semi-idolatrous idea that the ark was in itself a deity, or else the container of a deity, and to emphasize the new and, at least at first,

of that which was regarded originally either as Yahwe Himself or as that in which Yahwe resided and from which the divine force, which betokened the presence of Yahwe, emanated. As the "ark of the covenant" it was no longer directly associated with the presence of Yahwe, nor did it symbolize this in any way. For, on the one hand, to symbolize the actual presence or being of Yahwe by any image or concrete object, even the ark, would undoubtedly have violated a fundamental prophetic principle. And on the other hand, as we have seen, during this second period Yahwe was apparently not yet definitely looked upon as dwelling solely and permanently in the Temple at Jerusalem, but only as coming there once a year, upon the New Year's Day.

B

THE THIRD PERIOD

In the third period, as we have seen, the conception of Yahwe became radically different. Beginning with the Deuteronomic reformation and the centralization of worship in the one, single sanctuary, the Temple at Jerusalem, gather-

rather controversial idea that the ark contained only these sacred stones and naught else, and was therefore the constant, visible symbol of Yahwe's covenant with Israel.

Finally, what seems to have been the very youngest Biblical designation of the ark, and which is found only in Priestly writings, ארון העדות (cf. above, note 41). It represents a continuation of the conception of the ark current in the second period, as the depository of the two tablets of the Decalogue, the testimony of Yahwe's covenant with Israel. But, as we have seen, the dominant Priestly conception of the ark was as the throne of Yahwe, upon which He sits eternally in the midst of His people Israel. But, as we have seen also, the secondary Priestly conception of the ark, as containing the Decalogue, therefore the "ark of testimony," was purely conventional, and without the slightest reality. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that very late Priestly writers misinterpreted, though whether consciously or not it is impossible to say, the import of the term ארון העדות. For in Ex. 30. 6, 36; Num. 17. 19 העדות, i. e. the ark, is spoken of as the place שמה (לך) אשר אועד לכם, "the place where I shall meet with you." The implication of these three passages is that the ark was called העדות or ארון העדות because it was the place where Yahwe met (אועד) with Israel. That this is, of course, a false etymology does not alter the manifest fact that these late Priestly writers, for all three verses come from secondary strata of the Priestly Code, offered this interpretation of the term העדות in all seriousness. This implies probably that to them the ark had ceased to be regarded as the depository of the two tablets of the Decalogue, and was looked upon solely as the throne of Yahwe.

ing force with Ezekiel and his vision of the rebuilt Temple, and finding its complete expression in post-exilic literature, the belief became dominant that Yahwe had taken up His permanent residence in the Temple, in the midst of Israel.[84] But dwelling now in a particular place, the limits of which were exactly defined, it was inevitable that the figure of Yahwe be concretized a bit, be given just enough of form and being and tangibility to be actually localized in this spot. This process was not difficult, even though in principle it was not altogether in conformity with prophetic doctrine. Ezekiel had paved the way for it with his picture of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* and by prescribing that the eastern gate of the Temple must be kept tightly closed forever, thereby terminating more or less effectually the old, solar, non-Yahwistic rite of the entrance into the Temple of the first rays of the rising sun upon the New Year's Day. Thereby he symbolized, as has been said, the permanent presence of Yahwe in the Temple in the form of the *kᵉbod Yahwe*. This doctrine gained firm hold upon the imagination of the people, and, as we have seen, even found its place in the announcements of the early post-exilic prophets, Haggai and Zechariah, that when the new Temple should have been completed, as the crowning act of the dedication ceremonies upon the New Year's Day, Yahwe would come in the form of the *kᵉbod Yahwe*, and take up His permanent abode in the new Temple.[85] From this

[84] Utterances like that of Is. 66. 1, that the heavens are Yahwe's throne and the earth His footstool (cf. also I Ki. 8. 27), manifestly protesting emphatically against the idea that Yahwe should be thought to dwell or to be contained in a Temple, and at the same time reaffirming the doctrine of the absolute universality of Yahwe, His utter incorporeality and the impropriety of attempting to represent Him as confined to one particular abode, serve but to emphasize the generality of the concept of Yahwe actually dwelling in the Temple throughout the postexilic period.

[85] Hag. 1. 8; Zech. 2. 9. It is also implied in the vision of the trial of Joshua before Yahwe, holding court in the Temple and attended by angels, in Zech. 3, and in the symbolism of the golden candelabrum, in Zech. 4. This matter, however, is complex, and is obviously related to other matters already referred to, which must be reserved for treatment elsewhere. This doctrine of the coming of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* into the Temple on the New Year's Day has likewise been introduced into the account of the dedication of Solomon's Temple, in I Ki. 8. 1–11. This was done by Priestly writers and in quite skillful manner (cf. my " The Three

time on the *kᵉbod Yahwe* was thought to abide steadily in the Temple. But as yet there was not the slightest implication of the association of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* in the Temple with the ark.[86] In fact we do not meet this association of the ark with the *kᵉbod Yahwe* until the Priestly Code, and, as has been said, not even in the earliest portions of this, the Holiness and Torah sections of P, but only in the later Grundschrift and strata secondary to that.

But in the Grundschrift of the Priestly Code and other writings dependent thereon, Yahwe is regularly represented as sitting enthroned upon the *kapporeṯ* between the cherubim above the ark. At the same time the ark is still the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, now called לחת העדות, "the tablets of testimony." Accordingly the ark is likewise designated now as the ארון העדות, "the ark of testimony." Manifestly the association of the term עדות with the ark is secondary to its association with the tablets. They are the primary testimony, and the ark is called the "ark of testimony" only because the tablets are, according to tradition, deposited in it. Consequently it is clear that the testimony of the tablets is still much the same as what it was during the second period of the evolution of the conception of Yahwe and of the ark, testimony, through the "words"

Calendars of Ancient Israel," *HUCA*, I [1924], 46). In addition to the passages cited there, careful analysis establishes with fair certainty that vv. 6b–11 of this chapter are likewise secondary and altogether Priestly in character. Without these insertions the passage is quite complete, and narrates in simple, concise form the manner in which Solomon and the elders of Israel brought up the ark from where it had been deposited by David, and reverently set it up in the innermost part of the new Temple. But it is only these inserted verses and verse fragments which introduce the picture of the *kᵉbod Yahwe*, with all the attendant circumstances of the cloud filling the Temple and the priests unable to remain therein because of the cloud and the presence of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* therein. Nothing of this stood in the original account of the dedication of the Temple.

[86] In fact there is good reason for believing that the ark did not yet enter into Zechariah's conception of the Temple and its equipment, and that he regarded the golden candelabrum, referred to in chap. 4, as the symbol of the presence not of the ark but of Yahwe in the Temple. This matter, too, is, however, quite complex, and related to the matters referred to above, reserved for detailed treatment elsewhere.

inscribed upon them, of the covenant which Yahwe had established with Israel when He brought them out of Egypt.

But as we have already shown,[87] unquestionably this idea is only conventional and practically meaningless in P. For on the one hand, as has been said, unless they were exhibited upon occasion, or at least were capable of being exhibited, and this the presence of the golden *kapporeṯ* upon the ark probably made impossible, the tablets could not really serve as testimony. And on the other hand, the assurance that Yahwe had taken up permanent residence in Israel's midst, and would never depart therefrom, an assurance which obviously accords completely with and sprang out of Jeremiah's message of Yahwe's new, eternal covenant with a purified, regenerated Israel, which dominated unceasingly the belief, hope and speculation of post-exilic Judaism, worked a significant change in the symbolism of the ark. It caused the old idea of the covenant relation existing between Yahwe and Israel, particularly a covenant relation which, as the earlier prophets had proclaimed repeatedly, could and would be abrogated if Israel did not keep faith with Yahwe, to lose much, in fact almost all, of its original force. Consequently there was now little or no need, as there had been in the second period, of a testimony, a constant reminder to the people of their covenant relation with Yahwe. For, on the one hand, with Yahwe now dwelling in their midst they needed no reminder of Him and His covenant; and, on the other hand, they now believed firmly that this covenant must endure forever, even though they themselves might be somewhat remiss in fulfilling the obligations it laid upon them. These considerations too make it quite clear that the entire conception of the "tablets of testimony" and of the "ark of testimony" in P was altogether conventional, had little or no positive significance, and was eventually, as we have shown, either forgotten or else purposely disregarded by late Priestly writers.

Moreover, the extreme anti-anthropomorphism of the Priestly writers caused them considerable embarrassment in this connection. On the one hand, they borrowed the figure

[87] Above, note 41.

of the *kebod Yahwe* from Ezekiel, but refused to represent it, as Ezekiel had done, in human shape. Instead, in accordance with their theological principles, they sought to reduce the anthropomorphism and heighten the spirituality of the conception as much as possible by representing the *kebod Yahwe* as a fiery apparition, "something like the appearance of fire," [88] enveloped in "the cloud." The picture itself is significant, for it seems to betray a reminiscence, no doubt entirely unconscious on the part of these Priestly writers, of the actual association of the *kebod Yahwe* with the flaming appearance of the dawn when the first rays of the rising sun upon the equinoctial, New Year's Day shine forth from the midst of the cloud upon the eastern horizon. But to accommodate this picture to their doctrine that Yahwe had taken up His permanent abode in the Temple in the form of the *kebod Yahwe*, these Priestly writers had to localize it, to represent their spiritualized conception of the *kebod Yahwe* as confined by the limits of space within the holy of holies of the Temple, as dwelling exactly there, and in no other place, and also as dwelling there permanently and never departing therefrom.[89]

Furthermore, since they now represented the *kebod Yahwe* as dwelling permanently in the holy of holies, and since ancient tradition, based, of course, upon historical fact, told that the "ark of the covenant of Yahwe" likewise stood in the holy of holies, these Priestly writers had no alternative but to associate the ark of tradition with their figure of the *kebod Yahwe*. And since the could not very well represent the latter as contained within the ark, for this would not have comported at all with their conception of the dignity and spirituality of the *kebod Yahwe*, they could depict this association in only one way, viz. that the *kebod Yahwe* was

[88] Num. 9. 15; cf. Ex. 24. 17; 40. 38.

[89] According to Ezekiel 10–11, the departure of the *kebod Yahwe* from the Temple was the sign of the impending destruction of the latter. Similarly the Rabbis of the Tannaitic period and also early Christian writers preserved the tradition that the departure from the second Temple of the Shechinah, likewise through the eastern gate, betokened its impending destruction by the Romans; cf. Jer. Yoma, VI, 43c; Bab. Yoma, 39b; also the references cited by Lauterbach, *HUCA*, IV (1927), 184, note 10; Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, III, 8.

enthroned upon the ark. In this, of course, they also had Ezekiel's picture of the enthroned *kᵉbod Yahwe* as a model. Obviously in this way and by just these processes of reasoning, largely gradual and unconscious though it may all have been, these Priestly writers arrived at the conception of the ark, strange indeed and far removed from its original nature and traditional functions, as a throne of a deity; and, since the *kᵉbod Yahwe* was purposely and doctrinally regarded as incorporeal and therefore, except upon rare and special occasions, invisible, as an empty throne, or rather, more correctly, as the throne upon which a deity sat, who was invisible to mortals; therefore to mortals it seemed an empty throne.

After all in this process of thus reinterpreting the old ark and representing it as an empty throne these Priestly writers could have experienced no very great difficulty, since this concept was by no means strange to the belief and theology prevalent in their day in the large Semitic world in which Palestine was embedded. For according to Lucian,[90] in the group of eight chief deities whose thrones and images stood in the great Temple at Hierapolis was the sun-god, represented by an empty throne, i. e. one upon which no image of the deity stood; "for," as Lucian says, "the sun and moon are the only divinities that are not sculptured here. On inquiring the reason, I received for answer: Of the other deities it is permitted to make likenesses, because their figures are not known to all men; but the sun and moon are visible to everyone, accordingly there is no reason for delineating them." [91] Unquestionably this reason for not representing the sun by an image, but only by an empty throne, given by Lucian, does not give the real origin and primary cause of this custom, although it may retain some slight reminiscence thereof. But Lucian's statement does seem to imply that this custom was not confined only to the temple at Hierapolis, but was probably observed in most, if not all, Syrian or West-Semitic temples. There is no reason to believe that the Babylonians had this same scruple about depicting the sun-god. In fact the frequent representations in Babylonian pictography

[90] *De Dea Syra*, 34 (ed. Jacobitz, 357). [91] Tooke's translation, II, 456.

of Shamash seated upon a throne, enveloped in what appears to be a radiant garment and with rays of light streaming forth from behind his shoulders,[92] seem to indicate that the Babylonians regularly depicted both the sun- and the moon-god in this manner. Accordingly it would seem that in their pictures of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* Ezekiel was, more or less consciously, influenced by Babylonian representations of the sun-god, while the Priestly writers were influenced more directly by the West-Semitic practice of representing the sun-god by an empty throne.[93]

But in this enforced association of their picture of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* in the holy of holies with the ark, these Priestly writers were further embarrassed by ancient tradition. On the one hand, they had to accommodate their picture as best they could to the old tradition that the ark was the depository of the two tablets of stone upon which the Ten Commandments were inscribed. It is clear that these two conceptions of the ark have absolutely nothing in common. The ark conceived of as the depository of anything whatsoever was something altogether different than the ark conceived of as a sacred throne. It is self-apparent that it was only that, on the one hand, tradition had inseparably associated the ark with the holy of holies, and that, on the other hand, Priestly tradition or theology now associated the *kᵉbod Yahwe* with the holy of holies in the same way, which brought about this enforced and entirely unnatural and artificial coupling of the ark and the *kᵉbod Yahwe*. Undoubtedly had it not been for this, these Priestly writers would never have represented

[92] Cf. the well-known representation of Shamash upon the Hammurapi-stone, and Jastrow, *Bildermappe zur Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, 94.

[93] Whether in thus symbolizing the presence of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* in the holy of holies by an empty throne, these Priestly writers were to any degree conscious of the solar origin of the *kᵉbod Yahwe*, or whether this representation of the *kᵉbod Yahwe* in the manner in which the sun-god was represented at Hierapolis, and apparently also in other West-Semitic temples was purely accidental, or was rather due to the strong Priestly antipathy to the representation of Yahwe by an image of any kind, it is, of course, impossible to determine. Hartmann (*op. cit.* 233), following Reichel and Dibelius, suggests the possibility of Persian influence here also.

Yahwe as enthroned upon the ark, but would instead have represented Him as seated upon an ordinary throne or chair, just as Ezekiel did before them and the author of Dan. 7. 9 after them.

And on the other hand, as we have seen, tradition had likewise associated the *kebod Yahwe* in the Temple on the New Year's Day with a group of heavenly attendants, winged creatures, seraphim or cherubim. Originally, it would seem, they constituted Yahwe's heavenly court, with which He took counsel in fixing the destinies of nations, as well as His attendants and messengers. By the time of Ezekiel they had seemingly, in accordance with developing Jewish theological principles, become conventionalized as the mere, impersonal attendants of Yahwe and bearers of His throne. But apparently they were so integrally associated with the established conception of the *kebod Yahwe* that even the Priestly writers dared not omit them entirely from their picture. However, the extreme and absolute monotheism of these Priestly writers forbade them to conceive of, and much less depict, these cherubim as actual, existent, divine personalities alongside of Yahwe. Accordingly they had but one recourse. Between two to them necessary evils, or rather theological absurdities and impossibilities, they had to choose the less. Accordingly they chose to represent the cherubim, since they could not dispense with them entirely, as conventional figures or images in the holy of holies, either as fixed and inseparable parts of the *kapporet* above the ark,[94] or as in themselves two figures, part of the fixed equipment of the holy of holies in the Temple, standing upon each side of that room, beneath the wings of which the ark was deposited.[95] At least the presence of these images in the holy of holies, contrary though it was to fundamental theological principles of these Priestly writers, was, apparently, not quite so contrary and objectionable as the representation of them as existent, heavenly beings, even though of inferior rank, alongside of,

[94] So in Ex. 25. 18ff. and throughout the Priestly Code.
[95] So in I Ki. 6. 23–28; 8. 6f.

and thus qualifying the absolute unity of Yahwe, would have been.[96]

It is quite clear from all this that these Priestly writers were probably none too happy in their picture of the *kebod Yahwe* in the holy of holies of the Temple at Jerusalem, in its unavoidable and intimate association with the to them basically objectionable, traditional figures of the ark and the cherubim. Unquestionably, had they been able, they would have done away with both ark and cherubim entirely. But tradition, which seemingly strongly colored the popular conception of Yahwe's self-revelation to Israel, and for which too these Priestly writers, with their marked antiquarian instincts, had considerable regard, forbade this. They had to content themselves therefore by reducing the objectionable elements and associations in the picture as much as possible. And this they did by conventionalizing the cherubim and representing them as two images in the holy of holies, in direct association with the ark, and by representing the ark still, though, as we have seen, in unreal and impossible manner, as the depository of the two stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, and likewise, a most unreal and artificial conception, as the base of the empty throne of Yahwe.

But the unreality of this entire procedure and the manifestly basic incompatibility of the ideas involved in this representation of the *kebod Yahwe*, with the ark and the cherubim, with fundamental Priestly theological principles, raise the question as to the historic reality of the Priestly account of the ark and its manufacture. Were these Priestly writers actually acquainted with the historic ark? As we have seen, certain internal Biblical evidence, coming from the period shortly after the erection of the second Temple and antedating the composition of the Grundschrift of the Priestly Code and the secondary strata thereof by approximately a century or more, points to the conclusion

[96] These Priestly writers felt no doubt that by reducing the four cherubim of Ezekiel, the bearers of the divine throne, to only two, they had lessened somewhat the qualification of Yahwe's absolute unity, implied in this multiplicity of divine figures, even though of inferior rank.

that there was no ark in the second Temple. And, as we have likewise seen, rabbinic tradition is strong that the second Temple contained no ark. In the light of all these facts it is difficult indeed to avoid the conclusion that the picture of the ark which these Priestly writers drew with such elaborate detail, was entirely unhistorical and fanciful, that they had no actual, first-hand knowledge of the historic ark, its appearance, character and functions, and that their picture of it is of little or no value as a source of information as to the original character and purpose of the ark.

C

THE FIRST PERIOD

Accordingly therefore, in our attempts to determine what the ark actually was originally, we are compelled to rely primarily upon the meager evidence furnished by the oldest literary strata of the Bible, supplemented to a certain, slight extent by the information to be gathered from the literature of the second period.

Now the evidence points unmistakably to the conclusion that in the first period of its history the ark was actually looked upon as a deity. Not only by the Philistines was the ark so regarded,[97] but by Israel also, for it was taken into battle against the Philistines for the express purpose, "that it may come among us and deliver us from the hand of our enemies."[98] In this function of the ark significant parallels from the practice of other Semitic peoples are not lacking. Ǧaḏîmah, the Laḫmite king at Ḥîrah, used to carry two idols, aḍ-Ḍâribân, (literally, "the two smiters," or, perhaps more exactly and significantly, "the two givers of victory") into battle with him.[99] Even the Philistines themselves carried the images of their gods with them into battle, and in his great victory over them these images were captured by David.[100]

[97] Cf. I Sam. 4. 6–8 (especially in the LXX version).

[98] I Sam. 4. 3.

[99] Osiander, "Studien über die vorislâmische Religion der Araber," *ZDMG*, VII (1853), 501.

[100] II Sam. 5. 21. For additional instances of this practice among the Semites, cf. Gressmann, *Mose und seine Zeit*, 233.

Likewise in its experience of capture by the Philistines and sojourn as a trophy of victory in their land, the ark has significant Semitic parallels. Among the Babylonians and Assyrians and the various peoples with whom they contended, the carrying off of the images of the gods of the vanquished by the victors, was a common occurrence. The classic instance is, of course, the capture of the statue of the Babylonian goddess Nanâ by the Elamites and its recovery by Ašurbanapal sixteen hundred and thirty-five years later and restoration to its old temple at Erech.[101] The explanatory statement given by the Assyrian king is significant. It was not that the Elamites had been more powerful than the Babylonians, or that the goddess herself had been weak and unable to protect herself or her people against their enemy, but that she had been enraged against her own people and so had permitted herself to be carried away to a strange land. Even among her enemies, impliedly, just like the ark of Israel, she was still a powerful deity; only, presumably, her blessings were now bestowed upon the people among whom she was dwelling, her former enemies, while her old worshipers, deprived of her presence, and therefore without divine protection and rendered correspondingly weak and helpless, became the ready prey of their foes. Manifestly the capture of the image or cult object of the deity of an enemy, served a double purpose. Not only was it a trophy of victory, but even more, its possession rendered the enemy correspondingly stronger and its old worshipers correspondingly weaker. That similar ideas obtained among the pre-Islamic Arabs may be inferred from a statement of Nuwairî that four Himyarite princes, the sons of As'ad b. 'Amr, undertook an expedition to carry off the sacred black stone, the Ka'aba, in order to set it up in a sanctuary which they contemplated erecting in Ṣan'â; but they were defeated by the Banu Kinânah.[102] Not improbably the Philistines expected the ark to function in their midst in some such favorable manner, and were therefore doubly distressed when they

[101] Rawlinson, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, V, 6, col. VI, 107–128.

[102] Osiander, *op. cit.*, 478.

discovered that its presence among them was inimical to them to an extreme degree. And apparently the presence of the ark in their midst brought blessing to the household of Abinadab and all the inhabitants of Kiryat Yearim,[103] just as, so we are told explicitly, it brought blessing to the inmates of the house of Obed-Edom, in which it stood likewise.[104]

The character of the ark as a divine object is likewise attested significantly by the taboo inherent in it. Even to touch it without warrant, although for the most worthy and devout purpose, entailed death. Uzza died because he had ventured to lay his hand upon it in order to steady it, when it seemed that it might slip from the wagon.[105] And the clan of Yechoniah, of the inhabitants of Beth-Shemesh, suffered the loss of seventy members because they had dared to examine the ark too closely, and perhaps even to look into it, and had thereby violated the taboo associated with it.[106]

[103] I Sam. 7. 1; II Sam. 6. 3.

[104] II Sam. 6. 12.

[105] II Sam. 6. 6f.

[106] I Sam. 6. 19, emended in accordance with the more correct LXX text. This passage has never, so far as I can see, been interpreted quite correctly. H. P. Smith (*Samuel; International Critical Commentary* series, 48f.), followed by Budde (*Samuel;* in Marti's *Hand-Commentar* series, 46) and Gressmann (*Die Lade Jahves*, 19), explains the misfortune of the Bne Yechoniah as brought upon them by Yahwe because they did not rejoice with the rest of the inhabitants of Beth Shemesh when they beheld the ark. But why should they not have rejoiced equally with their fellow-townsmen upon this occasion, unless there was some specific reason for their not doing so? And since the approach of the ark to Beth Shemesh was undoubtedly the first contact of the Bne Yechoniah with it, whatever reason they may have had for not joining in the celebration of their fellow-townsmen could not have arisen before, but must have arisen after this event. Plain common sense therefore indicates that the misfortune which befell them in the loss of seventy of the members of their clan could not have been because they did not rejoice when they beheld the ark, but, just the reverse, this misfortune was itself the cause of their not being able to rejoice along with the other inhabitants of their village.

Now it should be noticed that in v. 13 וירא is followed by the direct object, את הארון, while in v. 19 ראו is followed by the preposition ב, ראה ב׳, ראו בארון means "to look at a thing fixedly, to examine it closely" (Gen. 21. 16; 34. 1; Is. 66. 24; Cant. 6. 11; Eccl. 2. 1; 11. 4), then "to take due notice of, to have regard for" (Gen. 29. 32; Num. 11. 15; I Sam. 1. 11; II Sam. 16. 12; Ps. 37. 4; 128. 5). Here it must mean, "they examined it closely," i.e. they handled

Manifestly it was just because it was a deity that the ark could bring blessing to the household, town or nation in which it was dwelling, whether temporarily or permanently, and where it was treated with due regard and proper ceremonial, as well as inflict punishment whenever the proper limits of its taboo were violated. The anticipation of blessing from having the ark with him, based no doubt upon reports which had come to him of the prosperity of the people of Kiryat Yearim, and later of that of Obed-Edom, must have been one of the primary motives actuating David in his purpose to bring the ark up to Jerusalem, just as the fear of the ark, based upon the unhappy fate of Uzza, deterred him for a time from carrying out his plan. It was likewise because the ark was regarded as a deity that it was thought able to give its people victory in battle, to select the way it wished to go and to lead its people along the otherwise unknown way which they had to travel, and bring them in safety to their ultimate goal, which it, or rather the deity associated with it, had promised to them. Presumably, too, the ark could discharge many other functions, of which we have no record, but which were the functions thought to be usually discharged by a deity and to redound to the blessing of its people.

it, for it was no doubt an object of which they had heard frequently in the past, and perhaps had even heard of its marvellous exploits in the land of the Philistines; and now that it had come among them, naturally they sought to satisfy their curiosity and see for themselves just what this ark was. Unaware of the taboo qualities of the ark, they did not hesitate to treat it too familiarly, to handle it unceremonially, and not at all improbably, they even ventured to look inside it to see what might be there. Consequently they suffered the same fate as did Uzza, for venturing to touch the ark. Those who dared to examine the ark too closely, and especially to touch it, died automatically. It was no violation of the taboo of the ark, to look at it, as v. 13 indicates; but it was a violation of the taboo to examine the ark too closely, with all the treatment that this implies. We can well understand therefore, why, as v. 20 states, the people of Beth Shemesh feared to keep the ark in their town, for there could be no telling who would be the next, even though innocent, victim of the violation of the taboo associated with it. We must accordingly translate v. 19, not as do Smith, Budde and Gressmann, " The Bne Yechoniah did not rejoice with the men of Beth Shemesh *when they beheld* the ark," but " *because they examined* the ark."

Moreover, all the evidence indicates that the ark, or the deity of the ark, was identified with Yahwe. The sanctuary at Shiloh, ministered to by a Levitical family, was a Yahwe shrine. The ark was there known apparently as the ארון יהוה, "the ark of Yahwe." And the Philistines themselves, according to tradition, identified the deity of the ark with the god who had brought Israel up from Egypt.[107] The implication too of the tradition recorded in I Sam. 5. 1–5, of the prostration of the image of Dagon before the ark, is likewise that the ark is a divine object or deity of character similar to that of the image of the Philistine deity, but of course of superior power and authority.

Most significant of all perhaps is the legend recorded in I Sam. 3. As is recognized by practically all scholars, this chapter belongs to a literary stratum somewhat later than I Sam. 4–6, and therefore quite naturally it seems to show some evidence of a slightly more advanced theology. None the less Yahwe is here associated with the ark in the most intimate and significant manner. The legend tells that while lying at night in the place in the sanctuary where the ark stood, Samuel hears Yahwe calling to him. Presumably it was in anticipation of some such occurrence that Samuel slept in this spot, no doubt having been assigned to this task by Eli. For the same reason, as we have seen,[108] Ex. 33. 11 tells that while Moses would return to the camp from the "tent of meeting," the youthful Joshua, Moses' apprentice, according to the J tradition, remained always within the tent and never went forth from it. The purpose here, too, was manifestly to receive the oracle. For this could never be anticipated; and whenever Yahwe would choose to speak, some one qualified by technical training must be present to receive the message. So here, the youthful Samuel, likewise the apprentice of Eli, sleeps in the room where the ark is, while Eli, the old priest, sleeps in his

[107] I Sam. 4. 8b. This passage is undoubtedly not original. All the more therefore it indicates that until a time later than the actual composition of the earliest stratum of I Sam. 4–6 the ark itself as a deity was identified with Yahwe.

[108] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 119ff.

accustomed bed, in order that he too might receive the oracle whenever Yahwe should choose to speak.

The presumption is strong, therefore, that the oracle of Yahwe here was associated with the ark, that, in other words, the narrative in its original form implied that Yahwe spoke from out the ark. It is true that v. 10 says explicitly that Yahwe came and took His place and then called the third time to Samuel, implying thereby that Yahwe was not present regularly in this room or portion of the sanctuary, but came thither only for the explicit purpose of calling to Samuel, and furthermore came and went away and then came again, each time that He called to Samuel. This procedure seems hardly natural or plausible. On the basis of v. 10 Smith[109] and Budde[110] would emend v. 4 to read, ויתיצב יהוה ויקרא, But it would be more plausible and much simpler to regard ויבא יהוה ויתיצב in v. 10 as a late, theological insertion, and the original reading, just as in v. 4 and again in v. 6, the simple ויקרא יהוה. In fact v. 6 seems to imply that just this was the original reading, rather than that proposed by Smith and Budde. But if this was indeed the original reading,

[109] *Op. cit.*, 25 ff.

[110] *Op. cit.*, 28. It is likewise easier to account for the insertion of ויבא יהוה ויתיצב in v. 10, on the basis of theological motivation, than it would be to account for the reverse procedure of a suppression, whether purposed or not, of an original ויבא יהוה ויתיצב in vv. 4 and 6. For we can readily understand that a later age, during the second period of the history of the ark, would take exception to the idea of Yahwe dwelling within the ark and speaking from out it. This was too crass and primitive, and smacked too much of the representation of Yahwe or the symbolization of His presence by a concrete, image-like object, to be acceptable to the prophetic theology which dominated this second period. As we have intimated, it must have been just because of the development of this prophetic conception of Yahwe, that the conception of the ark as the receptacle of the two tablets of stone developed. By the insertion of ויבא יהוה ויתיצב in v. 10, late glossators imagined that they had corrected the impression originally conveyed by this and vv. 4 and 6, that Yahwe spoke from out the ark. The insertion of these words, they believed, no doubt, implied that Yahwe came from afar, wherever that might be, presumably in heaven, to speak with Samuel. In quite the same way and from the same standpoint the J Code occasionally represents Yahwe as descending from somewhere on high, presumably from heaven (וירד יהוה, Gen. 11. 5; Ex. 19. 20; Num. 11. 25; וירד יהוה ויעמד, Num. 12. 5; and especially, וירד יהוה ויתיצב, Ex. 34. 5).

then it and the entire narrative imply beyond all possibility of doubt that Yahwe was actually present all the time in the room in which Samuel was sleeping, and that, just as we have suggested, Samuel was appointed by Eli to sleep in this room regularly, since Eli himself was apparently too old and feeble for this constant and exacting service, to receive the oracle whenever Yahwe would choose to speak. And of course Yahwe could be present in only one particular place or object in this room, viz. the ark, precisely as the explicit mention of the presence of the ark in this room in v. 3 implies. This chapter accordingly furnishes very strong and illuminating proof, not only of the direct association of Yahwe with the ark, but that actually in this first period of its history Yahwe was thought to actually reside within the ark.

Furthermore, the very name ארון, "box, casket" implies as various scholars have remarked, that the ark must have been primarily a container; i. e. in itself it could hardly have been regarded as the deity, as Yahwe, but must rather have contained, or at least have been thought to contain something, which was either regarded as Yahwe Himself, or else, what practically amounts to the same thing, as being the object in which Yahwe was thought to reside. This is confirmed by the established tradition of the second period of the history of the ark, that in it the two stone tablets of the Decalogue were deposited. It is confirmed still further by the interpretation of I Sam. 6. 19 which we have proposed, viz. that the clan of Yechoniah of Beth Shemesh examined the ark closely, and perhaps even looked into it, of course to see what was inside, and therefore were so sorely smitten by Yahwe. Our task therefore is now to determine, if possible, what the actual contents of the ark, so intimately associated with Yahwe, may have been.

In this phase of the question as to the form and nature of the ark, Semitic religious belief and practice offer striking and significant parallels. Sanchuniathon records that Agroueros or Agrotes, apparently, to judge from the names, an agricultural deity, had a wooden statue which was much venerated, and a shrine (or portable temple), drawn about in Phoenicia

by yokes of oxen.[111] Presumably this last was an object somewhat similar to the ark.

Far more striking in its parallelism with the ark is a peculiar structure which seems to play more or less of the rôle of a cult object among the Ruwala, an important and powerful tribe of the present-day Anazeh group of Bedouin tribes. The description of it, given by Musil,[112] is as follows; "The Ruwala have a structure made out of thin wooden boards, decorated with ostrich feathers, which is fastened upon the baggage-saddle of a camel. It is called *abu ẓhûr al-markab.* Only the Ruwala possess this. No other tribe has anything like it. As they believe, the *abu ẓhûr* comes from Ruweil (the eponymous ancestor of the Ruwala) and is called *abuẓ hûr* (*pater aeterni saeculi*) because it is passed on from generation to generation through the ages. *Abu ẓhûr* is the visible focus ... of all the tribes of the *zana*-Moslems. Whoever has it in his possession is prince of all these tribes, and they are obligated to follow him in battle. Every year a white camel is sacrificed before it, with the words, 'This is thy sacrifice, O Abu Ẓhûr!,' and its blood is sprinkled upon the corner posts of the structure. In this *abu ẓhûr* Allah takes pleasure in abiding and imparts directions to the tribe through external signs. Ofttimes the ostrich-feathers are supposed to tremble, although there may be no wind. Ofttimes the structure is believed to bow itself unceasingly to the right. This signifies *ḳudrat min allâh,* 'the power of God.' ... If the camel bearing the *abu ẓhûr* begins to move, the entire tribe follows it; where the *abu ẓhûr* lets itself down, there the camp is set up. Whenever the Ruwala are threatened by a powerful enemy and fear defeat (but only then) they bring the *abu ẓhûr*, and with it at their head they attack the enemy."

The points of similarity and manifest relationship between this strange object and the various Biblical traditions about the ark are almost startling. It too has the power of selecting the road it wishes to take, by driving the camel

[111] Cf. Cory, *Ancient Fragments*, 9.

[112] *Die Kultur*, XI (1910), 8f., quoted from Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, 37 (1917–1918), 220f.

which bears it irresistibly onwards. It too leads its people through the desert and determines their nightly camping-places by causing the camel bearing it to kneel, implying thereby that there it desires to stop and remain for the night. It too imparts oracles and, in the interest of its tribe, declares future events. It too goes into battle with its people and gives them victory over its and their enemies. And not this alone, for it does not go into every battle, but only into those battles where the danger is urgent and the security of the tribe is greatly imperilled. Just this was the procedure with the ark; for it was not taken into the first battle with the Philistines, where, seemingly, the tribes of Israel felt quite confident of victory. Only after this first defeat, and when the danger impending had become fully apparent, did they fall back upon their last resort, in which, clearly, they had implicit confidence, and bring the ark with them into battle. And, most significant of all these points of contact with the ark, Allah is thought to reside in the *abu ẓhûr*, if not permanently, then upon occasions when the tribe has need of him and his presence with them, just as, as we have seen, Yahwe too was at first thought to reside in the ark; and every year a sacrifice, and a major sacrifice at that, since it consists of a white camel, is offered to the *abu ẓhûr*, or to the deity associated with it, and the blood thereof is sprinkled upon the corner-posts of the peculiar object, with the significant words, "This is thy sacrifice, O Abu Ẓhûr."

And this parallelism becomes still more significant when we realize that Musil failed to grasp the full significance of this peculiar object and the rôle which it played in the life of the tribe, and particularly in its warfare, having been misled somewhat by the popular but incorrect interpretation of the name *abu ẓhûr*. This was more clearly recognized by Hartmann and Torczyner.[113] The latter scholar quotes a verse,

[113] "Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 265.

recorded by Curtiss,[114] as having been communicated to him by a Ruwala-tribesman,

> Abu ed-Duhûr will come unfailingly
> To help those who put on their equipment for war;
> And through him their horses become fear-inspiring.

As Curtiss has pointed out, *abu ẓhûr*, according to these verses, plays exactly the rôle of a tribal deity, and particularly a deity who gives his tribesmen victory in war. In all likelihood *abu ẓhûr* was originally the actual name of the tribal deity of the Ruwala, which has, however, under the influence of official Islam, superficial though it be with the Bedouin tribesmen, been half forgotten with the passage of time, and lingers on chiefly, if not entirely, in its association with this peculiar tribal cult- or war-object.

In one other respect Musil's description of this object, based upon the information given to him, was somewhat inexact, in that it was claimed that this was the only object of its kind, and that no other people possessed anything like it. The full name of this object was communicated to Musil as *abu ẓhûr al-markab*. The consideration given to the very important first half of the name has tended to detract somewhat from the consideration which the second half likewise merits.

Markab connotes in Arabic a vehicle of any kind used for transportation, whether wagon, boat or beast of burden. Burckhardt[115] is our authority for the fact that the Bedouin

[114] *Ursemitische Religion im Volksleben des heutigen Orients*, XV. Moreover, according to Canaan ("Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, IV [1924], 83), Abu ed-Dhûr is the name of "a rock, situated on the left side of the carriage road from Jerusalem to Jericho, after passing 'ên el-Ḥôḍ. This rock has a widespread reputation for the cure of backache. After a patient has rubbed his back against the rock, he places a stone on it. When last I saw this 'father of rocks,' he was loaded with a large heap of stones. He is not assigned at present to any *weli*, and I can not explain its widespread therapeutic use, except by assuming that it may have been once connected in some way with a holy man or object of worship." Doubtless had Canaan been familiar with the *abu ẓhûr* of the Ruwala, and the evidence pointing to a former tribal deity Abu ed-Duhûr, he would have associated this rock with him.

[115] *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys*, 82f.

tribes of the North Arabian desert actually possess several such objects, or at least did so a century ago. He says, "Some of the Aeneze chiefs use, in time of war, what may perhaps be styled the 'battle banner'; for it is never displayed but in decisive and important actions, where the fall or the loss of it is regarded as a signal of defeat. This standard is of two sorts, one called *merkeb* (مركب, or the 'ship'), consisting in two stands of wood, about six or seven feet high;... These are placed one opposite to the other on a camel's back, so that above there is not more than a span's distance between them; but below they are sufficiently separated for a person to sit in the midst on a saddle, and guide the camel: the upper part of this standard is covered with black ostrich feathers.

"The other sort of banner is called *'otfe* (عطفة); this consists of two side pieces of board, of an oblong square form, about five feet high, ornamented like the other with ostrich feathers. Such is now used by the *Teyar*, the chief of *Would Aly... En Ibsmeyr* and *Ibn Fadhel* have each a *merkeb*. The guide of the camel, that carries either a *merkeb* or an *'otfe*, is never an adult free-born Arab, but a boy, an old woman, or a slave; for it is thought beneath the dignity of a man to sing or howl the cry called زغاريت, with which the guide animates those who accompany the standard to battle. All the horsemen assemble around it; and the principal efforts of both parties are directed against the respective *merkeb* or *'otfe* of the enemy. A captured banner is borne in triumph to the tent of the victorious sheikh."

According to this description of Burckhardt there are two varieties of this peculiar object, one called *merkeb* and the other *'otfe*. Seemingly they differ only in form and outward appearance, but serve exactly the same function. Burckhardt apparently heard nothing from his informers about Allah or any tribal deity residing in this object, nor of its being used for purposes of divination. He heard of only one function which it discharged, viz. that of the tribal banner or palladium in battle, however not used indiscriminately for this purpose, but carried by the tribe only into the most important and decisive engagements. Its presence there was obviously

assumed to ensure victory to its tribe. On the other hand Burckhardt's description adds one significant element, totally lacking in that of Musil, and apparently not heard of by him in connection with the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala, viz. that of the rider, whether boy, old woman or slave, in the *merkeb*, whose task was by his cries to spur on the warriors to extreme efforts. Finally, Burckhardt's description establishes with certainty that the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala is not, as they claimed, the only object of its kind, but that similar objects are, or at least were quite recently, possessed by other tribes or tribal chieftains.

Still further light is shed upon this strange object, and particularly upon that of the Ruwala, by Wetzstein.[116] "Should it develop that they become convinced that victory can not be won except by extreme measures, they have still in the 'Oṭfa a final and in fact a very drastic means of inflaming the battle-spirit. The 'Oṭfa is a lattice-work object, made of strong wood, four-cornered, of greater length than width, and almost oval in shape, which is fastened upon the back of a strong, decorated camel. The older the 'Oṭfa is, the more it possesses the qualifications for serving as the palladium of its people; that of the Ruwala, one of the large 'Anesa-tribes of the Syrian desert, of which I made a drawing in 1860 in the tent of the tribal battle-leader, is said to be hundreds of years old. Before the beginning of the battle an especially handsome and reputable woman or maiden, if possible the one of highest rank within the tribe, adorned as a bride, unveiled, and, what has a peculiarly disturbing effect upon the Arabs, with hair flying loose and neck laid bare, mounts the 'Oṭfa, rides in front of the first battle-line and halts before the elite of the army, the youth of the tribe, in order to direct toward them the Intichâ, i. e. the solemn charge either to win the victory or to die. This consists of the little word liainêki, 'for thy two eyes!' Thereupon the 'Oṭfa advances upon the enemy and the battle begins. The greatest slaughter naturally takes place in the neighborhood of the

[116] *Verhandlungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie*, X (1878), 389; quoted from Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, 37 (1917–1918), 219f.

'Oṭfa, towards the capture and defence of which the main efforts of both sides are directed. During the combat the occupant of the 'Oṭfa, standing erect and turning now here, now there, spurs her fellow-tribesmen on with glance and gesture, with loud challenge and calling individual warriors by name, with praise and blame and the trilling sounds of the Zaġrûta (the customary cries of joy of the attendants of the bride at weddings). Not infrequently the entire body of male youth has fallen beside the ,Oṭfa. Likewise it is often captured, a fact which is remembered as a lasting humiliation for many generations. However, the beautiful woman, captured with the 'Otfa, is always treated honorably, and is released for a ransom, but one of very great amount. The ,Oṭfa remains as the trophy of the victor, if it is not recaptured by an attack upon the enemy's camp."

This description of Wetzstein adds some significant information to our knowledge of these peculiar objects. In the first place it confirms the fact that the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala is not unique, but that there are, or at least were, among the Bedouin tribes of the Syrian desert other like objects. In the second place it gives further information about the particular object of the Ruwala. Significantly this object, which Musil heard designated by the descriptive title *al-markab,* Wetzstein must have heard called *'oṭfe.* This indicates that the two names are apparently used interchangeably, without the distinction between them which Burckhardt recorded. Furthermore, the older an *'oṭfe* is, the more respect it enjoys, presumably because it is thought to be therefore more powerful and effective. That of the Ruwala seems to have been regarded as unusually old and therefore to have enjoyed a particular reputation and veneration. According to Wetzstein only a beautiful and highly respected woman occupies the *'oṭfe,* whereas according to Burckhardt, this is instead a boy, an old woman or a slave. There is no reason to question the reliability of both accounts. The facts in the case seem to be that the customary occupant of the *'oṭfe* is a young woman, who plays the rôle of a battle-maiden, spurring on fellow-tribesmen by her cries, her gestures and glances, and

even not infrequently by shouts of praise or rebuke for this or that individual warrior. Not infrequently, however, this rôle may be filled by an old woman, a boy or a slave; only never an actual warrior. An *'otfe* captured in battle, is retained by the captors, so long as possible, as a trophy of victory. But, as is but natural, the conquered tribe makes every possible effort to regain its palladium, and until it succeeds in doing this, it feels itself humiliated and dishonored.

Further information of some significance about the *'otfe* of the Ruwala is given by Blunt.[117] "The last thing loaded by Ibn Shaalán's people was the *uttfa*, a gigantic camel-hówdah used by the Roála whenever they expect a pitched battle, and then only. It is a huge cage of bamboo covered with ostrich feathers, and probably as old as the date of their first coming from Nejd, for ostriches are not found, I believe, north of Jebel Shammar. A delúl carries the *uttfa*, in which a girl is placed, whose business it is to sing during the fight, and encourage the combatants by her words. She needs to be stout-hearted as well as stout-lunged, for the battle generally groups itself round her, in attack and defence. The Roála have a superstitious feeling about her defence, and the enemy a corresponding desire to capture her, for it is a belief that with the loss of the *uttfa* the Roála tribe would perish. Formerly, each large Bedouin tribe had one of these; but now, perhaps from a scarcity of ostrich feathers and the difficulty of renewing them, the *uttfa* and the custom attached to it have disappeared, except among the Roála and, I believe, the Ibn Haddal.[118] To-day it was carried empty on the back of a fine she-camel."

This description of the *'otfe* of the Ruwala confirms that of Wetzstein, and likewise much of the general description of the *'otfe* and *merkab* given by Burckhardt. It also confirms the statement of Wetzstein that the regular occupant of the *'otfe* is a maiden of the tribe. Perhaps this was the regular

[117] *The Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 351.

[118] Lady Blunt adds the note that Palgrave mentions its existence among the Ajman, a tribe east of Jebel Shammar. However, she fails to give the reference for this, and I have not succeeded in locating it in Palgrave, *Central and Eastern Arabia.*

practice among the Ruwala, while among other tribes her place might be taken, at least occasionally, by an old woman, a boy or a slave, as Burckhardt records. The extreme regard and veneration with which the *'otfe* is treated is evidenced by the character of the camel which bears it, and also by the fact that when the tribe is about to set out on a journey the *'otfe* is the last object packed up. Apparently the loading of the *'otfe* upon the back of the particular camel designated to carry it might well serve as the signal for the tribe to set out.

Lady Blunt's description also confirms Wetzstein's statement with regard to the high age of the particular *'otfe* of the Ruwala. Apparently Lady Blunt regarded the decoration of ostrich feathers as essential to the *'otfe*, for she accounts for the gradual disappearance of this institution from among the various tribes by the assumption that this is because of the difficulty of securing sufficient ostrich feathers to keep the old *'otfes* in proper repair and to make new ones. This would accord somewhat with Musil's statement that it was through the waving of these ostrich feathers, particularly when there was no wind, that the deity associated with this particular *'otfe* was thought to impart oracular information. But this assumption of Lady Blunt is groundless; for, on the one hand, were it correct, we would expect to find the institution of the *'otfe*, with all the peculiar beliefs associated with it, far more general among the Bedouin tribes living to the south of the Syrian desert, where the ostrich is more common;[118a] and, quite significantly, the *'otfe* seems to be almost, if not entirely, unknown in that region. And, on the other hand, we shall have ample evidence that ostrich feathers are not at all essential to certain objects closely related to the *'otfe*. The gradual disappearance of the *'otfe* from among the Bedouin tribes, has, as we shall see shortly, a simpler, more natural and probable, and also for this study more significant reason.

Additional light is shed upon the nature and function of the *'otfe* by Rogers.[119] "The sheikhs of the 'Anazy tribes

[118a] According to Lawrence (*Revolt in the Desert*, 59) the ostrich is plentiful still today in the territory of the Sherarat, in the desert east of Tebuk. (Tebuk is on the railway almost due east of the southernmost point of the Sinaitic Peninsula).

[119] In *The Academy* of Mar. 31, 1883, 221f., writing from Cairo.

say that in ancient times every tribe had its 'Atfah, which was regarded as the repository of its valour and honour, and was only made use of on occasions of unusually serious importance. When a tribe went to war with a powerful opponent, the 'Atfah was placed on a strong and handsome camel, and was gaily and gorgeously decorated with ostrich-feathers, carpets, and embroidery work, and was surrounded by a band of warriors selected from among the bravest men of the tribe. In some tribes it was customary for a virgin, the daughter of one of the sheikhs, to take her seat under the canopy, and, by her singing, to incite the men to acts of bravery. Every effort was made and every precaution taken to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy; and, if the men engaged in fighting in another part of the field, or told off for the protection of the flocks or of the tents, perceived that the 'Atfah was in danger, they would leave their occupation, abandoning everything to rally round the mysterious emblem for its protection; for, if lost, the tribe was disgraced, and a new 'Atfah could not be made until after a victory over the enemy who had possessed himself of the original and the recovery of a remnant—be it ever so small a portion—of the old wooden framework. The captured 'Atfah could not be used by the victorious tribe, and it was therefore generally destroyed after capture. This custom accounts for the fact that of all the numerous tribes in the Syrian deserts only two now possess an 'Atfah."

This account is of extreme importance. In the first place it gives further confirmation to the conclusion that the customary, though by no means invariable, occupant of the *'otfe* was a maiden. And in the second place it too records that at one time the institution of the *'otfe* was quite common among Bedouin tribes, and accounts for its gradual disappearance, not by supposition, as did Lady Blunt, but by a fact of much significance. A new *'otfe* could not be made indiscriminately to replace an old one which had been captured or destroyed in battle. The capture of an *'otfe* was regarded as such a supreme calamity that the tribe did not hesitate at the most extreme efforts and sacrifices to protect

it. The tribe whose *'otfe* had been captured in battle was regarded as, and felt itself disgraced and humiliated. Not until it had regained its old *'otfe* through victory in battle, could it hold its head high once more. A new *'otfe* could be made only with at least a remnant of the old *'otfe* as its nucleus. A captured *'otfe* could not be used by its captors. Therefore, in order to forestall all possibility of its former tribe regaining it, or at least a portion of it, from which a new *'otfe* might be made, symbolic of the restored power of the now conquered tribe, a captured *'otfe* was usually destroyed. The inevitable result of such a practice must have been the gradual disappearance of the *'otfe* from among the Bedouin tribes. We can easily understand therefore why during the second half of the 19th century but one or two *'otfes* should still be in existence.

But the question arises here, Why, if the old *'otfe* were captured, could not a new one be made to replace it, unless at least a fragment of the old *'otfe* was used as the nucleus for it? An answer, altogether natural and of deep significance suggests itself. We have seen that, according to Musil's direct account, Allah was believed to reside in the *'otfe*, if not permanently, at least occasionally. Moreover, other important evidence links this particular *'otfe* of the Ruwala with Abu ed-Duhûr, apparently the old, half-forgotten, eponymous deity of this tribe. It is altogether probable that every ancient *'otfe* had similar associations, that it was regarded, in earlier and more primitive stages of its development, as the symbol, or even as the actual container of the tribal deity. In such case, its capture in battle would mean nothing other than this deity's capture by his enemies. It would imply, on the one hand, his own weakness and impotence in comparison with the enemy tribe and its deity; and on the other hand, it would imply that his old tribe was now without divine protection, was therefore in truth weak and humiliated. We can well understand, on the basis of this hypothesis, why a tribe would spare no effort and sacrifice to prevent the capture of its *'otfe*, and would even leave its cattle and its tents, of course with the women and children in them, unprotected and at

the mercy of the enemy, in order to protect its *'otfe* against capture.

Above all, on the basis of this assumption of an original association of *'otfe* and tribal deity, we can understand why a new *'otfe* could be made only with a portion, no matter how small, of the old one serving as a nucleus. For the old *'otfe* must have been charged in its every part with the spirit or indwelling of a deity. And this could be communicated to the new *'otfe* only by contact with the old one, and particularly if a portion of the old *'otfe*, charged with this divine essence, were built into the new one.[120] From this nucleus this divine essence spread until it completely permeated the new *'otfe*, and endowed it with a divinity and power equal to, and in fact identical with that of the old *'otfe*. Accordingly the complete destruction of an *'otfe* by its captors, made it absolutely impossible for its old owners to replace it. It must have meant to them and to their neighbors that they were a tribe entirely without divine protection, that they were therefore weak and impotent, held in light esteem by the surrounding tribes, and themselves disspirited and humiliated. It goes without saying too, just as Rogers states, that a captured *'otfe* could not be used by its captors. For, on the one hand, it had been the tribal deity of their enemies, and therefore could not be expected to bestow its divine help and blessing upon its former foes; and on the other hand, of what value would its help and blessing be to its captors, since in comparison with their own tribal deity it had proved of inferior strength and powerless to protect even itself from capture? To its captors it was of no avail whatever, but it might, despite its unquestionable divine nature, be destroyed by them with impunity. From such an impotent deity they had naught to fear.[121]

[120] Cf. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*,[2] index under *holiness* and *taboo*.

[121] Some such condition as this may account for the otherwise almost inexplicable fact that the tribes which came forth from Egypt adopted the worship of the Yahwe of the mountain in the desert, a deity up to that time apparently worshiped only by the Kenites, and certainly unknown to and not worshiped by them, as all the Biblical traditions, with the single exception of that of J,

The most recent account of the *'ọṭfe*[122] adds nothing to what has already been learned with regard to it; but inasmuch as it confirms a number of important facts, already elucidated, as well as for the sake of completeness, it may be cited here. It deals only with the oft-mentioned *'ọṭfe* of the

agree. Not impossibly the conditions which caused these tribes to settle in Egypt, or the misfortunes attendant upon them during their sojourn there, had made them lose faith in the strength and protective power of their former tribal deities. Not improbably they had even lost their old, tribal cult-objects or deity-symbols, comparable in every way, as we shall see shortly, to the present-day *'ọṭfe*, and so felt themselves entirely without a god of their own. Moses enheartened them with the message of a new god, who would adopt them as his people and take them under his protection. And when the power of this deity and his good-will towards them were manifested by the discomfiture and humiliation of the Egyptians and their gods, they were convinced of the truth of Moses' message and were ready to enter into covenant relations with this new and unquestionably powerful deity.

Similarly too the tribe of Dan must have been convinced by repeated defeat and the gradual decimation of their once powerful tribe at the hands of their Emorite or Philistine enemies, that their former tribal deity was unable to protect and prosper them. Quite probably too their old tribal cult-object, whatever it may have been, had been captured and destroyed, so that they now felt themselves entirely without a god of their own. At any rate their situation was so precarious that they had to resort to the desperate expedient of forsaking their old, tribal territory and migrating to a new home far to the north. On their way they stole the household idol of Micah, the Ephraimite, and adopted it as their new deity and tribal cult-object (Jud. 17–18). They could have been prompted to this last and altogether unusual and desperate act only if at the moment they actually had no tribal god and cult-object of their own. This extraordinary condition can be explained most satisfactorily by the above assumption of the capture and destruction of their former tribal cult-object, whatever it may have been.

This evidence suffices to prove that Jeremiah was wrong, even as far as Israel was concerned, in the implication of his rhetorical question, "Can a nation change its gods?" (2. 11). For his own day, with its large and powerful nations, each with its own elaborate pantheon, his question may have applied. But for ancient Israel, with its simple, primitive, tribal society, and for other Semitic peoples, dwelling upon the same tribal plane of social organization, the loss of old gods with the capture and destruction of old tribal cult-objects or god-symbols, and the consequent, eventual adoption by them of the worship of new and presumably more powerful deities, was by no means an impossible and unheard of, nor even uncommon procedure.

[122] Leachman, "A Journey in North-Eastern Arabia," *Geographical Journal*, 37 (1911), 267.

Ruwala. "As a rule the mounted men marched in front, behind them coming the thelul riders, while in the middle of them, on a picked 'thelul' (dromedary) was the 'Mirkab' of the Roalla. This consists of a frame covered with black ostrich feathers, in which a maiden from the sheikh's family rides in battle, exhorting the combatants to deeds of valour. In former times the 'Mirkab' was a familiar sight in Beduin warfare, but

In a very recent work (Seabrook, *Adventures in Arabia*, 85 ff.), published in 1927, after this article was written, the following description of the *'otfe* occurs (although the name *'otfe* is not used). "Pitched battles still occur occasionally among the prouder Bedouin tribes ..... The time and place are appointed. The opposing forces arrive panoplied, with all their tents and women, and set up their camps in full view of each other. Personal tournaments ..... often precede the battle.

"Instead of a flag or banner, each tribe has for its standard a sort of human oriflamme—an enormous throne fitted to a camel's back, a big, square litter with a canopy, completely covered with ostrich plumes dyed in brilliant colors. On the day of battle this throne is placed on a giant camel, with three or four of the most beautiful marriageable virgins of the tribe, dressed in crimson silks and adorned with all their jewels.

"A small camel boy, perched in front of the throne, guides the beast and they ride backward and forward, on the actual edge of the battle, screaming encouragement to their warriors.

"If a tribe goes down to absolute defeat, these chosen beauties become captive to the conquerors, but are treated with the greatest honor, and are even permitted to choose whom they will marry, though the most beautiful usually becomes a wife in the *hareem* of the sheik.

"..... On the day of the battle between the Sirdieh (a small but daring tribe dwelling east of the Djebel Druse) and Annezy, Gutul rode with three other Sirdieh beauties, and kept screaming to the camel boy to push in closer. At a moment when the battle seemed to be going against her tribe, she leaned forward, seized the bamboo wand from the little camel boy's hand, then knocked him off his precarious perch, and drove the camel forward into the thick of the battle, crying at the top of her lungs the prolonged 'ooo!—ooo!—ooo!—ooo!' ..... with the other girls screeching and clawing at her in terror.

"..... In the midst of the confusion and excitement, the Sirdieh rallied, and won the battle." (For this reference I am indebted to my friend and colleague, Dr. Sheldon H. Blank.)

The author had this account only from a secondary source. It is rather vague in its details and probably should not be pressed too strongly. It seems to depict a modified tradition of the *'otfe*, in which the rôle of the battle maiden (cf. below) is emphasized at the expense of the original, independent rôle of the *'otfe* itself.

now the Roalla are the only Beduin in possession of one." If this last statement be correct, then it follows that by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the other *'oṭfe* of which Lady Blunt and Rogers spoke as existent in their day, had disappeared, and only this one *'oṭfe* of the Ruwala was left. It is noteworthy too that Leachman speaks of it, just as did Musil at about the same time, as the *merkab*. Neither of them apparently heard it called *'oṭfe*, as the majority of the writers who preceded them did. The latter seems to have been the older and more specific name of this peculiar object, and of the entire class to which it belonged. *Merkab*, " vehicle," seems to be a younger and more general term for this class of objects.

That a young maiden of the tribe was usually the occupant of the *'oṭfe*, just as Wetzstein, Blunt, Rogers and Leachman, state, is clear from something further which Musil has to say.[123] " The Ṣḫûr lost their banner, el-bêraḳ, in an unsuccessful battle with Ibn Ša'lân. It was borne by the 'Aṭfa'. 'Aṭfa' means a fully matured maiden who, adorned with her best ornaments, sits upon a good riding-camel, swings the banner and with words and lashes drives the animal into the midst of the enemy. She is surrounded by the chosen men of her tribe, who must defend her; for should she be captured, the battle is lost and the tribe may never again carry with them either 'Aṭfa' or banner."

Here Musil represents the maiden as the bearer of the tribal banner, and seems to have no thought of her connection with the *'oṭfe*. In fact he seems to have no knowledge at all of the *'oṭfe*, and no doubt for this reason he failed to identify the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* of the Ruwala with the *'oṭfe*, as did Wetzstein, Blunt and Leachman. None the less the fact that the maiden who bears the tribal banner is known as the *'aṭfa'* indicates that this tribal banner is probably a comparatively late development among the Bedouin tribes, and that it is primarily a substitute for the older *'oṭfe*, gradually falling into disuse and disappearing, as practically all our authorities agree.

[123] *Arabia Petraea*, III, 377.

It indicates also that a maiden, and not an old woman, a boy or a slave, as Burckhardt states, was the customary occupant of the old *'oṭfe*. Perhaps, too, it is not without significance that the banner of the Ṣḫûr had its own name, *el-bêraḳ* (literally, "lightning"), just as has the *'oṭfe* of the Ruwala, *abu ẓhûr al-merkab*.

Doughty, too, has a brief but important word about this maiden.[124] Speaking of the well-clad and highly adorned maidens of the Beny Sâlem, a sub-tribe of the Harb, he says, "It seemed that any one of them might have been an *Atáfa* (or *Ateyfa*)—she that from her saddle frame warbles the battle-note, with a passionate sweetness, which kindles the manly hearts of the young tribesmen (and the Aarab are full of a wild sensibility).—They see her, each one as his spouse, without the veil, and decked as in the day of her marriage!—The Atáfa is a sheykh's daughter; but, said Hàmed, she may be another *mez'ûna*: it were infamous to kill an Atáfa; yet when shots flee, her camel may fall or run furiously, and the maiden-standard is in peril." From this passage it is clear that the name *'aṭáfa*, the technical term for the maiden who plays this rôle, is related to the name *'oṭfe*, and that it has survived among the Harb-Bedouin even though the *'oṭfe* itself has apparently disappeared, and the maiden has become but an ordinary, even though gayly dressed and adorned, camel-rider, spurring on the young warriors of her tribe to supreme efforts in battle. It indicates that at one time the institution of the *'oṭfe* was more general among the Arabs than it is at present, and that it is indeed, as Blunt and Rogers say, gradually disappearing. This passage also confirms our previous conclusion that originally the regular occupant of the *'oṭfe* was a maiden, the battle-maiden of the tribe, and not, as Burckhardt states, an old woman, a boy or a slave. This last, if correct, is probably a degenerate form of the older custom.

Elsewhere[125] Doughty writes as follows, "I might sometimes see heaving and rolling above all heads of men and cattle

[124] *Arabia Deserta*, II, 304.
[125] *Ibid.*, I, 61.

in the midst of the journeying caravan, the naked frame and posts of the sacred *Mahmal* camel which resembles a bedstead, and is after the fashion of the Beduish woman's camel-litter. It is clothed on high days with a glorious pall of green velvet, the prophet's colour, and the four posts are crowned with glancing knops of silver. I understand from grave elders of the religion, that this litter is the standard of the Haj, in the antique guise of Arabia, and yet remaining among the Beduw; wherein, at any general battle of tribes, there is mounted some beautiful damsel of the sheykhs' daughters, whose generous loud *Alleluias* for her people, in presence of their enemies, inflame her young kinsmen's hearts to leap in that martial dance to a multitude of deaths." The comparison which Doughty makes here between the *maḥmal* of the pilgrim-caravan to Mecca and the ancient Bedouin *'oṭfe* is suggestive indeed and leads to significant conclusions.

The *maḥmal* is described by Lane as follows;[126] "It is a square skeleton-frame of wood, with a pyramidal top; and has a covering of black brocade, richly worked with inscriptions and ornamental embroidery in gold, in some parts upon a ground of green or red silk, and bordered with a fringe of silk, with tassels surmounted by silver balls. Its covering is not always made after the same pattern with regard to the decorations; but in every cover that I have seen, I have remarked, on the upper part of the front, a view of the Temple of Mekkeh, worked in gold; and, over it, the Sultán's cypher. It contains nothing; but has two mus-hafs (or copies of the Kur-án), one on a scroll, and the other in the usual form of a little book, and each enclosed in a case of gilt silver, attached, externally, at the top... The five balls with crescents, which ornament the Mahmal, are of gilt silver. The Mahmal is borne by a fine tall camel, which is generally indulged with exemption from every kind of labour during the remainder of its life.

[126] *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (3rd ed.), 404f.

"It is related that the Sultán Ez-Záhir Beybars, King of Egypt, was the first who sent a Mahmal with the caravan of pilgrims to Mekkeh, in the year of the Flight 670 (A. D. 1272), or 675; but this custom, it is generally said, had its origin a few years before his accession to the throne. Sheger-ed-Durr (commonly called Shegeret-ed-Durr), a beautiful Turkish female slave, who became the favourite wife of the Sultán Es-Sáleh Negm-ed-Deen, and on the death of his son (with whom terminated the dynasty of the house of Eiyoob) caused herself to be acknowledged as Queen of Egypt, performed the pilgrimage in a magnificent 'hódag' (or covered litter), borne by a camel; and for several successive years her empty hódag was sent with the caravan merely for the sake of state. Hence, succeeding princes of Egypt sent, with each year's caravan of pilgrims, a kind of hódag (which received the name of 'Mahmal' or 'Mahmil'), as an emblem of royalty; and the kings of other countries followed their example. The Wahhábees prohibited the Mahmal as an object of vain pomp; it afforded them one reason for intercepting the caravan."

This is the description of the Egyptian *maḥmal*. It is clear that Lane has given here, and in authoritative manner, the traditional account of the origin of this peculiar institution current in Cairo in the 19th century. According to this tradition the institution of the *maḥmal* is only approximately six hundred and fifty years old. The authenticity of this tradition is strongly questioned by Snouck Hurgronje,[127] who points out that in addition to this *maḥmal* from Cairo, and likewise the one from Damascus, to which Doughty refers, there were in ancient times various other *maḥmals*, representing the various parts and lands of the Moslem world and the princes who ruled over them. The *maḥmal* from Irak played an important rôle in the history of Mecca in 1320, but forty-nine years after the traditional date of the origin of the Egyptian *maḥmal*, and the *maḥmal* from Yemen played a similar rôle in 1380; and, as Snouck Hurgronje remarks, this was certainly not the first time that the latter *maḥmal* had

[127] *Mekka*, I, 84 ff.

come to Mecca. In the light of these facts he asks very pertinently how it is possible that all the rival princes of Moslem states should have hit upon exactly the same method of representing themselves in the pilgrimage to Mecca, so very soon after the custom had been instituted by the Egyptian princess. He is therefore inclined to believe that the institution of the *maḥmal* must have had some different and more ancient origin. He furthermore cites De Goeje,[128] who suggests the possibility of some relation between the *'otfe*, the *maḥmal* and the old Arabic custom of carrying portable shrines upon a journey or into battle. But these portable shrines can scarcely be aught other than the *'otfe* of the present-day Bedouin. Snouck Hurgronje likewise cites the custom still observed in Djiddah, the sea-port of Mecca, that in the celebration of their folk-festivals the people of the different quarters of the city make *maḥmals*, each quarter having its own festival and each its own *maḥmal*, and each trying to outdo its rival quarters in the fabrication of its *maḥmal*. These facts are significant. They point to the conclusion that the folk-tradition of the origin of the *maḥmal*, cited by Lane, is altogether unauthentic, and evidences no more than that the institution is of such antiquity that its true origin is entirely unknown to the modern Muslim.

Moreover, the facts cited by Lane, that no matter how the details of the external adornment of the Egyptian *maḥmal* may vary from year to year, two details are constant, viz. the representations of the Ka'aba, or the Temple at Mecca, and of the two copies of the Koran upon the front side

[128] *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientales,*[2] No. 1, 180. De Goeje cites in particular the portable shrine of Mokhtar, mentioned by Tabari (translation Zotenberg, II, 702, 706). Unfortunately this is not accessible to me. However the same object was referred to by Ibn al-Wardy as follows; "In the year 66 of the Hejra, al-Mukhtar ibn 'Ubaid-Allâh ath-thaky went to al-Kûfa to avenge the blood of al-Hussein . . . The al-Mukhtar took unto himself a throne (Kuray [this is probably an error for Kursay]), and proclaimed that it contained a mystery, being to them exactly what the ark was to the children of Israel, and when al-Mukhtar sent the army to attack 'Ubaid-Allah ibn Zayâd, he went out with this throne on a mule, which carried him (or it [undoubtedly the latter]) into battle." (Quoted from Rogers, *op. cit.*)

of the *maḥmal*-cover, coupled with the additional fact that, despite the Egyptian tradition that Sheger-ed-Durr occupied the first *maḥmal*, none the less all *maḥmals* are entirely empty, point to one significant conclusion, viz. that originally the *maḥmal*, whatever its earliest name among the Arabs may have been, was the empty litter in which the deity of the tribe or tribes to which it belonged, was thought to ride, while upon the many wanderings of the nomad tribe. Nay more, since the *maḥmal* in the present day appears only in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, a difficult and dangerous journey indeed, particularly in ancient, and in fact until quite recent times, the thought suggests itself that originally the *maḥmal* was believed to be the actual guide of the pilgrim-caravan through the difficult and dangerous desert; it was thought to be the divine power which selected the road which the caravan must take, in order to arrive in safety at its destination. The peculiar, sacred character of the camel which bears the *maḥmal* tends to confirm this hypothesis. And perhaps some slight additional confirmation thereof may even be found in the tradition that it was a woman and a princess at that, who was the first occupant of the Egyptian *maḥmal*; for, as we have seen, the regular occupant of the '*otfe* was a maiden, and always the noblest maiden of the tribe. Unquestionably there is much probability to De Goeje's proposed correlation of the *maḥmal* and the *otfe*.

This conclusion is confirmed by certain additional considerations all pointing to the original conception of the *maḥmal* as being of divine character, or at least as possessing divine powers. Lane tells also,[129] in his description of the ceremonies incidental to the return of the *maḥmal* to Cairo, how he joined in the procession and came close to the *maḥmal*. "After touching it three times, and kissing my hand, I caught hold of the fringe, and walked by its side. The guardian of the sacred object, who walked behind it, looked very hard at me, and induced me to utter a pious ejaculation, which perhaps prevented his displacing me; or possibly my dress in-

[129] *Op. cit.*, 406f.

fluenced him; for he only allowed other persons to approach and touch it one by one; and then drove them back. I continued to walk by its side, holding the fringe, nearly to the entrance of the Rumeyleh. On my telling a Muslim friend, to-day, that I had done this, he expressed great astonishment; and said that he had never heard of any one having done so before; and that the Prophet had certainly taken a love for me, or I could not have been allowed: he added, that I had derived an inestimable blessing; and that it would be prudent in me not to tell any others of my Muslim friends of this fact, as it would make them envy me so great a privilege, and perhaps displease them. I can not learn why the Mahmal is esteemed so sacred. Many persons showed an enthusiastic eagerness to touch it; and I heard a soldier exclaim, as it passed him, 'O my Lord! Thou hast denied my performing the pilgrimage!'"

From this account it is not clear whether the soldier's words, "O my Lord!", were addressed to the *maḥmal*, or were merely an ejaculation. But from the remainder of the account it is evident that a large measure of sanctity is popularly believed to reside in the *maḥmal*, and that he who merely touches or kisses it derives by contact a *baraka* or blessing, a portion of its sacred strength or power; therefore the sacred and taboo character of the camel which carried it upon the journey to and from Meccah and its exemption from work for the remainder of its life. For this reason too the fact that Lane was not only privileged to touch it just once, but to hold fast to the fringe and march alongside of the *maḥmal* for a considerable distance, implied that a very large measure of *baraka* had been permitted to pass into him. Of this fact, and also of the additional fact that he, a non-Moslem, had dared to touch the sacred object, his pious Moslem acquaintances may well have been jealous.

Lane's description of the *maḥmal* is corroborated in every detail by that of Rogers,[130] who likewise witnessed the procession incidental to its return from Meccah in 1882 or 1883.

[130] *Op. cit.*

He writes, "It is a large frame of wood, capable of being carried by a strong camel. When in the procession it is covered with a green veil, richly embroidered with ornaments and inscriptions in gold thread, and with heavy fringes and tassels. It is surmounted by silver-gilt knobs at the top and four corners, and a copy of the Kurân in a silver-gilt case is suspended from the top. Lane states that in his time the covering was black; but certainly for many years past it has been green... The Mahmil contains nothing.

"If one asks the Muslims of Cairo what the Mahmil is intended to represent, they only say that it is in memory of the camel-saddle and canopy in which the Mamluke Queen of Egypt, Shajar ad durr, performed her pilgrimage to Mekka and Medinah in the thirteenth century of our era. On asking whether such a ceremony existed before her time, they reply that they have no records of any previous Mahmil. I have frequently tried to elicit an expression of opinion as to some other origin, but without result. If the Mahmil be simply an emblem of the saddle on which a Queen of Egypt performed her pilgrimage, herself a foreigner and probably a convert to Islamism, not born in the faith, why should the Muslim world venerate it to such an extent? And, again, why does a similar Mahmil start simultaneously from Damascus?"

These questions are indeed apposite. They are practically the same as those raised by Snouck Hurgronje. They find a ready and natural answer in the proposed correlation of the *maḥmal* and the *'oṭfe*. And in fact Rogers himself, although, it must be admitted, upon rather superficial grounds and without any real understanding of the full implication of his hypothesis, suggested that there must have been an original relationship, a development from a common source, not only of the *maḥmal* and the *'oṭfe*, but also of the ancient ark of Israel.

From all this evidence it is clear that the *'oṭfe* is indeed an ancient institution among the Arabs, that in olden days it was much more common than it is to-day, and that, as a number of the authorities, whom we have cited, have remarked, the institution is gradually disappearing from among the Bedouin tribes, and in fact actually survives to-day in only a

comparatively few tribes, and in these in what is probably a more or less degenerate form. The reason for this gradual disappearance of the *'oṭfe* is certainly not, as we have already remarked, that which Lady Blunt surmised, viz. the present-day difficulty of obtaining ostrich feathers with which to keep the *'oṭfes* in proper repair; for ostriches are hardly less plentiful to-day in the Arabian Desert than in ancient times, and had ostrich feathers been essential to the making and functioning of the *'oṭfe*, they would unquestionably have been used as generally in ancient days in the making of *'oṭfes* as they seem to be to-day; but this conclusion what little evidence there is does not support. Moreover, the *maḥmal*, apparently a variant and highly decorated form of the *'oṭfe*, has not the slightest suggestion of ostrich feathers in its makeup. Unquestionably the reason for the gradual disappearance of the *'oṭfe* from among the Bedouin tribes, given by Rogers, viz. the eventual capture and total destruction of almost all the tribal *'oṭfes* by hostile tribes, and the consequent inability of the original possessors of these captured *'oṭfes* to replace them, accounts for this circumstance far better.

Undoubtedly too this condition is furthered by a certain development and progress in Bedouin culture, extremely slow and almost imperceptible, it is true, but none the less real. This, coupled with the influence of Islam upon the life and practice of the Bedouin tribes, must have contributed not a little to the gradual disappearance of the *'oṭfe*. For while it is true that among these tribes the recognition and observance of Islam are more formal and superficial than real, this is true rather of the positive aspects of its observance than of the negative. Negatively Islam has exerted quite a far-reaching influence upon the old nomad life and institutions, in that, partly directly and officially and partly indirectly and unofficially, it has stamped certain ancient beliefs, rites and institutions as out of accord with fundamental Moslem principles, and has thus made for their gradual cessation and disappearance. This procedure is clearly illustrated by the Wahhaby attitude of disapproval of and opposition to the *maḥmal*, recorded by Snouck Hurgronje. Not improbably

these Wahhaby rigorists have a suspicion, and perhaps even a faint knowledge, of a non-Islamic origin of the *maḥmal*, remote though this be. This process, which might be illustrated further by the history of the development of every religion, and not least of all by that of ancient Israel, and particularly by the Deuteronomic and early post-Deuteronomic attitude toward the ark, as we have established it, is the most natural and logical reason for the gradual disappearance of the *'otfe*.

Now it is significant that, with the single exception of the tradition of Shegger-ed-Durr, and this tradition has little or no historic evidence to validate it, the *maḥmal* always is empty, so far as human occupants are concerned. It is true that, according to Snouck Hurgronje, the various *maḥmal*s have appeared at Mecca in historical times, i. e. during the last six hundred and fifty years, as the representatives of the rulers of the chief lands or divisions of the Moslem world; but this is undoubtedly a secondary association, a concession to Islam and a modification of the original, non-Islamic import of the *maḥmal*. Still further concessions to Islam in this connection may be seen, perhaps, in the representation of the temple at Mecca upon the forward face of the cover of the Cairo *maḥmal*, and certainly in the fixing of a copy of the Koran, according to Rogers, or even two copies, one in scroll form and one in book form, according to Lane, on the upper part thereof. This association of *maḥmal* and Koran gave to the former an Islamic association and symbolism which unquestionably it did not possess originally. It assigned a definite and important place in the official worship of Allah to an institution which originally probably had little or no connection with the worship of this deity, unless perhaps in the "days of ignorance" before Mohammed, when it was in all likelihood one of the various, common, tribal symbols of pre-Islamic Arabian deities.

What its particular character and functions may have been in this early period, we can, of course, not determine, except to assume that they were the same as those of all other objects of this class, viz. to give victory to the tribesmen in battle and to guide the tribe upon its journeys through the desert.

A faint trace of this last function seems to have survived in the association of the *maḥmal* with the pilgrimage to Mecca and the attendant journey thither through the desert. But whether this points to a regular gathering at Meccah in pre-Islamic days of the *maḥmals* or *'oṭfes* or *merkabs*, or whatever may have been the official name of these peculiar objects in that remote period, for the celebration of a great, annual festival at the sanctuary there, it is, of course, scarcely possible to determine with certainty. Such a conclusion would, however, be quite probable in case such a festival had more than local significance, and served as the occasion for the gathering of many tribes for purposes of religious celebration. Then what more natural and probable than that each tribe should bring with it, and indeed feel that it had been led thither through the desert, by the symbol of its tribal deity? In the celebration of such a festival there would then have been a considerable gathering at Mecca of *'oṭfes*, *maḥmals*, *merkabs*, and other similar tribal palladia and symbols of tribal deities, such as actually took place there in connection with the celebration of the Hajj in the 13th and 14th centuries A.D. and likewise takes place, although to a much less extent, even in the present day.

Now, as has been said, with the single exception of Shegger-ed-Durr, there is no indication of the presence of a human occupant within the *maḥmal*, nor of the association of any human being with it in any kindred capacity. Nor is there any indication of or room for the presence of a human being, whether maiden or some other person, in the *'oṭfe* while on the march, and particularly while discharging the function of leading the tribe through the desert. The human being, whether maiden or old woman, slave or young boy, was present in the *'oṭfe* only when the latter went into battle, but apparently at no other time. And, as we have seen, participation in battle seems to be, or to have been, but one of the important functions of the *'oṭfe*. The presumption is strong therefore that the presence of a human being in the *'oṭfe*, even during a battle, is not original and primary, but that it is rather secondary, and probably the result of the

fusion of two ancient institutions, both of which apparently underwent considerable modification in the course of time, chiefly because of the growing influence of Islam, and both of which even threatened to disappear completely, as they are, in fact, doing to-day. Such a condition and such an impending fate tend mightily to such fusion and to the consequent acquisition of renewed strength and power of perpetuation for a time of the newly organized institution resulting from the fusion. This fusion, if this assumption be correct, must itself have been of considerable antiquity, as the not inconsiderable mass of evidence thereof, and particularly the development of the technical name, *'atâfa* or *'ateyfa*, recorded by Doughty, indicates.

This institution of the battle-maiden in the practice of warfare among Semitic tribes seems to be of great antiquity, even though the evidence therefor, due to easily comprehensible reasons, is scanty indeed. In addition to the general evidence of the practice among Bedouin tribes, not only in modern, but likewise in ancient days, we have the specific instance of Aisha playing just this rôle at the Battle of the Camel in the year 36 A.H. (656 A.D.).[131] In this battle Aisha rode upon a thoroughbred camel, of unusual value. She was in the thick of the battle, spurring on her warriors to heroic efforts. Seventy men of the Banū Ḍabba fell about her in the vain attempt to defend her. Her camel was killed in the battle and she was captured by Ali. She was treated by him with every possible consideration and given her complete freedom.[132] We do not know that the term *'atâfa* was actually applied to Aisha in connection with her rôle in this battle, nor that the camel upon which she rode was caparisoned with an actual *'oṭfe*. But certainly she did play exactly the rôle of the battle maiden on this occasion; and apparently it was not a novel nor unfamiliar rôle to her or her contemporaries and was governed by definite regulations and principles. It may be inferred too, from the charge to Deborah, in Jud. 5. 12, to recite her song in the battle of the Israelite tribes against their Canaanite foes, that in this battle she too played the rôle of

[131] So Hartmann, "Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, 37 (1917–1918), 222.
[132] Cf. article, "Aisha," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, I, 216 f.

the battle-maiden, spurring the warriors of Israel to valorous deeds and to victory against their enemies.[133] But if so, then the institution of the battle-maiden must have existed also in ancient Israel.

We can readily understand why this institution should have disappeared regularly at a fairly early stage of the cultural evolution of Semitic peoples and have left but little trace in their literatures. For it is self-apparent that this institution is intimately bound up with and adapted only to early, tribal methods of warfare. So soon as Semitic peoples advanced beyond primitive tribal organization and form of government and methods of warfare, and developed an inter-tribal, and eventual monarchical, system of government and new methods of systematic warfare by well-organized and disciplined armies, the old institution of the battle-maiden was bound to disappear. And since this phase of cultural evolution as a rule went hand in hand with, or perhaps even preceded somewhat, the development of the art of writing and the free production of literature, it follows naturally that in Semitic literature references to the institution of the battle-maiden are comparatively few and obscure. But the evidence which we have gathered, scanty though it undoubtedly is, suffices to establish as probable that in the primitive days of Semitic tribal life and warfare the institution was fairly common, if not quite general. But the evidence also seems to indicate that it was originally an altogether independent institution, which had no primary association of any kind with the *'otfe* or other objects of this class, and that the present connection is due entirely, as we have suggested, to

[133] If this assumption be correct, then in both cases of Aisha and Deborah, this rôle was played, not by a maiden, but by a woman well along in years. For Aisha was forty-three years old at the time of the Battle of the Camel; and to have built up the reputation and influence among the tribes which she apparently enjoyed at the time of the Battle of Taanach, Deborah too must have been a woman well advanced in age. This agrees with the statement of Burckhardt that an old woman frequently played the rôle of occupant of the *'otfe* and of battle-maiden. Certainly both Deborah and Aisha were women of highest standing and influence, not only in their own, but even among neighboring and kindred tribes.

the common fate of being outgrown culturally and eventually disappearing, which impended over both, which tended among the Bedouin tribes to fuse them and give them some renewed strength and power of persistence for a time.[134] But if this inference be correct, it would follow further that originally the *'oṭfe* or its historic antecedent was always empty, even when going into battle, precisely as the *maḥmal* is to-day and the *'oṭfe* or *merkab* itself also on all occasions except in battle.

Returning now to the *'oṭfe*, it is clear that the account given by Musil is surprising indeed. For it differs in quite a number of significant details from the specific descriptions of the very same object by Wetzstein and Lady Blunt. There can be no question as to the reliability of Musil's testimony; for on the one hand, he is too careful and authoritative an observer and master of Bedouin life and custom, and too experienced an investigator thereof, to have been misled; and on the other hand, the information given him about the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* agrees too completely with the facts which we have been able to establish concerning the early form and functions of the forerunners of the present-day *'oṭfe* and *maḥmal*, to be questioned. It is of course strange, and in fact almost inexplicable, that the information which Musil should have been able to gather from the Ruwala about the *abu ẓhûr al-markab*, from thirty to forty years after both Wetzstein and the Blunts had visited the same tribe, is so different and so much more primitive in certain essential details; but even such a condition is not impossible nor does it give any reason for questioning the correctness of Musil's statement, particularly since it is corroborated by the entirely independent testimony of Curtiss with regard to the significant fact of the name *abu ẓhûr* or Abu ed-Duhûr.

At any rate Musil's description of this strange object, in contrast to the other accounts which we have quoted, emphasizes the most primitive features of its character and

[134] It is perhaps of some significance in this connection that Musil heard nothing at all, apparently, of the maiden in connection with the *abu ẓhûr al-markab*, although both Wetzstein and the Blunts heard of her explicitly in just this connection.

functions. It determines the way through the desert which the tribe must go; it gives the tribe victory in battle; a deity, whether Allah, as Musil was told, or Abu ed-Duhûr, as the name implies, dwells in it, and imparts his will, and thus gives indication of future events, either by the fluttering of the ostrich feathers upon the object, even though there be no wind at the time, or by the object inclining itself to one side; every year a white camel is sacrificed before this object, i. e. of course to the deity resident in or associated with it, and the blood of this sacrifice is sprinkled upon the corner posts thereof.[135] This is primitive Semitic concept and practice indeed.

But just this description, in almost every detail, applies to the ark of Israel also. It too, according to Biblical tradition, selected the road which Israel was to travel through the desert; it too gave victory in battle; in it too a deity apparently was thought to dwell, and from it to give oracular decisions. And while there is no explicit evidence that in the earliest period of its history sacrifices were actually offered directly to the ark or to the deity thought to dwell in it, and that the blood thereof was sprinkled upon the ark, due entirely to the paucity of the evidence bearing upon the ark coming from this earliest period, it would be altogether reasonable to assume that such sacrifices were actually offered.[136] And

[135] Inasmuch as Abu ed-Duhûr seems to be, according to Curtiss, a kind of ancestral deity of the Ruwala, and inasmuch also as the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* goes into battle and brings victory to the tribe, this sacrifice may be regarded, in part at least, as offered originally to the tribal ancestral deity who gives victory in battle. It may therefore be compared with the sacrifice which the *ʿaḳîd*, or tribal military leader, offers in the evening preceding an anticipated battle, with the words, "This is thy supper, O our ancestor; help us today!, *hâḍa ʿašâk jâ ğiddina tufzeʿ lana-l-jowm.*" (Musil, *Arabia Petraea*, III, 382.)

[136] Not improbably the sacrifices recorded in I Sam. 6. 14 and II Sam. 6. 13, 17 were just such sacrifices, offered directly to the ark, and with the blood even sprinkled upon the ark, although the present text, accommodated to later theology, states explicitly that these sacrifices were offered to Yahwe, or "before Yahwe," literally "into the face of Yahwe." For this last expression as a technical term in the sacrificial parlance of modern Palestine, cf. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion Today*, English edition, Chap. XVI; German edition, Chap. 22.

this assumption would find strong confirmation in the practice recorded in the Priestly Code, of offering sacrifices before the holy of holies in which the ark was supposed to stand, and of sprinkling the blood thereof upon the veil before the ark, towards Yahwe, i. e. towards the ark itself,[137] and, in the particularly solemn ceremonies of the Day of Atonement, the ancient New Year's Day, even upon the *kapporeṯ* itself,[138] the empty golden throne of Yahwe resting, according to Priestly tradition, on top of the ark. Unquestionably at the bottom of this last ceremony lies some ancient New Year's Day rite, the origin of which may well reach back to that early period of Israel's history when sacrifice was actually offered directly to the ark, or to the deity thought to dwell within it, and the blood thereof was sprinkled upon the top or the four corners of the ark. This ceremony would then be practically identical with that practiced to-day by the Ruwala upon the *abu ẓhûr al-markab*. In the light of these facts there can not be the slightest question that the ancient ark of Israel was originally an object of the same kind and class as the *'otfe* and the *maḥmal*[139] of the present-day Arabs, and particularly of the *abu ẓhûr al-markab*[140] of the Ruwala.

We have seen that a deity was thought to dwell within the ark. The question arises here whether the ark was empty

[137] Lev. 4. 6, 17. [138] Lev. 16. 14f.

[139] In this connection it is of considerable significance to note that the two copies of the Koran affixed to the upper part of the front face of the *maḥmal* parallel in both character and purpose the two tablets of the Decalogue which tradition located in the ark. Both Korans and stone tablets served to give to what was originally an idolatrous or semi-idolatrous cult-object a sanction and a definite, legitimate place in the comparatively advanced worship of the new national deities, Yahwe in the religion of Israel and Allah in Islam. But why *two* stone tablets and *two* copies of the Koran it is difficult to determine. (Cf. note 149.) But the coincidence in the number two is probably not without significance.

[140] Torczyner (" Die Bundeslade und die Anfänge der Religion Israels," *Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 264) correctly correlates the element *al-markab* in the name *abû ẓhûr al-markab* with, on the one hand, the early function of the ark as a מרכבה or means of transportation of the deity thought to dwell within, and המרכבה associated with the cherubim in I Chron. 28. 18, and, on the other hand, with the Rabbinical tradition which represented Ezekiel's picture of the *k*bod Yahwe* and its method of transportation as המרכבה.

of any concrete object, or whether there was actually something within the ark with which the presence of this deity was associated. The question is difficult indeed, and in fact, because of lack of direct evidence no final and positive answer can be given to it.

One thing seems almost certain, that if the ark did contain some concrete object, this was certainly not an image, as Gressmann claims.[141] For the presence of an image or idol or any object of specific shape, would imply its exhibition on particular occasions; and there is not the slightest evidence of any such procedure in connection with the ark in any of the periods of its history. Instead the constant implication is that the deity is always within, and never outside the ark, as the presence of any image or like object fashioned in some particular shape for occasional display, would imply.

Furthermore, on first glance it seems that the ark might well be compared to those vehicles, whether boats or wagons or palanquins, borne by human beings or animals, in which the images of Babylonian and Egyptian deities were carried during their festal processions. And indeed both Gunkel[142] and Gressmann[143] have made this comparison. Nor can it be denied that in the third period of its history, and even during the transition from the second to the third period, marked by Ezekiel's conception of the enthroned *kebod Yahwe*, the ark did perform, in part at least, the functions of these vehicles of divine transportation. It is true, too, that the ark, likewise during the first period of its history, would seem to have resembled these vehicles, since it, too, was transported hither and thither, into battle or along the road through the desert, and of course in such journeyings, the deity associated with it invariably accompanied it. But this last comparison is more seeming than real. For both the Babylonian and Egyptian objects referred to were vehicles of transportation of the images of the gods and nothing more. They had no immediate and inseparable connection with the deity himself

[141] *Die Lade Jahves*, 17ff.
[142] "Die Lade Jahves ein Thronsitz," *ZMR*, 1906.
[143] *Op. cit.*

or with the image or object by which he was represented. Only during the few, brief moments of physical transportation of the image in the procession was it in direct contact and association with this vehicle, and at all other times the vehicle had but little, and that only secondary, divine significance. But with the ark it was entirely different. Whatever the contents of the ark may have been, by which the deity was symbolized, or in which he was thought to dwell, it was never removed nor dissociated from the ark, nor was the ark ever opened that it might be exhibited to the public gaze. It remained constantly within the ark, inseparably associated with it, so completely and concretely that the ark itself came in popular thought and speech to be identified with the deity; the ark itself was to all intents and purposes the deity, and to lay unguarded and ritually unfit hand upon the ark was exactly the same in effect as to lay hand upon the sacred object within; it violated the taboo in which that particular deity was enwrapped and entailed death. Only incidentally, therefore, and not at all fundamentally, was the ark, during the first period of its history, in any way similar to these vehicles of sacred transportation of the Babylonian and Egyptian religions. Its relationship to the *'oṭfe*, particularly in the earliest stages of the development of this object, is manifestly far closer.

What then was the ark; or rather, and more correctly, what could the contents of the ark have been? The most natural assumption is that the ark contained a *betyl* or sacred stone.[144] This conception was, of course, common among the primitive Semites,[145] and the evidence is ample that it was current in ancient Israel, particularly among the northern tribes.[146] This was the most natural and likely object in which

[144] So also Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, I, 457f.; Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie*,[1] 369; Bertholet, *Kulturgeschichte Israels*, 99.

[145] Cf. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*,[2] 200ff.

[146] Cf. Gen. 28. 20–22, and the name of the sanctuary and city Bethel. Ex. 3. 2ff. records a tradition of undoubtedly great antiquity, that Yahwe dwelt originally in the סְנֶה (notice הַסְּנֶה, always with the article, i.e. therefore, *the* סנה, the well-known סנה, well-known, of course, just because Yahwe was thought to dwell in it) upon Mount Horeb in the desert. Since this tradition is found in

a deity who must move or be transported from place to place would be thought to dwell. Such powers could scarcely be ascribed to a primitive deity thought to sojourn in a sacred tree or spring. Such deities are of necessity inseparably bound to one fixed spot, and at that spot they must remain forever localized until eventually their worship is outgrown and the memory of them disappears. But a deity thought to dwell in a sacred stone can well be conceived of as moving or being moved from place to place; and just such a deity was the god of the ark.

Moreover, the dominant tradition of the second period of the history of the ark, as we have seen, was that it contained two sacred stones, sacred it is true, not because a deity was thought to dwell in them, but only because the divinely revealed Decalogue was thought to be inscribed upon them; but sacred none the less. It is true that this tradition might have developed entirely independently of the presence in the original ark of a sacred stone. But, as we have suggested, in all likelihood the tradition of the two tablets of the Decalogue in the ark is secondary, and in its original form the tradition told only of the scroll of the Book of the Covenant within the ark. It would have been far more natural for the tradition to have retained this, its original form, since writing upon a scroll was more simple and general than engraving upon stone tablets.[147] In all likelihood therefore there was some good

the Elohist Code, it is probably of northern, Israelite origin. On first thought, therefore, it would be natural to correlate this tradition with the Ephraimite tradition of the ark and its deity, and to assume that what was in the ark was either this מנה itself or a piece thereof. This would not be at all impossible. But it is hardly probable, since to remove the מנה from the spot where it originally stood would have destroyed its life, and would no doubt have thereby terminated automatically whatever attributes of divinity this מנה was thought to have possessed.

[147] Even upon the famous relief upon the Hammurapi-stone, Shamash, the sun-god, seems to be handing to the king a copy of the laws inscribed upon a scroll. It is difficult to conceive of the object in the sun-god's right hand, outstretched to the king, as aught else. This is all the more noteworthy since just in Babylonia writing upon scrolls was far less common than upon clay bricks, and since, furthermore, this law code of Hammurapi, at least in the copy that has come down to us, was inscribed not upon a scroll but upon a stone monument.

reason for the development of this secondary and less natural form of the tradition, viz. that of the two stone tablets. And the simplest and most probable reason, and in fact the only one that can possibly be conceived of, is that early fact or tradition did know of the presence of a sacred stone in the ark, and that a strong remembrance of this persisted into the second period of the history of the ark. Consequently even after the attempt had been made to supplant the old fact or tradition by the new tradition that the ark contained the scroll of the Book of the Covenant, this new tradition was in time accommodated to the original tradition and so modified as to tell now that the ark did actually contain a sacred stone, or rather two sacred stones, but sacred now, no longer because a deity was thought to dwell in them, but only because the Decalogue was inscribed upon them.[148] In such case the

[148] In this connection it is perhaps of some significance that the form of this tradition apparently current in the Northern Kingdom, since it is recorded in E (Ex. 32. 16), ascribed a larger and more directly divine character to the tablets of the Decalogue than did the form of the tradition apparently current in the Southern Kingdom, since it is recorded in J (Ex. 34. 1ff.). E told that not only had the Deity revealed the Decalogue to Moses, but He had likewise prepared the tablets and inscribed the ten " words " upon them with His own hands. On the other hand, J told that it was Moses who prepared the tablets, although at Yahwe's command, and that he brought them with him up the mountain, and that Yahwe merely inscribed the Decalogue upon them. It is noteworthy too that D (Deut. 10. 1–4) follows J rather than E in this tradition. This is all the more significant, since ordinarily D follows E in preference to J. This seems to accord with the fact already noted, that the D writers held the ark and its contents in less esteem than did an earlier age and its writers. Perhaps for this reason they placed the stamp of their approval upon the J tradition, because it ascribed somewhat less of sanctity to the two tablets than did the E tradition.

We have already seen that the oldest traditions, those of K and C, knew nothing of the divine character of their scrolls of the " words," but told simply and naturally that Moses wrote these " words " upon a scroll.

In this connection, and for the sake of completeness, mention must be made of the hypothesis that the ark was naught other than the coffin of Joseph in which his bones or mummy were deposited. This hypothesis has been suggested more or less hesitatingly by Loisy, *The Religion of Israel*, 91; Volter, *Ägypten und die Bibel*, 92f.; Hartmann, " Zelt und Lade," *ZAW*, XXXVII (1917–1918), 237. According to Biblical and rabbinic tradition the coffin of Joseph was carried by Israel upon the exodus and the journey through the

tradition of the two sacred stone tablets within the ark would point strongly to the conclusion that the original contents of the ark must have been a sacred stone.[149] But since, as we have seen, a deity was thought to dwell within the ark, such a sacred stone within the ark could have been only a betyl, a stone in which a deity was thought to dwell, and naught else.

However, the question of what the ark actually contained is really, because of the insufficiency of the evidence and the uncertainty of the conclusions which may be drawn from them, of secondary importance. The outstanding and indubitable fact is that the ark was thought to contain something, and this something, whatever it was, was either conceived of as the deity himself, or as the object in which the deity was thought to reside permanently. Because of this the ark itself was very naturally identified with the deity thought to dwell in it, and was regarded therefore as an inherently sacred object, endowed with all the qualities of divine function and taboo.

Moreover, the ark was intimately, and apparently, inseparably associated with Shiloh. There was the sanctuary in which the ark stood, and there it, or rather the deity associated with it, was ministered to by the Levitical priestly family of Eli. From this sanctuary at Shiloh the ark was brought down to battle against the Philistines at Eben Haezer. And inasmuch as Shiloh lay in the territory of Ephraim, and was, as I Sam. 1 clearly indicates, the center of worship of the tribe of Ephraim,

wilderness. It was believed too to possess miraculous powers, such as being able to move of its own accord and even to select the way which it wished to go (cf. *Jewish Encyclopedia*, VII, 251; Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, II, 181ff.). But outside of these matters there are no significant points of contact between the ark and the coffin of Joseph. And as we have seen, such powers as these are commonly attributed in the Orient to the coffins of saints. It is of course quite natural and probable that some of the details of this tradition were borrowed from the older tradition of the ark.

149 Or perhaps two sacred stones. For an ingenious but hardly convincing explanation of the reason for two stones, cf. Torczyner, *op. cit.*, 252f. On the other hand, Proksch (*Das Nordhebräische Sagenbuch — Die Elohim-Quelle*, 374) is inclined to believe that there were no stones at all in the ark.

to which all its members pilgrimed at least once a year to offer their sacrifices and fulfill their vows, it follows that the ark with its contents must have been primarily the cult object of Ephraim.[150] It must have played for this tribe precisely the same rôle which the stolen ephod of Micah played for the tribe of Dan,[151] which the ephod which Gideon set up at Ophrah did for Manasseh,[152] which apparently the ephod at Nob, which Ebiathar brought down with him to David, did for Benjamin,[153] and which presumably other similar objects did for the other northern tribes.[154] As the cult object of Ephraim it was the center of its tribal worship, and was the natural object to go into battle with its tribe and give them victory over their foes. As a tribal cult-object discharging these functions its close relationship to objects like the *abu ẓhûr al-markab* of the present-day Ruwala is doubly apparent.

In all likelihood, too, at the time of its capture by the Philistines, the ark had come to enjoy a considerable inter-tribal reputation, due to the position of influence and leadership among the northern tribes which Ephraim had acquired. Quite probably the sanctuary at Shiloh was frequented to a considerable extent by members of other kindred tribes belonging to that federation of central and northern tribes, in which Ephraim held the dominant position. In the two battles

[150] So also Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*[6] 45f., note; Benzinger, *op. cit.*; Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, I, 72, note 2; Bertholet, *op. cit.*, 100; Proksch, *op. cit.*

[151] Jud. 17–18.

[152] Jud. 8. 26f.

[153] I Sam. 21. 10; 23. 6, 9.

[154] I have suggested elsewhere ("The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 125, note 119) that the brazen serpent in the Temple at Jerusalem may have been originally a similar cult-object of some tribe, though of just which one it can no longer be determined, and that it was brought up to Jerusalem by David for much the same reason that he brought up the ark thither (cf. above, note 78). As we have likewise seen (*ibid.*, 119ff.), the tribe of Judah, apparently alone of all the tribes, seems to have had no such cult-object or representation of a tribal deity whatsoever, but had instead originally its "tent of meeting," whither Yahwe was thought to come from His abode upon the sacred mountain in the desert, and there meet with the people, represented by the oracular priest.

of Eben Haezer, it was not merely Ephraim, but all the tribes belonging to this federation, whose warriors were present, and it was because of this common defeat of all these tribes on this occasion that not merely the territory of Ephraim, but that of other tribes as well, and particularly that of Manasseh, the tribe adjacent to and most closely related to Ephraim, was overrun as far north as the Valley of Jezreel and Beth-Shean on the Jordan, and conquered by the Philistines. This federation, which was probably more a loose and tacit association of neighboring tribes, than a definite and systematic organization, had sprung up largely as the result of the common danger faced and the common victory gained by the Israelite tribes over their Canaanite enemies at the Battle of Taanach. Dan apparently had held itself aloof from this federation,[155] and had therefore later to fight its battle alone and unaided against the aggressive Philistines. It was badly defeated in this war and lost much of its man-power. Finally, reduced to a mere six hundred fighting men, it found itself unable to remain in its first place of settlement in Palestine and was compelled to seek a new home far to the north.[156] Benjamin had undoubtedly been one of the tribes participating in the Battle of Taanach,[157] and therefore must have been originally a member of this federation. But it had apparently withdrawn therefrom as the result of civil strife, particularly with Ephraim,[158] and in consequence did not participate in the Battle of Eben Haezer. For this reason its strength remained unimpaired by the outcome of this battle and its territory unconquered by the Philistines. Therefore it was free and ready to take up the contest against the Philistines a half century later, when Samuel, the Ephraimite, succeeded in inspiring Saul the Benjamite with his own zeal for this cause.

But the tribes participating in the Battle of Eben Haezer, Ephraim, Manasseh, and probably also, although perhaps not to quite the same extent, since their danger was not so immediate, Issachar, Zebulon and Naphtali, must have looked upon the ark as their common palladium, and have confidently

[155] Jud. 5. 17. [156] Jud. 17–18. [157] Jud. 5. 14. [158] Jud. 19–21.

expected that its presence in battle would ensure them victory over their hated foes. Accordingly, it would seem, they did not hesitate to stake everything upon this one battle, the second Battle of Eben Haezer, in which the ark was present. Their defeat was overwhelming. These tribes were conquered and their spirits crushed. Their territory now became the prey of the triumphant Philistines. The ark was captured; and even though it did succeed in delivering itself from the Philistines, and did likewise preserve its reputation as a powerful deity and cult-object, never again did it return to its former abode in Shiloh. Eventually it found its way up to the national sanctuary at Jerusalem, where, as we have seen, it came gradually, naturally and inevitably to be conceived in a new light and as discharging a new function, altogether unrelated to those which it had originally been thought to discharge; and in time an altogether new tradition grew up about it. And perhaps, as we have suggested, one of the strong reasons for the lack of spirit and courage on the part of the northern tribes at the time of Saul's rebellion against the Philistines, and their failure to rally to this leader's support, as he had unquestionably expected, was just the absence of the ark, their old palladium and guarantee of victory, from their midst. Without it, they thought no doubt, victory was impossible. So long as the ark was not with them, the Philistine yoke could not be thrown off; rebellion was hopeless.

VI

The Deity of the Ark

One final question remains to be answered, viz. as to the deity of the ark. There is not the slightest evidence that this deity was ever aught other than Yahwe. The name of no other deity is mentioned in connection with the ark, nor is there the slightest indication of the relationship of any other deity to it. But it is important to realize that all our evidence bearing upon the ark comes from the period following upon the settlement of the tribes of Israel in Palestine, and after

an intertribal consciousness and sense of relationship had attained a considerable development. And with this, of course, went hand in hand the development of the concept of a deity who was more than tribal, who in fact enjoyed, as we have seen, a considerable intertribal regard and worship. With the single exception of the tradition of its leadership of Israel through the desert, our oldest evidence bearing upon the ark comes from near the close of the period of tribal settlement in Palestine, and antedates by but little more than a century the establishment of the nation by David. Therefore, even if Yahwe had not been the original deity of the ark, there had been ample time and opportunity for His worship to have spread among the northern tribes, and to have supplanted, in connection with the ark, the worship, and even the name, of the deity originally associated with it. An almost exact parallel would be found in the manner in which Allah has almost entirely supplanted the original Abu ed-Duhûr of the Ruwala *'otfe*; and the tradition was communicated to Musil that Allah sometimes takes his seat in this *'otfe*. Only the name, *abû ẓhûr* has survived, and this apparently in a form changed somewhat from its original sound, and with a popular, new, artificial, etymological explanation of the name.

It is, needless to say, not at all impossible that a similar process may have taken place with the ark; that originally, some deity other than Yahwe, of course the eponymous, ancestral deity of the tribe of Ephraim, may have been associated with it, but that, by the comparatively advanced historical period from which our oldest evidence dates, his association and his worship and even his name had been so completely supplanted by those of Yahwe, the developing intertribal deity, that not even the slightest remininscence thereof survived, and in consequence we find in all our evidence only the name Yahwe associated with the ark. The fact that at this moment when the ark first appears upon the stage of history, a priestly family of unquestionably Levitical lineage,[159] and therefore

[159] Cf. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 451.

devoted champions of Yahwe, is ministering to it, might account to a large extent for the supplanting of such an original deity of the ark by Yahwe.

But while such a hypothesis would be altogether natural and possible, and is undoubtedly even quite plausible, there is on the other hand not the slightest actual evidence in favor of it, or pointing to any conclusion other than that Yahwe was from the very beginning connected with the ark, was the deity thought to reside in it. This would mean, of course, that Yahwe was originally the tribal deity of Ephraim, just as, as we have seen,[160] He was originally the tribal deity of the Kenites, from whom His worship passed, by virtue of the covenant relation established between Him and them, to the southern tribes of Judah, Simon and Levi. But this does not mean at all that the original Yahwe of Ephraim was necessarily the same as the Yahwe of the Kenites. We have seen that the latter was strictly a local deity, intimately and inseparably associated with the mountain in the desert, called therefore in the Kenite document, "the mountain of Yahwe." Not improbably Yahwe was not altogether the proper name of one particular deity. It may well have been at this time the common designation for quite a considerable number of local, tribal or clan deities of this particular class, deities associated with various spots out in the desert, worshiped by different desert clans or tribes, and thought to bestow upon them satisfaction of the basic needs and blessings of nomad life. Such a class of desert, pastoral deities would, of course, differ radically and contrast significantly with the Canaanite, agricultural Be'alim, when once they came into direct contact, after the tribes of Israel had begun to force their way into Palestine Perhaps in such an assumption of many local and tribal Yahwes we find the best and most natural explanation of the otherwise difficult problem of the parallel names of and traditions about the two sacred mountains in the desert, Sinai and Horeb, as well as the "mountain of Yahwe" of K. Certainly Sinai and Horeb were not originally merely two dif-

[160] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 101f.

ferent names for one and the same mountain. The conflicting Biblical traditions with regard to the location of the mountain of revelation, as well as the presence of these two names, and the scrupulousness with which they are kept apart by the J and E writers, establish this conclusion. Not impossibly either Sinai or Horeb may be identified with "the moutain of Yahwe" of K, although this is by no means certain. We have accordingly authentic Biblical traditions of at least two, and possibly three, different, sacred mountains in the desert upon which a Yahwe was originally thought to dwell. And this fact may well point to at least two or three original tribal Yahwes, each associated with a different mountain in the desert, undoubtedly conceived of as his original abode.

This entire argument is, it must be admitted, in the main hypothetical. And yet it has much in its favor. For, on the one hand, by whatever names the different tribes, which later, after their entrance into and settlement in Palestine, came to compose the federation, and ultimately the nation of Israel, called their respective tribal deities, it is certain that they conceived of all these deities in much the same manner and as discharging practically identical functions and bestowing upon their respective tribes much the same blessings of protection and pastoral abundance and numerous progeny. For just this reason it was easy for the tribes coming forth from Egypt, and convinced through bitter experience of the impotence of their old tribal deities, to adopt the worship of a new deity, who differed from their former tribal deities only in individuality and in the place where he was thought to dwell, and but little, if at all, in character, function and manner of worship. For the same reason, too, the tribe of Dan, likewise convinced through severe misfortune and tribal calamity of the powerlessness of its former tribal deity, could renounce his worship and in his place take a new deity, undoubtedly one of the same character and class as its former deity, but one presumably more powerful.[161]

[161] Jud. 17–18.

For such a group or class of desert, pastoral deities there must have been some general name or title to designate the class. This title may well have been Yahwe; and these different Yahwes may have been distinguished from each other, just as were the Bᵉʿalim of Palestine, either by subordinate proper names, or, more likely, by coupling the name Yahwe either with the particular spot in the desert where he was thought to have his fixed abode, or with the name of the clan or tribe who were his original worshipers.[162] Thus we would have the Yahwe of Sinai, the Yahwe of Horeb,[163] the Yahwe of Ephraim, &c.

One additional consideration strengthens the probability of this hypothesis. If it be not correct, and there was instead only one original Yahwe and no more, then He could have been only the Yahwe of "the mountain of Yahwe" of the Kenite document, the Yahwe of the Kenites, whose worship passed from them to the group of tribes who came forth from Egypt and settled in southern Palestine, Judah, Simon and

[162] This last statement is to be understood only in the most general sense. For there is considerable evidence that the tribes of Israel, as we know them in historical times, were in large part a comparatively late development. When the Israelites entered Palestine *beena* marriage still flourished among them to a considerable extent; and under the conditions of *beena* marriage, with relationship traced through the mother and in the direction of the mother's brothers, the basic social unit was not the tribe but the clan, the *mišpaḥa*. Largely as one of the first effects of contact with superior Canaanite culture, *baʿal* marriage gradually supplanted *beena* marriage; and this fact was one of the chief contributing forces to the eventual development of the tribe as the basic social and political unit in Israel during the early sojourn in Palestine. This in turn brought about the reduction of the clan to a smaller compass and a position of less social and political importance, and the gradual fusion of various original clans, such as Machir, Abi-Ezer, Gilead and the like into new, larger and more powerful tribes, such as Manasseh and Gad. This question I shall discuss in detail elsewhere. But if the clan was the basic social unit in the pre-Canaanite days, then we should speak of clan gods rather than of tribal gods.

[163] The Yahwe of Horeb would, of course, have been likewise the Yahwe thought to reside in the סנה upon this mountain. This is a most typical and significant instance of the old, pre-Canaanite, desert, local Yahwes. For certainly this Yahwe of the סנה on Mount Horeb could not possibly have been identical with the Yahwe of the sacred mountain with the cave upon it of the K document.

Levi. And, in such case, only from them could the worship of Yahwe have passed to the northern tribes. But we shall see in time,[164] that this southern group of tribes were the very last to enter Palestine, and that their entrance preceded the Battle of Taanach by but a few years.[165] And already in the Song of Deborah we find Yahwe the only Israelite deity mentioned, and mentioned in such manner that there is scarcely room for the assumption that this name was substituted later for the names of other Israelite clan or tribal deities which originally stood there. And it is clear from this ancient Israelite poem that already at this time among these northern tribes Yahwe enjoyed a considerable intertribal reputation. It is futile therefore to suppose that the worship of Yahwe was not original with these northern tribes, and that it must have passed to them from the southern tribes, largely through the mediation of the Levites, playing the rôle of intertribal priests of Yahwe. It is true that the Levites did come at quite an early period, following very shortly upon their settlement in southern Palestine,[166] to play this rôle of intertribal priests of Yahwe. Actually, however, this rôle was facilitated by the fact that Yahwe had evolved quite far as an intertribal deity already when the Levites appeared upon the scene, rather than the reverse, that Yahwe, originally the tribal deity of the Kenites alone, came to be regarded as an intertribal deity largely through the mediation and propaganda of these Levitical priests.

Therefore, while it must be acknowledged that the evidence is altogether insufficient to warrant any absolute assertion, none the less the large preponderance of evidence points to the conclusion that Yahwe was worshiped originally by

[164] In the third of this series of papers, treating of the historical significance of the Kenite Document, to appear in a subsequent volume of this *Annual*.

[165] Cf. the presence of Heber the Kenite in the north at the time of the Battle of Taanach, and the rôle played by his wife, Yael, therein, Jud. 4. 11ff.; 5. 6, 24ff.

[166] According to Jud. 18. 30 it was the grandson of Moses who became first the family or clan priest of Micah, and then the tribal priest of Dan. In other words, already the third generation of Levites in Palestine had begun to play the rôle of priests of Yahwe among the different tribes.

northern tribes independently of the late influence of the southern tribes, and especially of the Levites; therefore, instead of there having been one original Yahwe, as is generally assumed by scholars, Yahwe was probably a generic or class name for a group of early, desert, pastoral deities, worshiped by the various desert clans or tribes, the forerunners of the later tribes of Israel. In other words, there were originally, in all probability, numerous Yahwes, associated with different desert localities, and worshiped by different clans or tribes.[167] The worship of these various local, desert, tribal Yahwes was carried to Palestine by the migrating clans or tribes, was considerably modified there by contact with superior Canaanite civilization and Ba'al worship, and gradually coalesced into the conception of an intertribal, and eventually of a national Yahwe.

Accordingly, while positive, final evidence is lacking, and the possibility of a different process of evolution must be admitted, as has been said, the weight of evidence points to the conclusion that the original deity of the ark was a Yahwe, the Yahwe of Ephraim, or whatever the clan forerunners of Ephraim may have been.

And whatever the contents of the ark may have been, a sacred stone in all likelihood, or something else, it probably came from that spot in the desert where this Yahwe had been thought to dwell originally. In this particular object this Yahwe was from the very first believed to reside. Probably in it he had been worshiped by the ancestors of Ephraim; and when they migrated from their original desert home and sought a new and permanent abode in Palestine, they carried the sacred

[167] This hypothesis would also account adequately for the manifest regard for Yahwe as a deity in northern Syria, as evidenced by the names of the king of Hamath, Ilubi'di = Jaubi'di, and the name of the king of Ja'udi, Azrijau. (Cf. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 247f.) The appearance of these names, in which Yahwe is manifestly an element, may be due either to direct Israelite influence, since the monuments upon which they are inscribed date from the 8th century B.C., or they may be due to the settlement in northern Syria at an early date of Aramaean tribes, probably akin to Israel, who had likewise worshiped Yahwe, or a Yahwe, out in the desert, and had carried his worship with them into their new home, precisely as Israel did.

object with them in the ark. Not improbably already out in the desert they had carried this object about with them in the ark upon their seasonal migrations from one encampment and one place of pasturage to another, and had believed that it guided them upon these journeyings and brought them surely and safely to the place where they could find abundance of water and pasturage for their flocks. In all likelihood too they carried this sacred object in the ark with them into battle against their desert foes, and confidently believed that it ensured them victory and abundant booty. Probably to it and its irresistible power they attributed their triumph over their Canaanite predecessors in the land, and particularly such significant achievements as the capture of the fortified city of Bethel.[168] Not impossibly even at the Battle of Taanach it was carried into battle by its tribesmen, and to its presence there the victory of the tribes of Israel over their powerful and feared Canaanite foes may have been attributed. In such case we can the more readily account for the leading rôle which Ephraim played among the northern tribes during the greater part of the remainder of the tribal period and for the developing rôle of intertribal deity which the Yahwe of the ark of Ephraim seemingly came to play during this period.

[168] Jud. 1. 22–26. In v. 22 the statement that when the Joseph-tribes went up to besiege Bethel Yahwe was with them, raises a question of interest and significance for this study. The statement here is not couched in the same manner as its parallel in v. 19, nor has it here apparently the same general significance as there. There it accounts for the unfailing success of Judah's efforts to conquer the southern portion of Palestine by the explanation that Yahwe was with them, i. e. that He prospered their various undertakings. In v. 22, however, the statement ויהוה עמם seems to be somewhat more specific. The question suggests itself therefore, does this refer to the ark? When the Joseph-tribes went up against Bethel, did they take the ark with them, and did they accordingly attribute their capture of this fortified city to the presence of Yahwe, represented by the ark, in their midst? Knowing the rôle which the ark played in the Ephraimite practice of warfare, just this would have been the expected procedure. And in such case this passage would indicate that the ark and its contents were brought by the Joseph-tribes with them into Canaan, and were therefore of desert, and not of Canaanite origin. This is, however, merely a suggestion; for it must be admitted that the exact implication of the words ויהוה עמם is too vague and uncertain to permit resting any absolute conclusion upon them.

And one additional bit of evidence tends to corroborate this general conclusion, furnished by Num. 10. 35 f. It requires but a moment's thought to realize that these two verses have only an incidental and not at all original connection with v. 33 b.[169] That verse speaks of the ark as the divine guide of Israel though the desert. These verses conceive of the ark as going into battle with the hosts of Israel and giving them victory over their enemy. It is true that, as we have seen, both of these tasks were regular functions of the ark during the first period of its history. But in this particular connection there is not the slightest reason for mentioning the latter function. Unquestionably vv. 35 f. are not a part of the original Book of the Covenant, but were appended later, although undoubtedly still at a fairly early date, by some writer or editor who was familiar with them and knew perfectly well of their bearing upon the ark. This is borne out by the connection with v. 33 b provided by this editor in v. 35 a, seeking to make the words of vv. 35 b and 36 apply to the setting forth of the ark upon each successive day's journey upon this march through the desert to the final goal of Israel's migration, rather than to its going forth to and return from battle, as the actual content of the two verses implies. Manifestly the thought of v. 35 a has no connection at all with that of vv. 35 b–36, and serves only to link these two verses with v. 33 b, with which also they have no immediate nor original connection.

But vv. 35 b–36 are in themselves unquestionably of considerable antiquity, in all likelihood older than the actual composition of the Book of the Covenant. It is of little moment for this study whether for the שׁוּבָה of v. 35 we

[169] V. 34, is, of course, P, and a very late insertion. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Rabbis of old likewise had a strong feeling that Num. 10. 35–36 were not in their proper and logical place; consequently, with their customary dialectic methods, they tried to justify their location here. But R. Ashi, probably more venturesome than the majority of his colleagues, dared to suggest that these verses had stood originally in connection with Num. 1. 52 and 2. 1 ff. and 34, and that the entire passage should have come at the end of Num. 2, but had been broken up and transposed in some unknown manner.

should read שָׁבָה, with practically all modern scholars, and how we should interpret or emend the extremely difficult יהוה רבבות אלפי ישראל.[170] The fact is clear that here too the deity of the ark goes by the name Yahwe, and that he is here more than the mere tribal deity of Ephraim, is instead an intertribal deity, the deity of Israel.[171] These two verses, so plainly couched in poetic form, were undoubtedly the battle-cries of these tribes of Israel when going into battle with the ark of Yahwe in their midst, and when returning from battle after the victory had been gained.[172] The first

[170] For an interesting and ingenious, although I can not but feel, a rather far-fetched and untenable interpretation of this passage, cf. Torczyner, *op. cit.*, 223 ff.

[171] Israel here probably means primarily the closely related group of central tribes, the so-called Joseph-tribes, Ephraim, Manasseh and Benjamin, who apparently entered Palestine together under the leadership of Joshua, probably about 1350–1300 B.C., coming from the east and crossing the Jordan near Jericho. Whatever the origin of the name Israel may have been, it was probably applied originally to this particular group of clans or tribes, and may even have been borne by them out in the desert, before their entrance into Palestine. From them, due largely to the domination of these tribes, and especially Ephraim, from the time of the Battle of Taanach on, the name probably expanded to cover the entire group of northern tribes, bound together into a loose kind of federation growing out of the common victory gained over a common enemy at this important battle. It was probably to the original nucleus of the Joseph tribes, dwelling in central Palestine, that the name Israel upon the Merneptah inscription (circ. 1230 B.C.) referred (cf. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 222 ff.).

[172] For battle-cries of the modern Bedouin cf. Musil, *Arabia Petraea*, III, 386 ff. These show some slight similarity to Num. 10. 35 b–36; cf. in particular the battle-cry of the Tijâha, *eḏbaḥo, lâ jemlos*, "Kill him, so that he will not escape!" However, but few, if any, of these Bedouin battle-cries are addressed to a deity, as are Num. 10. 35 b–36. Many of them are semi-meaningless, while some are addressed to the enemy and others are calls to fellow-warriors. Such battle-cries are those of the Terâbîn, *ṣubjân jâ terâbîn, birâḳe' el-ḥejl*, "Be heroes, O Terabin, in the stabbing of the horses!"; of the Ṛawarne of eṣ-Ṣâfije, *ṣubjân jâ zoṛârne*, "Be heroes, O Zorarne!," and of the 'Amârîn, *ṣubjân jâ nišâma, ṣubjân jâ hâbbîn ar-rîḥ; hejlâ 'alejku biẓ-ẓafar, ṣubjân jâ bawârdijje*, "Be brave, O heroes, be brave, you who are swifter than the wind; forward, on to victory, be brave O you warriors!" These last are strikingly similar to the cry of the Philistines before going into the Battle of Eben Haezer, חזקו והיו לאנשים פלשתים, "Be strong, and show yourselves men, O Philistines!" (I Sam. 4. 9 a. The remainder of the verse, and the turn given by it to this battle-cry, are in all likelihood not original.)

cry was undoubtedly sounded by the Israelite warriors when going into the Battle of Eben Haezer; because of the unexpected outcome of this battle they had no opportunity to sound the second cry upon this occasion. But if the ark was present at the Battle of Taanach, as there is every reason to suppose, they had then, as well as no doubt upon numerous other occasions, opportunity to sound both cries. Certainly these two cries must have had some history behind them. They could not have come into existence just at the time of, nor even shortly before the capture of the ark by the Philistines. But this consideration points positively to the conclusion that for a considerable time back, perhaps as far back as the Battle of Taanach, or quite probably even earlier than this, the ark must have been the intertribal palladium and Yahwe the intertribal deity at least of that small group of clans or tribes which constituted the original federation known by the name of Israel, viz. the Joseph-tribes, Ephraim, Manasseh (Machir, Abi-Ezer, &c.) and Benjamin.

VII

Summary of the History of the Ark

Summing up all this evidence we must conclude that the ark contained a sacred object in which Yahwe, the tribal deity of Ephraim, was thought to dwell. This object, most probably a sacred stone, had probably stood originally in the desert, perhaps upon a mountain out there. The presence of this deity in this object made this spot sacred, the place of gathering and of simple religious worship by some one clan or tribe, or perhaps some small group of clans or tribes. When this clan or tribe or tribal group migrated from their original desert home, and sought a new and permanent abode in the country west of the Jordan, they carried with them, in its ark, in which perhaps it had already been housed during the desert period, this sacred object with the deity residing in it. They looked upon it as their faithful and unerring guide through the desert, particularly through stretches with which they were

but little familiar. They were accustomed also to carry it with them into battle, at least into decisive battles, and to attribute to its presence and assistance all victories gained in such battles. They likewise looked to it for oracular revelation and decision.

Settled permanently in Palestine the ark was eventually deposited in Shiloh in the territory of the tribe of Ephraim, in a suitable sanctuary, and in time a Levitical family came to function as its priests. Located here this ark served not only as the particular cult-object and palladium of Ephraim, but also at quite an early period it came to enjoy a large inter-tribal reputation and authority, at least among those seemingly related tribes which constituted the federation of Israel. And not improbably it enjoyed a considerable measure of authority and veneration also among those more remotely related tribes, who had apparently entered Palestine at an even earlier period than did these tribes of Israel, but whose fortunes came to be intimately bound up with those of Israel by the common danger threatening all from the original Canaanite inhabitants of the land, and especially by the outcome of the decisive battle of Taanach.

Captured by the Philistines in the Battle of Eben Haezer, the ark remained for a short time in their possession. But, concluding from a series of calamities which befell them during this period that the ark was, despite its capture by them, still a powerful and dangerous deity, they allowed it to depart from their possession and their land, after first submitting it to a decisive test to prove its divinity and its continued power. After an unfortunate experience at Beth Shemesh, the ark came to reside for a period of approximately a century at Kiryath Yearim. Why during this period its original worshipers apparently made no effort to reclaim it, particularly since it had proved its persistent divine nature and power both by its triumph over the Philistines and by the blessings which it undoubtedly brought upon the household of Abinadab, in which it was deposited, and upon all the people of Kiryath Yearim, just as later it brought through its presence similar blessings upon the household of Obed-Edom, it is difficult to imagine.

Seemingly the process would not have been difficult, since Kiryath Yearim lay apparently in the territory of Benjamin, and the Benjamites under Saul had taken up the battle against the Philistines, and were endeavoring to enhearten their northern neighbors and win their support in this war for freedom. It might be expected that the restoration to them of their old palladium would have revived the spirits of these northern tribes and made them valuable allies for Saul. But in all likelihood the people of Kiryath Yearim, experiencing the benefit of the presence of this sacred object in their midst, were unwilling to part with it. And not impossibly too the northern tribes had during this eventful century advanced a bit culturally and outgrown somewhat their former conception of and reverence for the ark. And quite probably too their deep-rooted fear of the Philistines deterred them from bringing back the ark into their midst; for such an act would, of course, have been tantamount to a declaration of rebellion against the Philistines; and this they did not dare.

At any rate the ark remained in Kiryath Yearim until brought up to Jerusalem by David. The probable reasons for this have already been discussed. It was undoubtedly removed by Solomon from David's tent-sanctuary to his more magnificent Temple. That is the last definite information about the ark that the Bible furnishes. Thereafter the ark is an object only of unhistoric tradition and legend, with little foundation on actual fact. This serves to show clearly the development of theological thought in Israel, but in no wise furnishes authentic historic information about the ark itself.

Undoubtedly the ark continued in the Temple down to the destruction by Nebuchadrezzar in 586 B.C., or perhaps only until the first deportation and plundering of the Temple in 597 B.C. During this period, under the influence of developing national Yahwe religion and of advance in theological thought and concept of Yahwe, due to the teachings of the prophets, the ark came to be looked upon more or less askance as, according to old and not completely forgotten tradition, a concrete representation of Yahwe; therefore, in accordance with the principles of the evolving theology, as an idolatrous,

non-Yahwistic object, altogether out of accord with the true, prophetic concept and worship of Him. But it escaped the fate of destruction which would undoubtedly have eventually overtaken it, just as it overtook the brazen serpent, apparently an object of kindred character, and in all likelihood of kindred origin, by undergoing a process of reinterpretation and legitimization. It came gradually to be regarded as the receptacle of a sacred stone, or rather of two sacred stones; but sacred now, not because a deity was thought to reside in them, but only incidentally, because Israel's national Yahwe had inscribed upon them the ten "words" which constituted the fundamental principles of His worship and the basis of His covenant with Israel. Looked upon in this light, the ark was suffered to remain in the Temple at Jerusalem. But apparently its original character was never entirely lost sight of by the prophetic party; and particularly during the last century or so of its sojourn in the Temple it seems to have experienced a gradual diminution in esteem. During the early portion of the post-exilic period, even after the second Temple had been erected, the absence of the ark therefrom was not even deplored, at least by the prophetic party.

But with the ascendency of the Priestly party in the period following Ezra, and with the composition of the Grundschrift and secondary portions of the Priestly Code, the ark came to enjoy a new regard and greatly increased in significance. It became intimately associated in Priestly tradition with the *kebod Yahwe*, the fiery form, ordinarily enveloped in the cloud, which Yahwe was thought to assume in His immediate contacts with Israel. In addition to maintaining the older tradition of the ark as the receptacle of the two tablets of the Decalogue, now known as the "tablets of testimony," these Priestly theologians and writers now represented it also and primarily as the throne of Yahwe, upon which He was believed to dwell permanently but invisibly, in the holy of holies, in the midst of Israel. Only the high-priest, and he only once a year, and then only under the precaution of all manner of safe-guards and the observance of innumerable taboos, was permitted to enter into Yahwe's presence before

the ark in the holy of holies, and catch a fleeting glimpse of the Holy One upon His sacred throne, the ark. Tradition is silent as to the eventual fate of the ark when the Temple was finally destroyed by the Romans.[173] Actually, however, both historic evidence and Rabbinic tradition seem to agree that there never was an ark in the second Temple, and that the picture of the Priestly Code is naught but the product of extensive theological speculation coupled with an antiquarian interest in the religious institutions of Israel's past and a desire to reinterpret these to accord with the dominant theology of the late post-exilic period and so give them a legitimate place in Israel's religion.

Such seems to have been the full history of the ark in ancient Israel.

VIII

The Ark in the Book of the Covenant

In the light of this history of the ark, as we have reconstructed it, the question naturally arises, why is the ark mentioned at all in the Book of the Covenant; what rôle does it play there, and what purpose does the mention of it serve? The question is difficult to answer with any certainty, since the reference to the ark in C is brief and obscure; yet it is a question of obvious importance, that must at least be considered as fully as possible.

On the basis of carefully considered internal evidence we have reached the conclusion that the nucleus of the Book of the Covenant, i. e. the small narrative setting plus the "words," was composed in the Northern Kingdom in 842 B.C., and constituted the basis of the religious reformation of Elisha, supported by Jehu and the Rechabites, under their leader Jonadab ben Rechab. This conclusion was reached as the result of first fixing the date of the Kenite Document as 899 B.C., its place of composition as the Southern Kingdom, and its purpose to enforce

[173] According to apocryphal and rabbinical tradition the ark was one of the five sacred objects hidden away by God when the Temple was destroyed and destined to be restored when the Messiah should come and rebuild the Temple. (II Mac. 2. 4–6; Bammidbar rabba, XV, 7; *Jewish Encyclopedia*, II, 105 f.)

the far-reaching religious reformation which in his fifteenth year King Asa, influenced by the prophetic party, which in turn had unmistakably a Kenite or Rechabite background, succeeded in carrying out. This reformation was directed chiefly against the foreign religious and cultural influences which had crept into the life and religious practice of the people, and even into the cult of the Temple at Jerusalem, from the days of David and Solomon onward. It aimed to restore what its champions conceived to have been the true, simple worship of Yahwe, as it had been practiced by the ancestors of the southern tribes, and particularly as it had been, so they thought, revealed by Yahwe to Moses after the exodus from Egypt, and by Moses in turn communicated to Israel. According to their tradition, upon this occasion a covenant had been established between Yahwe and these Israelite tribes, through the mediation of Moses, whereby Israel obligated itself to worship Yahwe alone and in accordance with the fundamental principles of His worship, revealed by Yahwe to Moses in a set of "words," and Yahwe on His part, obligated Himself to bring these tribes to and settle them in a good land, and be with them and prosper them ever thereafter. According to the historical record, this traditional covenant between Yahwe and Israel, made in the desert, was reaffirmed and properly solemnized at Jerusalem in the year 899 B.C., when the people gathered there for the celebration of the festival in the third month, the festival later known as Shabuoth.

Now, as we have seen, the relationship of the "words" of the Book of the Covenant to those of the Kenite Document is so obvious and so close that the conclusion can not be escaped that the former are dependent upon the latter. As the result of a minute comparison of the "words" of K with those of C, and a determination of the relative cultural background of the two sets of "words," we have likewise concluded that the "words" of C, and with them, of course, the original Book of the Covenant, must have been composed in the Northern Kingdom, and, it follows, at a time somewhat later than the date of composition of K. It is clear, moreover, from the determination of the cultural background of C, that it

must have been composed at a time when the Northern Kingdom had experienced a period of economic prosperity and cultural progress, when images of gold and silver were by no means unknown, nor even uncommon, in the ritual practice of the people, and elaborate altars of hewn stones were likewise employed. Such a condition obtained only during the reigns of Ahab and his immediate successors, when Israel not only succeeded in winning for itself a sure and recognized place among the leading states of western Asia, but likewise enjoyed an extended term of comparative peace and quiet, which enabled its citizens to follow their economic pursuits with comparatively little disturbance and interruption, and to experience the resultant material prosperity.

This national prosperity was strengthened and stimulated by Ahab's marriage with Jezebel, the Phoenician princess. This was in strict accord with the established political principles of the time, and in full conformity with the policy which Solomon had followed earlier and seemingly upon a more extensive scale. Jezebel, an ardent devotee of her own ancestral and national deity, brought with her to Israel and to Ahab's court the worship of the Baal of Tyre and also a numerous retinue of personal attendants and religious ministrants. Phoenician influence now began to modify the cultural life of Israel more and more, and the worship of the Baal of Tyre to make steady and rapid headway. Images of this Baal were set up, presumably in various parts of the country, and certainly in the sanctuaries at Samaria and Jezreel. And if the traditions of the Books of Kings are to be accepted, not content with this, Jezebel attempted to make active and aggressive propaganda for the spread of the worship of the Baal of Tyre throughout Israel. In this she encountered the strong opposition of the prophetic party under the leadership, tacit at least, of first Elijah and, after his death, Elisha.

Elijah, a shepherd from east of the Jordan and a firm, uncompromising champion of the old, simple, nomadic or seminomadic worship of Yahwe, conceived of Yahwe, as we have seen,[174] as still dwelling out in the desert upon the mountain

[174] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 32 ff.

where, according to the Kenite tradition, Israel first came in contact and entered into covenant with Him after the exodus from Egypt.[175] He opposed the plans of Jezebel unremittingly during his lifetime, but on the whole seemingly with comparatively little practical success. His method was that of bitter, fearless, uncompromising denunciation of the powerful queen and her god. He acted independently and had but little immediate contact and direct cooperation with the professional prophets of his day, for his methods, as well as his prophetic call, were largely different than theirs. But his authority and superior rating as a prophet, called directly and personally by Yahwe, were apparently fully recognized by them. After his death his disciple Elisha seemingly continued his master's methods for a time. Eventually, however, no doubt becoming convinced that no real and practical results were to be achieved by these methods and that the worship of Baal in Israel could never be uprooted in this way, Elisha resorted to different methods, the methods employed by the

[175] It is indeed a strange and significant fact that Elijah, apparently a native of Gilead, should conceive of Yahwe and His dwelling-place in quite the same manner as did the Kenites, dwelling in the extreme southern part of Judah. The suggestion has been advanced by some scholar, whose name and likewise the reference to whose work have escaped me, that Elijah may not have been a native of Gilead, but only a stranger and sojourner there. He bases his argument chiefly upon the statement of I Ki. 17. 1 that Elijah was one of the "sojourners of Gilead" (מתשבי גלעד), and argues that this points to a non-Gileadite origin for Elijah. In such case, of course, it would be natural to regard Elijah's original home as in the extreme south, in the vicinity of the Kenites. This would account completely for Elijah's ardent championing of Yahwe, and for his believing, along with the Kenites and the prophetic party of the south, that Yahwe still dwelt upon "the mountain of Yahwe" in the desert. If the reading מֵתּשָׁבֵי גִלְעָד of I Ki. 17. 1 is original and correct, then this hypothesis is extremely plausible. But it is by no means unlikely that it is a dittography and misreading of an original תֹּשָׁבֵי (cf. the *Commentaries* of Kittel and Benzinger to the passage). In such case, of course, Elijah must be regarded as a native Gileadite. Then the question as to how Elijah came to hold this view of Yahwe in common with the Kenites would remain unanswered for lack of evidence. His native shepherd life and point of view would account for his conceiving of Yahwe in the old, traditional, semi-nomadic manner, but it would hardly account for his holding to the Kenite-Judahite belief that Yahwe still dwelt upon this particular mountain in the desert.

professional prophets in the Northern Kingdom upon two previous occasions, when the dynasties of Jerobeam I and Baasha were overthrown. Elisha made common cause with the professional prophets and employed one of them as his agent in anointing Jehu as king of Israel. In the revolution which followed the entire house of Ahab was murdered. Jehu became ruler of the Northern Kingdom. And, supported by Jonadab ben Rechab, he gathered under a pretext all the devotees of the Tyrian Baal, undoubtedly members of the court party, the followers of Jezebel, into the sanctuary at Samaria, and there butchered them in cold blood.[176] This act had the unqualified approval, and probably even the cooperation, of Jonadab ben Rechab and no doubt of Elisha also. In this way the worship of the Baal of Tyre was uprooted from Israelite life and practice, and, at least on the surface, the old worship of Yahwe was restored.

Externally this reformation bears a strong resemblance to that of Asa in 899 B.C., fifty-seven years earlier. In both cases a woman, the queen, and then, after her husband's death, the queen-mother, is the leader of the court party, and the chief champion of the worship of foreign, non-Yahwistic deities, and foreign cultural influence. In both cases the opposition is fostered by the prophetic party, unmistakably in contact with and under direct Kenite or Rechabite influence. And in both cases the reformation directs itself externally and concretely to the destruction of images regarded as non-Yahwistic and symbolic of foreign deities.[177] In particular the

[176] II Ki. 10. 15–29.

[177] It is not at all improbable that the reformation of Elisha-Jehu-Jonadab ben Rechab was likewise sealed with a covenant ceremony, similar to that by which the reformation of Asa was sealed, according to II Chron. 15. 12 ff. It is true that II Ki. 10. 15–29 makes no mention of such a covenant; but it is difficult to avoid the impression that the narrative here is incomplete. Certainly the reformation itself, to be thoroughly effective, required not merely the butchery of the worshipers of the Tyrian Baal, but also the formal rejection of the worship of this deity and a declaration of loyalty to Yahwe by Israel; and this would, of course, imply a renewal or reaffirmation of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel. In all likelihood therefore, some such record stood in the original account of this important event. We can well understand, furthermore, why this record should have been suppressed and omitted from

Kenite influence manifest in K and the participation of Jonadab ben Rechab, member of a Kenite clan, in the reformation of Elisha, suggest a direct relationship between the reformation in the Southern Kingdom in 899 B.C. and this reformation in the Northern Kingdom fifty-seven years later. And this suggestion is strongly confirmed by the close and direct dependence of the "words" of the Book of the Covenant upon those of K, which we have established. This evidence suffices to establish with utmost probability that the original Book of the Covenant constituted the basis of the reformation of Elisha-Jehu-Jonadab ben Rechab in 842 B.C., just as the Kenite code of "words" constituted the basis of the reformation of Asa in 899 B.C. It follows therefore with reasonable certainty that the date of composition of the "words" of the Book of the Covenant, together with their narrative setting, must have been 842 B.C.

But then our question, how account for the mention of the ark in the Book of the Covenant? And this question becomes all the more pertinent and striking when we realize that at just this time, in 842 B.C., the ark was no longer in the possession of the northern tribes, nor present anywhere in the Northern Kingdom, but was deposited in the Temple at Jerusalem, and had in fact been there uninterruptedly ever

this passage in II Ki. 10, and why all reference to this event is omitted entirely from Chron. It was, of course, because the later prophets and their followers, the prophetic party of a later day, disapproved most heartily of this wholesale murder of the worshipers of Baal by Jehu and denounced it as a crime incurring the wrath of Yahwe (cf. Hos. 1. 4; 2. 2). With such a prophetic judgment upon this act, later prophetic and priestly writers could not well record, nor even acknowledge, that the event was crowned by the solemnization of a covenant between Yahwe and Israel; hence their complete silence about this covenant ceremony. But if we admit that in all probability this reformation of Elisha-Jehu-Jonadab ben Rechab, with all its hideous details of betrayal, murder and butchery, was climaxed by a solemnization of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel, its parallelism with the reformation of Asa becomes complete in all essential features. And not only this, but its relation to the Book of the Covenant, with its record of the original solemnization of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel in the days of Moses, recorded in Ex. 24. 4–8, of which this last solemnization in 842 B.C. was, so it would naturally be interpreted, merely the renewal or reaffirmation, would become doubly clear.

since the erection of this Temple a century or more before this. And not merely that, but the ark had been gone from the possession of and presence among the northern tribes for approximately two hundred and fifty years, and the knowledge and memory of it must have become extremely weak by 842 B.C. Its mention therefore in this northern document, and the reference to the early function as divine guide through the desert which, as we have seen, ancient tradition ascribed to it, are surprising indeed. There must have been some reason for such reference.

In answer to this question only a conjecture can be offered, due, of course, to total lack of evidence; but a conjecture so natural and fitting as to render it extremely plausible and illuminating. The reformation of 842 B.C. was directed primarily against the worship of the Tyrian Baal in Israel and the image-cult and foreign cultural influence associated with it. It sought to reaffirm and reestablish the old worship of Yahwe as the true, national god of Israel. The concept of Yahwe underlying this reformation was that which had been held and cherished out in the desert in the early, semi-nomadic days, the concept which had been zealously guarded and boldly championed by the Kenites and Rechabites and by Elijah, the shepherd prophet. It was a concept which had been touched and modified, particularly in the agricultural Northern Kingdom, by contact with Canaanitish Baals and the resultant syncretism; yet in it semi-nomadic, desert features still predominated; and it was upon these that the prophetic program laid the main emphasis. Stated generally and as a basic principle, this reformation aimed to root out foreign, Baal-worship from Israel, and to restore the old, native Yahwe-worship, rooted in semi-nomadic life and desert ideas and ideals.

But how symbolize this old, native, desert Yahwe? We have seen[178] that in the reformation of 899 B.C. in the Southern Kingdom Yahwe and His true worship were symbolized by the old "tent of meeting," while the syncretistic worship, with its manifold foreign elements, against which

[178] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 119–127.

this reformation contended, was apparently symbolized by the *mifleṣeṯ* of Maachah, the queen-mother, and probably also by similar images associated with this syncretistic worship, and perhaps even by the recently erected Temple at Jerusalem in which this worship was centralized. In the reformation of 842 B.C. in the Northern Kingdom the symbol of the false, syncretistic worship, against which the reformation was directed, must have been, of course, the image or images of the Tyrian Baal which Jezebel had set up in the various sanctuaries. What fitting symbol of the old, native, desert Yahwe could there be, which would represent Him fittingly in the eyes of the people of the Northern Kingdom? Certainly it could not be the "tent of meeting," for, on the one hand, as we have seen, this had been the cult-object only of the southern tribes, and differed radically in its original character from the various cult-objects of the northern tribes. And on the other hand, in the one respect of reintroducing the old "tent of meeting," in opposition to the Temple at Jerusalem, the reformation of 899 B.C. had failed; and with this failure the old "tent of meeting" must have forfeited much of its pristine regard and have passed practically into semi-oblivion. Certainly it was no proper and effective symbol of the old Yahwe for the northern tribes.

But what symbol more natural and fitting could there be than the ark? It had been the palladium of the northern tribes during the days of their greatest triumphs in the early period of settlement in Palestine. It had been the cult-object of Ephraim, and eventually too of the other tribes federated with Ephraim. According to firmly rooted tradition, it had led them upon their desert journeyings until they were permanently settled in Palestine, and had gone with them into battle and given them victory over their enemies; it had established them securely in the land and prospered them in all their early undertakings. It was of desert origin and associated with the name and worship of Yahwe from those ancient days. Therefore, contrasted with the Tyrian Baal and his images, it was for the people of the Northern Kingdom the true symbol of Yahwe. And a moment's thought

shows clearly that no other object whatsoever could have played this important rôle in this northern reformation, for no other ancient cult-object had enjoyed the same regard and authority among the northern tribes in the early tribal days.[179]

Moreover, the very condition that the ark was no longer in the possession of the northern tribes, but was located in the Temple at Jerusalem, facilitated this process. For, on the one hand, as the result of the absence of the ark from their midst, and the fact that it had been gone for two hundred and fifty years, these northern tribes could have had only a more or less vague, traditional, but no real knowledge of the ark and its actual appearance and its full, original nature and function. Their conception of Yahwe as their national deity had certainly advanced materially during this momentous period, and they could no longer conceive of Him in quite the same primitive manner as did their tribal ancestors. To them there was probably hardly any question of Yahwe, no longer merely a tribal, but now a national deity, actually being in the ark, or of there being in it a sacred stone or some other similar object in which Yahwe was thought to dwell. By this time this belief must have been largely, if not entirely outgrown, and in the minds of the northern tribes, so far as they thought of the ark at all, which was probably very little, it must have come gradually to be regarded as the symbol of Yahwe rather than as Yahwe Himself, or as the container of Yahwe. And on the other hand, the very presence of the ark in the Temple at Jerusalem must have given to it, even in the eyes of the people of the Northern Kingdom, a new sanctity and legitimacy as a symbol of Yahwe, their national god, which it would otherwise not have enjoyed. Even to the leaders of this prophetic movement this fact must have had a deep significance. Had the ark been still merely

[179] Thus, for example, the cult-object of the tribe of Dan was of Palestinian origin (Jud. 17–18), and apparently also the cult-object of Manasseh (Jud. 8. 24–27). Not improbably this was true also of the cult-objects of some of the other northern tribes. In fact the ark is the only ancient, northern, tribal cult-object of which we have any record, which goes back to a pre-Palestinian, desert origin and association with the worship of Yahwe there.

what it had been in the early, pre-Davidic days, they could hardly have sanctioned it, and referred to it in their program of reformation; for it would unquestionably have seemed to them too concrete a representation of Yahwe, differing but little, if at all, from the representation of Him by images, against which they protested so steadily. But the presence of the ark in the Temple at Jerusalem must have completed the process of gradual reinterpretation of it, from its original character as a Yahwe-cult-object to its new character as a Yahwe-symbol, and must have likewise given it, even for these prophetic champions, a certain positive legitimacy and sanctity, which it could otherwise not have acquired.

And so very naturally they revived the memory of the old ark of Yahwe among the northern tribesmen and represented it as the approved symbol of Yahwe, the true, national god of Israel and god of Israel's fathers. Thereby they declared concretely to the citizens of the Northern Kingdom of their own day that this old Yahwe, whose origin was in the desert, was still their true god, and not the new, foreign deity whom Jezebel and her court party had sought to foist upon them. It was Yahwe who had prospered them through all these years and given them victory over their enemies and a proud and leading place among the states of Western Asia. And to Him alone their faith and their worship were due, even as they had covenanted with Him in the ancient, desert days. And this true god of theirs, Yahwe, was to be worshiped in accordance with the simple principles and by the simple rites, theoretically at least, and to a large extent factually also, of desert origin, set forth now in the "words" of the Book of the Covenant. This was their true worship and not the more elaborate worship of Baal in Baal sanctuaries, with their altars of hewn stones, probably with steps leading upon them, with images of gold and silver, with abundant and extensive sacrifices and festivals of a dominantly agricultural, solar character. The program of the reformation of 842 B.C. was decidedly reactionary, just as that of the reformation of 899 B.C. had been. It sought to reintroduce the simple altar of earth in place of the altars of hewn stone, just as the

reformation of 899 B.C. had in all likelihood attempted to reintroduce the old "tent of meeting" in place of the new, elaborate Temple at Jerusalem. And just as that reformation had failed in this one reactionary purpose, so in all likelihood this reformation of 842 B.C. also failed in its effort to reintroduce the simple, earthen altar.[180] The course of cultural progress can not be lightly turned backward.

In this program of reformation the ark had its definite place and served a specific and valuable purpose. But it could not be as the old ark unmodified from its original, primitive character and functions. The presence of the ark in the Temple at Jerusalem required a fitting explanation that would legitimize it and give it a definite place in the program of this reformation. The old traditions of the sanctity and powers of the ark, no doubt rather vague and shadowy by this time, and not altogether free from illegitimate, idolatrous implications, had to be put aside altogether, and a new interpretation of it presented, which would, on the one hand, accord fully with the conception of Yahwe held by these reformers, and, on the other hand, would further their cherished program as much as possible. Unquestionably it was under the force of these conditions that the new tradition developed that the ark was sacred, yes, and sacred because of what it contained; this much survived from the old tradition. But what it contained, so it now came to be told, was merely the record of the covenant between Yahwe and Israel, the scroll of the "words" of the covenant, which Moses had written down at Yahwe's bidding in the old, desert days. Thus, on the one hand, the ark came to have a traditional association with Moses, something which it could hardly have had previous to this,[181] and, on the other hand, it now became even more than the symbol of Yahwe Himself; it became the symbol and the constant

[180] Therefore no doubt the secondary, but certainly still quite early, provision of Ex. 20. 25, that if Israel insists upon building stone altars, they must at least not be of hewn stones.

[181] Unless perhaps through its Levitical priests, Eli and his sons, probably in some way akin to Moses. The name Pinchas, borne by Eli's son and also by Moses' great-nephew, the grandson of Aaron, according to Priestly tradition, and itself of Egyptian origin, may well support such a conclusion.

reminder to the people of His covenant with Israel; from this time on it was the ארון ברית יהוה, "the ark of the covenant of Yahwe." Such must have been its official name henceforth. And this very name and its frequent repetition must have had a potent effect in redeeming the ark from all its earlier, traditional, idolatrous implications as a tribal cult-object and concrete representation of Yahwe, and giving it a definite, legitimate place in prophetic tradition and program and in the subsequent evolution of the religion of Israel.

In this way and at this time, in all likelihood, the new, prophetic tradition about the ark and its sacred character arose and supplanted the older and historically more correct tradition. And later, and no doubt still somewhat under the influence of the old tradition of the probable presence of a sacred stone in the ark, the new tradition was further modified slightly, to tell that, not a scroll, containing the "words" of the covenant, was in the ark, but two sacred stones, sacred, however, not because of an inherent sanctity or indwelling of any deity in them, but because the "words" of the covenant were inscribed upon them, and, moreover, inscribed upon them by Yahwe Himself. And, as we have seen, according to the northern Elohist version of this tradition, not only the writing, but even the stones themselves, prepared for writing, were the actual work of Yahwe; their sanctity was therefore absolute. So the new tradition about the ark and its contents developed. Its subsequent history we have already learned. There can be little further question as to the place of the ark in the tradition of the Book of the Covenant and the rôle which it played in the reformation of 842 B.C., of which the Book of the Covenant furnished the program.

Unquestionably the narrative setting of the Book of the Covenant must have once been more extensive than we know it at present. In particular it must have told more about the ark and the depositing in it of the scroll of the "words" by Moses. All this, however, has, for one reason or another, been suppressed by later editors, and only the small fragment of the original narrative setting contained in Ex. 24. 4–8 and

Num. 10. 33 b, and in all likelihood a small nucleus in Ex. 33. 5 b–6, have been preserved.[182] Of this no more can be said at

[182] It would be natural to expect that the narrative portion of the Book of the Covenant would have told something about the carriers of the ark. We have seen above (p. 20) that this must have told or implied that on the desert journey the ark was carried along on the shoulders of men, whom it drove irresistibly in the direction in which it chose to go. Presumably these bearers of the ark were not ordinary persons; they must have been men who stood in some particularly intimate relation to the deity of the ark. Who could they have been?

In answer to this question Deut. 10. 8 gives a significant hint. It tells that "at that time," i.e. at the time when Moses made the ark at Yahwe's command, and deposited the two tablets of the Decalogue in it (With בעת ההוא in v. 10 cf. the same expression in v. 1. Note also that vv. 6 and 7 are a Priestly gloss inserted into this context, and disturb the obviously original continuity between vv. 1–5 and v. 8.) Yahwe singled out the tribe of Levi to carry the ark. In v. 11 the Deuteronomic version of Yahwe's command to Israel to set out upon its journey through the wildernes is found, following immediately upon the account of the making of the ark and of the appointment of the Levites to carry it. The implication is clear that the Levites were the bearers of the ark upon the journey through the wilderness.

Obviously therefore the Deuteronomic authors of Deut. 10. 1–5, 8–11 must have had before them a narrative which told of these three incidents in connected form. We have had reason to conclude that the original of the narrative of the making of the ark in vv. 1–5, is to be found in Ex. 33. 5b–6, and that these verses stood originally in close juxtaposition to Ex. 34. 1–5 (above pp. 29 ff.). But we find no narrative of the selection of the Levites following this passage. However, in Ex. 32. 26–29, i.e. a passage almost immediately preceding Ex. 33. 5b–6, we find an account of the selection by Yahwe of the Levites, in order to bestow a blessing upon them. This passage is embedded in the narrative of the Golden Calf, but it is recognized by all scholars as a very disturbing element in this narrative, having little apparent connection with and explanation from the Golden Calf story. Unquestionably it is not in its original position in the Biblical narrative.

The passage is extremely difficult of explanation, due to its manifestly fragmentary character. It seems to imply that in Moses' absence the people of Israel had sinned grievously against Yahwe, and that only the Levites had remained faithful to Him. It does not state here wherein the sin of Israel had lain, nor likewise in what respect the Levites had remained faithful. But from Deut. 33. 9 it may be safely inferred that the sin of Israel was faithlessness to its covenant with Yahwe, whereas the Levites alone had kept the covenant. Therefore, Deut. 33. 10 goes on to say, the Levites have the high privilege of functioning as Yahwe's priests. Ex. 32. 26–29 unquestionably carries the same implication, that Israel's sin consisted in disregard of its covenant with Yahwe, but recently made. This motif fits perfectly into the C narrative, and makes it parallel the K narrative in one additional and significant detail.

present. It remains for us to consider now in detail the laws of the present Book of the Covenant, and particularly those laws which, seemingly, supplement the original "words." The "words" themselves we have already considered in sufficient detail, and little more can or need be added to what has been said.[183]

In the light of these considerations we may venture to infer that Ex. 32. 26–29 originally followed 33. 5b–6, and that the Deuteronomic authors of Deut. 10. 1–5, 8–11 found them there, still in their original position, and not yet dislocated to their present place in Ex. 32. In their original position they must have gone on to tell that the blessing which Yahwe bestowed upon these Levites as the reward for their faithfulness to Him and His covenant was the high privilege of carrying the ark, and of standing before Him, of ministering unto Him, and of uttering blessings in His name, as Deut. 10. 8 puts it, or of communicating His judgments and oracles to Israel and of bringing His chief sacrifices upon His altar, as Deut. 33. 10 has it. Just these functions were discharged by the Levitical priests of the ark of Yahwe at Shiloh, Eli and his household. Undoubtedly this is then the family tradition of the house of Eli, accounting for their selection by Yahwe to be His priests and the bearers of His ark, whether upon the journey through the wilderness or into battle with the Philistines or other enemies.

We may therefore conclude that Ex. 32. 26–29 was likewise originally a part of the Book of the Covenant and followed in the C narrative almost immediately after Ex. 33. 5b–6.

The meaning of the passage is, however, still obscure; nor does it seem possible to throw much further light upon it. It is not clear wherein the faithlessness of the people of Israel and their disregard for the newly-made covenant lay. Certainly it had nothing at all to do with the Golden Calf episode, for, as we have seen ("The Oldest Document of the Hexateuch," *HUCA*, IV [1927], 109 ff.), that narrative, in its original form, belonged entirely to the Kenite Document. Perhaps it may be inferred from Deut. 33. 8, that it had to do with a testing of the people in some way by Yahwe, at the place called therefore Massah, in order to prove their faithfulness; and only the Levites withstood the test. But wherein the test consisted and what was the consequent nature of Israel's faithlessness neither Ex. 32. 26–29 nor Deut. 33. 8 nor any of the later Biblical traditions about Massah and Meribah (Ex. 17. 1–7; Num. 20. 7–13) give the slightest hint. Manifestly it resulted in a violation in some way of the newly-made covenant, as the result of which Yahwe punished the offenders at the hands of the faithful Levites, and then commanded the people to leave His sacred mountain and set out upon their journey toward their מנוחה (Num. 10. 33), the land which Yahwe had promised to give them as a part of His l. covenant-obligation to them. On this journey through the wilderness they were led by the ark carried by the Levites. All this must have once constituted the concluding portion of the narrative of the Book of the Covenant.

[183] "The Oldest Document, &c.," *HUCA*, IV (1927), 54–98.

THE POEMS OF HAGGAI*

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HAGGAI was probably born during the Captivity in Babylon, and came to Jerusalem in one of the smaller groups of returning exiles that followed the first expedition in 537 B.C. The suggestion of Ewald, André, and Cornill, based on 2, 3, that Haggai had seen the former Temple before its destruction in 586 B.C. requires too advanced an age for the poet at the time of his appearance in 520 B.C. There is no evidence that Haggai was a venerable old man in 520 B.C. as Cornill (*Der israelitische Prophetismus*, Lect. 5) says. On the other hand, Havet's statement (*La Modernité des Prophètes*, p. 166) that there was no one left at that time who could have seen the Solomonic Temple, is an exaggeration. It is hardly necessary to add that Havet's assignment of Haggai's poems to the reign of Herod the Great (37–4 B.C.) is impossible (see *op. cit.*, pp. 164. 204; cf. Lagarde, *Mitteil.* 4, 365).

Daiches (OLZ† 11, 277) has found a Babylonian equivalent of the name (cf. first of Critical Notes below). There is more

* The translation and restoration of the Hebrew text which follow are based on the interpretation of the Book of Haggai given in the Old Testament Seminary of the Johns Hopkins University under the direction of the late Professor Paul Haupt. Grateful acknowledgment is here made of the writer's indebtedness to him.

† For the abbreviations and diacritical marks see JBL 29, 112; JSOR 1, 3; AJSL 26, 19. 204 and inside front covers in SBOT. Note also:

André = *Le Prophète Aggée*, Paris, 1895.
Böhme = *Zu Maleachi und Haggai*, in ZAT, 1887.
BuL = Bauer and Leander, *Historische Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache*, Halle, 1918.
CoE = Cornill, *Einleitung in die kanon. Bücher des AT*, 1913.
DB = Hasting's *Dictionary of the Bible*.
EB[11] = *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (eleventh edition).
EdJ = E. Meyer, *Entstehung des Judentums*, Halle, 1896.

reason to regard him as a layman who was deeply interested in the political conditions of his time, especially the restoration of the political independence of his people, than as a priest (so Reuss and André) who was concerned only with rebuilding the Temple. The allusions in IV, A to the flesh of sacrificial victims and defilement by contact with a dead body could, of course, be made by any layman (cf. the conclusion of Haupt's paper, *Was Amos a Sheepman?* in JBL 35, 287).

In his article *Ancient Babylonian Parallels to the Prophecies of Haggai* (AJSL 35, 128) Bewer has called attention to the first column of Cyl. A of Gudea (*c.* 2500) where this ancient priest-king of Lagaš is told by the god Ningirsu in a dream, which is interpreted to him by his divine mother Nina, to rebuild the temple of Ningirsu, which had been ruined by a flood; see Witzel's translation in part 1 of his *Keilinschriftliche Studien* (Leipzig, 1918), p. 98. But careful interpretation of the texts gives the impression that parallels between the Gudean inscription and the poems of Haggai are not striking. Haggai, *e.g.*, expected a period of prosperity and political independence with restoration of the Davidic dynasty, rather than the beginning of the Messianic age with the completion of the Temple in which Jhvh would make his home (AJSL 35, 129[1]).

Ehrlich	=	*Ezekiel und die kleinen Propheten (Randglossen z. hebr. Bibel)*, Leipzig, 1912.
G^{29}	=	Gesenius-Bergsträsser, *Hebräische Grammatik* (29th edition), Leipzig, 1918.
GA	=	E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. 3, Stuttgart, 1912.
IJG^{5}	=	Wellhausen, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte* (5th edition).
JB	=	Jewish Bible, 1917.
Joel	=	Haupt, *Joel's Poem on the Locusts*, in ΞÉNIA (1911), 381–399.
Klosterman	=	*Geschichte des Volkes Israel.*
KS	=	*Keilinschriftliche Studien*, Leipzig, 1918.
LSAT	=	Delitzsch, *Die Lese- und Schreibfehler im AT*, Berlin, 1920.
Michaelis, J.D.	=	*Deutsche Übersetzung des AT*, Göttingen, 1782.
Mitchell	=	*Haggai and Zechariah*, in ICC, New York, 1912.
Riessler	=	*Die kleinen Propheten*, Rottenburg, 1911.
Rothstein	=	*Die Genealogie des Königs Jojachin und seiner Nachkommen*, 1902.
VB	=	Jeremias and Winckler, *Vorderasiatische Bibliothek*, Leipzig, 1907.
VG	=	Brockelmann, *Grundriß der vergleich. Grammatik der semit. Sprachen*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1908–1913.

In the seventeen years that had elapsed between the liberation of the Jews by Cyrus (538 B.C.) and the date of Haggai's appearance (520 B.C.) a succession of bad harvests and poor crops, the levies of passing Persian armies (cf. Wright, *Zech.* 186) as well as heavy taxes within the community during the reconstruction period, and the usual difficulties incident to the re-establishment of the homes and industries of the returned Jews, had greatly impoverished and discouraged them. It was natural, therefore, that the reconstruction of the ruined Temple had not progressed.

The death of Cambyses in 522 B.C. was followed by many insurrections throughout the great Persian empire, and there arose a number of aspirants for the Persian throne. Among these was Darius Hystaspis, who succeeded after three years in establishing himself and quelling all opposition. The dates of the leading events of this period are as follows: On March 11, 522 B.C. began the uprising of Pseudo-Smerdis in Persia. The last date of Cambyses before his death is the 16th of the following month. The assassination of Pseudo-Smerdis and the occupation of the throne by Darius Hystaspis occurred on Sept. 29 of the same year. Darius won his way into Babylon on Dec. 21. During the spring and summer of 521 a number of rebellions in the provinces were put down. Sept. 21, 521 is the first date of Nabû-kudurrî-uçur's revolt in Babylon. The second revolt was not quelled until 519 (HAV 281; GA 3, 194; JBL 33, 161; 32, 107).

The watchful Haggai in Jerusalem believed that he could see in this universal political confusion, before the final success of Darius was assured, the overthrow of the Persian supremacy. With this expected downfall he saw an opportunity to restore the political independence of Jhvh's people under the leadership of the Davidic scion Zerubbabel. For the success of Zerubbabel's political plans he considered the reconstruction of the Temple necessary (JBL 32, 109; 33, 161; 37, 209. 230; AJP 40, 67; *Mon.* 29, 294).

In spite of the consensus of critical opinion that the book is prose throughout, it can be shown that Haggai's genuine words exhibit a distinct meter. Sievers (*Alttestamentliche Miscellen* 6–10 [BSGW 59], pp. 63–75 [1907]) reconstructs the text after a

metrical scheme in which the introductory narrative passages are also included. On the other hand, he thinks that there is no strophic arrangement in Haggai's poems. In Augusti-de Wette's AT (1810) 1, 4–11; 2, 3–9. 14b–19. 21b–23 were arranged in lines, and in Bunsens' *Bibelwerk* (1860): 1, 2–11; 2, 3–9. 11–19. 21b–23. There is no metrical arrangement in RV, JB (except 1, 6), Geo. A. Smith's *Twelve Prophets* (1898), Kautzsch's AT3 (1910), Duhm's *Zwölf Propheten* (1910), Orelli's *Kleine Proph.*3 (1908), or Kittel's *Bibl. Hebr.*2 (1913). In Baentsch's posthumous translation of Haggai in *Die Schriften des AT* by Gressmann, Gunkel, &c., part 19 (Göttingen, 1912), p. 76, only the first three lines of II (2, 21b. 22) are regarded as metrical. Similarly in Hitzig's *Prophet. Bücher* (1854) 2, 22 was arranged in five hemistichs. Budde, *Geschichte der althebr. Literatur* (1906), p. 169, gives a translation of 1, 2–11 in hemistichs, but it is not metrical. Mitchell's reconstruction of some lines (on p. 38 of his commentary) is not satisfactory.

The book contains four poems. The one in c. 1 consists of five triplets with 2 plus 2 beats in each line. The poem at the end of c. 2 is a single quatrain with 3 plus 3 beats. The poem in 2, 1–9 is composed of two quatrains and two triplets, all with 2 plus 2 beats. Of the two poems in 2, 10–19, which were probably delivered on the same day, the first has three couplets with 2 plus 2 beats, while the second consists of four couplets with 3 plus 3 beats. The gloss in 1, 5. 6 also contains a quatrain with 2 plus 2 beats. For the combination in the same poem of stanzas with 2 plus 2 beats and stanzas with 3 plus 3 beats see AJSL 20, 163, n. 2; CoE 506; *Cant.* 52, l. 7; BL 101, l. 1. Haupt (JBL 32, 107; 33, 161) has advanced the theory that Zechariah 8, 9–17 and 7, 1–3 plus 8, 18. 19a plus 7, 4–6 plus 8, 19b contain two poems of Haggai.

The narrative passages (1, 1. 12. 14; 1, 15 and 2, 20; 2, 1. 2. 10. 11) have been added by another hand. Because of their resemblance to Zech. 1, 1. 7; 7, 1–3; 8, 18; Ezr. 1, 1 and Neh. 1, 1; 2, 1 they may be ascribed to the Chronicler (350 B.C.) to whom the compilation of Ezra and Nehemiah is usually assigned; cf. JBL 40, 119. It is probable that he merely enlarged upon dates that were attached to each poem not long after its

utterance and were thereafter associated with it. Budde (*Althebr. Lit.* 169) thinks that Haggai's poems were edited by a disciple, who also provided the historical introductions, dates, &c., just as Jeremiah's poems were written down by Baruch.

Translation

I

LET NOT THE TEMPLE LIE IN RUINS!

(Aug. 28, 520 B.C.)

i	1, 2	ᵅThus said Jhvh,ᵝ	These people say,
		⌈The time is⌉ not ⌈come⌉	to build Jhvh's house.
	4	ᵞIs it time for yourselves	to dwell under[δ] cover?ᵋ
ii	7	ᵋᵑConsider now,[1]	how ye have fared:[2]
	9ᵃ	Ye looked for much,	and lo! it is little;[3]
		What ye brought home,	I blew upon it ‹.›[4]
iii	9ᵇ	Why is that so?	says Jhvh Sabaoth.
		On account of my house,[5]	which lies in ruins,[6]
		While ye are running	for your own houses.[7]
iv	10	Therefore { } the heavens	withheld ‖their‖ dew.[8ᵩ]
	11	I called a drought {ˈ}	on ˣland and ʎmounts,[9]
		And on the grain,	and the new wine.[μ]
v	8	Go up to the mountain,[10]	and ‹cut down› timber,[11]
		And build the house!	Then I'll show my glory.[12ᵛ]
	13	ᵋI[13] am with you,	says Jhvh ‹Sabaoth›.ᵒ

(α) 1, 1 In the second year of King Darius,[14] in the sixth month, on the first day of the month,[15] came Jhvh's word through[16] the prophet[17] Haggai to Zerubbabel[18] ππ as follows

(β) 2 Sabaoth, as follows

(γ) 3 Jhvh's word came through the prophet Haggai as follows[19]

(δ) 4 your houses (ε) while this house is in ruins[20]

(ζ) 1, 5 and now thus said Jhvh Sabaoth:[21]
Consider now how ye have fared:
6 Ye have sown much, and brought in little;
Ye ate, but not [enough]; [ρρ] ye had clothing, but were not warm;
And ‹ye› [σσ] earned wages into a bag full of holes.[22]
(η) 7 thus said Jhvh Sabaoth (ϑ) 10 and the earth withheld its produce
(ι) against you (κ) 11 the (λ) on the
(μ) and on the oil and on ‹all› that the ground brings forth, on men and beasts, and on all handiwork[23] (ν) 8 said Jhvh
(ξ) 13 Jhvh's messenger, Haggai, said ‹ττ› to the people as follows
(ο) 12 Zerubbabel [υυ] and all the remnant[24] of the people hearkened to the voice of their God, Jhvh, [φφ] and the people reverenced[25] Jhvh.
14 Jhvh stirred up the spirit of Zerubbabel [χχ] and all the remnant of the people, so that they went to work[26] on the house of their God, Jhvh Sabaoth

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(ππ) **1**, 1 ben-Shealtiel,[27] the governor of Judah, and to the high-priest Joshua[28] ben-Jehozadak
(ορ) 6 ye drank, but had not enough (σσ) the wage-earner (ττ) 13 in a message of Jhvh[29]
(υυ) 12 ben-Shealtiel, ‹the governor of Judah›, and the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak
(φφ) that is, ‹to› the words of the prophet Haggai, which were in accordance with what their God, Jhvh, had caused him to deliver ‹to them›[30]
(χχ) 14 ben-Shealtiel, the governor of Judah, and the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak

II

ZERUBBABEL IS MY CHOSEN ONE

(Sept. 20, 520 B.C.)[1]

2, 21 [αβ]I am shaking [γ]heaven and [δ]earth,[2]
22 I shall upset the great kingdom's throne,[3]
I shall destroy ‹all› the strength of [ε]the heathen,
I shall ‹wreck› their chariots and riders,
[Subdued] will be horsemen and ‹footmen›,
each ‹falling› by the sword of his brother;[4]
23 [ζ]But I'll take thee, my servant, Zerubbabel, [ϑ]
and place thee as a ring[5] ‹on my right hand›.[ι]

(α) 1, 15; 2, 20 On[6] the twenty-fourth day of the month [χχ][7] ‹came› [λλ] Jhvh's word to[8] Haggai [μμ] as follows
(β) 21 Say to the governor of Judah, Zerubbabel, as follows[9]
(γ) the (*accus.*) (δ) the (*accus.*) (ε) 22 the great kingdom of
(ζ) 23 at that time, says Jhvh Sabaoth (η) ben-Shealtiel
(ϑ) says Jhvh (ι) for thee have I chosen,[10] says Jhvh Sabaoth

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(χχ) **1**, 15 in the sixth (month) in the second year of King Darius
(λλ) **2**, 20 a second time[11] (μμ) on the twenty-fourth of the month

III

BE NOT DISMAYED!

(Oct. 17, 520 B.C.)[1]

A i 2, 3 (α) Who is left among you — that saw (with his eyes)
This house (of God) — in its former glory?[2]
What do ye see — now (in its place)?
Is not its appearance — like naught in your eyes?[3]

ii 4 Now take thou courage,[4] — O Zerubbabel! (βγ)
And { } all ye people! — says Jhvh ‹Sabaoth›.
{Take courage} and work! — for I am with you; (δ) ‹(ε)›
5 My spirit abides — among you, fear not![5]

B iii 6 (ζ) After a little — I'll shake once more[6]
(η) Heaven and (θ) earth — and (ι) sea and (κ) dryland.[7]
7 I'll ‹destroy› (λ) the nations — and [8]treasure‹s›[9] will come in. (μ)

iv 8 Mine is the silver[10] — and mine is the gold. (ν)
9 Yea, great will be — the (ξ) Temple's (ο) glory. (π)
And in this place — I'll give[11] prosperity. (ρσ)

(α) 2, 1 In the seventh month, on the twenty-first day of the month,[12]
2 Jhvh's word came through the prophet Haggai (ττ) ¢ # to Zerubbabel (υυ)
and to ‹all› the remnant of the people as follows
(β) 4 says Jhvh (γ) Take courage, O high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak!
(δ) says Jhvh Sabaoth
(ε) 5 the word which I pledged to you when ye came forth from Egypt[13]
(ζ) 6 for thus said Jhvh Sabaoth (η) the (*accus.*) (θ) the (*accus.*)
(ι) the (*accus.*) (κ) the (*accus.*) (λ) 7 all
(μ) 7 from all the nations, and I shall fill this Temple with glory, said Jhvh Sabaoth
(ν) 8 says Jhvh Sabaoth (ξ) 9 this (ο) future
(π) 9 above the former, said Jhvh Sabaoth (ρ) says Jhvh Sabaoth
(σ) ‹that is, peace of mind and preservation for every one who lays the foundations for re-erecting this Temple›[14]

(ττ) 2, 1. 2 as follows: Say
(υυ) ben-Shealtiel, the governor of Judah, and to the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak

IV

A LITTLE RELIGION IS NOT SUFFICIENT

(Dec. 18, 520 B.C.)[1]

A i 2, 12 [α] "If" a man should carry holy flesh[2] in [β]his garment,
And touch with the skirt some[γ] bread, or [δ]pottage,

ii Or [ε]wine, or oil, or any kind of food,
Would that become holy?[3] [ζ]They ⌈will⌋ say, No.

iii 13 [η]But if ye touch a corpse,[4] and then any of these,
Would they be unclean?[5] The priests[6] ⌈will⌋ say, Yes.[7]

B iv 14 [θ]"So[8] it is with these people[9] before me,
declares Jhvh ‹Sabaoth›.
And so it is with their handiwork:[10]
what they offer there is unclean!

v 15 Consider now (the time)[11]
from this day going backward,[12]
Ere stone was joined to stone[13]
in the Temple,[κ] ‹how did ye fare then?›

vi 16 Ye would come to a heap[14] of twenty
and ‹lo!› there were but ten;
When ye came[λ] to draw fifty (measures)
‹from› a vat,[15] there were but twenty.[μ]

vii 18 [ν]"The time from the day[16] when was founded
‹the› Temple,[ξ] now consider!
19 Is the seed-grain yet[17] in the pit?[18]
are the grape-vines[ο][19] ⌈yet⌋ unbearing?[π][20]

(α) 2, 10 On the twenty-fourth day of the ninth[21] month[ρρ] Jhvh's word
11 came to[22] the prophet Haggai as follows: Thus said Jhvh Sabaoth,
Ask the priests[23] for instruction[24] as follows

(β) 12 the skirt of (γ) the (δ) the (ε) the

(ζ) the priests ⌈will⌋ answer (η) 13 and Haggai said

(ϑ) 2, 14 and Haggai began and said (ι) So it is with this nation and
(κ) 15 of Jhvh (λ) 16 to the winepress
(μ) 14. 17 ‹σσ and they were grieved because of their labor ττ›,[25] I have smitten you with blight, and with mildew, and with hail,υυ yet ‹ye do not come› to me, says Jhvh[26]
(ν) 18 Consider now from this day going backward φφ (ξ) of Jhvh
(ο) 19 and the figs and the pomegranates and the olive trees
(π) from this day I will bless[27]

(ρρ) 2, 10 in the second year of Darius
(σα) 14 ‹because of their acceptance of bribes›[28]
(ττ) ‹and their hatred of a pleader in court›[29] (υυ) 17 all your handiwork
(φφ) 18 from the twenty-fourth day in the ninth month[30]

Explanatory Notes

I

(1) Lit. *set your heart on your ways*; AV *consider your ways*. This phrase, however, does not mean, Consider what you are to do in the future, but what you have experienced in the past. St. Jerome (cited by Orelli) says: *Considerate et in memoriam redigite quae feceritis et quae passi sitis.*

(2) The command in v. 8 interrupts the argument in vv. 7. 9 and belongs after v. 11 (Sievers).

(3) Hardship, misfortune, and crop-failure had resulted instead of the fulfillment of the large expectations which the Jews had brought with them from Babylon as portrayed in Pss. 122. 126 (AJSL 11, 80. 134). To the people, existing prospects seemed no better than those of previous years.

(4) *I blew upon it* does not mean *I blew it away* (so AV^{M}, also J. D. Michaelis, and Orelli; Luther, *ich zerstäube es*) or *I pooh-poohed it*, I despised it, it is insignificant like wind-driven chaff, but *I blasted it*. The poet's intention was not to show Jhvh's contempt for their poor harvests but to emphasize the fact that these were due to His anger. *Blast* denotes not only *blowing*, but also *blight*, curse. Grotius comments, *Ita perire feci sicut perit emissus halitus*. In the story of Aladdin the slave of the lamp breathes upon the vizier's son so that he becomes paralyzed. In ath-Tha'labi's (died A.D. 1038) *Stories of the Prophets* (AJSL 14, 150, l. 3) Job's leprosy is said to have been caused by Satan blowing

into his nostrils a blast which turned his body white. Marti quotes the Arabian superstition mentioned by Bauer: It is in the highest degree disagreable to Moslems if any one whistles over a threshing floor heaped with grain. Then comes the devil, they say, in the night and takes part of the harvest.

(5) The people contended that the Temple could not be rebuilt because of the hard times. Haggai asserts that the hard times are due to Jhvh's displeasure because the Temple was allowed to lie in ruins. The poet implies that prosperity will come as soon as indifference to the Temple's condition ceases.

(6) Cf. 2 K 25, 9. 13; 2 Chr. 36, 19. Soon after the Return, the altar of burnt-offering was erected, if it was not already standing when the Jews arrived; but apart from this, little work had been done on the heaps of stone and charred timbers that marked the Temple site (see n. 26).

(7) The Hebrew verb, which means *to run*, *to hasten*, and in Assyrian, *to succor*, corresponds to our colloquial *to hustle*: ye are active and energetic in the interest of your own houses, but not for my house. Grotius: *vestras res tantum agitis. Deum non curatis, nec ille vos curat.*

(8) During the Palestinian dry season (May to September) nightly sea-breezes, heavily laden with moisture, precipitate it as thick mist on the summer crops of millet, sesame, figs, melons, grapes, olives, &c. In the summers preceding August 28, 520 B.C. these west winds had been irregular and interspersed with hot sirocco winds from the east, destructive to crops.

(9) The drought was universal. It affected lowlands and highlands, and touched such different growths as grain and grapes. Even the wooded hills, nature's reservoirs, were dry (cf. Am. 1, 2).

(10) For timber it was not necessary to go to distant Lebanon, famous for cedars, nor even as far as Carmel which was also thickly wooded; neighboring hillsides afforded all the timber that the limited means and strength of the little community could utilize. In Haggai's time there must have been woodland in the vicinity. Cf. Neh. 2, 8; 8, 15. *Mountain* here practically means *forest*. Caesar (*Bell. Gall.* 6, 25) uses *Hercynia silva* for the forest-covered mountain system of Germany from

the Black Forest to the Carpathians (cf. JBL 36, 249). Cf. also Goethe's *Füllest wieder Busch und Tal* (for *Berg und Tal*). Heb. *śadê*, field, is Assyr. *šadû*, mountain; Heb. *ḥorš*, thicket, is Assyr. *ḥuršu*, mountain; Heb. *dobr*, steppe, is Eth. *dabr*, mountain. Haggai meant, Go out to the wooded hills! Contrast Morgenstern's *the Temple mount* in his paper *On Leviticus* 10, 3 in the Haupt Anniversary Volume (Baltimore and Leipzig, 1926), p. 99.

(11) Building stone could be found in the Temple ruins and the devastated city; cf. 2, 15; Ezr. 6, 4. Timber was needed for the framework and roof.

(12) Lit. *then I'll take pleasure in it and glorify myself.* Grotius: *placebit mihi in ea domo ostendere majestatem meam.* As long as Jhvh had no Temple in Jerusalem, He could not dwell among his people and manifest his glory.

(13) V. 13 interrupts the narrative section that follows the poem, and many regard it as a gloss. Sievers inserts a modified form of v. 13^a between vv. 8 and 12 and rejects v. 13^b. V. 13^b, however, contains a sentiment corresponding to v. 8^b and may be the missing line of the triplet and a fitting conclusion to the first poem (cf. ZAT 26, 13, l. 4).

(14) Darius Hystaspis, 521–485 B.C. The passage 2, 3 would be meaningless at a later date, and the political situation described in 2, 6. 7. 21. 22 corresponds to that which existed when Darius Hystaspis ascended the Persian throne. Riessler's view that Darius represents Cambyses, and that Zerubbabel was identical with Nehemiah and the first Persian governor of Judea, is impossible (cf. JBL 32, 107, n. 1; 111, n. 13).

(15) Aug. 28, 520 B.C. Cf. HAV 290; GA 3, 195; JBL 33, 161. The Babylonian year of twelve lunar months consisted of 354 days. The first year of Darius, 521 B.C., contained a thirteenth or leap-year month of thirty days. Strassmaier (*Camb.* 400) has shown that the dark of the moon which was observed on Dûzu 14th in the seventh year of the reign of Cambyses, occurred July 16/17, 523 B.C. If the 1137 days from Dûzu 14, 523 to Elul (sixth month) 1, 520 be added to the Julian date of July 16/17, 523 for the former, the date of Haggai's first poem must be Aug. 28/29, 520 B.C. The first of Elul was a holiday (Is. 66, 23; Am. 8, 5)

and the poem was delivered before such a group of people as would assemble about a speaker on a day of this kind.

(16) Lit. *by the hand of* (cf. 2, 1). The divine message was communicated to the people through this channel. In 2, 10. 20 the communication is to the prophet only, presupposing that it was to be passed on to others.

(17) Haggai was a patriotic poet like Amos, Hosea, and Micah. Heb. *nabî* means not *foreteller* but *caused to speak, inspired* (TOCR 1, 271). CD (s.v. poetry) cites Bailey's line in the proem to *Festus*: *Poetry is in itself a thing of God; He made His prophets poets.*

(18) Zerubbabel, as Albright suggests, may be a late erroneous vocalization, based upon a popular etymology of the name. Originally it was *Zêrbâbél*, Babylonian *Zêr-Bâbili*, meaning *Offspring of Babylon*, and a common formation in Babylonian (JBL 40, 108). Vocalizations based on popular etymology are very common, and have been collected by Böhl in an important paper on *Wortspiele im Alten Testament*, JPOS 6, 196–212, and in his brochure *Volksetymologie en Woordspeling in de Genesis-verhalen*. *Zerûb-babel* is a monstrosity, quite without parallel (Contrast Haupt, JBL 32, 108).

Zerubbabel was the Davidic scion on whom the Jewish hopes for the restoration of their political independence centered; he was the grandson of the last legitimate king of Judah, Jehoiachin (1 Chr. 3, 17; 2 K 24, 8) who was eighteen years old when he was carried captive to Babylon, and fifty-five when released by Evil-Merodach (2 K 25, 27). At that time he may have been allowed to establish a harem, so that he had seven sons. At his death his eldest son, Shealtiel, it may be supposed, was recognized as head of the Jews. It is possible that neither Shealtiel nor the second son, Malchiram, had sons and that the Zerubbabel who was heir to the throne was born to the third son, Pedaiah (1 Chr. 3, 19). Albright's conjecture (JBL 40, 108) that both Shealtiel and Pedaiah were fathers of sons bearing the name Zerubbabel, more easily solves the apparent discrepancy indicated in n. 27 below. The great joy that would arise among the exiles when an heir to the throne was born about 538 B.C. is pictured in Is. 9, 6 (JBL 32, 108; 35, 283; OLZ 12, 67; AJP 40, 67:

Mon. 29, 299). The babe Zerubbabel was taken with those who returned to Jerusalem in 538 B.C. under the permission of Cyrus. The boy was probably under the protection of his uncle Sheshbazzar whom E. Meyer (EdJ 75; see also *Ezra-Nehemiah*, SBOT, 58, 14) and Albright (JBL 40, 108f.) identify with Shenazzar, the fourth son of Jehoiachin. Albright proposes *Šin-ab-uṣur*, a common neo-Babylonian name (cf. Meyer's *Šin-bal-uṣur* and contrast Torrey's view, AJSL 37, 93, n. 1) as the common original for both Shenazzar and Sheshbazzar. Shenazzar may have died as Zerubbabel was approaching manhood in 521 B.C., and perhaps one of the first official acts of Darius was the appointment of the eighteen year old Zerubbabel to succeed his uncle as governor of Judah.

(19) V. 3 is a useless repetition of part of v. 1, and interrupts the argument in vv. 2. 4.

(20) V. 4^b arose from v. 9^b.

(21) VV. 5^a and 7^a are monotonous repetitions of v. 2^a. VV. 5^b. 6 are amplifications of vv. 7^a. 9^a.

(22) André interprets the Hebrew term as a little perforated stone which indicated that its wearer was a serf, but it refers to a leaky purse. Grotius compares the sieves of the Danaides. Because of the high prices, money had lost its value, and even the well-paid laborer could buy no more than before. The conditions of 520 B.C. were paralleled by those that followed shortly after the World War. Necessities cost so much that, no matter how often purses are filled, their contents quickly disappear.

(23) V. 11^b is a detailed prosaic account of the drought's effects, and may represent an accretion of glosses.

(24) The *remnant* does not refer to those left in the land after the deportation in 586, nor to their descendants, but to the few who had survived the Captivity, and had returned to Judah, and had not succumbed to the ensuing hardships.

(25) Not *fear* (AV) of punishment by Jhvh, but reverential awe manifested in obedience and respect.

(26) Neither Haggai nor Zechariah know of any previous work on the Temple. Ezr. 5, 16 is unsupported by evidence or probability, and Ezr. 3, 8–10 is much confused. Hölscher (*Die Propheten*, 334) suggests, on the basis of Jer. 41, 5, that even

the altar of burnt-offering had been erected during the period of the Captivity by Jhvh-worshipers who were left behind. Débris may have been removed; the foundations would not have been destroyed, and may have needed only repairs before the superstructure could be begun.

(27) Shealtiel is named as Zerubbabel's father in Matt. 1, 12; Luke 3, 27; Ezr. 3, 8; 5, 2; Neh. 12, 1 and throughout Haggai; but in 1 Chr. 3, 19 Zerubbabel is named as the son of Pedaiah. See note 18 above.

(28) Joshua was the grandson of Seraiah (1 Chr. 6, 14; 𝔐 5, 40) who was slain at Riblah in 586, and son of Jehozadak who went into the Captivity. Joshua may have been the first high-priest, the theocratic head of the congregation only after the removal of Zerubbabel in 519. The introductory lines are later than 519. Joshua may represent a subsequent addition. Haggai addressed his poem to Zerubbabel, not to Zerubbabel and Joshua (JBL 32, 113, l. 7; 37, 210; JSOR 2, 78). The statement *and to the high-priest Joshua ben-Jehozadak* must be regarded as an unhistorical tertiary addition. S. E. Cook (EB[11] 1, 4[a]) says, Several difficulties in the present Biblical text appear to have arisen from the attempt of later tradition to find a place for Aaron in certain incidents.

(29) This gloss may have been inserted in order to prevent the misunderstanding that Haggai was an Angel of Jhvh (so Ehrlich). Heb. *mal'ak* and Gr. ἄγγελος mean both *messenger* and *angel*. The addition does not imply that Haggai and Malachi are the same person (so Cheyne, *Crit. Bibl.* 179).

(30) V. 12[b] was probably added to avoid the impression that the people had actually heard the voice of Jhvh (cf. ZDMG 63, 513, l. 13; Deut. 4, 12; John 5, 37).

II

(1) Both André and Böhme felt that the text of the second chapter had been disturbed. Haupt (JBL 32, 113; 37, 211; JSOR 2, 76) suggests that the poem at the end of the book (2, 20–23) originally followed the first poem; 1, 15 must be combined with 2, 20 to provide the date of this utterance. VV. 21–23 breathe a spirit of revolution against the Persian

supremacy, and express the hope that in the midst of the overthrow of the Persian power, the Davidic scion Zerubbabel will restore the political independence of Jhvh's people. Because of its revolutionary character it was probably suppressed after the power of Darius had been established; see above, p. 155. At a later date, probably after the fall of the Persian empire, the poem was appended at the end, since it exhibits the same meter as the preceding lines in vv. 14–16. 18. 19, and also because it formed a more pleasing conclusion to the book, just as Ezra-Nehemiah originally followed Chronicles, which later were given the concluding place in the canon in order to end it with the hopeful outlook of 2 Chr. 36, 23 (cf. Grimm's *Euphemistic Liturgical Appendices*, p. 1).

The rebuilding of the Temple was advocated by Haggai for political purposes. The desire for national independence was strong. Hopes for it were encouraged by the world situation at the death of Cambyses and the grapple for the Persian throne by Darius and others. The result in Judah was a political rebellion, with Zerubbabel, the governor of Judah by favor of the Persians, at its head. Haggai visualizing the world turmoil, lends his support to Zerubbabel. Less than a month after his first address he speaks again to prophesy the success of the rebellion and the exaltation of Jhvh's Chosen, Zerubbabel. According to Haupt, Ps. 21 (to which Ps. 24, 7–10 should be appended) glorifies the coronation of Zerubbabel. Also Pss. 20, 110, 132; 1 S 2, 1–10; Is. 9, 5. 6; 11, 1–6; Mic. 5, 1. 3; Luke 1, 68–79 refer to this Davidic scion (JBL 33, 167; 37, 213. 231; JSOR 2, 81; AJP 40, 69. 72. 74; ZDMG 58, 621; *Mic.* 10; *Mon.* 29, 296, 301, 305).

(2) V. 21 does not refer to a seismic disturbance, but is a poetical figure for the overthrow of the great powers of the earth which in 520 B.C. were the Persian government and its gods (cf. note 7 on III and JBL 37, 282[i]). These were apparently tottering to a fall in the confusion that followed the death of Cambyses (cf. JBL 32, 108).

(3) Lit. *throne of kingdoms*, an intensive plural referring to the dominion of the world-wide Persian empire.

(4) Jewish hopes need not be limited by the puny strength of their little community. Jhvh's power, believed to be operating

at the very moment in causing the confusion and dissension within the great Persian empire, was expected by Haggai to bring about its utter destruction (cf. Jud. 7, 22; Ezek. 38, 21; Zech. 14, 13; 2 Chr. 20, 23). Jhvh's hand was at work, and ultimately would set up Jerusalem as His dwelling place, the center of world control (JBL 32, 109–112. 115. 120).

(5) Zerubbabel was to signify to all the world all the authority and favor which a signet ring of Jhvh's hand would carry (cf. Gen. 41, 42; Est. 3, 10; 8, 2). Sellin, *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (1912), p. 179, n. 1, says that the Cherub is called in Ezek. 28, 12 a *signet*; but this passage is very uncertain; see *Ezekiel* (SBOT) 85. 39. 42; Kautzsch's AT[3] 1, 899, note *a*. Ezek. 28, 12[b]–16 seems to be an illustrative mythological quotation; cf. Is. 14, 12. Sellin's explanation of the obscure phrase in Ezek. 28, 12, rendered in JB: *thou seal most accurate*, is just as questionable as his interpretation (*op. cit.*, p. 178) of the epithet in Is. 9, 6, translated in RV[M]: *Father of Eternity* (cf. AJP 40, 72; *Mon.* 29, 302). For *signet* as a symbol of something precious and dear cf. Jer. 22, 24; Cant. 8, 6; see Haupt, BL 109; Grapow, *Vergleiche im Ägyptischen* (1920), p. 19. For Cant. 8, 6 also compare the lines in Tennyson's poem *The Miller's Daughter*; She is grown so dear, that I would be the jewel that trembles in her ear; ..... and I would be the girdle about her dainty waist ..... and I would be the necklace ..... upon her balmy bosom.

(6) All the Versions count 1, 15[a] as the first verse of c. 2, and in the Received Text there is a lesser pericopic division between vv. 14 and 15. Rothstein and Klosterman believe that a passage has fallen out of the text after v. 15. The date in 1, 15 is one which the utterance in 2, 21–23 would suit admirably; the same day of the month is referred to in 2, 20; and the poem in 2, 20–23 is the only one of the four in the book whose attached date lacks mention of the month. What appears as a useless appendage after 1, 14 serves well before 2, 20–23.

(7) Twenty-three days after the date in 1, 1 (see n. 15 on I), *i.e.* Sept. 20, 520 B.C.

(8) See n. 16 on I.

(9) André correctly assigns v. 21[a] to the final redactor who conformed the verse to 1, 1 and 2, 2 on the basis of the address

to Zerubbabel in 2, 23. Note the omission of Joshua here; see note 28 on I.

(10) Zerubbabel, chosen for the throne of David.

(11) This addition was probably made by a late glossator who believed the twenty-fourth referred to the ninth month in 2, 10. 18. Cf. the translation of Josh. 5, 2 in the Polychrome Bible and Zech. 4, 12 (JBL 32, 121, 11) as well as *Est.* 22, 14; IJG[5] 276, n. 5.

III

(1) After seven weeks of work on the Temple the people grew discouraged at the slow progress of its reconstruction. The enthusiasm which marked the beginning of their labors (1, 14) waned, as they became aware of the limited resources of the little community, the restrictive effect of withdrawing workers from productive occupations, and the contrast between the glory of the former Temple and the one which their hands were erecting. Nor had there yet appeared a fulfillment of the prediction of Zerubbabel's exaltation which had been made four weeks before. Haggai saw the necessity of re-establishing the *morale* of the workers.

(2) The Temple had been destroyed sixty-six years before by Nebuchadnezzar (2 K 25, 9. 13). A very few men, seventy-five or eighty years old, could have remained to tell from personal remembrance, of the glory of those bygone days. That their reminiscences would be idealized, and that they would be pessimistic with regard to the times at hand, would be more or less characteristic of their old age. The effect on the public mind of such disparaging remarks was detrimental to the purpose of completing the work.

(3) This comment was doubtless quite familiar to the ears of the people, and was mentioned by the poet, not for emphasis of its truth, but as an introduction which would catch the public attention, and from which he could proceed to combat the discouragement which it caused.

(4) Do not spend time in vain and disquieting comparisons! Take courage and work!

(5) There is no reason for discouragement. Jhvh, abiding among them would beyond a doubt supply all that they might fail to accomplish. Cf. Is. 9, 7 (*Mon.* 29, 302; AJP 40, 72).

(6) The prediction in 2, 21–23 had not been fulfilled. Doubts concerning it had arisen. So Haggai says: Have faith *only a little while longer*; Jhvh has shattered the powers of the world before, and he will do it again *after a little while*. The Hebrew phrase at the beginning of this triplet means lit. *yet once a little it* or *once more a little it is*, i.e., the Persian empire was shaken by rebellions in various provinces at the beginning of the reign of Darius. These insurrections have been crushed. But soon the empire will be shaken again by new uprisings, and this will enable you to regain your political independence (JBL 32, 108). J. D. Michaelis' (1782) rendering (*once more, but only for a short time*) is incorrect; he referred this prediction to Alexander the Great's overthrow of the Persian empire in 331. The same misinterpretation was given by Döderlein in his edition of Grotius' *Annotationes* (1776).

(7) V. 6 does not refer to a physical catastrophe, but to the religious and political upheaval that was taking place over the world, and to battles on land and sea (see n. 2 on II). The hemistich *and sea and dry land* is not a prosaic gloss, as Mitchell thinks.

(8) The same Hand that was destroying the nations will cause these events to bring about the enrichment of Jerusalem, His chosen dwelling place. Rich spoil will flow into the city, when Zerubbabel becomes victorious with Jhvh's aid. The Maccabees provide a parallel 350 years later; cf. Ps. 68, 14. 31 (AJSL 23, 229, n. 21 and 236, n. 48).

(9) The Received Text has the singular, which the Vulgate and Luther explain as referring to the Messiah. The Versions have the plural, and in the Received Text (in which the word, though singular, is accompanied by a plural verb) it can be pointed as a plural without the change of a single consonant. It refers, as the following verse indicates, to the riches that will be gotten from the heathen who are to be subdued by Jhvh's power.

(10) This statement is not declarative of Jhvh's ownership of valuable metals in use or unmined, but is anticipatory of the riches that were to flow into the city when Jhvh's plans for Zerubbabel were fulfilled.

(11) The Temple's humble beginnings will finally be clothed with glory, and the people's poverty will be replaced with pros-

perity. In Is. 9, 6 Zerubbabel is called the Prince of Weal, *i.e.* prosperity (*Mon.* 29, 302; AJP 40, 69).

(12) Oct. 17, 520 B.C., the seventh day of the Feast of Tabernacles (Ezek. 45, 25; Lev. 23, 34) of which no mention is made here. Its celebration may have been much less elaborate in 520 B.C. than usual because of the poor harvests and other troubles.

(13) V. 5^a is lacking in all the Versions but the Vulgate, and is rejected by nearly all critics. The glossator was probably thinking of a passage like Ex. 3, 12, and meant to say: Remember *the promise which I gave you when you came out of Egypt*. Cf. also Jer. 7, 23; Ex. 19, 5. 6.

(14) *Peace of mind*, i.e. security; *preservation*, i.e. safety; if they start to lay the foundations of the new Temple, they will not be disturbed and endangered. This gloss to the final word of the second poem is preserved in the Greek. We need not suppose that it is based on Ezr. 9, 9^b.

IV

(1) Work on the Temple again lagged, and shrugging shoulders reappeared, when Haggai's extravagant promises of October failed to materialize within the following two months; so he renewed his efforts to inspire the people with enthusiasm. A new kind of appeal was necessary. This time his approach was on the basis of the religious significance of the new Temple.

(2) That is, the meat of a sacrificial victim.

(3) Does holiness spread easily? Does it pass from one object through another to a third? Any one in the crowd familiar with the common ideas of ceremonial contagion knew that the only reply was, No.

(4) Cf. Num. 19, 11–22 (P). Aversion among Orientals to a dead body and the ceremonial defilement of all that touches it is well known.

(5) Does pollution spread easily? Will it spread through an intermediate object or person to a third?

(6) A layman might have hesitated to put aside a valuable skin-bottle of wine that had accidentally been touched by one who had been near a corpse, but every one knew that in such

a case the verdict of the priests would be, Unclean. A layman may be inclined to disregard the rules of quarantine for contagion, but every one knows that any physician will insist on them where a contagious disease exists. As no one needs actually to inquire for the physician's opinion on such a matter, so Haggai's hearers did not actually consult the priests.

(7) The implication in these two questions may be illustrated by the fact that a single disease germ may affect an entire community, but a great amount of disinfectant is required to eradicate an epidemic that has once spread.

(8) The pause that followed vv. 12. 13 made their *argumentum ad hominem* more impressive, and served to separate their dialectic from the exposition that follows. The following lines have three beats in each hemistich, not two as in the preceding three couplets; cf. *Cant.* 14, no. 10, ii and p. 52; BL 101, l. 1.

(9) The people were living without a center of ceremonial and moral cleansing, the Temple, while they were continually in contact with the defiling foreign influences of their day. The altar of burnt-offering did not afford a place strong enough to make the true religion of Jhvh a real influence. Only the reconstructed Temple could dominate their minds. When it had been built, they would be proud that they were Jews, and keep themselves ritually clean.

(10) Their defilement had contaminated their handiwork to such a degree that when they brought the product of their labor before Jhvh, it did not please Him, and He had therefore not prospered them.

(11) Contrast **2**, 4 (n. 2 on III). Haggai here directs attention to the past instead of to the future. Such work as had been done on the Temple was being accompanied by evidences of the return of Jhvh's favor.

(12) Lit. *upward*; cf. our expressions, *to trace the stream upward, down to the present time, high antiquity*. The primary connotation of the Hebrew term for eternity (*ʿólám*) is *highness*, i.e. *high antiquity*, time long past. We use *below* (Lat. *infra*) for *later* in a book, and *above* (Lat. *supra*) for that which precedes. Lat. *vita superior* means *former life*, and *aetas superiorum* denotes *past*; also ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω (or ἐπέκεινα) χρόνοις signifies *in former*

times. On the other hand, the past is called in Hebrew: *front*, and the future: *back* (AJSL 24, 141, n. *). Drusius (1550–1616) and J. D. Michaelis (1668–1738) interpreted this Hebrew *upward* correctly as equivalent to *retro ad anteriora tempora* (see Hitzig-Steiner *ad loc.*).

Wellhausen says, *upward* must have the same meaning in both vv. 15 and 18, and any one who denies that *upward* means *forward* cannot expect any consideration of his exegesis. We must assume the risk. The interpretation denounced by Wellhausen is found in Luther's Bible, J. D. Michaelis' translation, Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*, Hitzig's *Prophet. Bücher*, Ewald's *Propheten* [2], Kautzsch's AT [1]; also in Siegfried-Stade's and Francis Brown's dictionaries as well as in VB. V. 18[a] (v) is secondary, and the following date (φφ) is an erroneous tertiary addition (see below, n. 29).

(13) The poet invites comparison between two distinct periods in the past which are separated by the date on which the reconstruction of the Temple was begun, Sept. 1, 520 B.C. (cf. 1, 12; Zech. 4, 9; JBL 32, 109; 33, 161). The period before that date he pictures in v. 16, and the interval between Sept. 1 and Dec. 18 he treats in vv. 18. 19.

(14) An experienced farmer might be expected to estimate the amount of grain that had been threshed out, by looking at the size of a pile of straw and chaff. In dry seasons, however, the heads of the grain do not fill out, and the yield of grain in proportion to the straw is much less. An epidemic of disease or *rust* also affects both the quality and quantity. In the summers preceding Sept. 1, 520 B.C. the farmers, who came to store their grain after threshing, found their expectations only half met.

(15) Grapes were trodden in the upper vat of the wine-press; the juice flowed from it into a second vat from which it was drawn into jars and skins (see the cut on p. 68 of the translation of *Judges* in the Polychrome Bible; cf. EB 5312). Heb. *pûrâ* is sometimes used for the press itself (cf. Haupt's *Joel*, n. 59 and AJSL 24, 126). Here it refers to the receiving vat which a vine-dresser might approach with the expectation of drawing off a yield of fifty jars. But in a dry season the grapes shrivel and yield less juice. The seasons preceding 520 B.C. had proven more disastrous to grapes than to grain, and less than half the expected

yield of wine was produced. *Jars* after *fifty* is omitted in Hebrew, just as we say a *quarter* for the fourth part of a dollar, or as *tenner* is used for a ten-pound note, or *tierce* for the third part of pipe (126 wine-gallons). A Roman *amphora* (MLN 33, 432) held about six gallons, a Syriac *ḥâḇîṯâ* (OLZ 18, 297; ZA 30, 99) about eight gallons. For Oriental store-jars cf. the cut on p. 42 of Müller-Simonis, *Du Caucase au Golfe Persique* (Washington, 1892).

(16) In the interval since Sept. 1 the drought had been broken, and the early rains of October-November had come in abundance to soften the sun-baked ground for plowing and seeding.

(17) Barley and wheat, the two winter grains, had been sown after the fall rains. A good harvest could be anticipated. The fields are generally sown in November-December (see Benzinger, *Hebr. Arch.* 130[1]; contrast Matthes, ZAT 21, 125). Sometimes the winter rains are delayed until January (EB 4008). The husbandmen cannot start ploughing before the autumnal rains have prepared the land for the reception of the seed. The ground becomes very hard during the dry season (DB 1, 48[b]).

(18) Grain was stored in pits (cf. Jer. 41, 8 and JBL 38, 133, n. 3) or in dry cisterns hewn out of the rock (EB 85). In England a hole dug in a potato- or turnip-field, for storing potatoes, &c. during the winter, is called a *pit* (EB[11] 21, 659[b], l. 5). The rendering *barn* (which means originally *barley-place*, *bere-ern*) is misleading, as are also Marti's *Speicher* and Nowack's *Scheuer* (so, too, Wellhausen and Duhm) or J. D. Michaelis' *Kornboden*. There were no covered buildings for the storage of farm-produce in Palestine. For a description of the grain-pits of post-exilic Gibeah, three miles north of Jerusalem, see Albright, *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, vol. IV, p. 27.

(19) The good vintage had already given proof of the changed fortunes.

(20) In vv. 15-19 Haggai appealed to the change in the tide of misfortune since work had begun on the Temple, as evidence of the contention that prosperity was directly dependent on the reconstruction of Jhvh's Temple. Therefore, so he implies, the people should hasten to work on it; the earlier its completion, the sooner will come the full measure of Jhvh's grant of prosperity.

(21) Dec. 18, 520 B.C. The two Hebrew months and three days, which had elapsed since the third poem (see n. 12 on III) was published, amount to two months and but one day in the longer months of the Julian calendar.

(22) Cf. 2, 20 and n. 16 on I.

(23) The questions in vv. 12. 13 were not actually submitted to the priests. It is but a literary device adopted by the poet (cf. JBL 32, 108, n. 4; also Reuss' AT 2, 546, n. 4). The people knew well what the decision of the priests would be, if they were consulted; see above, n. 6.

(24) *Torah* is elsewhere used to denote the Law and is so translated here by the Versions; but, used without the article here, it has the more original meaning of *instruction* or *decision* (cf. JBL 36, 259). The oldest codes of the Law, Ex. 20–23 (E) and 34, 10–26 (J) as well as the Deuteronomic Code and the laws of Ezekiel, perhaps also the Law of Holiness (Lev. 17–26) were doubtless known, and more or less authoritative, at this time; but such incidents as this show that the Law was still living and growing. The priests rendered decisions which might afterwards be codified.

(25) According to Haupt (JBL 36, 149) the addition which is found in the Greek after 2, 14, consists of three glosses, the original Hebrew text of which should have been translated:—(a) *because of their acceptance of bribes*;—(b) *and they were grieved because of their labor*;—(c) *and their hatred of a pleader in the gate.* Gloss *b* belongs to end of IV, vi while he assigns *a* and *c* to Zech. 8, 16. See below, n. 28.

(26) V. 17 is an illustrative quotation which is a loose reproduction of Am. 4, 9. It is rejected by nearly all critics, since it mentions grain-diseases which arise from excessive moisture, whereas the genuine words of Haggai refer to drought; cf. 1, 10. 11.

(27) These words are a euphemistic liturgical appendix to avoid the ominous conclusion *unbearing*.

(28) See above, n. 25. Haupt who holds that Zech. 8, 9–17 is Haggaian (JBL 32, 107; 33, 161), believes that Zech. 8, 9–17 is a sequel to Hag. 2, 14–19 and was once written in a column parallel to it. Glosses σσ and ττ, having been inserted between the two columns, afterwards crept into the wrong column.

(29) Lit. *in the gate*, i.e. *who pleads with a court in favor of a* (poor) *defendant*.

(30) This date (Dec. 18, 520 B.C.) cannot refer to the following phrase *The time from the day when the Temple was founded*, since that occurred about Sept. 1; see above, n. 13. It is an addition based on the date given in 2, 10 (α) and is rejected by Wellhausen, Nowack, Marti, Duhm and Budde.

Critical Notes

חגי, adjectival in form, means *festal* (GK § 86, i; ZDMG 63, 520, l. 11). The name may also be explained as a shortening of חגיה (1 Chr. 6, 15) or of חגריה, as Zaccai (Zacchaeus) is a contraction of Zechariah (cf. JAOS 22, 101; BA 3, 566). Daiches (OLZ 11, 276) regards it as a mixed name, Hebrew in outer covering and Babylonian in content. *Ḫa-a-ag-ga-a* is found twice in the Murašû contract tablets. The name is not uncommon among the Hebrews, being found in the Talmud and borne by approximately a dozen different men mentioned in the Elephantine papyri where it is exceeded in frequency only by *Hosea, Meshullam* and perhaps *Nathan* and *Shallum*.

א

(i) For 𝔐 לֹא עֵת בֹּא עֵת־ read לֹא עֵתָּ בָא עֵת following 𝔊 οὐχ ἥκει ὁ καιρός, 𝔙 *nondum venit tempus*, 𝔏 *usquequo non veniet tempus*, 𝔖 לָא מִתֵּי וְבָנָא, 𝔗 לָא מְטָא עִדָּן. Ehrlich's reading לֹא עֵתּ־בְּנוֹת בית יהוה, with excision of להבנות at the end, and Grätz's עִיד בָּא for 𝔐 עֵת־בֹּא, adopted in Oort's *Emendationes*, are both unacceptable.

For 𝔐 העת לכם 𝔗 has הבדין בשר לכון, *is it thus fitting for you?*

For 𝔐 קִרוּיִם (𝔊 κοιλοστώμοις, 𝔏 *caelatis*, 𝔙 *laqueatis*, 𝔗 די מטללין בנסרי ארזא, *which are roofed with planks of cedar*) we must read סְפוּנִים; cf. 1 K 6, 15 and στέγη, *roof*; στέγος, *house*. Contrast *Kings* 163, 32. Ehrlich's emendation צפונים, co-ordinated to אתם, is gratuitous; but the rendering *covered* (roofed) *houses* in Reuss' AT (1892) is better than the translation *ceiled* (i.e. *wainscoted*) *houses*.

(ii) Ehrlich admits that v. 7^{b} should be followed by v. 9.

For 𝔐 לְבַבְכֶם 𝔊𝔏𝔘𝔖 have τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, *corda vestra*, לבותכן (so throughout the book) and some critics (cf. ICC *ad loc.*) might feel tempted to read לִבֹּתֵיכֶם; but the plural would be contrary to Hebrew usage (cf. GK^{28} § 124, s). It would be just as unidiomatic as if a German translator used the plural for our *physics*, *mathematics*, *acoustics*, *gallows*, *headquarters*. 𝔊 has ξύλα (𝔖 קישא) for עֵץ, Hag. 1, 8; ἔργα for מלאכה, 1, 14; θρόνους for כסא, 2, 22; 𝔖 פאריה for יבולה, 1, 10; 𝔘 *jumenta* for הבהמה, 1, 11; cf. last note on μ. Kittel notes *ad* Lam. 3, 41 that many MSS read לבבינו instead of לבבנו, and that the plural is supported by 𝔊𝔘𝔖; but לִבֵּינוּ (we should expect at least לִבּוֹתֵינוּ; cf. Franz Delitzsch's translation of Acts 14, 17) is as incorrect as 𝔐 לִבֵּהֶן (Nah. 2, 8) for לִבָּהֶן (contrast *Nah*, 46). It is sufficient to refer to the concordances *s.* לִבָּם and לִבָּם or לִבָּם and לִבְּכֶם.

Not only לב is used in the singular, even in cases where it refers to a number of persons, but also קרב, נפש, רוח, פה, and this usage prevails also in Assyrian. Gen. 42, 28 we read ויצא לִבָּם (𝔊 καὶ ἐξέστη ἡ καρδία αὐτῶν, *Graec. Ven.* ἐξῆλθεν ἡ σφῶν καρδία, 𝔖 ואל לבהון). Similarly we find in Assyrian: *iplax libbašunu*, their heart feared, or *ikpud libbašunu*, their heart planned.

We often find αἱ καρδίαι in NT where OT has the singular לב; cf. *e.g.* Mal 3, 24 and Luke 1, 17; Jer. 31, 33 and Heb. 10, 16; Ps. 95, 8 and Heb. 3, 8. 15. 𝔊 has καρδίαν πατρὸς πρὸς υἱόν for 𝔐 לב אבות ואל בנים in Mal. 3, 24, 𝔘 *cor patrum ad filios*, 𝔖 לבא דאבהא על בניא, 𝔗 לב אבהן על בנין. Joel (2, 13) says קרעו לבבכם ואל בגדיכם; 𝔊 has τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, 𝔘 *corda vestra*, 𝔖 לביכון. It is idiomatic Hebrew to say לב בני אדם, לב חכמים, עשׂי לכם לב, חדש ורוח חדשה, פי רשעים, הכינו לב, נתתי להם לב, שׂמי לבם, אל תשיבי לב, סעדו לבבכם. The singular ἡ καρδία instead of the plural αἱ καρδίαι is found also in the NT; cf. *e.g.* Luke 1, 66; 8, 12; 24, 32. 38 where 𝔘 renders: *et posuerunt in corde suo; tollit verbum de corde eorum; nonne cor nostrum ardens erat*; but *cogitationes ascendunt in corda vestra*. Cf. also John 12, 40; 14, 1; I John 3, 20.

Ehrlich thinks we ought to read פָּנוּ אל הרבה, *ye made room for much* (Gen. 24, 31). It was not necessary for the people to make room for the harvest; they had plenty of garners (cf. n. 18 on IV) and they were not full. Moreover, we should expect at least פָּנוּ להרבה. The phrase פנה אל הרבה means lit. *to turn the face towards much*, i.e. *to look for* in anticipation.

For 𝔐 והנה 𝔊𝔗 suggest והיה, but 𝔙 has *ecce*. The ל is emphatic; cf. n. 3 to Haupt, *The Book of Ecclesiastes* in *Oriental Studies* (Boston, 1894), p. 264; see also GK § 143, e; VG 1, 501, b; JBL 29, 104; 35, 289; AJP 40, 71, n. 27; למעט is practically equivalent to our *precious little*.

Read ביתה; 𝔐 הבית is due to הבית in the preceding verse. הבאתם is a conditional clause (GK § 159, g).

נפחתי בו is correctly interpreted by 𝔗 אני שלח ביה מארתא, *I cast upon it a curse*. For נפח, *blow, curse*, cf. Job 4, 9 where AV translates נשמת by *blast*; רוח, *wrath*, in Jud. 8, 3; Is. 25, 4; 30, 28; Zech. 6, 8 (JBL 32, 112, n. 19); Prov. 16, 32; 29, 11; אף means *heavy breathing*, also *wrath*; Syr. אתנפח, *to be blown upon* or *away* signifies also *to be blasted*.

For ב in נפחתי בו cf. Lat. *afflare* and JBL 32, 112, n. 19; AJP 40, 70, n. 23.

(iii) For 𝔐 יען מה נאם יהוה 𝔊 has διὰ τοῦτο τάδε λέγει Κύριος. But there is a pause after יען מה. 𝔙, correctly, *Quam ob causam? dicit Dominus*. For the two beats of יַעַן מָה, see AJSL 19, 130, last line. Cf. וקבל in the second hemistich of ג, ii.

For 𝔐 רצים 𝔊 has διώκετε. The following ל has the connotation of *for the benefit of*. For רוץ, *to run*, be zealous, cf. Is. 59, 7; Prov. 1, 16; 6, 18; GB[16] 752[a]; see also above, p. 162, l. 16. Ehrlich cites *Ber.* 28[b]: אני רץ לחיי העולם הבא, *I strive for life in the world to come* (BT 1, 104, l. 4). We must not read בביתי ..... רצים (so Wellhausen, also Duhm, ZAT 31, 108). Nor can we adopt Cheyne's emendation חֲרָצִים (*Crit. Bibl.* 179).

(iv) After עליכן omit 𝔐 עליכם (𝔙, *super vos*) following 𝔊𝔏. 𝔗 has על כן בדיל חוביכין *therefore on account of your sins*. 𝔐 עליכם originated as a gloss after יאקרא in the following line, and later

was transferred to the preceding line because of its resemblance to עלי־כן.

For 𝔐 מטל (𝔊 ἀπὸ δρόσου, 𝔖 מן טאלא) we must read טַלָּם; cf. ϑ. 𝔗 has מלאחתא מטרא, *from sending rain*. Delitzsch (LSAT 12, מ) thinks that the prefixed מ in 𝔐 מטל is due to dittography. Grätz's reading מֵעָל instead of מטל is not good.

For 𝔐 וָאקרא 𝔊 has καὶ ἐπάξω.

For 𝔐 חרב 𝔊𝔖𝔏 have ῥομφαίαν, חרבא, *gladium* (= חֶרֶב).

For 𝔐 על in the third line of this triplet, read the archaic form עלי. Haupt reads also עִמִּי, עַמִּי wherever the rhythm requires it; see JBL 38, 151, n. 10.

(v) For 𝔐 והבאתם (𝔗 וְאַיתִי, 𝔖 איתי, 𝔙 *portate*), read וּבְרֹאתָם, following 𝔊 κόψατε and 𝔏 *caedite*; ברֹאתם may have been corrupted to הבאתם, but not *vice versa*. Ehrlich retains 𝔐. Grätz (*Emend.*) suggests יחטבתם, but this would not have been corrupted to והבאתם.

The Dageš in ארצה־בו is due to the enclitic character of בו; cf. Haupt, JBL 36, 251[i], *ad* v. 9; 37, 216, v. 2; GK[28] § 20, g, l. 7; G[29] 66; BuL 188. 199; VG 570, c.

The *Kĕṯîb* ואכבד is preferable to the *Qĕrê* ואכבדה. Note also that אכבדה would become in pause אכבְּדָה. For the meaning *I shall manifest my glory* cf. the translation of Lev. 10, 3 in the Polychrome Bible; also Ezek. 28, 22; Is. 26, 15. According to Morgenstern (ZA 25, 141–153 and the *Haupt Anniversary Volume*, p. 98) כבוד יהוה is a technical term used by Ezekiel and P to designate the semi-material form assumed by Jhvh in revealing himself to mortals. To Ehrlich, אכבד means here *I shall feel amply rewarded*.

After 𝔐 יהוה 𝔖 adds חַיְלָתָנָא.

(α) We must not insert לאמר אמר־נא following 𝔊 λέγων Εἰπὸν and 2, 1. 2 and 20. 21; 𝔐 לאמר אמר־נא should also be omitted in 2, 1. 2. In 2, 20. 21 (ויהי דבר יהוה אל חגי) the insertion of לאמר אמר is correct, but in 1, 1 and 2, 1. 2 (היה דבר יהוה ביד חגי אל זרבבל) it is superfluous. Cf. Budde's remarks in ZAT 26, 9; also note on ד, α.

(β) 𝔐 לאמר is lacking in 𝔊𝔖.

(δ) Oort's emendation בבתים instead of בבתיכם is unnecessary, if we read בסְפִנים and regard בתיכם as a gloss.

(ζ) Read לִשְׂבְעָה for 𝔐 לְשָׂבְעָה.

Grätz (*Emend.*) suggests בי for 𝔐 לו, following 𝔊 καὶ οὐκ ἐθερμάνθητε ἐν αὐτοῖς, but 𝔐 means: A man would clothe himself without feeling warm; cf. Haupt's remarks on impersonal constructions in his paper *The Son of Man* in *Mon.* **29**, 126. Lange in his *Bibelwerk* (1876) gives the correct translation *aber nicht zum Warmwerden für einen.*

Omit 𝔐 המשתכר as a gloss and read ישתכר (so several MSS; cf. ZAT **26**, 11) for 𝔐 משתכר. Cf. *Leviticus* 26, 40; *Kings* 289, 20.

Ehrlich's view that הָבָא in the second hemistich of v. 6 does not mean *to bring in*, but *to produce*, is unfounded; cf. 2 S 9, 10. We do not find אשר תביא הארמה in v. 11.

(μ) In 𝔐 על־אשר insert בל, following 𝔊𝔗𝔖 and many MSS.

𝔐 האדם is a collective noun; 𝔊𝔏𝔙 have the plural. Similarly בהמה; cf. above, p. 177, l. 9.

(ξ) V. 13 or portions of it are rejected by nearly all critics. The epithet מלאך יהיה in ξ for the usual נביא suggests that 13^a is an interpolation; but 13^b is a fitting conclusion for the first poem (cf. ZAT **26**, 13).

(ο) Ehrlich's view that כל שארית העם does not include the people who had returned from Babylon is untenable; שארית denotes the Jews after the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. In Maccabean texts it refers to the Jews who had survived the Syrian persecution; cf. Haupt's translation of Ps. 76, 11 (ZDMG 61, 287, l. 20; 286, l. 28). Zeph. 3, 13, cited by Ehrlich, is Maccabean (cf. JBL **38**, 147, l. 13) and שארית ישראל at the beginning of that verse is a later addition.

(ππ) For 𝔐 פחת 𝔊 has ἐκ φυλῆς, an attempt to see in the strange word פחת some form related to the more familiar ממשפחת. 𝔗 likewise inserts בית. Heb. פחת is the Assyr. *bêl pixâti*, lord of a district, and *paxâtu*, governor (AJSL **24**, 131; AkF 6). Cf. above, p. 165, l. 12. In Hebrew we have secondary doubling of the *h*:

pāḥḥâ, *paḥḥaṭ*; cf. *aḥḥâḏ*, one, constr. *aḥḥaḏ*; also *aḥḥîm*, brothers, *äḥḥâu*, his brothers (BuL §§ 24, g; 21, n; contrast AkF 6).

(יט) Insert פחת יהודה following 𝔊𝔏 and parallels in 1, 1. 14; 2, 2.

(ככ) Read ואל for 𝔐 ועל after ישמע.

For באשר שָׁלַח, *as he commanded him to speak*, cf. Prov. 26, 6; 2 S 11, 22; 1 K 14, 6; Is. 55, 11. Grotius says: *Sicut misit Dominus, id est, quae Deus ei dicenda mandaverat, nam* שלח *Hebrais saepe hanc significationem habet.* Cf. GB[16] 832[a], e and JBL 26, 24, n. †.

After 𝔐 אלהיהם 𝔊𝔘𝔖 add אליהם. Its omission in 𝔐 is due to haplography. We must not substitute אלהים for אלהיהם, as Ehrlich suggests.

ב

For the Hebrew text of this quatrain see Haupt, JSOR 2, 77.

After 𝔐 ארץ 𝔊 adds καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ξηράν, an addition due to the resemblance of 2, 21 with 2, 6.

𝔐 ממלכות (𝔊 βασιλέων for βασιλειῶν) is an intensive plural; the great king (ὁ μέγας βασιλέυς) of Persia is called מלכים in Ps. 110, 5 (JSOR 2, 76) and in the same way the great Persian empire is called ממלכות. In the Sidonian inscriptions of the fourth century B.C. ממלכת means *king* (cf. JAOS 45, 272). 𝔙 has the singular for ממלכות in 8. Also in 𝔐 the plural forms מלכים, ממלכות, and מלכיות (*i.e.* מלכָיות or מלכָיית; cf. Albrecht, § 84, h) which were written מלכי, ממלכי, and מלכי, respectively (JBL 34, 81; 36, 252; AJSL 32, 74) are occasionally confounded; in Jer. 10, 7 Duhm and Cornill substitute מלכיהם (Θ, τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν αὐτῶν) for 𝔐 מלכותם.

Insert כל before חזק, following 𝔊[A].

Read והאבדתי for 𝔐 והפכתי which is due to vertical dittography; cf. Mic. 5, 9.

𝔐 מרכבה is a collective noun; cf. our *horse* for *cavalry*, and *foot* for *infantry*. 𝔊𝔗𝔖 read the plural. The word denotes the scythed chariots of the Persians, the δρεπανηφόρα ἅρματα of Xen. *An.* 1, 7, 10 and Diod. Sic. 17, 53 (JBL 37, 231, l. 3).

After 𝔐 ורכביה 𝔊[A] adds καὶ καταστρέψω πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καὶ καταβαλῶ τὰ ὅρια αὐτῶν· καὶ ἐνισχύσω τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς μου· Cf. נ, ס; ד, μ. σσ. ττ.

Point וַיָּרְדּוּ (hophal future of רדה, *to subdue*) instead of 𝔐 וַיִּרְדּוּ (perfect qal of ירד with ו consecutive). Cf. AJSL 32, 70; JBL 34, 58, l. 9; also 38, 163[1]. Grätz's emendation חרדי is gratuitous.

Read רגלים, *footmen*, for 𝔐 ורכביהם which is dittography from the preceding hemistich; cf. Jer. 12, 5; WF 217, iii.

After אחיו Nowack (following Grätz) adds יפל; others prefer יפלו.

Duhm (ZAT 31, 110) regards איש בחרב אחיו as a secondary addition derived, perhaps, from Ezek. 38, 21; horses, he says, have no swords.

Ehrlich thinks we must evidently read תחתם, *instead of them* (*scil.* ממלכות) instead of 𝔐 בחותם, but this would be very prosaic, and תחתם would never have been corrupted to בחותם. Moreover, ממלכות denotes one kingdom, *viz.* the Persian empire, and even Haggai did not hope that Zerubbabel would become the supreme ruler of the Persian empire.

To 𝔐 בחותם 𝔗 adds על יד which supports Haupt's suggestion that an original בימיו has been lost because of its resemblance to כי־בך at the beginning of ו which follows.

(אא) Ehrlich says we must read השש instead of בששי, but בששי is a tertiary addition, derived from 𝔄, α, as is also בשנת שתים לדריוש המלך which, according to Ehrlich, should be prefixed to 𝔄, ג.

ג

(i) 𝔐 הנשאר is omitted in 𝔊[V] 𝔏; 𝔊[S] περιλειφθείς. For the article before the predicate cf. GK § 126, k. Since the allusion was to the well-known few who had seen the Solomonic Temple the use of the article is natural.

The plural ראים is an intended contrast with the singular ראה of the first line.

𝔐 ומה means *what, and as what*, not *how*; מה גדול, *how great = what a great thing*. Cf. WdG 2, 314, l. 4; contrast GB[16] 401, B. On the other hand, מי may mean *how*; see last note on ד, v.

Wellhausen's rendering of כמוהו כאין is correct; Heb. כמוהו can not mean simply *such a thing* (ZAT 26, 13; GB[16] 330[b]) or *such a one* (VB; JB). There is nothing contemptuous in כמוהו, as Lange in his *Bibelwerk* supposes. The literal translation would be *its likeness is the likeness of nothing*; cf. GK[28] § 161, c. In Arabic when we wish to say, *he is like a dog*, we must say (as in the Koran 7, 175) lit. *his likeness is like the likeness of the dog*; cf. KAT[2] 505; Fleischer, KS 1, 378. Even Rückert (1831) rendered incorrectly: *Ist nicht ein solches wie Nichts in euren Augen?* and Hitzig (1854): *Ist nicht Seinesgleichen wie keines in euren Augen?* Ewald's statement that older writers would have said היא כאין is unwarranted. The idiomatic כמוהו כאין and the two corrupt readings אתכם אין and מהיותם certainly do not indicate that Haggai was an old man (Ewald, *Proph.*[2] 3, 179).

(ii) For the hemistich זרבבל cf. first note on א, iii.

After נאם יהוה add צבאות with 𝔏𝔘.

𝔐 חזק, misplaced in l. 2, should be restored as a plural before ועשו in l. 3.

(iii) Wellhausen's conjecture that 𝔐 עוד אחת מעט היא represents the conflation of two variants, *I shall shake once more* and *I shall shake soon* is gratuitous. We must not delete אחת. 𝔊 has ἔτι ἅπαξ = עוד אחת. Nor can we assume that 𝔖 תוב חדא זבן read עוד אחת פעם or, rather, עוד פעם אחת. Heb. אחת means *once* (GK[28] § 134, r) just as Syr. חדא may be used in this sense without the addition of זבנא (Nöldeke, *Syr. Gr.*[2] § 241). Keil translated correctly: *noch einmal, und zwar in kurzem*. Orelli's explanation of אחת as *one period* of time is incorrect. 𝔊 ἔτι ἅπαξ re-appears in Heb. 12, 26.

For 𝔐 עוד מעט 𝔊 has ἔτι ὀλίγον in Ps. 37, 10, and ἔτι μικρὸν in Ex. 17, 4. 𝔐 עוד אחת מעט היא is expressed by 𝔗 עוד חדא ועירא היא and 𝔙 *adhuc unum modicum est*. The literal translation of the Hebrew phrase is, *again once a little it is*. Both עוד and אחת are adverbial, while מעט is an adjective used substantively as the subject of היא, *it is*. The whole phrase forms the first clause of the compound sentence, the second clause of which begins ואני מרעיש.

Ehrlich states that we must read אם instead of אחת. He thinks the ם of אם dropped out through haplography, and א was regarded as a symbol for 1; עוד should be connected with אמר in ζ: *for thus says Jhvh furthermore, If it*—the beginning of the reconstruction of the Temple—*be insignificant, I shall shake up*, &c. For עוד אמר he refers to ועוד ראיתי and עוד למד, Eccl. 3, 16; 12, 9. But in both passages, which are secondary, עוד means *continually, constantly*; see Haupt's *Eccl.* 17. 33; cf. Ps. 84, 5^{b}. Duhm (ZAT 31, 109) thinks that אחת may mean *at once*; he compares פתאם, Mal. 3, 1, and is inclined to regard מעט היא as an explanatory gloss.

For 𝔐 הרעשתי which is due to מרעיש at the end of the first line of this triplet, read השמדתי; cf. note on הפכתי in ב, and JBL 35, 228.

Ehrlich thinks that את־הים was added because some of the treasures referred to at the end of this triplet came from the sea, החרבה being added by way of supplement; contrast n. 7 on III.

Ehrlich's reading והֵבִיאי instead of 𝔐 ובאו is no improvement; but he is right in deleting כל־הגוים after ובאו.

For 𝔐 חֶמְדַּת (so, too, 𝔗𝔖𝔙, חֶמְדַת, רגתא, *DESIDERATUS*) read חֶמְדָּת following 𝔊 τὰ ἐκλεκτά and 𝔏 *electa*; so nearly all modern critics; note the prefixed plural באו. The reading חֶמְדַּת with the addition כל הגוים is probably due to a subsequent Messianic interpretation; cf. Luke 2, 30. The original reading may have been המְדוֹת or המוּדת (cf. G^{29} 45; also LSAT 62) and the omission of the ו before or after ד may be due to haplography (cf. JBL 37, 216, l. 9, and the last note but one on ד, vii). Cheyne's emendation מנחת for חמדת in the present passage (*Crit. Bibl.* 180) is gratuitous.

(iv) According to Ehrlich, כבוד does not mean *glory*, but *wealth*; but this is questionable; cf. his interpretation of ואכבד in א, v. Mitchell, too, renders: *wealth* instead of *glory*. For Morgenstern's treatment, see א, v.

The mistranslation in AV, *the glory of this latter house* (this would be כבוד הבית האחרון הזה) instead of *the latter glory of this house* (so RV) is retained in JB.

(α) Before שארית prefix כל following 𝔊𝔖𝔏; cf. 1, 12. 14.

(ε) V. 5ª is omitted in 𝔊𝔏 and is rejected by nearly all critics. 𝔙 makes it the direct object of ועשו in v. 4; כרתי may stand for ברית. Perles (MVAG 22, 129) follows 𝔙 in connecting את־הדבר with עשו. He thinks ε should be inserted after עשו and refers to עשי דברו, Ps. 103, 20, עשׂה דברו, Ps. 148, 8; but ε is prosaic, and the insertion of this clause would destroy the poetic form. Moreover, דבר in connection with ברת does not mean *command* (1 K 13, 1; 20, 35) but *promise* (1 K 2, 4; 8, 20). 𝔙 renders: *et facite (quoniam ego vobiscum sum, dicit Dominus exercituum) verbum quod pepigi vobiscum cum egrederemini de terra Ægypti.* Duhm (ZAT 31, 109) thinks that we may prefix ואקים to את־הדבר, but we may just as well supply וכרתי; cf. Haupt, *Mic.* 6, 8; contrast Hitzig-Steiner's commentary, p. 328, l. 2. Grätz (*Emend.*) proposed to read אל הברית אשר כרתי. The prefixed את is certainly not the preposition את, *with* (so Marti). Budde (ZAT 26, 14) regards את as dittography of the last two letters of the preceding צבאות; he prefers to read: הברית אשר כרתי.

(σ) After 𝔐 אתן שלום נאם יהוה צבאות 𝔊 adds καὶ εἰρήνην ψυχῆς εἰς περιποίησιν παντὶ τῷ κτίζοντι τοῦ ἀναστῆσαι τὸν ναὸν τοῦτον, which 𝔄 follows. According to Wellhausen, the Hebrew original of this gloss was וְשַׁלְוַת נפש לחיות כל היָסֹד לקומם ההיכל הזה, *and peace of mind to restore the whole foundation for re-erecting this Temple.* 𝔊 read יִסַּד instead of יָסַד. Wellhausen's reading יָסַד has been adopted by Marti, Nowack, and Budde (ZAT 26, 14). But the כל before היָסד would be strange; it would be more natural if it were prefixed to ההיכל. Sellin (cited by Nowack) regards περιποίησις as a translation of מִחְיָה. This is preferable to לְחַיּוֹת, but instead of εἰς περιποίησιν we had better read καὶ περιποίησιν = ומחיה; the ל should be prefixed to כל יסד. According to Haupt, the ו before שלום is the ו explicative which often introduces glosses (GB[16] 189[b], d; GK[28] 484, n. *b*; cf. *Pur.* 16, 19). We must therefore render this gloss to שלום, prosperity: *that is, peace of mind* (security) *and preservation* (safety) *for every one who lays the foundations for re-erecting this Temple.*

Budde (*loc. cit.*) proposed to prefix ו to לקומם, so that the meaning would be: *and tranquillity of mind for the restoration and the erection of this Temple*; but this is unsatisfactory. For the article in כל־הבא לעבד cf. Num. 4, 47: עבדה, πᾶς ὁ εἰσπορευόμενος πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, *every one that came to serve*; Num. 21, 8: והיה כל הנשוך וראה אתו וחי, πᾶς ὁ δεδηγμένος ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ζήσεται, *every one that is bitten, when he looks upon it, will live* (GK[28] § 127, b). Riessler restores the Hebrew (?) original of this clause as follows: ישלום נפש לכל עשה בקומם הבית הזה (cf. n. 14 on I).

(זז) Budde and Sievers prefer substitution of אל for ביד to the excision of א: אמר: לאמר; cf. note on א, α.

ד

(i) 𝔐 הן was substituted for אם (cf. 2, 13) probably by some Aramaic-speaking scribe.

(ii) Before 𝔐 יקדשו prefix קדוש; the emphatic inf. abs. has often been omitted by the scribes; cf. *e.g.* JBL 38, 164, l. 2; also 170, v. 5, l. 2; 169, v. 15, l. 1; 168, v. 19, l. 3. The ו in יקדשו was omitted by haplography. The question is not, Is בשר־קדש holy? but, Are the things that come into contact with בשר־קדש holy?

For 𝔐 ויאמרו read וַיֹּאמְרוּ. The question is hypothetical: If you asked this question, you would receive a negative answer.

(iii) In טמא־נפש the נפש is genitive (GK § 128, x). Heb. נפש, *soul* means both *person* and *dead body*; cf. GB[16] 515[a], a. d; Grimm's *Euphemistic Liturgical Appendices*, 5, l. 6, and JAOS 28, 116. For *person* = *body* (AJSL 26, 1), cf. our *body-guard, body-servant* for *personal guard* or *attendant*. For *body* = *dead body*, cf. *corpse*, Lat. *corpus* and Ger. *Leiche* = Eng. *like* which meant originally *body*, then *dead body* (see JAOS 37, 255; cf. above, p. 171). Duhm's statement (ZAT 31, 110) that נפש nowhere denotes a corpse is untenable; nor is it true that, as a rule, one can be defiled by another person only in case that person is dead; cf. *e.g.* Lev. 13, 45; 15, 5–8. 10. 11. 18. 19. 21–24. 27.

For וַיֹּאמְרוּ and וַיַּעֲנוּ see second note on ii.

The omission of the plural ending in ימאו at the end of this section may be due to haplography; in 𝔐 it is followed by יען.

(iv) For the change in meter see above, p. 172, l. 14.

𝔐 אשר is the object of יקריבו, although 𝔊 has καὶ ὃς ἐὰν ἐγγίσῃ ἐκεῖ, 𝔏 *et quicunque accesserit illo*. According to Ehrlich, יקריבו is intransitive as in Ex. 14, 10; the whole clause is to be rendered *und wo sie hintreten, da entsteht Unreinigkeit*. The traditional explanation, he says, deserves no refutation. But his interpretation, endorsed by Riessler (cf. n. 14 on I), is also unacceptable.

(v) 𝔐 ומעלה, *and upward*, means *and backward*; cf. above, n. 12 on IV. Zeydner's reading למטה (cited by Matthes, ZAT 21, 124) is impossible. Assyrian derivatives of עלי are commonly used of the past (HW 65, s. *ullânu*). The Jewish grammarians call a word accented on the ultima *milrá'*, i.e. accented *below*, while a word accented on the penult was termed *mil'él*, accented *above*, i.e. with the accent moved *backward* from the end toward the beginning of the word; cf. GK[28], p. 58, n. 3; G[29] § 12, b; contrast ZAT 27, 285; BuL §§ 12, a; 7, c.

As to ומעלה 𝔊[V] has in Hag. 2, 15 ὑπεράνω (𝔊[A] ἐπάνω), and in v. 18 𝔊[Γ] has ἐπέκεινα. In 1 S 16, 13; 30, 25 𝔊[V] has ἐπάνω, and 𝔊[L], ἐπέκεινα. Both mean *previously*; they cannot mean *subsequently*; οἱ ἐπάνω (or ἐπέκεινα) χρόνοι denotes *the former times*. For the explanation of the addition ומעלה (omitted by 𝔖) in these two passages (where 𝔗 has ולעילה, 𝔙 *et deinceps, and perpetually*) see n. 12 on IV. In Hag. 2, 15. 18 𝔗 has ולעילה, 𝔙 *et supra* in v. 15, but *et in futurum* in v. 18; also 𝔖 has ולהל which means *forward, in the future*; the Last Judgment is called דינא דלהל; Syr. להל (Nöldeke, § 155, B) is the Heb. הלאה; יש הלאה, *stand back!* (Gen. 19, 9) is in 𝔖: פרוק להל.

There is no passage where למעלה means *in the future* (contrast ZAT 26, 14[i]). Also in *Qidd.* 76[a] (BT 5, 972, l. 9) ולמעלה refers to οἱ ἐπάνω, *the ancestors*; cf. Levy's dictionary, vol. 3, p. 192[b]; contrast *Ber.* 26[b]; *Pes.* 50[b] (BT 1, 97, l. 1; 2, 499, l. 6). Marti's rendering (*rückwärts*) of מעלה, Hag. 2, 15 in Kautzsch's AT[1] (1894) was correct, and his translation (*die kommende Zeit*) in

AT[3] (1910) is wrong. JB, *forward* (Ehrlich, *fürderhin*) is a step backward. J. D. Michaelis (1782) rendered correctly: *tut einen Rückblick in die vorige Zeit.*

According to Ehrlich מטרם is not Hebrew and is illogical. He thinks we must undoubtedly read מיום instead of מטרם. The traditional reading would imply that the people were to consider the entire time from the remotest past down to the beginning of the reconstruction of the Temple. This is indeed far-fetched. It is sufficient to point out that מטרם is preceded by מן היום הזה (cf. also Fleischer, KS 1, 622). But if any one hesitates to read מטרם, he may substitute בטרם. In the first and the fourth of the four Arabic versions of the Psalter, edited by Lagarde (cf. AJSL 2, 103, n. 1) we find in Ps. 90, 2 (cf. JBL 31, 121) instead of قبل ان تكون الجبال or قبل تحبل الجبال *ere mountains were brought forth*: من قبل ان تكون الجبال cf. also WdG 2, 189, B: من قبل صلوة الفجر, *before the morning prayer*, and Reckendorf § 247, f.

For the *enjambement* in the second lines of couplets v and vi see AJSL 23, 240 and *Nah.* 29, l. 14.

For the metrical restoration of this passage cf. Haupt, AJSL 24, 127.

𝔐 מְהָיוֹתָם is meaningless, either at the end of v. 15, or prefixed to v. 16 where 𝔐 and all the Versions place it. 𝔊 τίνες ἦτε correctly read מי היתם. For מי, *how*, see BA 1, 17; AJSL 24, 127; contrast GB[16] 419[a]. The reading מי היתם (Kautzsch's AT[1], 1894, also AT[3], 1910; cf. ZAT 26, 15) is preferable to מה היתם (so Matthes, Oort, Marti, Nowack, Sievers, Duhm, Ehrlich) or Sellin's emendation מֵחַיּוֹתָם, *before they restored*. RV *through all that time* (retained in JB) is a paraphrase of AV *since those* days *were* rather than a translation of the Hebrew text. Matthes' reading מה היתם (ZAT 23, 125[f]) is given in Gesenius' *Thes.* (1835), p. 375[a]: *Hagg. II, 16 pro* מְהָיוֹתָם .... *cum Alexandrino interprete* (τίνες ἦτε) *legendum videtur* מהיתם, *i.e.* מַהַיִּיתֶם *pro* מָה הֱיִיתֶם; cf. Köhler's *Haggai* (1860), p. 97, n. 1. Similarly Matthes' מפר השיר instead of מפר היש (ZAT 23, 121) was suggested by J. D. Michaelis

in 1774; see Fürst[3] 1, 559[b]; Haupt, AJSL 20, 166, n. 26; JHUC, no. 316, 22[i].

(vi) We need not read the inf. בֹּא (so Marti, Ehrlich, Duhm); בָּא is impersonal; cf. second note on א, ז. AV *when one came* is correct. 𝔊 ὅτε ἐνεβάλλετε εἰς κυψέλην κριθῆς εἴκοσι σάτα, καὶ ἐγένετο κριθῆς δέκα σάτα is not a literal translation, but a paraphrase; ערמה does not mean κυψέλη, nor need we add either סאים (cf. GK § 134, n) or שׂערה (or שׂערים; Cod. 20 of de Rossi, חטים). 𝔙 *cum accederetis ad acervum viginti modiorum, et fierent decem*, 𝔗 מדהויתון עלין לערימת עסרין יהיא עסרא, 𝔖 כד עאלין הויתון על ברית עסרין והוא עשרא, but מי הייתם (𝔐 מהיותם) must be joined to the preceding line.

For the insertion of הנה before היתה in the second hemistich cf. 1, 9.

For 𝔐 פירה (omitted by 𝔖) read מפורה; the omission of the prefixed מ is due to haplography. 𝔊 (πεντήκοντα μετρητάς), 𝔙 (*quinquaginta lagenas*), 𝔏 (*amphoras*) and 𝔗 (חמשין גרבין דחמר) take פורה to be a large jar for the storage of wine. The amphora of the Greeks and Romans was also a liquid measure, equal to about six gallons, Landersdorfer, *Sumer. Sprachgut im AT* (Leipzig, 1916), pp. 81. 49 regards פירה as a Sumerian loan word (cf. Haupt, MLN 33, 433[i]; AJSL 24, 126. 171; ZDMG 64, 714, l. 17; AJP 39, 309; *Joel*, n. 59). Heb. פורה is the fem. of Assyr. *pûru*, urn. Our *vat*, formerly spelled *fat*, is the Ger. *Faß*, barrel, and *Faß* is also a measure of capacity (JHUC, no. 306, p. 25).

(vii) In למן the ל is governed by שימו לבבכם at the end of this line. 𝔊𝔖 connect שימו לבבכם with the following line, but v. 19 is an independent question.

𝔊 has for 𝔐 העור הזרע במ: εἰ ἐπιγνωσθήσεται ἐπὶ τῆς ἄλῳ, הזרע being misread הַגָּרֶן.

For 𝔐 מגורה read ממגרה as in Joel 1, 17 where 𝔊 has θησαυροί. ממגרה is a pit (silo) in which grain is stored, lit. *thrown down* (from מגר, Ps. 89, 45; cf. WdG 1, 125, l. 2 and C, 4). It is not a *threshing floor* as 𝔊 ἐπὶ τῆς ἄλῳ and 𝔗 באדרא (ZDMG 64, 705, l. 28) translate. Budde's reading בַּמַּגָּרָן, *on the threshing floor*

(ZAT 26, 16[1]) is unacceptable. Nor can מורה in this connection mean *object of fear* (so Zeydner, cited by Matthes, ZAT 21, 125). In Joel 1, 17 the plural of ממגרה is written ממגרות; the ו of בימי מגרה in the present passage may be due to dittography of the ר (JBL 37, 216, l. 9).

For 𝔐 ועד read ועד following 𝔊 καὶ εἰ ἔτι and 𝔙 *et adhuc*; cf. Delitzsch, LSAT § 63[a], l. 4. The omission of ו before ד may be due to haplography.

We must not read נשאם, following 𝔊 τὰ οὐ φέροντα, instead of נשא, as Delitzsch (LSAT 10, l. 5) suggests; if ם and ת are eliminated, the singular is correct, and the perfect is preferable to the participle. In December the vintage is over. The fields were sown about November-December (see n. 17 on IV) and the grapes harvested about August-September. RV *yea* (AV adds *as yet*) *the vine ..... has not brought forth* (retained in JB) is untenable.

(α) For אל חגי (𝔊 πρὸς Ἀγγαῖον) we must not read ביד חגי (so 𝔖 and several MSS, also Marti and Kittel). See note on א, α.

(β) Scribal expansion, due to בגפי in the following hemistich. 𝔊 has not only ἐν τῷ ἄκρῳ τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ in the second hemistich, but also τὸ ἄκρον τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ in the third.

(ι) ו often introduces affixed glosses (GK § 154, a, n. 1; b; GB[16] 189[b], d) or connects prefixed additions (*Est.* 8 3, δ; *Mic.* 1 12, η; 1 11, μ; 1 08, ν; JBL 36, 83, γ; 37, 231, ν; 38, 151, λ). The genuine הגוי of v. 14 is the word commonly used for Gentiles, and the glossator may have considered כן העם הזה more appropriate.

(μ) The first clause of this gloss appears in 𝔊 after v. 14 between the two clauses σσ and ττ; cf. above, notes 25 and 28 on IV. 𝔊 ὀδυνηθήσονται ἀπὸ προσώπου πόνων αὐτῶν read וְיִגְּעוּ instead of וְיִגְעוּ. 𝔊 has ὀδύνη for נָגַע in Gen. 44, 31; Pss. 13, 3; 107, 39. 𝔊 may also have read וְיָמֵרוּ; cf. ὀδυνηθήσονται for הָמַר (contrast ZDMG 66, 401) in Zech. 12, 10. G. A. Smith's restoration, יִתְעַנּוּ מִפְּנֵי עַצְּבֵיהֶם *they vex themselves with their* (profane) *labors*, is not good. Nor can we read יְעָנּוּ or יַעֲנוּ, as suggested by Sievers (*loc. cit.* 73[1]) who is inclined to insert this clause in v. 14 after

יבן בל מעשה ידיהם. Riessler (cf. n. 14 on I) gives the following restoration of the Hebrew (?) text of this clause inserted between the two clauses of σσ and ττ: יען משאותיהם בקר יעברו מפני יניעיהם ושנאתם בשערים מיכיח. See Haupt, JBL 36, 149 and notes on σσ and ττ.

V. 17, according to Haupt, is a loose reproduction of Am. 4, 9 which he restores as follows:

הכיתי אתכם [‹כח›רבון·]	כשדפון וביקון [ ]
גנותיכם וכרמיכם[α]	יאכל הגזם
ולא שבתם עדי	נאם יהוה:

(α) ותאניכם וזיתיכם

I smote you with a [‹drought·],	with blasting and blight; [ ]
Your gardens (of fruit trees) and vineyards[α]	the locusts devoured;
Yet, ye did not return to Me,	declares Jhvh.

(α) and your fig trees and your olive trees.

𝔐 אתכם instead of איכם at the end of Hag, 2, 17 is no doubt due to the אתכם at the beginning of the verse. Why the glossator used אתים instead of שבים we cannot tell. In Ethiopic this verb means to *return*, while in Assyrian it means *to find* (Haupt, JSOR 1, 42). It is poetic in Hebrew, but common in Aramaic and Arabic. Oort (*Emend.*) reads ואינכם שבים (so, too, Budde, ZAT 26, 15) in the present passage, but this would not have been corrupted to ואין אתכם.

𝔐 ברד in Hag. 2, 17 may be a correction of the corrupt הרבות of Am. 4, 9 (so, Haupt).

(σσ) For מקחם שחר cf. 2 Chr. 19, 7; for the construction see GK[28] § 115, h. d; WdG 2, 60, A. 𝔊 ἕνεκεν τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῶν τῶν ὀρθρινῶν (𝔏 *propter praesumptiones eorum matutinas*) read שחר instead of שחר, but not לקחתם instead of לקחתם, as Wellhausen supposed.

(ττ) For שנאתם בשער מוכיח, 𝔊 (καὶ ἐμισεῖτε ἐν πύλαις ἐλέγχοντας, 𝔏 *et odio habebatis in portis arguentes*) read ושנאתם בשערם; the plural ending in בשערם is dittography of the initial מ

of מיבוח, and the plural πύλαις is responsible for 𝔊 ἐλέγχοντας instead of ἐλέγχοντα (see Haupt, JBL 36, 149), cf. note on μ.

(ρφ) Ehrlich says, we must either read לששי in the present passage or בחשיעי in ב, κκ.

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(ρ) 2, 9 נאם יהוה צבאות ההיכל הזה׃ (σ) ‹ושלום נפש› ‹ו›‹מחיה› לכל היסד לקומם

(τ) 2, 2. 1 לאמר׃ אֱמֹר נא (υυ) בן שלתיאל פחת יהודה ואל יהושע בן יהוצדק הכהן הגדול

ד

A 2, 12 i ᵃ‖אם־ישׂא איש בשר־קדש בᵝבגדו
ונגע בכנפו אל־ᵞלחם ואל־ᵟנזיד
ii ואל־ᵉיין ואל־שמן ואל־כל מאכל
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13 iii ᵛ‖אם־יגע טמא־נפש בכל־אלה הטמא‹ו›
‖[ו]ענו הכהנים ‖[ו]אמרו יטמא‹ו›׃

B 14 iv ᶲכן־הגוי הזה לפני נאם יהוה ᵠצבאות ᵠ
וכן־כל מעשה ידיהם ᵡ ואשר יקריבו־שם טמא־הוא׃
15 v ועתה שימו־נא לבבכם מן־היום הזה ומעלה
מטרם שום־אבן ᵠעᵠל־אבן בהיכל׀ ׀ יְ‹י›הֵ‹ת›ם‹ו›׃
16 vi בא אל־ערמת עשרים ו‖ᵠהנה היתה עשרה
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18 vii ᵛלמן־היום אשר יסד ‹ה›היכל שימו לבבכם׃
19 העוד הזרע ב‹ט›מגרה ו‖ᵠעᵠד הגפן לא־נשאᵗ׃

(ν) 2, 10 בעשרים וארבעה לתשיעיᵖᵖ היה דבר יהוה ׀אל׀ חגי הנביא לאמר׃
11 כה אמר יהוה צבאות שאל נא הכהנים תורה לאמר׃ (β) 12 כנף
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(θ) 14 ויען חגי ויאמר (ι) כן העם הזה ו (κ) 15 יהוה (λ) 16 אל היכב
(μ) 17 ‹ררוגנו מפני עמלם›› הכיתי אתכם בשדפין ובירקון ובברד‹ט› ואינ{}כם
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(ν) 18 שימו־נא לבבכם מן היום הזה ומעלהᵖᵖ (ξ) יהוה
(ο) 19 והתאנה והרמון ועץ הזית (π) מן היום הזה אברך

(ρρ) 2, 10 בשנת שתים לדריוש (σσ) 14 ‹יען טָהֳרָם שחד› (ττ) ‹ושׂנאתם בשער מוכיח›
(υυ) 17 את כל מעשה ידיכם (φφ) 18 מיום עשרים וארבעה לתשיעי

ב

2, 22. 21b α אני־מרעיש את־השמים ואת־הארץ | והפכתי כסא ממלכות
והשמדתי חזק כל־חזק ממלכות הגוים
והרסתי רכב ורכביה
וירדו סוסים ורכביהם
איש־בחרב אחיו
23 ביום ההוא נאם יהוה צבאות
אקחך זרבבל עבדי
ושמתיך כחותם כי בך בחרתי נאם יהוה צבאות׃

(α) 2, 20. 1, 15 ביום עשרים וארבעה לחדש | כ־הי־ה דבר יהוה אל חגי לאמר׃
(β) 21 אמר אל זרבבל פחת יהודה לאמר (γ) את־ה (δ) את־ה
(ε) 22 ממלכות (ζ) 23 ביום ההוא נאם יהוה צבאות (η) בן שאלתיאל
(θ) 23 נאם יהוה (ι) כי בך בחרתי נאם יהוה צבאות

(κκ) 1, 15 בשלשי בשנת שתים לדריוש המלך
(λλ) 2, 20 שנית
(μμ) 2, 20 בעשרים וארבעה לחדש

ג

2, 3 i A α מי־בכם הנשאר את־הבית הזה ומה אתם ראים־אתו עתה הלוא כמהו כאין בעיניכם׃
4 ii ועתה חזק זרבבל β ו{}כל־עם הארץ נאם־יהוה צבאות {חזקו} ועשו כי־אני אתכם׃
5 ורוחי עמדת בתוככם אל־תיראו׃

6 iii B עוד־אחת מעט־היא ואני מרעיש את־השמים ואת־הארץ ואת־הים ואת־החרבה׃
7 והשכתי את־כל־הגוים ובאו חמד כל־גוים
8 iv לי הכסף ולי הזהב׃
9 גדול יהיה כבוד הבית הזה אחרון מ ובמקום הזה אתן שלום׃

(α) 2, 1 בשב־עי בעשרים ואחד לחדש היה דבר יהוה ביד חגי הנביא |
2 נ אל זרבבל ואל כל שארית העם לאמר׃
(β) 4 נאם יהוה
(γ) 4 וחזק יהושע בן יהוצדק הכהן הגדול
(δ) נאם יהוה צבאות
(ε) 5 את־הדבר אשר כרתי אתכם בצאתכם ממצרים
(ζ) 6 כי כה אמר יהוה צבאות (η) את־ה (θ) את־ה (ι) את־ה (κ) את־ה
(λ) 7 כל (μ) כל הגוים ומלאתי את הבית הזה כבוד אמר יהוה צבאות
(ν) 8 נאם יהוה צבאות (ξ) 9 הזה (ο) האחרון (π) מן הראשון אמר יהוה צבאות

חגי

א

i	1, 2	α כה־אמר יהוה β	העם־הזה אמרו
		לא־γעת בא־עת	δבית־יהוה להבנות׃
	4	ההעת לכם־אתם	לשבת בתים ס פ ונים׃
ii	7b	ζ שימו לבבכם	על־דרכיכם׃
	9a	פנה אל־הרבה	והנה למעט
		והבאתם בית	‹אני› נפחתי־בו‹ו›
iii	9b	יען מה	נאם־יהוה צבאות
		יען ביתי	אשר־הוא חרב
		ואתם רצים	איש לביתו׃
iv	10	על־כן {} כלאו	שמים מטל ם מ׃
	11	ואקרא {‹ו›} חרב	על־ארץ ו‹על›חרים
		ועל‹כל› הדגן	ועל‹כל› התירוש ו‹על›
v	8	עלו ההר	ובי[2]ו‹את› עץ
		ובנו הבית	וארצה־בו ואכבדה׃
	13b	‹אני› אתכם	נאם־יהוה ‹צבאות›׃

(α) 1, 1 בשנת שתים לדריוש המלך בחדש הששי ביום אחד לחדש היה דבר יהוה ביד חגי הנביא אל זרבבל פת לאמר׃ (β) 2 צבאות לאמר

(γ) 3 ויהי דבר יהוה ביד חגי הנביא לאמר׃ (δ) 4 בתיכם (ε) והבית הזה חרב

(ζ) 5 ועתה כה אמר יהוה צבאות

שימו לבבכם על־דרכיכם׃

6 זרעתם הרבה והבא מעט

אכול ואין־ל[ו]שבע pp [כ]שתו׃ sσ לבוש ואין־להם־לו

אל־צרור נקוב׃

(ιι) 7 כה אמר יהוה צבאות (ϑ) 10 והארץ כלאה יבולה (ι) עליכם (κ) 11 ה

(λ) 11 על־ה (μ) ועל היצהר ועל ‹כל› אשר תוציא האדמה ועל האדם ועל הבהמה ועל כל יגיע כפים׃ (ν) 8 אמר יהוה

(ξ) 13a ויאמר חגי מלאך יהוה‹יי› לעם לאמר

(ο) 12 וישמע זרבבל tυ וכל שארית העם בקול יהיה אלהיהם pφ ויראו העם מפני יהוה׃ 14 ויער יהוה את רוח זרבבל ** ואת רוח כל שארית העם ויבאו ויעשו מלאכה בבית יהוה צבאות אלהיהם׃

(ππ) 1, 1 בן שאלתיאל פחת יהודה ואל יהושע בן יהוצדק הכהן הגדול (ρρ) 6 שתו ואין לשכרה

(σσ) 6 המשתכר (ττ) 13a במלאכות יהוה (υυ) 12 בן שלתיאל פ פחת יהודה פ ויהושע בן יהוצדק הכהן הגדול (φφ) ו‖ואל‖ דברי חגי הנביא כאשר שלחו יהוה אלהיהם ‹אליהם›

(χχ) 14 בן שלתיאל פחת יהודה ואת רוח יהושע בן יהוצדק הכהן הגדול

DAS TANNAITISCHE GRENZVERZEICHNIS PALÄSTINAS

Von SAMUEL KLEIN, Nové Zámky, Czecho-Slovakie

EINLEITENDES

Als ein aus dem Altertum auf uns gekommenes Dokument, hat das in verschiedenen Quellenschriften[1] enthaltene tannaitische Grenzverzeichnis seit langem schon die Aufmerksamkeit der Palästinaforscher wachgerufen,[2] die in ihm mit Recht eine bedeutsame Fundgrube für die Ortskunde des Heiligen Landes erblickten. Auf Grund der hier folgenden Untersuchungen glauben wir, dieses Grenzverzeichnis zugleich als eine überaus wichtige Geschichtsurkunde, namentlich was die Kenntnis der jüdischen Siedlungsverhältnisse betrifft, bezeichnen zu dürfen.

Ohne auf die bisherigen Bearbeitungen dieser Urkunde näher einzugehen, sei nur der Verdienste H. Hildesheimers um die Aufhellung derselben gedacht. Seine Arbeit hat mit aller Klarheit gezeigt, daß im „Grenzverzeichnis" es sich nicht um ein systemloses Aneinanderreihen von beliebigen Ortsnamen handelt, wie dies früher mehrfach angenommen wurde. Ferner hat er die verschiedenen Rezensionen unserer Urkunde, zum Teil mit Heranziehung handschriftlichen Materials, miteinander verglichen, um auf diesem Wege den ursprünglichen Text — soweit als möglich — zu erhalten. Endlich stellte er als Erster die Frage nach der Ent-

[1] **Sifrè Deut. 51; Tosefta Schewiit IV 10; j. Schewiit VI 1; Jalkut Deut. 874.**

[2] Bibliographie der früheren Arbeiten s. bei Hildesheimer, Beiträge zur Geographie Palästinas (*Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Rabbiner-Seminars in Berlin* 5645), und in meinem דרך חוף הים = *Die Küstenstraße Palästinas*, hebr. 11 f.; deutsch 13 f. — Kittels Sifrè-Übersetzung S. 135 f. bietet nichts Wesentliches.

stehungszeit des Grenzverzeichnisses und versuchte auch, eine Lösung dieses schwierigen Problems zu bieten.

Trotz umfassender Kenntnisse und gründlicher Untersuchung der Einzelheiten ließ aber auch er noch manche Fragen offen, die auch von den späteren Bearbeitern der Urkunde nicht beantwortet wurden. Meiner Ansicht nach bedürfen die einzelnen, vielfach korrumpierten Namen einer erneuten gründlichen Prüfung, ehe sie mit heutigen Ortsbezeichnungen gleichgesetzt werden, und namentlich muß die Frage nach Veranlassung und Entstehungszeit des Grenzverzeichnisses auf Grund des topographischen und sonstigen historischen und halachischen Materials abermals gestellt werden.

Vergleicht man die bei Hildesheimer und bei Luncz[3] synoptisch geordneten Listen, so wird man mit Bedauern feststellen müssen, daß in diesen langen Verzeichnissen kaum ein einziger Name in sämtlichen Rezensionen gleichmäßig erscheint! Auch die Anzahl der Grenzpunkte ist in den verschiedenen Rezensionen verschieden. Die größte Zahl von Namen bietet die Wiener Handschrift der Tosefta, und deshalb wurde sie von Hildesheimer zur Grundlage der Untersuchung genommen. Mag nun sein, daß diese Rezension aus anderen Gründen einen gewissen Vorzug den anderen gegenüber beanspruchen darf,[4] so glaube ich doch nicht, daß die größere Fülle von Namen allein entscheidend sein dürfte. Es ist nämlich sehr gut denkbar, daß eine ursprünglich kürzere Rezension vom Redaktor der Tosefta nachträglich erweitert worden sei. Daher wird es sich methodisch empfehlen, zunächst auf Grund der *kürzesten* Rezension (des Sifrè[5]) den allgemeinen Lauf der Grenzlinie festzustellen und erst dann die in der längeren Rezension enthaltenen Namen (wenn möglich) in diese einzufügen.

Die uns vorliegenden Texte des Grenzverzeichnisses haben eine lange Leidensgeschichte hinter sich. Abschreiber und Drucker

[3] *Jahrbuch* ירושלים XI—XII, 290—303. Er benutzte zur Jeruschalmirezension drei Handschriften (S. 284 Anm. 1) und stellt diesen Text an erste Stelle.

[4] Sämtliche Namen (außer IV) sind mit ו aneinandergereiht. Das zeigt, daß der Abschreiber die einzelnen Namen wohl voneinander unterschied, was bezüglich der anderen Texte nicht immer behauptet werden kann.

[5] Dieser bietet 35, die Tosefta Wien 41 Namen.

haben die ihnen vollkommen unbekannten und gleichgültigen Namen je nach ihrem Gutdünken geändert oder — verballhornt.[6] Ohne Korrektur des Textes wird es also bei schwierigen Stellen nicht gehen. Dabei ist aber an der methodisch sehr wichtigen Regel festzuhalten, die mit Bezug auf unsere Urkunde von Dalman[7] aufgestellt wurde: „Die Texte bedürfen sämtlich der Zurechtstellung *mit Hilfe des lokalen Befundes.*"

Die Zurechtstellung muß aber auch mit Hilfe des erreichbaren *handschriftlichen* Materials geschehen. Bezüglich des *Sifrè*, bzw. des aus ihm geflossenen *Jalkut Schimeoni* standen mir durch die besondere Freundlichkeit des Herrn Dr. L. Finkelstein in New York, dem auch an dieser Stelle herzlichst gedankt sei, drei Handschriften zur Verfügung.[8] Auch das in letzter Zeit an den Tag geförderte handschriftliche Jeruschalmimaterial konnte in gewissem Maße verwertet werden.

I. Die Rezension im Sifrè

	(כ"י לונדון)	(כ"י רומי)	(ילקוט כ"י אקספרד)
	תחום מארץ ישר' ועד	תחומי ארץ יש' עד	
	מקום שהחזיקו עולי בבל	מקום שהחזיקו עולי בבל	בבל פרשת אשקלון
(1)	פרשת אשקלון	פרשת אשקלון	
(2)	חומות מגדל שרשן	חומת מגדל שר שן	חומת מגדל שרשן
(3)	דר	דר	דיר
(4)	וחימות עכו	והמת עכו	וחמת עכו
(5)	מניאתו	והאש מניאתו	מניאתו
(6)	וניאתו עצמה	וניאתו עצמה	וניאתו עצמה
(7)	מברתא	כברתא	כברתא

[6] Ein besonders krasses Beispiel sei hier angeführt! An Stelle von טרכונא דניטרא דבתחום בוצרא liest man in der ed. princ. des Jalkut: טרטונא דיטרא דכתב רב תנחום נוצרא. Während die Worte ט' דיטרא (wie es weiter gezeigt wird) gute, ja sogar ursprüngliche Lesarten bieten, enthalten die letzten vier Worte etwas ganz Unsinniges. Öfters wurden unbekannte Namen nach bekannten biblischen Namen geändert, worauf im Laufe der Untersuchung hingewiesen werden soll.

[7] *Palästina-Jahrbuch* 1922/23, S. 22 Anm. 2.

[8] Herr Dr. Finkelstein hatte die Güte, mir die Abschriften mit der Bemerkung zu senden: העתקותי נעשו בדייקנות טרובה ואל יהא לבו נוקפו בסטכו עליהן.

	(כ״י לונדון)	(כ״י רומי)	(ילקיט כ״י אקספרד)
(8)	ובומתא ובומתא	ובית וניתא	ובית וניתא
(9)	קצרא וגלילא	קצרא דגלילא	קצרא רגליא
(10)	קבייתא רעייתא	קבייא דעייתא	קבייא רעייתא
(11)	מצריא רעבתא	מצייא דעבתא	מצייא רעבתא
(12)	במותא דבירין	נמותא דבירין	במותא דבורין
(13)	פחורתא דיתיר	סחורתא דיתר	נחורתא דיתר
(14)	נחלא דא בעאל	נחלא דאבצל	נחלה דאביצאל
(15)	בית ער	בית ער	בית ער
(16)	מרעשתא	מרעשתא	מרעשתא
(17)	לילא רבתא	לילא רבתא	לילא רבתא
(18)	קרבא דבר סנגרא	כרכא דבר סנגרא	כרכא דבר סנגרא
(19)	מיסף	מיסף	מיסף
(20)	כפנתא	ספנתא	ספנתא
(21)	נקיבתא רעיא	נקיבתא רעיין	נקיבתא רעיון
(22)	תרנגולא עילאה דקיסרי	תרנגלא עילאה דקיסרי sic!	תרנגלא עילאה דקיסרי
(23)	בית סוכת	בית סוכות	בית סוכת
(24)	ויונקת	ויקנת	ויינקת
(25)	ורקם דאגרא	ורגם דחגר	ורקם דחגרא
(26)	וטורבונא דזמרא דתחום בוצרא	וטרכינא דזימרא דבית תחום בוצרא	דזימרא רבת רכ וטרבונא / וגורבונא תחום גוצרא
(27)	סקא	יובקא	יוסקא
(28)	וחשבון	וחשבון	והשבון
(29)	ונחלת דור	תחלת זרד	ונחלת דור
(30)	סכוטא	ססותא	סכותא
(31)	נימרין	נימרין	נימרין
(32)	עליה מוליא ורואי	מליה וירואי	מלייא וירואי
(33)	ורקם גיאת	ורקם גיאה	ורקם גיאה
(34)	וגינאה דאשקלון	וגנייא דאשקלון	וגינניא דאשקלון
(35)	ודרך גדולה ההולכת במדבר	ודרך גדולה ההילכת במדבר	ודרך גדולה ההולכת למדבר

Die Überschrift lautet: תחומי[9] ארץ יש[ראל] ער[10] מקום שהחזיקו עולי בבל[11], worauf die einzelnen Grenzpunkte folgen:

[9] Ms. London irrtümlich תחום מא״י.

[10] London: ועד.

[11] Jalkut Ms. Oxford fehlt die ganze Überschrift, nur das letzte Wort [בבל] erscheint dort fehlerhaft בבל und zu Punkt 1 gezogen. Den gleichen Schreibfehler

(1) פרשת אשקלון bezeichnet den „Scheideweg von *Askalon*". „Die Grenze lief hier diesseits der Wegscheide, d. h. der Abzweigung des Zuganges der Stadt vom Hauptverkehrsweg."[12] Die Stadt selbst wird also vom Gebiete Erez Israels ausgeschlossen.

(2) חומית מגדל שרשן „die Mauern des *Stratonturmes*" bei Caesarea maritima. Der Turm und die später in seiner Nähe erbaute heidnische, eigentlich herodeanische Stadt blieben außerhalb der Grenzlinie. Ähnlich verhält es sich auch mit

(3) דר, genauer דור,[13] womit die Küstenstadt *Dora* gemeint ist.

(4) עכו חומות[14] schließen wieder die Stadt *Akko* aus dem eigentlich jüdischen Gebiete aus.

(5) Die handschriftliche Überlieferung ist hier, wie bei (6), nicht ganz verläßlich. Doch können die Namen mit Zuhilfenahme der Tosefta und des Jeruschalmi, wie auch auf Grund des lokalen Befundes hergestellt werden. Es handelt sich um ראש[15] מי נאתו „den oberen Lauf des Wassers von *Gato*", bzw. um

(6) נאתו עצמה „*Gato* selbst". Gemeint ist *Ġaʿtūn* nordöstlich von Akko. Das Wasser des Ortes ist der *Nahr Mefschūch*, dessen Oberlauf die Grenzlinie bildet. Man befindet sich hier am Eingang des galiläischen Gebirges.

(7) כברתא[16] ist mit Dalman[17] richtig bei Chirbet el *Kabarsa* direkt nördlich von Akko, am Westufer des Nahr Mefschūch anzusetzen. Nach den lokalen Verhältnissen wäre es angebracht, diesen Punkt vor (5—6) zu nennen, wie ihn die Tosefta in der Tat hat.

(8) בית זניתא[18] heißt heute Chirbet *Zuënita* unweit nordöstlich von (6).

ואע"ג דמצינו בספרי בתחומי א"י שהחזיקו עולי בבל בכל פרשת אשקלון. In seinem Sifrè wurde also neben der richtigen auch die falsche Lesart verzeichnet.

[12] Dalman, *Pal. Jahrb.* 1924, 65.

[13] Jalkut דור ist דור zu lesen.

[14] RN a. a. O. עכו חומות(ת)ו. Ms. Rom und Jalkut bieten חמת, wohl חַמַּת zu lesen.

[15] Ms. Rom האש, l. ראש.

[16] So ist auch Ms. London statt מברתא zu lesen.

[17] *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1922/23, S. 22 Anm. 2.

[18] כומתא oder בומתא in Ms. London ist Schreibfehler für בזניתא = בי זניתא. Derartige Zusammenziehung von בית, bzw. בי mit dem folgenden Wort ist öfters

(9) קצרא דגלילא[19] ist die „Burg von *Galīla*“ (*nicht*: „von Galiläa!“), heute Chirbet *Ǵelil* nördlich von (8).

(10) קבייא oder קבייתא דעייתא meint jedenfalls eine Lokalität in der Nähe der Ortschaft ʿ*Ajta* nordöstlich von (9). Der volle Name des Ortes lautet heute ʿ*A. esch-Schaʿub* = „A. der Schluchten“. Mag sein, daß in קבייא, קבייתא diese Bedeutung enthalten ist.[20]

(11) Viel Kopfzerbrechen verursachte der folgende Name: מצייא דעבתא! Das erste Wort ist mit der Londoner Handschrift מצריא, d. h. „Ackergrenzen“ zu lesen. Aber auch das zweite Wort, hier der eigentliche Ortsname, ist mit einer einfachen Korrektur herzustellen, indem man statt דעייתא–דעבתא schreibt.[21] Somit erhält man מַצְרֵא דְעַיְתָא, die „Ackergrenzen von ʿ*Ajta*“, eben jenes Ortes, der als Grenzpunkt (10) in unserem Verzeichnis genannt war.

(12) Schwierig ist auch der folgende Punkt. במיתא oder נמיתא דבירין ergibt offenbar keinen rechten Sinn. Auch die Lesart במותה[22] kann nicht richtig sein. Am Anfang des Wortes muß ein Buchstabe gestanden haben, aus dem ב, כ oder נ entstehen konnte. Der lokale Befund führt zur richtigen Herstellung des Textes. Unweit nördlich ʿAjta findet man *Rāmijā*, dem im Altertum sicher ein hebr. רמה, aram. רמתה entsprach. Dies ist in כמותה zu erkennen, bzw. es muß dieses in רמותה geändert werden. — Daneben erscheint in unserem Verzeichnis: דבירין... Was bedeutet dieses?

Aus den anderen Rezensionen[23] werden wir an seiner Stelle בור oder ביר gewinnen. Es handelt sich also um einen oder mehrere *Brunnen* (oder *Zisternen*) in der Nähe von *Rāmijā*. Da רמה u. dgl. im Lande häufig anzutreffen ist,[24] so wurde, um diesen Ort ge-

nachzuweisen; vgl. meine *Palästina-Studien* IV, 55 f. Siehe auch Gesenius Buhl[17], S. 96[b].

[19] Ms. London גני, l. דני; Jalkut רגליא, l. דגלי[ל]א. — ר statt ד auch bei den folgenden Punkten.

[20] Hildesheimer a. a. O. 19. Doch erwägt er auch die Bedeutung „Bergkuppen“. Wo nicht anderes bemerkt, sind die Gleichsetzungen Hildesheimers akzeptiert worden.

[21] Vielleicht wurde statt עייתא einmal עותא geschrieben. Ein Kopist machte daraus nach der palästinischen Schreibart עבתא (vgl. וא = אבא).

[22] Sifrè-Ausgaben.

[23] Tosefta Erfurt דבור; Wien דכור (l. דבור); j. ebenso, aber auch דכיר (l. דביר).

[24] In der Bibel gibt es sechs Orte mit dem Namen רמה; ferner: רמת לחי, רמת נצפה; drei רמות. Aus der Mischnazeit: רומא und רום בית ענת (*Pal.-Stud.* I im Register).

nauer zu bezeichnen, ihm hier דבירין „*R. der Brunnen*“ hinzugefügt (vgl. רמת מצפה, רמת לחי). In der Nähe von R. muß es berühmte Zisternen gegeben haben.

(13) פחורתא דייתיר ist die durch die Londoner Handschrift verbürgte, einzig richtige Lesart. ייתיר = יַתִּיר heute genau so — *Jātir* — liegt in gerader Linie nördlich von (12). פְּחוֹרָתָא bezeichnen gewisse „Höhlen“ in der Nähe des Ortes, wie in ähnlichem Zusammenhang (bei einer Grenzbestimmung der Stadt Tiberias) gleichfalls פחרתא genannt sind.[25]

(14) נחלא דאבצאל[26] bezeichnet jedenfalls einen Wādi nördlich, bzw. nordöstlich von (13), der als natürliche Grenzlinie mit Recht verwendet wird. Leider ist der alte Name scheinbar verschwunden. Vielleicht ist der Wādi el-Ma gemeint. Daß in dieser Gegend einst jüdische Siedlungen bestanden, zeigt der Ort el-*Jehudije* im Osten des genannten Wādis.

(15) בית ער[27] vermute ich in dem nordöstlich von (13) gelegenen *Ḥāris*.[28] (14) wäre also der nördlichste Grenzpunkt in Obergaliläa; von (15) an zieht sich die Grenzlinie in südöstlicher Richtung.

(16) מרעשתא ist zweifellos richtig: *Berʿaschit* östlich von (15).

(17) לילא oder לולא רבתא wird auf Grund der anderen Rezensionen zu ändern und zu bestimmen sein (vgl. Abschnitt II, Punkt 21).

(18) כרכא דבר סנגרא. Der Name ס, obwohl in allen Handschriften gleich, bedarf dennoch einer gründlichen Zurechtstellung, wie weiter (Abschnitt IV) gezeigt werden soll.

(19) מיסף, vgl. dazu II, Punkt 16.

(20) ספנתא kann nur das zwischen *Ḥasbējā* und *Rāscheija* gelegene es-*Sefine* sein. Daß es „viel zu weit nördlich liegt“,[29] mag

[25] j. Erubin V 22[b]; vgl. meine *Beiträge zur Geographie und Geschichte Galiläas* (1909), S. 59 ff.

[26] דא בעאל des Londoner Ms. ist natürlich דאבצאל zu lesen. אבצאל könnte derselbe Name sein wie Phasaël (פצאל). Hildesheimer, S. 33, denkt an ʿAin *Ibaʿal*, das aber sprachlich nicht entsprechen kann.

[27] Ms. Rom falsch ער.

[28] Zu ע = Ḥ vgl. עפריים = חפריים in der Mischna (*Pal.-Stud.* IV, 23 f.; Albright, *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research* IV, 156 f.) und weiter unten Anm. 75.

[29] Hildesheimer, S. 24 f.

uns überraschen, spricht aber nicht im geringsten gegen die Richtigkeit der Gleichsetzung.

(21) נקיבתא דעיין. Das zweite Wort, der eigentliche Ortsname, ist jedenfalls das biblische *ʿIjjōn*, dessen Namen heute die Hochebene Merǧ *ʿAjjūn* bewahrt. Was נקיבתא bedeutet, ist unbestimmbar. Es wird sich um ein pluralisches Wort handeln, vgl. oben (11) und (13), vielleicht auch (10). Da in unserem Verzeichnis mehrfach natürliche Höhlen oder Schluchten als Grenzpunkte genannt werden, so wird man auch hier an derartige „Durchbohrungen“[30] in der Nähe des seitdem verschwundenen alten Ortes *ʿIjjōn* denken dürfen.

Die Grenze wendet sich nach Osten den Jordanquellen zu und es wird (22) תרנגלא עילאה דקיסרי das „obere Hahnenbild von *Cäsarea* [Philippi]“ genannt, das auch aus einer anderen Stelle als Grenzpunkt des jüdischen Gebietes bekannt ist.[31]

* * *

Die nun folgenden *ostjordanischen* Grenzangaben beziehen sich auf ein einziges, bisher kaum beachtetes jüdisches Gebiet, nämlich auf das Gebiet der **Trachonen** und des **Ḥaurans**.

Es ist dies eine wichtige Erkenntnis, die zuerst von I. Goldhar ausgesprochen, aber bei seiner völlig unmethodischen Art der Forschung von ihm selbst nicht gehörig verwertet wurde.[32] Unabhängig von ihm kam ich zum gleichen Ergebnis und trug auch diese Auffassung schon vor einigen Jahren vor;[33] jedoch ließ ich mich zum Teil von Hildesheimers gerade in diesen Abschnitten seiner sonst vorzüglichen Arbeit unbefriedigenden Ergebnissen leiten, indem ich die von den verschiedenen Rezensionen gebotenen Lesarten keiner schärferen Kritik unterzog. Dies möge nun im folgenden geschehen.

Zum besseren Verständnis der Angaben unseres Verzeichnisses sei aber folgendes vorausgeschickt: Südlich und östlich von *Damaskus* dehnen sich große vulkanische, zum Teil sehr fruchtbare

[30] Hildesheimer, S. 37, denkt an ein „Engtal“; Dalman, *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1914, S. 46, an eine „Schlucht“, nämlich des Wādi *Charrār*.

[31] j. Demaj II 1, vgl. Abschnitt V, 7.

[32] (Jerusalem אדמת קדש(תרע״ג, 280 ff.

[33] עבר הירדן היהודי (*Pal.-Stud.* III), 44.

Gegenden, bzw. Lavaplateaus aus. Ein kleineres Plateau ist der *W'ar ez-Zākije* südlich von Damaskus. Weit größer sind aber jene Gebiete, die *Strabo* „die beiden *Trachonen*" (Τραχωνες) nennt und die nach ihm hinter Damaskus liegen. Gemeint sind — wie dies von Wetzstein[34] nachgewiesen wurde — das *Ṣafā* im Osten und das *Leǵa* im Südwesten von Damaskus. Dieser südwestliche Trachon grenzte nach den Angaben des Eusebius an *Bostra*.[35]

Sind diese vulkanischen Gegenden in unseren Quellen nachweisbar; waren sie im Altertum auch von Juden bewohnt? Unser Grenzverzeichnis gibt auf diese Fragen die gewünschte Antwort.

a) Das zuerst genannte vulkanische Plateau W'ar ez-*Zākije* erscheint in unserem Verzeichnis als (23) Grenzpunkt: בית סוכת, בית סוכות. Der Text bedarf einer geringfügigen Änderung, die aber auf Grund eines später zu behandelnden Textes (Abschnitt IV) ohne weiteres vorgenommen werden darf. Statt בית סוכת ist nämlich בית כסות zu lesen. — Einen Ort, der nach dem Plateau, oder umgekehrt, nach welchem das Plateau benannt wurde, können wir gleichfalls aus mehrmaliger Erwähnung in der talmudischen Literatur nachweisen: R. Jirmeja (4. Jahrh. in Tiberias wohnhaft) trifft Entscheidungen in diesem Orte, dessen Name einmal als סכתא, zweimal als סכותא erscheint.[36] Wo ist der Ort zu suchen? — Eine der soeben erwähnten Mitteilungen zeigt klar, daß der Ort in der Nähe eines Flusses lag, aus welchem das Wasser in das Bad des Ortes geleitet wurde. Da nun in unserem Grenzverzeichnis בית סכות unmittelbar auf Cäsarea Philippi (22) folgt, so wird man unbedingt nach dem *Orte* Ez-*Zākije*, südlich vom *Nahr el-Awaǵ*, bzw. *Sābirāni* geführt. Dies ist der von R. Jirmeja besuchte Ort. Fraglich ist nur, ob auch im Grenzverzeichnis der *Ort* oder aber das *Plateau* gemeint ist. Zwar findet man nicht selten, daß der gleiche Ort bald mit בית, bald ohne dieses Wort erscheint, somit בית סכות = סכות sein und den Ort selbst bezeichnen könnte; jedoch scheint der Umstand, daß wir weiter wieder ganze *Gegenden* im

[34] *Reisebericht über Hauran und die Trachonen* (1860), S. 24 f., wo Strabos (XVI 2, 20) Bericht erörtert wird. Vgl. auch Schürer I[4], 426 Anm.

[35] Schürer a. a. O.; s. unsere Anm. 38.

[36] Ab. z. 58[b]: ר' יהמיה איקלע לסכתא. — Moëd K. 4[b]: ר' יהמיה שרי לבני סכותא לטיכרא נהרא מטיטא; j. MK I 2: כהדא דבני דסכותא. Vgl. mein עבר הירדן היהודי, S. 56; jedoch ist das dort Gesagte nach dem hier Ausgeführten zu berichtigen.

Grenzverzeichnis genannt antreffen, eher dafür zu sprechen, daß בית מכית das Lavaplateau *W'ar ez-Zākije* bezeichnet, wo natürlich mehrere Ortschaften lagen.

b) Der *südwestliche Trachon* ist zweifellos mit (26) טרכונא דזימרא דתהום בוצרא[37] (oder ... דבתהום ...) gemeint. Zur näheren Bezeichnung des Gebietes wird (wie bei Eusebius[38]) deutlich gesagt, es handle sich um jenen Trachon, der im Gebiet Bostras (oder an Bostras Gebiet grenzend) liegt.

Auch das Wort דזימרא ... ist sehr beachtenswert. Gegenüber der von den Drucken gegebenen Lesart דנימרא ist nämlich an דזימרא festzuhalten, das von sämtlichen Handschriften des Sifrè und auch von einem alten Texteszeugen (Abschnitt IV) geboten wird.

„*Trachon des Zimra*" bezeichnet offenbar jenen Trachon, der nach einem gewissen *Zimra* benannt werden konnte. Diesen Mann und sein Gebiet kennen wir aus jenen Berichten des Josephus, wo er über die Besiedlung des Trachons unter Herodes referiert.[39] Der genannte König erhielt um 23 v. Chr. von Augustus größere Gebiete des vom Unwesen der Räuber unsicher gewordenen *Trachons* und siedelte dort babylonische Juden unter Führung eines gewissen *Zamaris* an. Wir dürfen nun den Namen dieses Mannes in der merkwürdigen Grenzangabe טרכונא דזימרא erkennen. Sein Gebiet „der Trachon Zimras" grenzte an das Gebiet *Bosras*. Vielleicht geht man nicht irre, wenn man seinen Namen auch in dem südwestlich von *Eṣ-Ṣanamen* gelegenen Orte *Zimrīn* erkennt.

c) Bezüglich des *östlichen Trachons* sei zunächst aus Wetzsteins so wichtigem Reisebericht[40] folgende Stelle angeführt: „Von den ʿAneze werden die beiden Stämme [Ǵējāṯ und Sʿtāje] Ahl el-*Ḥuǵr* الحجر, d. h. Bewohner des Klüftenlandes, genannt: die Schlupfwinkel des östlichen Trachons heißen die ʿAneze *Ḥuǵr*."

[37] So ist natürlich die eigentümlich korrumpierte Stelle im Manuskript des Jalkut zu berichtigen; vgl. auch oben Anm. 6.

[38] *Onom.* ed. Klostermann 110 28: Τραχωνῖτις δὲ καλεῖται ἡ παρακειμένη χώρα τῇ ἐρημῳ τῇ κατὰ Βόστραν τῆς Αραβίας. 112 22: Καναθ ... ἐν τῷ Τραχῶνι πλησίον Βόστρων. Vgl. auch Antiqu. IV 7 4: Bosora an der Grenze Arabiens.

[39] Antiqu. XV 10 3. XVI 9 2. XVII 2 1–3. Vita 11, und meine Darlegungen in עבר הירדן היהודי 17 ff.; *Jeschurun* IX, 164.

[40] S. 34.

Es ist unschwer in *el-Ḥuǵr* das vom Grenzverzeichnis (25) gebotene חגרא zu erkennen, das also ein bestimmtes Gebiet bezeichnet.

Ein mittelalterlicher arabischer Geograph nennt Ar-*Raḳim* in der Nähe von Damaskus.[41] Diesem *Raḳim* entspricht offenbar רקם des Grenzverzeichnisses,[42] das jedoch in unseren Texten durch ein ד- mit חגרא verbunden — also als רקם דחגרא — erscheint. Eine Anführung der *Sifrè*stelle bei RSbA belehrt uns jedoch, daß in seinem Texte רקם וחגר gestanden,[43] somit ursprünglich an zwei gesonderte Gebiete gedacht worden ist. Diese zwei Gebiete findet man tatsächlich in der Mischna (Gittin I 1) angeführt. Rabban Gamliel sagt: „Wer aus dem *Reḳem* (מן הרקם) und dem *Ḥagar* (ומן החגר) einen Scheidebrief nach Palästina bringt, muß erklären, er sei vor ihm geschrieben und unterzeichnet worden." Man sieht also klar, es handelt sich um zwei verschiedene, freilich einander nahe liegende Gebiete, deren östlicheres רקם war, wie dies von R. Jehuda in gleichem Zusammenhang (I 2) bezeugt wird, der in רקם den *östlichsten Grenzpunkt* palästinensischen Gebietes erblickt. In bezug auf die Vorschriften des Scheidebriefes gilt sogar רקם im Osten schon als Ausland, und zwar aus dem Grunde, weil seine Bewohner — wie uns wieder R. Jehuda an anderer Stelle[44] belehrt — proselytischer Abstammung waren.

Ob diese beiden Namen hier im Osten ursprünglich waren, ob sie etwa vom Edomiterland hierher übertragen wurden,[45] ob wir den alten Namen רקם (oder רגם, wie eine Handschrift hat) in den zahlreichen, „Ruǵm" genannten Steinhaufen der vulkanischen Gegend[46] erblicken dürfen, sind Fragen, die kaum entschieden

[41] *Muḳaddasi* ed. de Goeje 175; vgl. mein עבר הירדן היהודי, 45 Anm.

[42] Dies gegen meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* 1917, 142.

[43] חדושים zu Gittin I 1: ... ורקם וחגר דמצינו בספרי מכבוש מצרים וכבוש בבל. Siehe noch Anm. 87.

[44] M. Nidda VII 3: כל הכתמים הבאים מרקם טהורין, רי יהודה מטמא מפני שהם גרים ושועין.

[45] Siehe meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* a. a. O.

[46] Wetzstein, *Reisebericht* 34 Anm. 1. Vgl. dort S. 35: „Merkwürdig aber sind viele Tausende von rohen Wohnungen, welche auf einer Strecke von vielleicht 5 Stunden das südliche Loḥf der Dirêt et-Tulûl bekränzen und auf eine ungemein starke Bevölkerung jener Gegenden in früherer Zeit schließen lassen." Ebd. 98 Anm. 1: „Einige Duzende von großen Blöcken bilden einen Riǵm." Siehe noch *ZDPV* XX, 212.

werden können. Uns genügt hier die Feststellung, daß in unserem Grenzverzeichnis unter רקם והגרא *der östliche Trachon* gemeint ist und daß die Grenzangaben (23), (25), (26) auf die in der Nähe von Damaskus sich erstreckenden vulkanischen Gebiete sich beziehen.

Die Feststellung, daß Juden oder jüdische Proselyten in diesen fernen östlichen Gegenden gewohnt haben, mag uns überraschen, sie kann aber nicht bezweifelt werden. Daß es in Damaskus Juden und zahlreiche Proselyten gab, ist eine wohlbekannte Tatsache.[47] In einer Mischna werden die östlich von Damaskus gelegenen Wüstenseen mit Bezug auf die Vorschriften des Reinigungswassers genannt,[48] was natürlich nur so einen Sinn hat, wenn in ihrer Nähe Juden gewohnt haben.

* * *

Unsere Aufgabe ist es nun, die im Osten des Landes angeführten Grenzangaben unseres Verzeichnisses der Reihe nach zu prüfen, die Namen festzustellen und zu lokalisieren.

(24) Auf בית סבות, welches nach den obigen Ausführungen entweder den Ort oder — was wahrscheinlicher ist — das Lavaplateau Ez-Zākije bezeichnet, folgt nach der gewöhnlichen Annahme קנת, das die alte biblische Stadt *Kenat* sein soll. Aber hier gibt es überaus auffällige Lesarten. In den Handschriften des Sifrè liest man nämlich anstatt יונקת—וקנת, bzw. ויונקת (Rom: ויקנת). Dies zeigt, daß am Anfang des Namens ו oder י stand und nachher die Buchstabengruppe נקת, keinesfalls aber קנת folgte! Es muß daher angenommen werden, daß Tosefta und Jeruschalmi den unbekannten Namen יונקת oder יונקת sich zurechtgemacht und so den „biblischen" Namen קנת gewonnen haben. Dieses Streben, „echte biblische" Namen zu gewinnen, werden wir bei den folgenden Punkten zu beobachten öfter Gelegenheit haben. — Wie nun יונקת—יונקת zu deuten sei, weiß ich nicht mit Bestimmtheit anzugeben. Ich vermute nur, daß in ihm der Name einer heidnischen Kultstätte steckt. Am nächsten liegt es, an *eṣ-Ṣanamen* zu denken, wo im Altertum mehrere Götzentempel standen. Der eine war

[47] Bellum j. II 20, 2; s. dazu Derenbourg in *Ben Chananja* 1867: *Forschungen des wissenschaftlich-talmudischen Vereins* Nr. 14.

[48] Para VIII 10; s. mein עבר הירדן היהודי 71 f.

der Fortuna geweiht[49] (doch dürfte dieser kaum in Betracht kommen, da die Fortuna bei den Juden גדין genannt wurde). Der heutige arabische Name „Zwei Götzen" weist jedenfalls auf eine heidnische Kultstätte hin, und die mittelalterliche jüdische Tradition (die bei Saadja Gaon vertreten ist) lokalisierte hier das biblische *Aschtarot Karnajim* („A. mit den *beiden* Hörnern").[50] In den griechischen Inschriften der römischen und byzantinischen Zeit erscheint die Stadt mit dem Namen Αιρη (*Aere*).[51] Dies scheint nicht semitisch zu sein. Eine absichtliche Verunstaltung des ursprünglich semitischen Namens durfte in יונקת zu suchen sein. Möchten weitere Untersuchungen mehr Licht über diesen dunklen Punkt verbreiten!

Über (25) רקם וחגרא, ebenso über (26) den „*Trachon des Zimra, der an Boṣra grenzt*" ist schon oben das Nötige gesagt worden.

(27) bieten die Rezensionen einen dem biblischen *Jabbok* ähnlichen Namen; auch Ms. Rom hat יובקא. Es ist aber ganz bestimmt, daß hier *nicht* dieser Fluß gemeint ist. Liegt er doch in recht weiter Entfernung von dem Gebiete, in welchem wir uns befinden! Es sind wieder die von den beiden anderen Handschriften gebotenen „schwierigen" Lesarten heranzuziehen. Da findet man יובקא und סקא. Das י ist wohl sicher zu streichen; dann erhält man יַסקא, d. h. als den eigentlichen Namen סקא. Darin ist nun zweifellos Σακκαια der Inschriften[52] zu erkennen. Es liegt im Osten des Trachons und heißt heute noch *Schakka*. Eine Beschreibung mancher prachtvoller Bauten dieser einst bedeutenden Stadt findet man im Reiseberichte Wetzsteins.[53]

(28) bieten sämtliche Quellen (auch die Handschriften) חשבון; und doch kann diese Lesart nicht die ursprüngliche sein! *Ḥesbon* war eine emoritische Königsstadt (heute heißt der Ort *Ḥesbān*), die in einer Linie mit der Nordspitze des Toten Meeres lag; da wir aber in den folgenden Punkten noch einige trachonitische, bzw. ḥauranitische Lokalitäten erkennen werden, so kann bei Punkt 28 nicht an das weit südlicher gelegene Ḥesbon gedacht

[49] Baedekers *Palästina und Syrien*[6] (1904), S. 139.
[50] עבר הירדן היהודי S. 80 s. v. עשתרות קרנים.
[51] Thomsen, *Loca sancta*, S. 16: Aere.
[52] Thomsen a. a. O. 100.
[53] S. 57 ff.; 68 Anm. 1.

werden. Es handelt sich offenbar wieder um die jedenfalls sehr alte Verschlimmbesserung eines Kopisten, die dann von sämtlichen Rezensionen übernommen wurde. Der ursprüngliche Name muß natürlich ähnlich חשבן oder חשבן ausgesehen haben. Diesen nachzuweisen wird uns nicht schwerfallen.

Südlich vom Trachon (26) erstreckt sich das Ḥaurangebirge. Daß auf ihm zur Zeit des zweiten Tempels zahlreiche Juden wohnten, kann mit voller Sicherheit behauptet werden. Schon der Umstand, daß der Prophet Ezechiel die Grenze von חַוְרָן (47. 16, 18) unter den Grenzpunkten des zukünftigen Landes Israels nennt, mußte die Besiedlung dieser Gegend begünstigen. Tatsächlich findet man einen aus dem Ḥauran stammenden Lehrer, der gegen Ende der Tempelzeit in Jerusalem lebte. Es ist R. Johanan, der Sohn der Ḥauraniterin (בן החורנית möglicherweise einer Proselytin), oder kürzer: „der Ḥauraniter", החורני.[54] Sein Heimatsort wird nicht näher angegeben. — In der bekannten alten Mischna, welche über die Anzündung der Feuersignale der Neumondsheiligung berichtet (Rosch hasch. II 4), wird als ostjordanischer Berg חורן genannt. Handschriften bieten הברן. Darunter kann nicht „die Umgebung des Gebirgsstockes, der noch heute Ǵebl Ḥauran heißt"[55] gemeint sein, vielmehr ist darunter, wie die übrigen in der Mischna und Tosefta angeführten Namen zeigen, eine bestimmte alleinstehende Bergkuppe[56] zu verstehen. Wo lag dieser?

Im Südwesten des Ḥaurangebirges findet man den auch aus dem Altertum nachweisbaren Ort *Ḥebrān*.[57] Wie die dort gefundene aramäische Inschrift (aus 47 n.) bezeugt, lag die Stadt im Gebiete des Philippus. Unweit von ihr erhebt sich eine der höchsten Spitzen des Ḥaurangebirges (1478 m hoch). Darin erkenne ich den Berg חברן–חורן von dem auch die Stadt *Ḥebrān* ihren Namen erhielt. Diese aber ist wohl sicher in unserem Grenzverzeichnis zu finden, nur muß statt חברן–חשבן (d. h. *Ḥabrān*) gelesen werden. Ein Abschreiber, der חברן (= Ḥebrōn) nur in

[54] Sukka II 7; Erubin 13[b]; Jebamot 15[b]. Vgl. Derenbourg a. a. O.

[55] Schürer I[4], 427.

[56] Vgl. in der Tosefta R. h. II: בראשונה היו משואות בראשי ההרים הגבוהים... בחורן. Zur Sache vgl. עבר הירדן היהודי 20.

[57] Schürer I[4], 428 Ende der Anm. 3.

Judäa kannte und es wohl wußte, daß man sich hier im Ostjordanlande befindet, beeilte sich (mittels einer kleinen Änderung) eine ostjordanische Stadt hierherzusetzen, und schrieb anstatt חברן — חשבן, bzw. חשבון. Eine jüdische Bevölkerung in der Ḥaurangegend (בקעת בית חוורן) und insbesondere in der Stadt חוורן kann bis weit in die Amoräerzeit hinunter nachgewiesen werden. Ja noch zur Zeit der Entstehung des Islams und im späteren Mittelalter können die Spuren jüdischer Siedlungen in dieser Gegend festgestellt werden.[58]

(29) Wieder muß der ursprüngliche Name aus der falschen Lesart herausgeschält werden. Diese bietet etwa נחל זרד, und doch kann es sich hier nicht um den südlich vom Toten Meere die Grenze des Landes bildenden Bach (Deut. 2. 13, 14) handeln!

Zum Glück ist in diesem Fall die ursprüngliche Lesart leicht festzustellen; sie lautete: נחלה דורד[59] oder (hebr.) נחלת ורד, d. h. „Rosental". Auf diese Lesarten können die übrigen verderbten leicht zurückgeführt werden. — In unserem Grenzverzeichnis ist der westlich vom *Ḥebrān*, חברן (28), nach *ʿAṯamān* sich hinziehende *Wādi Ḏahab*, bei den Griechen *Chrysorrhoas* genannt, gemeint. Unser Verzeichnis bietet den ursprünglichen semitischen Namen. Das eben genannte *ʿAṯamān*, das wir bald in unserem Verzeichnis kennenlernen werden (30), liegt an beiden Ufern dieses Tales, das seinen Namen natürlich von den es zierenden Rosen erhielt. Wetzstein[60] berichtet: „Unter der reichen Flora [des südöstlichen Ḥaurans] sah ich viele Blumen, die eine Zierde unserer Gärten sein würden, namentlich eine faustgroße, dunkelrote, prachtvolle Lilie (Sušan). Auf der weiten Ebene zwischen Imtān und Ēnak fand ich sie zu Tausenden." Ist auch in dieser Schilderung die Rose (ורד) nicht ausdrücklich genannt, so zeugt eben der alte Name für das Vorhandensein dieser in Palästina gar nicht seltenen Blume in dieser Gegend. In der Nähe Jerusalems gibt es auch einen *Wādi el-Wered*, also genau unser נחלה דורד.[61]

[58] Nachweise in עבר הירדן היהודי 57 f.; 58 Anm. 2, wo חוורן die Stadt gemeint ist; ferner 63.

[59] Tosefta Wien. Ms. London: ונחלת דור, l. [ד]ונחלה דור[ד]; Rom: נחלת ורד, l. תחלת ורד; Oxford: ונחלת דרד, l. [ד]ונחלה דר[ד], oder: ד[ד]ור...

[60] a. a. O. 40.

[61] Vgl. Löw, *Flora* III, 194; besonders 197; ferner 207.

(30) Wie weiter (Abschnitt IV) gezeigt wird, handelt es sich um einen Namen חמימה, wie das heutige *ʿAṯamān* im Altertum hieß.

(31) Noch immer befinden wir uns im Ḥaurangebiet. נימרין ist nämlich *nicht* das aus Bibel und Mischna und auch Josephus bekannte נמרין unweit dem Jordan, nördlich vom Toten Meere,[62] sondern die ḥauranitische Stadt Ναμαρα der Inschriften,[63] heute *Nimra* genannt. Sie liegt am gleichnamigen Wādi südlich von *Saḳḳa* (27). Die Stadt ist auch aus dem Jeruschalmi bekannt, und zwar wird sie als äußerster Grenzpunkt jenes Gebietes genannt, wohin noch die die Neumondsheiligung mitteilenden Boten aus Palästina (Galiläa) gelangten.[64] Bemerkt sei, daß dieser Grenzpunkt an ungenauer Stelle im Verzeichnis des Sifrè erscheint; nach der Lage des Ortes müßte er nämlich auf (27) folgen. Wahrscheinlich ist der Name erst später hinzugefügt worden, als die jüdische Siedlung sich dort befestigte. Die oben erwähnten Jeruschalmistellen stammen aus dem 3. Jahrhundert, und der gleichen Zeit gehört auch die Mitteilung des Eusebius an, der über den „bedeutenden Ort" Ναμαρα berichtet.[65]

(32) Die Feststellung des ursprünglichen Textes bietet hier manche Schwierigkeiten. Das zweite Wort ist richtig als der Name von Ζορραα, heute *Zorawa*, also זרוא oder זורוא erkannt worden. (Es liegt im Südwesten des Trachons.) Dagegen ist das זרוא vorangesetzte מליא, מליה, מיליא[66], עליה unerklärt geblieben. Die Lösung bringt wieder der lokale Befund. Im Trachon- und Ḥaurangebiet findet man des öfteren das Ortsappellativum *Melaḥ*. Es bezeichnet die Grube oder die Bodenvertiefung, die zur *Salz*gewinnung verwendet wird. Es konnte natürlich auch als Ortsbezeichnung dienen; so kennt man ein *Melaḥ* eṣ-Ṣarrār im Südosten des Ḥauran, inschriftlich als Μουλαχ(ου) bezeugt.[67] In unserem Verzeichnis, wo zweifellos מליח zu lesen ist, kann nur eine Lokalität in der

[62] Hildesheimer, S. 60.

[63] Thomsen a. a. O. 92.

[64] Siehe meine מאמרים שונים (*Pal.-Stud.* II), S. 44 Nr. 3 und weiter Ende Abschnitt V.

[65] *On.* 138 11: κώμη μεγίστη ἐν τῇ Βαταναίᾳ.

[66] Ms. London hat hier zwei Varianten aufgenommen.

[67] Wetzstein, *Ausgewählte griech. und lat. Inschriften* etc., p. 275. Siehe auch *ZDPV* XX, S. 187.

Nähe *Zoroas* in Betracht kommen. In seiner Nähe trifft man tatsächlich ein *Melīḥat* el-ʿAṭasch und ein *Melīḥat* esch-Scherkije (südlich vom ersteren) an. Ersteres konnte sehr wohl nach Zoroa als מליחה ד)זרואי „*Meliḥā von Zoroa*" bezeichnet werden.

Mit diesem Grenzpunkt ist die Abgrenzung der Trachon- und Ḥaurangegend beendet. Nach den oben genauer beschriebenen drei Lavaplateaus wurde ein viereckiges Gebiet, das durch die Namen von סקא (27), גימרין (31), חברן (28) im Osten, נחלה דורד (29), השמונה (30) im Süden und מליח זרואי (32) im Nordwesten bezeichnet ist, als zum Lande Israel gehörig festgestellt. *Im Ostjordanlande werden überhaupt keine anderen Grenzpunkte mehr genannt*, offenbar, weil es keine jüdischen Siedlungen mehr hatte: eine wichtige Handhabe zur Zeitbestimmung unserer Urkunde (vgl. Abschnitt VII).

Als Grenzpunkt (33) bietet das Verzeichnis רקם גיאה, einen Punkt in der Nähe der nabatäischen Hauptstadt *Petra*, deren semitischer Name Αρκεμη, d. h. רקם war und in deren Nähe ein Tal (גיאה–גיא) und ein Ort Γαια (heute el-*Ǵi*) existierte.[68]

Zum Schluß werden noch, nach der Rückkehr zum Ausgangspunkt, die גינייא דאשקלון die „Gärten von Askalon" (wo Gemüsebau eifrig betrieben wurde[69]) genannt.

Die letzte (35) Angabe, welche von der „nach der Wüste führenden großen Straße" spricht, dürfte hier kaum am Platze und auch nicht ursprünglich sein. Es kann hier nach Bestimmung des südlichsten Punktes bei *Petra* und nach der Rückkehr zum Ausgangspunkt, *Askalon*, nicht mehr von der Straße, welche etwa nach der ägyptischen Wüste führt, gesprochen worden sein. Näheres s. weiter Abschnitt III.

* * *

Eine kurze Übersicht der in der Sifrè-Rezension enthaltenen Angaben ergibt folgende Statistik:

1—4: Küstenstädte;

5—22: Grenzorte Galiläas im Westen, Norden und Nordosten;

[68] Näheres bei Hildesheimer, 69 ff.

[69] Siehe meinen Artikel Askalon im Probeheft der Enzyklopädie des Judentums *Eschkol*.

23—32: Trachonen und Ḥauran;
33: bei Petra;
34: Ausgangspunkt.
(35: Zusatz.)

Bei Punkt 32 hat Ms. London zwei Lesarten verzeichnet, deren keine den ursprünglichen Namen genau wiedergibt.

II. Die Tosefta-Rezensionen

(תוספתא כ"י ארפורט)
תחום ארץ ישראל

(1) פרשת אשקלון
(2) חומת מגדל שרשן דקיסרי
(3) ושורא דרור
(4) ושורא דעכו
(5) כבריתא
(6) ריש מעין רגעתן
(7) ורנעתן גרמא
(8) אנר זניתא
(9) וקצטרא דגליל
(10) וקביא רעיתא
(11) תפלית
(12) סניפתא
(13) וסחרתא דיתיר
(14) מומתא דבור
(15) וממציא דעכתא
(16) מי שפר
(17) עילי רבתא
(18) ומחרשת
(19) מגדל הרוב
(20) ונקיפתא דעיון
(21) תיקרת
(22) וכפרא דבר סנגרא
(23) ותרנגלא עילאה דלעילא מן קיסרין
(24) בית סוכת סכל
(25) ורקם דחגרא
(26) טרכונא דבתחום בצרה
(27) חשבון
(28) ויוקפא
(29) נחלה דורד
(30) ויגוד סיכותא
(31) ונמרין
(32) מלי חזרואי
(33) ורקם גיאה
(34) וגיניא דאשקלון

Die in der Erfurter (jetzt Berliner) und in der Wiener Handschrift der Tosefta enthaltenen Texte unseres Verzeichnisses sind nicht in allen Punkten übereinstimmend; sie sind auch nicht gleichen Ursprungs und müssen gesondert betrachtet werden.

a) Der Text der E (= Erfurter) -Tosefta ist kürzer. Er zeigt folgendes Bild im Vergleich mit der Rezension des Sifrè (Abschnitt I):

(1—4) sind im wesentlichen gleich. Bei (2) wird zu „Mauer des Stratonturmes" sachlich richtig דקיסרי „von *Cäsarea* (sc. maritima)" hinzugefügt; zu (3) דור[שורא ד][70] [„die Mauer von] *Dor*". — Statt des hebräischen חומת עכו wird hier (4) das aramäische שורא דעכו verwendet. — (5) כבריתא folgt hier richtig nach Akko (s. I, 7). — (6) ist natürlich ריש מעין דנעתן zu lesen;[71] dann (7) ינעתן נרמא, wobei wieder aramäisches נרמא statt עצמה im Sifrè auffällt. Das ע ist sprachlich richtig; א im Sifrè wiedergibt die galiläische Aussprache. — (8) hat statt hebr. בית־אנר וניתא: . Ob dies = יגר „Steinhaufen" ist? — (9) קצטרא דגליל ist bloß andere Schreibart für קצרא. — (10) lies: קביא דעיתא.

Neu ist (11): תפלית. In der Wiener Tosefta findet sich תפניא; (im Jerusch. תפנים) jedoch in anderer Reihenfolge, ein Umstand, der zeigt, daß es sich um einen späteren Einschub handelt. Der ursprüngliche Name wie auch die Lage müssen nichtsdestoweniger festgestellt werden. — Hildesheimers Kombination[72] (statt תפלית mit Zuhilfenahme von תפניא) תפנית mit dem heutigen *Tibnīn* scheint mir nicht richtig zu sein. Das ל ist nicht ohne weiteres in נ zu ändern, vielmehr kann נ sehr leicht Schreibfehler für ל sein. Ferner liegt *Tibnīn* etwas zu weit nördlich von den bisher genannten Orten. Daher schlage ich *Dibl* in der unmittelbaren Nähe von *ʿAita* (10) und *Rāmijā* (14) vor. Zu dem Lautwechsel **dibl** = תפלית können mehrere Analogien bei palästinischen Ortsnamen angeführt werden.[73]

(12) Für סניפתא ist nach Sifrè ספינתא zu lesen; für (13) סחרתא — פחרתא דיתיר. — (14) ist nach den Ausführungen in Abschnitt I רומתא דבור zu lesen. — (15) muß heißen: מִצְרָא דַעֲקָא(מ). — (16) מי שפר mag die ursprüngliche Lesart statt מיסבר sein und die Bedeutung wie *Kallirrhoë*[74] haben. — Zu (17) עילי רבתא s. weiter sub *b* Punkt 21. — Für (18) lies: מרחשת = מרעשתא[75] im Sifrè.

[70] דור ist natürlich Schreib- oder Lesefehler.

[71] Jedoch dürfte ursprünglich נייא gestanden haben, vgl. Abschnitt I und hier sub *b* 5.

[72] S. 22 ff.

[73] ד = ת: יוֹתַפַת = יוֹדַפַת = Jotapata; נרוך = נרבת = Narbata, vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 3 ff. — Zu ם = b s. Hildesheimer, S. 22 f. und weiter Punkt 20.

[74] Vgl. Ber. r. 33 § 4 ed. Theodor 308 1;3 עין טובה = Καλλιῤῥόη.

[75] ח = ע vgl. oben Anm. 28 und weiter Anm. 84.

(19) מגדל חרוב ist *neu*. Der Name bedeutet wohl „Turm des Ḥarubbaumes“,[76] deshalb ist er nicht mit el-Ḫirbe („die Ruine“) zu vergleichen. Genaue Identifikation kann ich nicht geben, doch dürfte der Turm unweit *ʿIjjōn* gestanden haben, das (20) hier folgt. נקיפתא (statt נקובתא) דעיין ist phonetisch richtig. — Zu (21) תיקרת vgl. weiter Abschnitt IV, Punkt 2 und 3; ebendort in bezug auf כפרא דבר סנגרא (22), das einer gründlichen Zurechtstellung bedarf. — Zu (23) ist nichts zu bemerken.

(24) bietet die Tos. E zwei Varianten: a) בית סוכת, das nach den obigen Ausführungen (I, 23) בית סבות zu lesen ist; b) סכל dürfte Schreib- oder Lesefehler statt סָבָּת sein. Der Abschreiber wußte nicht, ob סבת oder סכל zu lesen sei, und nahm deshalb beide in den Text auf. — (25) lies nach dem Obigen (I, 25) רקם וְחנרא. — (26) ist der kürzere Name des südlichen Trachons. — (27) lies: חברן (s. oben I, Punkt 28). — (28) ist in סקא zu ändern (I, 27). — (29) lies: נחלה דורד (I, 29). — Zu (30) יגור סיכותא s. Abschnitt IV, Punkt 6. — (31) ist richtig. — (32) Für מלי חזרואי ist einfach מליח זרואי zu lesen. — (33—34) sind in Ordnung. — Die Angabe betreffs der „großen Straße, welche nach der Wüste führt“ *fehlt*: ein Beweis, daß sie im Sifrè später hinzugefügt wurde (vgl. Ende I).

Zusammenfassend kann folgendes festgestellt werden:

1. der Text von E zeigt durchwegs (außer 1) *aramäische* Färbung;

2. gegenüber Sifrè fehlen hier die dortigen Punkte 14, 15, 24 (und richtig 35);

3. neu sind dagegen hier 11 und 19;

4. zu 24 hat E eine Variante verzeichnet.

b) Bezüglich der *Wiener* Handschrift der Tosefta[77] ist folgendes zu bemerken:

(2—3) zeigt der Text eine Verwirrung. Richtig muß er lauten: (2) וחומת מגדל שר[שן]. Dazu gab es eine Variante ושירא דקיסרה (=דקיסרין vgl. bei *a*), die inhaltlich das gleiche besagt. Der Abschreiber wußte dies nicht und fügte die Variante an (3) an, wo

[76] Siehe Krauss, *HUCA* I, 198.

[77] Eine tabellarische Anordnung der Namen findet man bei Hildesheimer zwischen p. X und XI, weshalb sie hier fortbleiben kann. Hildesheimer verzeichnet die Varianten (in Klammern) aus ed. princ. (s. bei ihm p. X Anm. 32).

aber der Text zu lauten hat: ושינה [ר]דור[78] oder wohl richtiger וישורה [ר]דיר.[79] — (5) ist beachtenswert מעין ורוש מייא דנעתין für (ähnlich Sifrè: מי). Die Endung ין- statt ין- mag in Galiläa richtig sein.[80] — (8) וכוניתא ist natürlich בוניתא = בי זניתא zu lesen.[81] — (9) lies: וקצטרא דגלילא, denn es handelt sich bloß um *ein* Castrum. — (10) ist וקובעיא[82] דעייתין zu lesen, wo עייתן für עייתא beachtenswert ist. — (11) lies: ורמותא דבור (s. oben zu *a* 14).

(12) bietet einen *neuen* Punkt: וכורני רבתא. Hildesheimer verzeichnet die Variante וטרני ר'. Ist diese richtig, so käme eṭ-*Ṭire* nordöstlich (11) in Betracht. Nördlich davon liegt *Rās eṭ-Ṭire*. Ähnliche Ortsnamen finden sich auch sonst in Galiläa,[83] daher wäre die Hinzufügung von רבתא „Groß T." erklärlich, während dies bei כורני unnötig wäre. Zu (13) תפניא s. oben sub *a*. — (14) lies: בפנתא. — (15) lies: ופחרתא דית[י]ר. — (16) muß lauten: ומצ[ר]א ד[ע]ייתא. — (18): ומרחשת. — (19) ist die Namensform יפצאל beachtenswert.

(20) עילשתא ist *neu* und nur hier zu finden. Hildesheimer vergleicht wohl richtig *Ḥallūsīje*[84] am *Nahr Ḳāsimīje*.

(21) אולם רבתא gegenüber לולא ר' des Sifrè verdient unbedingt den Vorzug. In der Tosefta E findet man עילי, worin wohl ursprüngliches עילם vermutet werden darf. In der galiläischen Aussprache wäre dies = אולם. Hildesheimer hat den Ort in *ʿAlmōn* am Nahr Ḳāsimīje östlich von (20) festgestellt. Ein anderes אולם ist in Untergaliläa bekannt;[85] daher hier das Appellativum רבתא wie oben (12). — (24) מישא *ist nur in dieser Handschrift vorhanden*. Ich vermute es in *Dēr Mimās* im Süden der Ebene von *ʿIjjōn*, nach welchem es in unserem Verzeichnis erscheint.[86] — Zu (25—26)

[78] Statt ודור.

[79] Danach sind meine Ausführungen in *Küstenstraße* p. 4 hinfällig.

[80] Vgl. צלמין = צלמון (*MGWJ* 1927, 266); טבעין = טבעון (*Pal.-Stud.* IV, 40 f.); עבבין = Ακχαβαρων (bei Josephus).

[81] Siehe Anm. 18.

[82] Ed. princ. hat hier קובאיא, wo א = ע richtig sein kann, da man mit einer galiläischen Ortsbezeichnung zu tun hat.

[83] Vgl. Horowitz: טוריה, א״י ושכנותיה, 304 und in den Anmerkungen.

[84] Zu ע = ח vgl. Anm. 28, 75.

[85] Horowitz a. a. O. 23.

[86] Zum Namen vgl. Krauss, *HUCA* I, 197 Anm. 67; Löw, *Flora* III, 417.

s. Abschnitt IV. — (28) lies: ונקת[י]. — (29) lies: ורקם[87] וחגרה. — (31) גר שהדוהא scheint eine biblische Ortsbezeichnung zu sein; in Wirklichkeit eine der am meist verderbten Stellen unserer Liste, s. weiter IV. — (33) lies: ומלַח דורואי. — (34) lies: וסקא.

(37) ורפיח וחונרא ist *neu* und findet sich nur hier und im Jeruschalmi: רפיח דחנרא. Man nimmt an, es sei damit die bekannte syrisch-ägyptische Grenzstadt רפיח Ραφια gemeint.[88] Auffällig ist dann die Reihenfolge, da dieser Punkt jedenfalls *nach* רקם גיאה bei Petra stehen müßte, während er hier *vor* diesem, ja sogar vor Ammon und Moab (38) erscheint. Jedoch ist (38) ein späterer Einschub, wie weiter (Abschnitt V, 11) gezeigt wird. Immerhin bleibt רפיח auch so sehr auffällig, wenn nicht etwa ein anderes רפיח im Ostjordanlande angenommen werden darf, was noch weiter (Abschnitt III) zu erwägen sein wird.

Übersicht: 1. Die Namen werden in der Wiener Tosefta-handschrift mit ו aneinandergereiht;[89]

2. gegenüber Sifrè fehlen die dortigen Punkte 15 und 23 (dieser in Tosefta E vorhanden);

3. neu sind hier 11, 20, 37, 38 (Zusatz).

III. Der Jeruschalmi-Text*

kann nach den bisherigen Untersuchungen wie folgt hergestellt werden:

פרשת [אשקלון]. חומות[90] מנדל שור[שן].[91] ושורא דדור. ושורא דעכו. וקצרא דגלילא. וכברתא. ובית וניתא. וקובעיא [דעיתא]. ורמותה דבור. וטריי רבתא. תפלית. וספנתה.[92] ופחרתא דיתיר. ומיצרייא דאייתא. וראש מי נעתון. ונעתין עצמה.

[87] Ed. princ. hat ורכה, das sicher aus וחגרה entstanden ist. Jedenfalls beweist die korrupte Lesart, daß zu Beginn des zweiten Wortes ein ו (nicht ד) gestanden hat (vgl. Abschnitt I zur Stelle).

[88] Hildesheimer 66 ff.; meine *Küstenstraße* 2 f.

[89] Ausnahme Punkt 4, wo dies sicher nur Zufall ist.

* Vgl. dazu außer Hildesheimers Tabelle (zwischen p. X—XI) Luncz ירושלים XI—XII. 290 ff.; ferner Ginzbergs *Geniza-Fragm.* p. 362[b]; Kommentar des מה״רי בן מלכי צדק in der großen Wilnaer Mischnaausgabe zu Schewiit VI, 1.

[90] חומות in *Geniza-Fragm.*

[91] שיר, doch könnte dies aus שור entstanden sein; שורשן, wie בוצרה.

[92] So richtig in *Geniza-Fragm.*

מי ספר.[93] ומרחשת.[94] ומגדל חרוב. ואולם רבתא. ונקובתא דעיון...[95] כרכה רבה דבר...[95] ותרנגולא עילאה דלמעלה מן קיסרין. וטרכונא דמתהם לבוצרה. ומליח דורבאי.[96] ונמרין. ובית סבת.[97] ויונקת. ורפיח דחגרא. ודרך הגדולה ההולכת למדבר. חברן. וסקא. ונחלא דורד. ויגר...[95] ורקם דגיעה. וגיניא דאשקלון.

Auffällig sind die mehrfachen Umstellungen. Daß *Gʿatūn* (I, 5—6) an unrichtiger Stelle erscheint, ist offensichtlich. Es scheint, daß der fahrlässige Abschreiber die an einer Stelle vergessenen Namen ohne viel Überlegen an einer anderen Stelle „nachholte". — Auch hier erscheint בית סכל (für כבת), wie in der Variante der Tosefta (II a, Nr. 24).

Unerklärt ist die Stellung von רפיח דחגרא und דרך ההולכת למדבר inmitten ostjordanischer Ortschaften, falls diese Angaben auf eine Gegend im Südwesten Palästinas sich beziehen sollten (s. Ende I).

Daher glaube ich bezüglich des „großen Weges" der Ansicht von Z. Horowitz[98] und A. M. Luncz[99] beipflichten zu müssen, daß darunter die *große ostjordanische Pilgerstraße* gemeint sei, die im Osten des Landes von Nord nach Süd sich ziehend nach der arabischen Wüste führt. Hier ist natürlich nur jene Strecke gemeint, die an der Westseite des Trachons läuft, hier zugleich die Westgrenze des jüdischen Gebietes bildend.

Ist es aber so, dann muß auch רפיח וח(ו)גרא der Tosefta (oben, Ende Abschnitt II), bzw. רפיח דחגרא im *Ostjordanlande* angesetzt werden. Der Sprachgebrauch, bzw. die Übersetzung des biblischen חצרים mit רפיח und שור mit חגרא in den Targumim kann bei Entscheidung dieser Frage nicht maßgebend sein,[100] da es sich hier um *wirkliche Ortsbestimmungen* handelt, während die Targumim die zu ihrer Zeit geltende *Exegese* wiedergeben. Freilich hat — wie wir weiter (Abschnitt IV) sehen werden — das palästinische Targum רפיח (*ohne* דחגרא) des Grenzverzeichnisses auf das im

93 *Geniza-Fragm.* מספר.
94 *Geniza-Fragm.* מראשית, also א = ח = ע.
95 Die Ergänzung s. Abschnitt IV.
96 Palästinische Schreibart mit ב (s. oben Anm. 73).
97 Komm. מהר״י טכלי hat hier ובית דיגלי, das ich nicht erklären kann.
98 מחקרי ארץ אבותינו (Jerusalem תרע״ח), S. 58 f.
99 a. a. O. 301 Anm. לא.
100 Hildesheimer, S. 67.

Südwesten gelegene Rafiaḥ bezogen, doch kann dies bei Berücksichtigung der oben genannten Gründe nicht als richtig anerkannt werden.

Möglicherweise ist דחגרא des Jeruschalmi mit Rücksicht auf jene Exegese dem ursprünglichen רפיח hinzugefügt worden. Doch wage ich dies nicht als sicher zu behaupten, da wir ja im Nordosten des Ostjordanlandes eine חגרא genannte Gegend — einen der beiden Trachonen — feststellen konnten.

Jedenfalls muß aber רפיח oder ר' דחגרא des Grenzverzeichnisses hier im Osten, und zwar in der Nähe der „großen" Pilgerstraße, neben der es genannt ist, gelegen haben. Wir sind in der Lage, diesen *Grenz*ort im Osten aus alter Quelle nachzuweisen:

Josephus fügt jenem Kapitel, wo er die Grenzen Galiläas, Samarias und Judäas feststellt,[101] noch einige Angaben bezüglich des Reiches von Agrippa II. hinzu. Dieses umfaßte die Toparchie von Gamala, Gaulanitis, Batanaea und Trachonitis. Es begann beim Libanon und den Quellen des Jordan (im Norden) und reichte (im Süden) bis zum Tiberiassee; seine Ausdehnung (von Ost nach West) war vom Dorfe *Arpha* (κώμη Ἄρφας) bis Julias (nördlich vom genannten See). Gemeint ist bei Ἄρφας das heutige Er-*Rāfe* westlich von *Zoroa*, in der unmittelbaren Nähe (östlich) der großen Pilgerstraße.[102] *Das ist nun* רפיח *unseres Grenzverzeichnisses im Osten des Landes.* Daß in der Transkription des Josephus das ח am Schlusse des Namens nicht erscheint, kann angesichts des ähnlichen Ραφια (= רפיח) nicht überraschen.[103] Und daß der heutige Name dieses *ḥ* gleichfalls nicht aufweist, hängt damit zusammen, daß im Norden und Nordosten die Gutturale bekanntlich schon im Altertum vernachlässigt worden sind.

IV. Reste einer Rezension des Grenzverzeichnisses in den palästinischen Targumim zu Num. 34

In den beiden palästinischen Targumim (*a*: Pseudo-Jonatan; *b*: Jeruschalmi-Targum) zu den Grenzen des Landes Kanaan

[101] Bellum III 3 5.

[102] Siehe darüber Klausner im קבץ החברה העברית לחקירת א"י II, 135.

[103] Ein ς wird von Josephus ans Ende der semitischen Namen sehr oft gesetzt.

(Num. 34) ist eine eigenartige Paraphrase erhalten geblieben, die wir in einem Anhang zu dieser Arbeit eingehender besprechen wollen. Diese Paraphrase schöpfte aus verschiedenen, zumeist tannaitischen Quellen, so auch aus unserem Grenzverzeichnis. Folgende Namen, bzw. Angaben stammen zweifellos aus unserer Urkunde:

a	*b*
(1) רקם גיאה (V. 4). רקם גיעה (V. 12)	(1) רקם (V. 3). רקם דגיעה (V. 4)
(2) כרכור דבר זעמה (V. 8)	——
(3) כרכור דבר סנינורא (V. 8)	——
(4) דווקינום ותרנגולא עד קמרין (V. 8)	(4) דיוקינום (טור תלגא) דקיסריון [ד]יוקינום תורנגלא דקיסריון
(5) קרן זכותא (V. 9)	(5) קרון זכתא
(6) גבתא דחטמונא (V. 9)	(6) בתרא...
(7) בירא (V. 9)	——
(8) רבית ככל (V. 9)	——
	(9) כל טריכון זמרא
	(10) רפיח

(Einige weitere Entlehnungen werden im „Anhang" zu dieser Arbeit besprochen.)

Dazu ist folgendes zu bemerken:

(1) רקם ג׳ wird bald mit א׳, bald mit ע׳ geschrieben (vgl. oben die j.-Rezension).

(2—3) כרכור ist jedenfalls Schreibfehler statt כרכי = כרכא „Festung". Es werden hier also zwei Festungen genannt: die eine des בר זעמא, die andere des בר סנינורא. Was bedeuten diese Namen und sind sie oder waren sie im ursprünglichen Grenzverzeichnis enthalten?

Die zweite Angabe ist jedenfalls dem Verzeichnis entnommen. So liest man in der Sifrèrezension an 18. Stelle כרכא דבר סנגרא (Ms. London: קרכא — l. קרכא); ähnlich in der Toseftarezension W (26): כרכא דבר סינגורא; E: כפרא דבר סנגרא (l. כרכא) und im j.: ברכה רבה ובר סנגדא lies: כרכא רבה דבר סנגדא „die große Festung des Bar..." Nun ist aber zu beachten, daß in Tosefta W und E dieser Angabe das bis jetzt unerklärte Wort vorangeht: ותיקרת oder ותקרא, an dessen Stelle man im j. ותיקרת oder וחקרת liest. Offenbar ist ותיקרת in וַחֲקֶרֶת zu korrigieren. Zugleich zeigt aber der Status constructus

von חַקְרַת, daß nach diesem ein Wort zu folgen hat. Ich glaube sicher, dieses fehlende Wort im Targum zu finden. Die Angabe hat zu lauten: חַקְרַת בר ועמא. — חקרה ist gleichbedeutend mit כרכא und findet sich auch sonst nicht nur als Name der syrischen Festung von Jerusalem, sondern als Name der alten Festung von גוש חלב (Gischala) in Obergaliläa.[104] Es handelt sich also in unserem Verzeichnis um zwei Festungen, die nach je einem „Sohne von..." benannt waren. — Wo lagen sie? — In allen Rezensionen erscheinen sie *vor*, zum Teil *unmittelbar vor* dem „Hahnenbild von Cäsarea", d. h. in dem ehemaligen *ituräischen Gebiete.*

Über Ituräa erfährt man in der römischen Zeit folgendes: Sie erstreckte sich vom Libanon im Westen bis Damaskus im Osten und bis zu Panias und Ulatha (d. h. bis zur Sumpfgegend des Ḥūlesees) im Süden. Sie hatte räuberische Bevölkerung und räuberische Herrscher, die eine Reihe von Burgen im Libanon errichteten. Sie wurden zwar von Aristobul I. (101—100 v. Chr.) vorübergehend besiegt, aber sie erholten sich bald und mußten von Pompejus bekämpft werden. Aus der Reihe der ituräischen Herrscher kennen wir um 23 einen *Zenodoros* (Strabo nennt ihn einen Räuber λῃστής), dessen Gebiet nicht nur über Panias und Ulatha, sondern sogar über *Trachon* hinaus sich erstreckte. *Diese Gebiete fielen nach seinem Tode dem jüdischen Könige Herodes zu.* Etwa ein halbes Jahrhundert später (38—49 n. Chr.) herrscht in Ituräa ein gewisser Σοαιμος (Sohaemus oder Soëmus).[105]

Dieser beiden ituräischen Herrscher Namen sind nun zweifellos in den beiden rätselhaften Angaben unseres Grenzverzeichnisses zu erkennen. ועמא ist offenbar Σοαιμος. Man trifft zwar diesen Namen in einer Ossuarinschrift in der Transkription סיעם an,[106] aber das palästinensische Targum verwendet mit Vorliebe ז für ם; so finden wir weiter (s. Punkt 5) anstatt סכותא der übrigen Rezensionen im Targum זכותא. Übrigens ist der Wechsel von ם und ז in nichtjüdischer

[104] I Mak. 3. 45 und sonst; Meg. Taan. II (23. Ijjar); M. Arachin IX 6. Zur Sache s. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 34 ff.

[105] Alles nach Schürer I⁴, 707—725. Über Zenodorus S. 714. Über Soëmus S. 720.

[106] Siehe mein *Jüd. Paläst. Corpus Inscriptionum* S. 56 Nr. 166 aus Nazareth סועם בר מנחם גוח נפש; s. dazu noch Dalman, *Orte und Wege Jesu*³, S. 66.

Umgebung auch sonst zu belegen.[107] חקרת בר זעמא oder כרכא דבר זעמא ist also eine *Festung des Soëmus*. Der volle Name des Herrschers war nämlich *Bar* Soëmus; so sind viele gut bezeugte ituräische Namen mit בר = Bar, Βαρ zusammengesetzt.[108]

In der anderen, jedenfalls korrupten Angabe ist der Name des oben genannten anderen ituräischen Herrschers, nämlich des *Zenodoros*, zu erkennen. Daß סנגרא oder סינגורא Name eines Mannes oder einer Ortschaft[109] wäre, ist absolut nicht belegt; daß es nicht das wohlbekannte סינגורא = συνήγορος ist, braucht nicht erst bewiesen zu werden. Zudem ist noch auf die Variante סינגרא zu verweisen, während συνήγορος immer סניגור geschrieben wird. Auch das ד des j. (סנגרא) ist zu beachten. Der ursprüngliche Name ist aus den korrupten Lesarten wiederherzustellen; er muß lauten סינדורא, d. i. *Zenodoros*, bzw. *Bar-Zenodoros*. — Josephus nennt diesen Zenodoros auch mit dem kürzeren Namen *Zeno* und berichtet, daß ein Stück seines Gebietes an Herodes' Sohn Philippus übergeben worden sei.[110] Daher heißt es bei Lukas (3. 1), daß Philippus auch über Ituräa geherrscht habe.

Aus den obigen Ausführungen ist zu ersehen, daß gewisse ituräische Gebiete um die Wende des 1. Jahrhunderts im jüdischen Besitze waren. Es ist auch zweifellos, daß Juden in den neuerworbenen Gebieten sich niederließen.[111] Die Grenzen dieser Gebiete mußten zu einem gewissen Zweck, den wir später kennenlernen, festgesetzt werden. Die *genaue* Lage der beiden genannten Burgen oder Festungen kann freilich nicht festgestellt und es können hierüber bestenfalls Vermutungen geäußert werden.[112]

[107] Vgl. מחוז = מחוס: *MGWJ* 1917, S. 134.

[108] Schürer a. a. O. 708 Anm. 5. Auf Inschriften findet man: Bargathes, Baramna, Barates (ברעתה), Βαραθης.

[109] Dalman, *Wb.*, Levy, *Targ. Wb.* 176a: „Sannigora" (?!).

[110] Bell. j. II 6, 3; s. dazu *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 55 f.

[111] j. Berachot III 1: כטבא כהן ויוצא חוצה לארץ... להציל השדה מיד גוי ואסילו ליטור יוצא ועוזר עליה. In dem rätselhaften Wort ליטור erkenne ich den semitischen Namen von Ituräa = יטור (vgl. Schürer a. a. O. 707 f.). Die Stelle besagt also, daß ein Kohen sogar nach Ituräa reisen dürfe, um ein Feld zurückzuerhalten. Ituräa wird hervorgehoben, da dort angesichts der unsicheren politischen Verhältnisse nicht viel Hoffnung auf die Wiedergewinnung des Grundstückes vorhanden sein dürfte.

[112] Man darf vielleicht an die beiden Festungen *Ḳal'at Bustra* und *K. es-Ṣubēbe* unweit *Panias* denken. Siehe darüber Robinson, *Neuere biblische Forschungen* 538 f.; Baedekers *Pal. und Syr.*[6], 229.

(4) דווקינום, richtiger nach *b* דיוקינום, ist εἰκών „Bild" und dürfte die vom Targumisten frei vorgenommene Hinzufügung zu der eigentlichen Angabe des Grenzverzeichnisses sein,[113] die in den Worten ותרנגולא עד קסרין enthalten ist. Richtig muß es natürlich heißen: דקסרין..., bzw. nach *b* דקיסריון (= Caesarea Philippi zur Unterscheidung von קיסרין = Caesarea maritima). In *b* ist übrigens diese Angabe zweimal enthalten, das erstemal fehlerhaft: טורתלנא[114]..., lies: תרנגלא.

(5) קרן (*a*), bzw. קרון זכותא (*b*) entspricht zweifellos סבותא, bzw. בית סבות (I, 23). Im Worte קרן, richtiger קרון, ist קרי „Dorf" zu suchen und dürfte richtig קְרֶן (oder קָרֶן) zu lesen sein. Der Targumist will damit die Dörfer der Lavagegend *Zākuta* bezeichnen.

(6) גבתא דחטמונא ist ein sehr bedeutsamer Beitrag zur Zurechtstellung einer Angabe des Grenzverzeichnisses, die scheinbar heillos verdorben ist.

In der Sifrèrezension (30) fanden wir סבוטא, סמיתא, סביתא, dem in Tosefta W (31) und j. יגר שהדותא entsprach. Man hat entgegen allen kritischen Grundsätzen die an zweiter Stelle genannte Lesart, welche eine wohlbekannte biblische Ortsbezeichnung (Gen. 31. 46) bietet, akzeptiert,[115] ohne zu fragen, wieso die Lesart im Sifrè und die in Tosefta E zu erklären sei. Letztere hat nämlich יגור סיכותא, und es ist wahrlich undenkbar, daß ein Abschreiber aus dem wohlbekannten biblischen יגר שהדותא das völlig unverständliche יגור סיכותא oder סבותא machen sollte. Auch die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Sifrètextes spricht entschieden gegen יגר שהדותא. Ms. Rom hat סמיתא; London: סביטא; Oxford: סבותא. Sieht man sich diese Lesarten genauer an, so kommt man bald zu der Vermutung, daß sie aus חטמונא entstehen konnten, und anstatt יגור סיכותא von Tosefta E ist sicher יגר חטמונא zu lesen.

Die Richtigkeit dieser Korrekturen wird nun nicht bloß durch unsere Targumstelle erwiesen. Ein in der Tosefta Schewiit IV 9 erhaltenes Verzeichnis der Grenzorte der jüdischen Stadt *Nave*

[113] Vielleicht entstand aber das Wort יוקינום unter Einfluß der oben I, Punkt 24 behandelten Grenzangabe ויונקת, die schon früh mehrfach korrumpiert wurde.

[114] טור תלנא ist die Wiedergabe von הרמון im Targ. Jon. zu Deut. 3. 9.

[115] Hildesheimer, 57 ff. Er sucht freilich auch סבותא (= מצפה) zu rechtfertigen; aber die Varianten סמיתא, סבוטא bleiben unerklärt.

im Ostjordanlande nennt an fünfter Stelle יגרי חטם „die Steinhaufen von Ḥatam".[116] Heute entspricht diesem alten Namen *ʿAṭaman* südöstlich von *Nave*. Der Ort wurde gekürzt חטם, vollständiger חטמונא genannt. Zur Bestimmung der Grenze verwendete man die in der Nähe sich befindlichen „Steinhaufen" (יגרים = Rugm) oder einen besonders großen Steinhaufen, יגר. Dieses Wort ist nun ein Verhängnis für die Abschreiber geworden, da infolgedessen das biblische יגר שהדותא hierher versetzt worden ist. Der palästinische Targumist wollte für „Steinhaufen" einen noch bezeichnenderen Ausdruck gebrauchen und verwendete deshalb (statt יגר) גבתא, das auch sonst als Ortsbezeichnung anzutreffen ist.[117] In *b* ist das Wort in korrumpierter Form als בתרא[118] enthalten (aber zu קרן זבתא gezogen), während dort דחטמונא fehlt.

Dieser Grenzpunkt erscheint im Grenzverzeichnis inmitten trachonitischer Ortschaften, was ja den tatsächlichen topographischen Verhältnissen entspricht.

(7—8) כיריא דבית סכל erscheint im Targum als *eine* Ortsbezeichnung. — בית סכל fanden wir in Tosefta E (II *a*, Punkt 24) und in j als Variante zu בית סוכת (lies: בית סכות oder סכת). Der Targumist fand auch diese Lesart in seiner Vorlage und glaubte sie neben dem richtigen וכתא (oben Punkt 5) verwenden zu müssen. — Was aber soll כיריא sein? — Es ist mit ed. Ginzburger zweifellos ביריא zu lesen und mit ביריין des Sifrètextes (I, 12) gleichzusetzen. Demnach ist im Targum ביריא ובית סכל zu lesen.

(9) כל טר(י)כון זמרא in *b* ist eine wertvolle Variante (statt des unrichtigen נימרא), die wir durch die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Sifrètextes bestätigt fanden.

(10) רפיח haben wir oben Ende Abschnitt III besprochen. Wichtig ist, daß der Targumist רפיח ohne דחנרא in seiner Vorlage fand. Wir haben den Grenzpunkt im Osten nachgewiesen (s. Abschnitt III); der Targumist selbst dachte jedoch an den syrisch-ägyptischen Grenzort, was daraus hervorgeht, daß er unmittelbar darauf das aus der jüdischen Literatur sonst unbekannte שוקמזיי

[116] Siehe dazu meine Ausführungen *JQR N. S.* II, 554 ff.; עבר הירדן היהודי, 41 f.

[117] Vgl. im Register meiner *Beiträge zur Geographie und Geschichte Galiläas*: גובתא שמאי, ג׳ דציפורין, גובתא דאריח.

[118] So vermutet, wohl richtig, mein Schüler stud. Schwadron in Jerusalem (wo wir das Grenzverzeichnis als seminaristische Übung behandelten).

(lies: שוקמזון) (Συκαμαζων der Kirchenväter) an der Küste folgen läßt.[119] Doch stand dieser Name sicher nicht im ursprünglichen Verzeichnis.

Der Targumist scheint seine hier besprochenen Angaben aus dem Jeruschalmi geschöpft zu haben. Dafür spricht die ungenaue Reihenfolge ebenso, wie gewisse Übereinstimmung in der Schreibung der Namen.[120] Jeruschalmi und Targum[121] stammen jedenfalls aus Palästina, und diesem Umstand ist es wohl zu verdanken, daß in dem sonst so schlecht überlieferten Targumtext wir doch einige wichtige Punkte in genauer Schreibung vorfinden konnten.

V. Verwandte Texte

Zum besseren Verständnis des großen Grenzverzeichnisses müssen noch eine Reihe verwandter Texte der talmudischen Literatur hier besprochen werden:

1. Tosefta Ahilot XVIII 15 בראשונה היו אומרים: תחומי אשקלון מקבר גדול עד יגור ועד גוב[122] ועד תרעין הן[123] טמאין ונמנו עליהם חכמים וטיהרום.

Der Bericht besagt, daß ursprünglich ein größeres Gebiet um *Askalon* als ausländisch gegolten habe, in späterer Zeit sei jedoch von mehreren Gelehrten eine Abstimmung vorgenommen und die genannten Orte seien „rein" — d. h. als palästinensischer Boden — erklärt worden. Wann diese Abstimmung stattgefunden, erfährt man gleichfalls aus der Tosefta, wonach Rabbi, R. Ismaël b. R.

[119] Siehe dazu meine *Küstenstraße Palästinas* S. 2 f. Im Targum heißt es nach Rafiaḥ und Sykamozon: עד מטי ספר ימא דטילחא. Ich glaube, das letzte Wort streichen zu müssen, da der Targumist jedenfalls an die Südwestgrenze dachte. Die Ausführungen Dalmans in *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 58 zu diesem Punkte scheinen mir nicht zwingend genug zu sein. Der Targumist hat, wie oben nachgewiesen wurde, das tannaitische Grenzverzeichnis vielfach benutzt; und da die Targumstelle vom Ostjordanlande handelt, glaubte ein Abschreiber oder ein Drucker an Stelle von ימא oder ימא רבה — ימא דטילחא setzen zu müssen, während der Targumist in Wirklichkeit den ostjordanischen Grenzpunkten jene an der Küste folgen läßt.

[120] Vgl. סכל(י) oben III, S. 23; גיעה für גיאה in beiden Texten.

[121] Über das Verhältnis der beiden palästinischen Targumim zueinander s. im Anhang.

[122] So im Toseftazitat bei RS zu XVIII 9. In der Tos.: ועד ינודיו ועד גנב.

[123] Richtiger wohl הין, wie in den Ausgaben der Tosefta.

Josse und R. Elazar ha-Kappar auf Grund einer Aussage des R. Pinḥas b. Jaïr die Stadt *Askalon selbst* als rein erklärt hätten.[124] Es ist nur natürlich, daß die Reinheitserklärung sich auf das ganze Stadt*gebiet* erstreckte, was ja die erste Toseftastelle ausdrücklich sagt. Trotz dieser Reinheitserklärung wurden aber die Stadt und ihre Nachbarorte (חברותיה) in gewisser Beziehung als ausländisch angesehen, da sie durch das gleiche Kollegium (mit Ausnahme von R. Ismaël b. R. Josse) von den Zehntabgaben freigesprochen wurden.[125]

Unser Grenzverzeichnis vertritt offenbar den *älteren* Standpunkt, da es Askalon aus dem Gebiete Erez Israels ausschließt und das Territorium des Landes nur bis zum Scheideweg, bzw. zu den Gärten (1 und 34 im Sifrè) reichen läßt.[126] Innerhalb des so ausgeschiedenen Gebietes lagen die in der obigen Toseftastelle genannten Lokalitäten. Mit Sicherheit kann nur יגור — heute *el-Ġura* ganz nahe östlich von Askalon — festgestellt werden.

Das große Grenzverzeichnis ist also jedenfalls einer der Zeit Rabbis vorangehenden Periode zuzuweisen.

2. Ähnliche Berichte besitzen wir bezüglich der Stadt *Cäsarea* am Meere. Auch diese galt früher (מעולם „seit jeher" heißt es im betreffenden Bericht) als unrein, wurde aber bei einer Gelegenheit (leider wird nur der Tag: der 5. Adar-scheni, ohne das Jahr, angegeben) als rein erklärt, damit ein jeder (d. h. sogar Kohanim) das Stadtgebiet betreten dürfe.[127]

[124] מעשה... ששבתו כחנות של פזי בלוד והיה ר' פנחס בן יאיר יושב לפניהן. אמרו לו: אשקלון מה אתם כה? אמר להן: מוכרין חטין בבסליקאות שלהן ושובלין ואוכלין את פסחיהן לערב. Da zur Zeit Rabbis kein Pessachopfer dargebracht wurde, so scheint die von R. Pinḥas bezeugte Tatsache auf die Tempelzeit sich zu beziehen. Vgl. jedoch j. Schewiit VI 36c: יודעין היינו לפידקי של אשקלון ולוקחין חטין ועולין לעירינו ושובלין ואוכלין בתרום תינו. Der Anfang des Toseftaberichtes ist jedenfalls nach j. zu korrigieren.

Auf Grund dieser Aussage erfolgte die Reinheitserklärung, der auch R. Ismaël b. R. Josse zustimmte (vgl. die Fortsetzung: על טומאה אחת ששמאתי טהרתי).

[125] Tos. Ahilot XVIII 4: עיירות הטובלעות בא"י כגון... אשקלון וחברותיה, אע"פ שמשורים מן המעשר ומן השביעית אין בהם משום ארץ העמים. Dies ist das Ergebnis der zweiten Abstimmung, deren Gegenstand so bestimmt wird: טהו שנהג בה מ[שום] ארץ העמים?

[126] Vgl. j. Schewiit 36c: אשקלון עצמה?...מן מה דתני "גינייה דאשקלון" הדא אמרה אשקלון כלחוץ.

[127] Tos. Ahilot XVIII: העיד ר' יהודה בן יעקב מבית גובריא ויעקב בר' יצחק מבית גופנין על קסרי שהחזיקו בה מעולם [בטומאה sc.] והתירוה שלא בטנין; א"ר חנן: אותה שנה שביעית היתה... א"ר זריקא בי"ששה באדר השני נכנו עליה עשרים וארבעה זקנים והתירוה ש[ו]היו הכל נכנסים לתוכה. Es gab also zwei Überlieferungen über die Freierklärung von C.; nach der einen

Eine andere mehrfach korrumpierte, in unseren Texten lückenhafte Toseftastelle gibt auch (ähnlich wie bei Askalon) die einzelnen Punkte des ursprünglich unreinen Stadtgebietes an.[128]

geschah dies ohne Abstimmung, d. h. die jüdische Bewohnerschaft hat die Früchte des früher als zu Erez Israel gehörenden Gebietes einfach als ausländische Bodenerträgnisse angesehen und im Erlaßjahre ohne weiteres genossen. Nach der anderen Überlieferung wurde dies von 24 Gelehrten gestattet. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich um die Sanktionierung eines schon bestehenden Zustandes.

[128] Tosefta ebd. 13 (617ª): ואיזה מזרח קיסרי? מכנגד מטשפלין שלה ועד כנגד בית הנת שלה. העיד יהודה הנחתום על סטיו המזרחי שהוא מהור ושאר כלה מטמא משום ארץ העמים. — Die Frage: „Welche ist die Ostseite von Cäsarea?" — nimmt offenbar Bezug auf die Mischna Ohol. XVIII 9: מזיח קסרין וטערב קסרין קברות, wonach nicht nur das von den Stadtmauern umfaßte Gebiet, sondern auch die weitere Umgebung im Osten und Westen wegen dort befindlicher Gräber unrein sei. Obige Toseftastelle gibt nun die *Ost*seite an, während sie von der *West*seite schweigt. Mit Recht wurde von Büchler (*JQR* XIII, 685) zur Ergänzung dieser Toseftastelle das Zitat bei R. Samuel b. Gama herangezogen: ואיזה טערב קסרי(ו)ן? מכנגד קורם שלא גזבר בן שאול ועד סוף החומה הישנה והשאר כלה מטמא משום ארץ העמים. (Der Kopist der Tosefta übersprang die Worte von einem והשאר bis zum anderen.) Aber dieses Zitat ist vollkommen sinnlos, und der Versuch von Krauss (*JQR* XIV, 751) es herzustellen und zu deuten ergab kein brauchbares Resultat. — Man muß, von bekannten Tatsachen ausgehend, dem Sinn der Worte näherzukommen versuchen.

An Stelle Cäsareas am Meere stand früher der *Stratonsturm*, der in den tannaitischen Quellen מגדל שרשן genannt wird (vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 5 Anm. 19). Das tannaitische Grenzverzeichnis spricht, wie wir oben (I, 2) sahen, von den Mauern (oder der Mauer) des Stratonsturmes zur Bestimmung des vom Lande Israels ausgeschiedenen Gebietes, das also als unrein galt. Dieser Turm stand im Westen, am Meere. Statt שרשן ist auch die Schreibung שרשאן denkbar. [Hiefür bietet die Tosefta mehrfache Belege (vgl. meine *Küstenstraße* S. 10 Anm. 3 und s. noch T. Gittin II 10: בן קראה, l. richtig קדארה = קדָרה); zur Sache vgl. Raschi zu Ketub. 69ᵇ oben s. v. אין לך לאמר סתח בשום אות אלא א״כ אלף או ה׳ כטוכין לו או עם״י ינחם הנקודה שתחתיה, והיא באה במקום אות כאלו כתוב ינאחם וכו׳.]

Man muß nun die Buchstabengruppe שלאנזברנשאול schärfer ins Auge fassen und richtig einteilen; etwa so: של אגוב רבנשאול. Wenn wir das ל am Ende der Buchstabengruppe streichen, bleibt רבנשאו, worin ich mit gewissen Änderungen [ש aus רב; ר aus נ; נ aus ו hergestellt] שרשאן vermute. Ist nun „Straton" da, so muß vor ihm „Turm" gestanden haben. Daher ist die Buchstabengruppe אגוב mit geringfügigen und sicher erlaubten Korrekturen מגדל zu lesen. Die ganze Gruppe lautet danach: של מגדל שרשאן. Wenn wir noch das vorangehende קטור in חוטת ändern, so erhalten wir חוטת מגדל שרשאן, also die im tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis vorhandene Angabe. (Ich bedauere es sehr, mit derartigen Konjekturen operieren zu müssen; eine Nachprüfung der Stelle in der Handschrift des Samuel b. Gama ist mir leider unmöglich!) Die ganze Toseftastelle, ergänzt durch die obige Mischna, besagt nun folgendes: מזיח קסרי(ן) וטערב קסרי(ן) קברות. ואיזה

Im *Osten* der Stadt lagen: a) טטרפלין = τετράπυλον, das mit vier Säulenhallen geschmückte Tor;[129] b) סטיו = στοία, die die Stadt umgebende Säulenhalle; c) ein בית הגת, Kelterhaus, da in der Umgebung Cäsareas viel Wein produziert wurde.[130] Nach Jehuda des Bäckers Zeugnis war die östliche Säulenhalle rein, alles übrige aber unrein.

Im *Westen* werden nach dem von uns zurechtgestellten Text genannt: a) חומה של מגדל שרשאן, die Mauer des Stratonturmes; b) das Ende der alten Mauer. Das zwischen diesen beiden liegende Stück ist unrein, alles andere ist rein.

Aus allem dem folgt, daß das Stadtgebiet Cäsareas ursprünglich als unrein galt, während seine weitere Umgebung zum Lande Israels gerechnet wurde. Der neue Beschluß hatte den Zweck, das *Stadtgebiet selbst* als rein zu erklären. Andererseits aber wurde das *weitere* Stadtgebiet (genau so wie bei Askalon) in bezug auf die Beobachtung der Bodengesetze des siebenten Jahres als ausländisch angesehen. Der ganz gleiche Beschluß betreffs Askalons ist von Rabbi und seinem Bet-din erbracht worden. Man wird also nicht irregehen, auch den Beschluß betreffs Cäsareas ihm zuzuschreiben.

Unser Grenzverzeichnis, das als Grenzpunkt die Mauer(n) des Stratonturmes nennt, schließt offenbar die Stadt selbst aus dem Lande Israels aus, vertritt auch hier den älteren Standpunkt, ist also jedenfalls älter als Rabbi (d. h. die zweite Hälfte des 2. Jahrh.).

3. Das weitere Gebiet Cäsareas sollte also als Ausland angesehen werden. Wie weit dieses Gebiet reichte, wird in einer talmudischen Stelle wie folgt angegeben[131]: „Alles, was das Meer sieht (d. h. alle jene Orte, von wo aus man das Meer erblicken kann), ist erlaubt." Manche sagen: bis מגדל מילחא, manche sagen: bis zur Höhle טלימון (oder תלימון). Ersteres ist Ḫirbet *Maliḥa*, bei

מזרח קיסרי? מכנגד טטרפלין שלה ועד כנגד בית הגת שלה. העיד יהודה הנחתום על סטיו המזרחי שהוא טהור והשאר כלה טמאה משום ארץ העמים. — ואיזה מערב קסרין? מכנגד חומה של מגדל שרשאן ועד סוף החומה הישנה, והשאר כלה (טמאה) [טהורה] משום ארץ העמים.

[129] Vgl. *Expos. totius mundi* 26 (angeführt bei Thomsen, *Loca sancta* 74 s. v. Καισαρεια); *tetrapylon* eius nominatur ubique, quod unum est novum aliquid spectaculum.

[130] Siehe *Schwarz-Festschrift* 393 [אגדור = קסרין של גד[ו]רה]; ebendort 391 Anm. 24.

[131] j. Demaj II 1 (22c 34): שוריי. אית [l. mit Ms. j. Rom: יתה] (מיא) כל דחטי דבעי מיטר עד מגדל מילחא ואית דבעי מיטר עד מערת טלימון [Ms. R: תליטון].

Eusebius Μαγδιηλ genannt, nördlich von Cäsarea.[132] In der Nähe dieses Ortes dürfte die oben genannte Höhle zu finden sein. — Unsere Stelle fährt dann fort und sagt unter anderem: וצורן ודאי בקיסרין. Das zweite Wort gibt keinen rechten Sinn; es muß dort ein Ortsname gestanden haben: „Die Orte צורן und ... sind wie Cäsarea", d. h. gleichfalls aus dem eigentlichen Land Israel ausgeschlossen. In der Tat findet man in der römischen Jeruschalmihandschrift[133] וצורן ודאר, d. h. die Stadt *Dor* (*Dora*) (deren Name auch sonst in dieser Orthographie erscheint[134]) ist gleich Cäsarea zu behandeln. צורן dürfte etwa als „Klein-Zōr" zu erklären und mit dem heutigen *Tel Ṣūr*, südlich *Dor*, gleichzusetzen sein.[135]

Unser Verzeichnis nennt ebenfalls *Dor*, und da seine „Mauer" als Grenzpunkt angegeben wird, so ist dadurch das engere Stadtgebiet jedenfalls aus dem Lande Israels ausgeschlossen. Dies mußte deshalb gesagt werden, da in der Stadt seit langer Zeit Juden wohnten;[136] doch sollte die Niederlassung in Dor den die Reinheitsvorschriften beobachtenden Kohanim verboten werden.[137] In bezug auf Dor ist offenbar auch später kein erleichternder Beschluß erbracht worden, vielleicht deshalb, weil die jüdische Bewohnerschaft keine beträchtliche gewesen.

4. Bezüglich *Akkos* liest man in M. Oholot XVIII 9: ... ומזרח עכו היה ספק וטהרוהו חכמים „die Ostseite Akkos war zweifelhaft (rein), und die Weisen haben sie für rein erklärt." Die Westseite,

[132] Siehe meine *Küstenstraße*, S. 4f.

[133] Die Photographie stand mir durch die Freundlichkeit Prof. Epsteins-(Jerusalem) zur Verfügung.

[134] Jos. 17. 11; I Kön. 4. 11; vgl. Gesenius-Buhl[17], 151. Der Name ist auch in einer korrupten Stelle des Babli anzutreffen. Ḥullin 6ª: R. Zēra und R. Ami kamen ins Gasthaus דיאי; Ms. München: סונדק דאי; lies: לסונדק דאר oder ס' דדאר.

[135] צורן als phönikischer Ortsname an der den Phönikiern gehörigen Küste ist weder auffällig noch aber alleinstehend. Nördlich Dor findet man es-*Ṣurafend*, das offenbar dem phönikischen *Ṣarafand*, südlich Sidon (=צרפת אשר לצידון) entspricht. Wir haben also mit phönikischen Neugründungen zu tun. Einen zu einer gewissen Zeit den Phönikiern gehörenden Ort vermutet Dalman (*Orte*[3], 61 Anm. 1) in בית לחם צוריה j. Meg. I 70ª (10 von unten) in Untergaliläa.

[136] Die Stadt war seit Alexander Jannai jüdischer Besitz (Ant. XIII 12, 4), vgl. Schürer II, 140. Zu Agrippas I. Zeit wird die Existenz einer Synagoge bezeugt (ebd. XIX 6, 3).

[137] Ähnliches geschah ja bekanntlich bei der Neugründung von Tiberias.

die am Meer gelegene, ist jedenfalls rein gewesen;[138] an der Ostseite handelte es sich gleichfalls nur um die unmittelbare Umgebung der Stadt (wie bei Cäsarea). Die Stadt selbst galt für ausländisch, deshalb wird sie in unserem Grenzverzeichnis durch Nennung der „Mauern von Akko" aus dem Gebiet Erez Israel ausgeschlossen.

5. Tos. Ahilot XVIII 14 (617.11 ff.) ההולך מעכו לכזיב, מימינו למזרח הדרך טהורה משום ארץ העמים ... משמאל למערב הדרך טמאה משום ארץ העמים ... עד כזיב; ר' ישמעאל בר' יוסי אומר בשם אביו עד לבלאבן.[139]

Das rechts (östlich) von der Akko-Kezib-Straße sich erstreckende Gebiet ist rein (palästinensisch), das westliche ist aber ausländisch. R. Ismaël überliefert im Namen seines Vaters, das gleiche gelte nicht nur bis *Kezib* (*Ekdippa*), sondern noch etwas nördlicher bis *Lablaban*, der Nordspitze des *Rās el Abjaḍ*, bzw. bis *Lebbūna* unweit von *Wādi Ḥamūl*.

Unser Grenzverzeichnis vertritt hier einen anderen Standpunkt. Nach Akko folgt in ihm *Gʿatūn südlich* vom Nahr Mefschuḥ (5—6) oder כברתא (heute *Kabarsa*), gleichfalls südlich vom genannten Bache, aber auf der *Westseite* der Akko-Kezib-Straße.[140] Ferner beweist unser Verzeichnis, daß weder Kezib noch aber Lablaban zum Lande Israel gerechnet wurde. *Die Angaben des Verzeichnisses weisen also auf eine dem R. Josse (Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts) vorangehende Zeit hin, da der Küstenstrich im Norden noch nicht stark von Juden besiedelt war.*

6. Den mit dem Grenzverzeichnis übereinstimmenden Standpunkt nimmt ein die Tosefta Schewiit IV 6 (vgl. den fehlerhaften Text in T. Ḥalla II 6): איזו היא ארץ ישראל? – מנהר [ל]דרומה של אכזיב ואילך וכו'.[141] Demnach erstreckt sich Erez Israel bis zum *südlich* von Akzib (= Kezib) fließenden Fluß; dieser ist der Nahr Mefschuḥ, an dem wir die oben bezeichneten Grenzpunkte fanden.

Dies war die ältere Ansicht. Die jüngere, wonach das Land bis Kezib sich erstreckt, läßt sich genauer datieren; sie stammt von

[138] Vgl. M. Oholot XVIII 6: המהלך בארץ העמים ... בים ובשונית שהור.

[139] Die Lesarten wurden in meiner *Die Küstenstraße Palästinas* S. 10 ff. besprochen. Ebendort auch die Identifikationen.

[140] Die obige Barajta gibt freilich auch zu, daß es auch auf der Westseite einige jüdische Punkte gebe (משמאלו טמאה ... עד שתיודע לך שהיא חייבת), aber dort gilt als Nordgrenze Kezib, während im Grenzverzeichnis der Nahr Mefschuḥ als solche betrachtet wird.

[141] Zum Text s. ידיעות המכון לחקר היהדות (Jerusalem) I, 72 Anm. 2.

Rabban Gamliel II (etwa 100),[142] obschon sie auf eine alte historische Tatsache zurückzuführen ist. Der Hasmonäer Simon war nämlich Strateg der Meeresküste von der tyrischen Leiter bis zur Grenze Ägyptens, d. h. etwa 3 r. Meilen nördlich von Ekdippa bis zum Bache Mizrajims.[143] Die Meeresküste innerhalb der genannten Grenzpunkte war also mit Ausnahme der heidnischen Städte Askalon, Cäsarea, Dor, Akko, in gewissem Sinne jüdisch. Unser Verzeichnis berücksichtigt mehr die tatsächlichen Verhältnisse und ist jedenfalls älter als die Halacha (oder Theorie) Rabban Gamliels und R. Josses. Aus anderweitigen Stellen läßt sich tatsächlich nachweisen, daß die Küstenstädte erst nach 70 eine größere jüdische Bevölkerung erhielten und daß Rabban Gamliel es war, der den dortigen Gemeinden seine besondere Aufmerksamkeit zuwandte.[144]

7. j. Demaj II 1 sagt der Amora R. Jona, das Land vom „Hahnenbild Cäsarea Philippis" und höher sei ausländisch אבל מתרנגול קסריון ולמטן בארץ ישראל, das unter ihm (d. h. südlich) gelegene Land sei wie Erez Israel. Dies stimmt mit der Angabe unseres Grenzverzeichnisses (22) überein und dürfte ihm entnommen sein. Es darf wohl darauf hingewiesen werden, daß der Amora von dem unterhalb Cäsareas gelegenen Land sagt, es sei כארץ ישראל „wie" E. J. — ein Ausdruck, der darauf hinzuweisen scheint, daß jene Landschaft ursprünglich doch nicht zum Lande Israel gehörte. Wann sie an Palästina geschlagen wurde, wird zu bestimmen sein (s. Abschnitt VII).

8. j. Schewiit VI 1 (36c unten): Priester befragten R. Johanan bezüglich der Strecke von *Nave*. Er gab ihnen im Namen R. Ḥunjas aus Bet-Ḥawran zur Antwort: Die Priester pflegen zu gehen bis דרי — und auf der Strecke von *Bosra* bis zum Pardes.[145] Der

142 M. Ḥalla IV 8: רבן גמליאל אומר: שלש ארצות לחלה. (1) מארץ ישראל ועד כויב הלה אחת; (2) מכויב ועד הנהר ועד אמנה שתי חלות...; (3) מן הנהר ועד אמנה ולפנים שתי חלות...; vgl. ebd. 7: רבן גמליאל אומר: שתי חלות בסוריא ור' אליעזר אומר חלה אחת; s. ferner M. Schewiit VI 1, wo die gleiche Einteilung zu finden ist: das jüdische Land wird also bis Kezib ausgedehnt.

143 Vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, S. 10 ff.

144 Siehe *Pal.-Stud.* I, 30 f.; *Küstenstraße*, S. 9 f.

145 כהנייא שאלון לר' יוחנן: אהן חושא (הנייא) [הנווא]; אמר להן ר' יוחנן בשם ר' חונא דברת הזורין: נהגין כהנייא מטי עד דריי; וההן הוטא דבוצרייא עד דפדיסא. Vgl. meine Ausführungen in *JQR N. S.* II, 554.

erste Ortsname entspricht Δορα der Inschriften,[146] heutigem ed-*Dūr*, etwa 35 km in der Luftlinie südöstlich Nave. Doroa gehörte noch zu Erez Israel (kommt im Grenzverzeichnis, das jedenfalls älter als R. Johanans Gewährsmann ist, nicht vor), während *Boṣra* (heute Boṣrā eskī Schām) südöstlich davon nicht mehr zum Lande gerechnet wird, da die Priester nur bis zum Prachtgarten vor der Stadt gingen. Auch das Grenzverzeichnis betrachtet den „Trachon von Zimra" nur *bis zur Grenze Bosras* als jüdisch (oben I, 26; II, 26).

9. Einen Grenzpunkt unseres Verzeichnisses, nämlich יגר חטמונה, fanden wir in der Liste der im Gebiete Naves gelegenen Ortschaften (vgl. Abschnitt IV, 6).[147]

10. Bezüglich נימרין (31) erfährt man aus zwei Angaben des j., daß dies der äußerste Grenzpunkt war, bis wohin die „Sendboten der Neumondsheiligung" gelangten. Jedenfalls gab es dort eine jüdische Siedlung.[148]

11. In der Tosefta Wien findet man gegen Ende des Verzeichnisses (38) "ועמון ומואב". Keine der anderen Rezensionen weist diese Grenzangaben auf; es handelt sich offenbar um einen Einschub, der in gewissen halachischen Texten seine Begründung findet; diese sind:

a) Der Schluß der oben sub 6 angeführten Toseftastelle lautet: ארץ מצרים [ו]סמוך לעמון ומואב, d. h. die Grenzlinie des Landes zieht sich *nahe* an Ammon und Moab (im Osten) und Ägypten (im Süden); die genannten Länder gehören naturgemäß nicht zu Erez Israel. Ursprünglich mag die Grenzangabe in der Tosefta tatsächlich so gelautet haben: סמוך לעמון ומואב. Sie wurde dann auf Grund einer anderen Stelle abgeändert.

b) M. Jadajim IV 3 wird nämlich die Frage besprochen, wie Ammon und Moab bezüglich des siebenten Jahres zu behandeln seien. Die gleiche Frage wird dort auch betreffs Ägyptens besprochen. Aus der ganzen Erörterung ergibt sich, daß es sich um eine *neue* Verordnung der zu Beginn des 2. Jahrhunderts lebenden Lehrer handelt.[149] Vorher galten die genannten Landschaften in

[146] Vgl. Thomsen, *Loca sancta* I, 56. *ZDPV* 1910, 42; mein עבר הירדן היהודי 54.
[147] Tos. Schewiit IV 9; j. Demaj II 1. Dazu *JQR* a. a. O. 554 ff.; עבר הירדן 42.
[148] j. R. h. I 4; Ketub. II 7. Dazu meine מאמרים שונים לחקירת א"י 44 Nr. 3.
[149] Ich habe die Stelle in meinem עבר הירדן 45 f. besprochen.

jeder Beziehung für Ausland. Sie waren deshalb im ursprünglichen Grenzverzeichnis *nicht* genannt. Daraus folgt, daß unser Verzeichnis älter als die genannte Mischna ist. Wohl gibt es gewisse Spuren jüdischer Niederlassungen im ammonitischen Gebiet schon aus der vorhasmonäischen Zeit;[150] auch nachher siedelten sich Juden in Ammon und Moab an, und gleich den anderen jüdischen Einwohnern des In- und Auslandes zahlten auch diese ihre Schekelsteuer regelmäßig für den Jerusalemer Tempel.[151] Doch dürfte ihre Zahl so unbedeutend gewesen sein, daß man ihre Siedlungen im ursprünglichen Grenzverzeichnis übergehen konnte. Erst zu Beginn des 2. Jahrhunderts wurde erwogen, auch diese Gebiete, bzw. Siedlungen ins Land Israel hineinzubeziehen. Diesem Standpunkt entsprechend wurde die Ergänzung עמון ומואב in der Tosefta vorgenommen. Aber aus mehreren Verhandlungen der Amoräer ist klar zu ersehen, daß sie diese Gebiete als ausländisch zu betrachten geneigt waren, obschon es öfters vorkommen durfte, daß Juden sich dort Grund und Boden erwarben.[152]

VI. Sinn und Zweck des Grenzverzeichnisses

Die im vorangehenden Abschnitt besprochenen verwandten Texte zeigen mit aller Deutlichkeit, daß die Festsetzung gewisser Grenzpunkte in der mischnischen und der talmudischen Zeit mit den Vorschriften der *Boden- und der priesterlichen Reinheitsgesetze* in engstem Zusammenhange steht. In dieser Richtung ist auch die Zweckbestimmung des großen Grenzverzeichnisses zu suchen. Dies ergibt schon der Zusammenhang, in welchem es in Tosefta und j. Talmud angeführt wird: die Traktate behandeln nämlich die Vorschriften des siebenten Jahres. Es war dringend notwendig zu bestimmen, innerhalb welcher Grenzen diese in Geltung stehen. Die alten, in Num. 34 enthaltenen biblischen Grenzangaben konnten nicht mehr ausreichen; insbesondere sind an der Küste *heidnische* Siedlungspunkte entstanden, somit konnten sie nicht zum Lande gerechnet werden. In anderen Gegenden, ins-

[150] Ebd., 1 ff.
[151] Tos. Schekalim II 3; vgl. ebd. 14.
[152] j. Schewiit VI, 36^{c} 63—36^{d} 17.

besondere im Ostjordanlande, besonders im ehemaligen Gebiete Halb-Manasses, entstanden wieder *neue jüdische* Niederlassungen, und da erhob sich die Frage: Gehören diese zum Lande, sind auf sie die Boden- und Reinheitsgesetze anwendbar? Diese Frage beantwortet unser Grenzverzeichnis, das also einen *religionsgesetzlichen*, keinesfalls aber einen politischen Zweck im Auge hat. Freilich hängen die Grenzpunkte des Landes mit der Ausdehnung der Machtsphäre des Staates aufs engste zusammen. Es muß daher auch die Frage nach der Entstehungszeit (vgl. Abschnitt VII) des Verzeichnisses gestellt werden.

Vorher aber noch ein Wort über die darin genannten Grenzpunkte im allgemeinen.

Es wurde mit Recht als fremdartig empfunden, daß an der Küste im ganzen vier Punkte genannt sind. „Es bleibt zweifelhaft" — schreibt Dalman [153] — „ob *Asdod* in das jüdische Land des Gesetzes eingeschlossen war, da von Askalon bis Cäsarea auffallenderweise alle näheren Angaben fehlen." Die gleiche Frage hätte er aber auch bezüglich aller anderen im Grenzverzeichnis *fehlenden* Küstenstädte stellen können! — Die Sache verhält sich aber so: Wir haben oben auf die Tatsache hingewiesen, daß seit dem Hasmonäer Simon der Küstenstrich als jüdisch galt; tatsächlich spricht eine in Mischna und Tosefta erhaltene Halacha vom Lande Israel, das sich von Kezib bis zum Bache Ägyptens ausdehnt.[154] Damit

[153] *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 66.

[154] Siehe oben Anm. 142 und Tos. Ḥalla Ende II (und Parallelstellen), wo נחל מצרים genannt wird.

Der Küstenstrich von Askalon südwärts bis zum Bache Ägyptens war freilich sehr schwach bewohnt. Juden durften dort nur in ganz minimaler Zahl sich aufgehalten haben, weshalb über jenes Gebiet keine Verfügung getroffen zu werden brauchte, d. h. theoretisch galt es als jüdisch, in der Praxis wurden die Boden- und Reinheitsgesetze dort nicht angewandt, weil es kaum Juden dort gab. Diesen Sachverhalt erfährt man aus j. Schewiit VI 36^{c}_{49} (Ven.): מפני מה לא נזרו על אותה הרוח שבנרדיקי... מפני שניוזה רע עד היכן... עד נחל מצרים.

Die Frage bezieht sich auf die Gegend von *Gerar* (= Gerarikè), südlich von Gaza bis zum Bache Ägyptens. Was ניוזה רע bedeutet, ist mir nicht klar. Vielleicht ist ניב = נוב „Frucht". Es sei hier die Parallelstelle nach Ber. r. ed. Theodor 702 3–5 (64, 3) angeführt: מפני מה נזרו על הניווי זה שבנרדיקי, מפני שהוא ניווי רע, ועד איכן חייבו... עד נחל מצרים.

ניווי soll nach den Kommentatoren = נוה = Wohnen bedeuten. Wenn vor נזרו nicht לא zu ergänzen ist (wie in j.), so meint die Stelle: Warum wurde be-

ist gesagt, daß von der Küste landwärts *alles* heilig sei. *Die in unserem Verzeichnis genannten vier Punkte sind eben die Ausnahmen.* Bezüglich Cäsareas und Akkos werden als Grund der Ausschließung das Vorhandensein von Gräbern auf dem Territorium dieser Städte oder in ihrer unmittelbaren Nähe angegeben. Ähnliches haben wir bezüglich Askalons erfahren, da auch dort bei der Grenzbestimmung der Stadt ein „großes Grab" genannt war (s. Abschnitt V, 1). Das gleiche darf wohl sicher mit Bezug auf Dor vermutet werden. In allen diesen wie in den übrigen Küstenstädten (etwa Gaza, Joppe, Apollonia und Ḥefā) gab es jüdische Einwohner.[155] Eben mit Rücksicht auf die Priester und manche die Reinheitsgesetze beobachtenden Laien mußte der Charakter der im Verzeichnis genannten Städte genauer festgestellt werden. Später, nachdem diese Städte (vgl. oben Abschnitt V) rein erklärt wurden, hätten sie keinen Platz mehr im Grenzverzeichnis des Landes Israel.

Was aber die übrigen, im Norden Galiläas genannten zahlreichen Orte betrifft, so sei zunächst auf die auffällige Tatsache hingewiesen, daß kein einziger der Grenzorte, außer קיסרין Cäsarea Philippi, in der an galiläischen Ortsnamen reichen talmudischen Literatur sonst erscheint.

stimmt, daß in der Gerarikè (so ist natürlich statt Geradikè zu lesen) die Bodengesetze angängig seien? Antwort: Weil das Wohnen(?) dort schlecht sei (daher ohnedies keiner sich dort niederlassen wird). Dazu paßt die weitere Frage: Wie weit ist dort die Gegend zehntpflichtig (חייבו)? — Bis zum Bache Ägyptens.

In j. wird dann mit Recht die Frage aufgeworfen: והרי עזה גיויה יתה!, ohne darauf eine Antwort zu geben. *Gaza* liegt in einer fruchtbaren Oase, ist aber heidnisch, somit sollte man es (gleich Askalon, Cäsarea, Dor und Akko) als ausländisch erklären. Es scheint aber, daß zur Zeit der Anlegung unseres Verzeichnisses keine Juden dort wohnten. Auch später dürfte die jüdische Bevölkerung eine minimale gewesen sein.

Zum folgenden Satz in j. סישפשה וכו׳ vgl. meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* 1920, 186 f. und dagegen Epstein, ebd. 1921, 90.

[155] Vgl. die zahlreichen jüdischen Grabinschriften aus *Joppe* in meinem *Jüd. Pal. Corp. Inscr.*, S. 36 ff.; ebd., S. 51 (Nr. 157) aus *Apollonia*; S. 52 aus *Gaza*; S. 54 aus *Jabne*; S. 99 (Nr. 181): *Cäsarea*; dazu noch zwei neue im Sammelband ציון (Jerusalem 5686) I, 18 ff. — Alt hat *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1922/23 S. 102 Anm. 2 noch je zwei Inschriften aus *Cäsarea* und aus *Ḥēfa* nachgewiesen. Aus *Askalon* stammt die völlig undeutliche Grabinschrift Nr. 180 (Ergänzungen), die aber einer späteren Zeit angehören mag; aus *Asdod* die Synagogeninschrift Nr. 15 (S. 85).

Nun erfährt man in betreff auf Cäsarea Philippi, daß dieses bis zu einem Hahnenbild palästinisch, nördlich davon ausländisch sei. Diese Stadt lag also hart an der Grenze des jüdischen Gebietes, ja, es galt nur zum Teil als jüdisch. Ähnlich muß es sich mit den übrigen galiläischen Ortschaften verhalten, die unser Verzeichnis nennt: sie sind hart an der Grenze Palästinas, d. h. an der galiläisch-syrischen Grenze gelegene Orte, die aber jedenfalls jüdische oder neben der heidnischen auch jüdische Bewohnerschaft hatten. Südlich von der Grenzlinie galt der Boden als jüdisch, nördlich davon als heidnisch. Dies hatte besondere Bedeutung für die Beobachtung der Bodengesetze auf den an der Grenze gelegenen Feldern. Daher werden an einer Stelle unseres Verzeichnisses (I, 11) die „Ackergrenzen" (מיצריא) von ʿAjta genannt.

Man kennt diese an der Grenze Palästinas, bzw. Syriens gelegenen Orte aus verschiedenen halachischen Bestimmungen und einigen agadischen Sätzen:

1. Kauft einer ein Feld in Syrien in unmittelbarer Nähe Palästinas, das Feld kann jedoch von Palästina aus in Reinheit erreicht werden (d. h. zwischen dem palästinischen und dem syrischen Boden ist keine Trennung vorhanden), so ist das Feld rein und die Bestimmungen der Zehnt- und der Bodengesetze des siebenten Jahres sind dort angängig.[156]

2. Palästinische Städte in der unmittelbaren Nähe der Grenze erhalten besondere Wächter (im siebenten Jahr), damit die Heiden nicht eindringen und die (ohnedies spärlichen Früchte) des Brachjahres plündern.[157]

3. Ist die Mauer einer an der Grenze gelegenen Stadt eingestürzt, so darf sie an Halbfeiertagen regelrecht wiederhergestellt werden (obwohl sonst derartige Arbeiten an Halbfeiertagen verboten sind).[158]

4. In der Tosefta[159] findet man eine Kontroverse zwischen R. Josse und R. Eleazar bezüglich der „Grenzen von Erez Israel

[156] M. Oholot XVIII 7: הקונה שדה בסוריא סמוכה לארץ ישראל וכו׳.

[157] Tos. Schewiit IV 7: עיירות א״י סמוכות לספר מוסיפין עליהן שומר, כדי שלא יפוצו גוים ויבוזו פירות שביעית.

[158] Tos. Moëd K. I 7: חומת העיר שנפרצה ... אם היתה סמוכה לספר מותרה ובונה כדרכו. — Nr. 3a s. im Nachtrag.

[159] Tos. Maass. sch. II 15; Baba K. VIII 19: ר׳ יוסי אומר: תחומי א״י שבכתובין נדונין כחוצה לארץ; ר׳ אלעזר א׳ נדונין כא״י.

in den [heiligen] Schriften". Nach ersterem werden sie als Ausland, nach letzterem als Inland beurteilt. — Die ausdrückliche Betonung der Grenzen „in den *Schriften*" weist darauf hin, daß den beiden um die Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts lebenden Lehrern ein Grenzverzeichnis außer jenem (oder jenen) in den heiligen Schriften enthaltenen bekannt gewesen ist. Wie die dort genannten Grenzpunkte zu beurteilen seien, sagen sie jedoch nicht.

5. In einer anonymen Aggada[160] wird das Wort משכנותיך „deine Wohnstätten" in Psalm 43.3 auf die „Grenzgebiete von Erez Israel" angewandt und hinzugefügt: diese seien ebenso heilig wie Erez Israel selbst. Obwohl Mose und Ahron das Volk nur in jene Grenzgebiete geführt hatten, gilt dies so, als hätten sie es in das Innere des Landes gebracht. — Diese Aggada vertritt offenbar die Ansicht, daß sowohl die in der Bibel, als auch jene in der Traditionsliteratur genannten Grenzpunkte als Inland zu beurteilen sind.

6. R. Josse b. Ḥanina meint, die im Buche Josua genannten Ortschaften seien jene, die an der Grenze der Stammgebiete lagen.[161] Auch daraus ist zu schließen, daß die Grenzorte als zu Erez Israel gehörig zu beurteilen sind.

Für unsere Frage ergibt sich aus diesen Stellen, daß die im großen Grenzverzeichnis genannten galiläischen Orte hart an der Grenze lagen, aber als zum Territorium des Landes gehörig betrachtet wurden.

Aus der Reihe der auf Cäsarea Philippi folgenden Grenzpunkte sind mehrere auch aus anderen Stellen der Traditionsliteratur bekannt. Wie wir sahen, handelt es sich um die Trachonen und den Ḥauran, — solche Landschaften, die auf Grund biblischer Angaben, da sie im ehemaligen Gebiet Manasses lagen, sicher zu Erez Israel gerechnet werden durften.

VII. Die Entstehungszeit des Grenzverzeichnisses

Auf Grund obiger Untersuchungen steht jedenfalls fest, daß unser Grenzverzeichnis frühere Verhältnisse als die Aussprüche der Lehrer des 2. Jahrhunderts widerspiegelt. Wann wurde es angelegt?

[160] Pesikta r. c. 15 (69ᵇ): אלו סָפְרֵי א״י שהן קדושים כא״י ... משכנותיך: הרי קדשך.

[161] j. Meg. I 1 (Z. 15 v. u.): הספוכות לספר מנה. Vgl. noch zur Sache Krauss, *Heatid* III, 41f.

Schon bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung des Verzeichnisses muß es auffallen, daß darin besonders viele Grenzpunkte im *Norden und Nordosten des galiläischen Gebietes* erscheinen. Diese Punkte führen aber über jene Grenzen Galiläas hinaus, die man aus den Angaben des Josephus als die offiziellen Grenzen der Landschaft in den letzten Jahren des jüdischen Staates kennt.[162] Solche unzweifelhaft außerhalb jener Grenzen gelegenen Punkte sind Jatir (13), Ulschata (II b, 20) Ijjon (21), Sefinta (20); ferner die in Ituräa festgestellten Festungen des Soëmus und des Zenodorus (18; II, 21—22; s. S. 25 ff.).

Nicht minder überraschend sind aber die zahlreichen Grenzpunkte in den *Trachonen* und im *Ḥauran* (von 23 bis 32).

Wann wurden diese und jene syrisch-ituräischen Gebiete zum Lande Israel gerechnet, bzw. wann wurden sie von Juden in solchem Maße besiedelt, daß sie als jüdisch angesehen werden konnten?

Die Antwort kann hierauf auf Grund sicherer historischer Berichte gegeben werden.

Im Jahre 23 erhielt Herodes vom Kaiser Augustus die Gebiete von *Trachon*, *Auranitis*, *Batanäa* und die von räuberischen Stämmen bewohnte Landschaft östlich vom Genezarethsee. Er siedelte besonders in Batanäa viele Juden an, die die Landschaft vor den Räubern schützten und dadurch eine zahlreiche jüdische Bewohnerschaft dorthin lockten.[163] Auch im *Ḥauran* entstanden jüdische Siedlungspunkte um die Wende des 1. Jahrhunderts, wie wir dies oben (Abschnitt I, 28) feststellen konnten.

Eine andere wichtige Gebietserweiterung des herodeanischen Reiches war die im Jahre 20 erfolgte Schenkung der früher dem *Ituräer* Zenodorus gehörenden Landschaften *Ulatha* und *Panias* und des umliegenden Gebietes nördlich und nordöstlich vom Genezarethsee.[164] Nach Herodes' Tod gehörten die gleichen Landschaften im Osten und Norden dem Tetrarchen Philippus. Es werden als seine Gebiete genannt: *Batanäa*, *Trachonitis*, *Auranitis*,

[162] Bellum j. III 3, 1: der nördlichste Grenzpunkt ist Θελλα beim Ḥulesee, heute *Et-Tlel*. Siehe dazu Goldhar, ארמת קדש 258; Dalman, *Orte und Wege*[3], 210; meine *Pal.-Stud.* IV Anhang III.

[163] Ant. XV 10, 1; Bellum j. I 20, 4. Siehe hierüber mein עבר הירדן 17 ff.

[164] Ant. XV 10, 3; Bellum j. I 20, 4; vgl. Schürer I[4], 369.

Gaulanitis, *Panias* und *Ituräa*.[165] An einer Stelle nennt Josephus jenes Gebiet, das früher dem Ituräer Zeno[dorus] gehörte, jetzt aber im Besitze Philippus' war, bis *Ina*.[166] Gemeint ist das heutige *Hīne* südwestlich von Damaskus. Derselbe Ort erscheint als [ב]יתינה zusammen mit noch einem Orte: אימה [ב]יתין (heute *Bēt Imā*) an einer Stelle der Tosefta als Beispiel für solche Städte, die im Gebiete Erez Israel „verschlungen" sind, wo Juden mit Heiden zusammen wohnen und ihre Felder gemeinschaftlich bearbeiten.[167]

Die Ansiedlung jüdischer Kolonisten in diesen nördlich vom eigentlichen Galiläa gelegenen und in den trachonitisch-ḥauranitischen Gegenden erheischte die religionsgesetzliche Regelung der neuangeschlossenen Gebiete mit Bezug auf die Bodenabgaben und die Vorschriften des Erlaßjahres, was wahrscheinlich in die Kompetenz des großen Bet-din in Jerusalem gehörte. Dies mußte naturgemäß sofort nach Gründung der neuen Siedlungen geschehen. Einige der hierauf bezüglichen Halachas haben wir schon oben kennengelernt. — Auf Grund obiger Darlegungen *stehe ich nicht an, die Anlegung des großen Grenzverzeichnisses in der Regierungszeit Herodes', und zwar um das Jahr 20 v. Chr., anzusetzen.*

Das ursprüngliche Verzeichnis konnte natürlich nur die zur Zeit des Herodes besiedelten Grenzorte enthalten; später wurde es mit dem Wachsen der jüdischen Bevölkerung in den Grenzgebieten um die Namen der neuen Siedlungen erweitert. Ein solcher später hinzugefügter Ortsname ist z. B. der von Cäsarea Philippi, da diese früher Panias genannte Stadt, wie der Name zeigt, durch Philippus ausgebaut und benannt worden ist.

[165] Vgl. Schürer I[4], 425.

[166] Bellum j. II 6, 3. Die Korrektur Schürers a. a. O. Anm. 2 (Πανειαδα statt Ιναν) ist verfehlt.

[167] Tos. Kilajim II 16 = j. Orla Ende;63 [b] (vgl. *Pal.-Stud.* IV, 55 f.): אין עושין עם הגוי בכלאים, אבל עיירות הטובלעות בא"י כגון באינה ובאימה וחברותיה עושין עמהן בכלאים. Die „verschlungenen Städte" sind verschieden von den „nahegelegenen" Städten, über die im vorigen Abschnitt gesprochen wurde. Die עיירות הטובלעות lagen tatsächlich *in* Palästina, nur waren ihre Einwohner zumeist Nichtjuden, weshalb jene Städte in bezug auf die Bodengesetze der Thora als außerpalästinisch behandelt werden. Tos. Ahilot XVIII 4 nennt als solche Städte: סוסיתא (Hippos) und אשקלון; Tos. Gittin I 3: כפר סימאי im Gebiete Akkos. Vgl. zur Sache Gittin 4a: אמר אביי בעיירות הסמוכות לא"י ומובלעות בתחום א"י עסקינן; ferner im Nachtrag (Anm. 158a).

Demgegenüber ist zu beachten, daß in der älteren Rezension (Sifrè) der Name von *Cäsarea am Meere nicht* vorkommt, sondern der *Stratonsturm* (2) genannt ist. Dies spricht entschieden für die Anlegung des ursprünglichen Verzeichnisses *vor* dem Jahre 10, dem Jahre der Vollendung der Bauarbeiten an Stelle des alten Stratonsturmes,[168] und bestätigt unsere Ansetzung der Urkunde um 20.

Das Grenzverzeichnis ist aber im Laufe der Zeit mehrfach umgearbeitet worden. Dies zeigen die nachgewiesenen Erweiterungen, wie sie besonders in der Wiener Toseftarezension aufzufinden sind. Im Laufe der Jahrhunderte mußten ja verschiedene Änderungen in den Siedlungsverhältnissen der Grenzgebiete eingetreten sein, denen entsprechend das Verzeichnis jeweilig geändert, bzw. ergänzt wurde. Unser Verzeichnis, *wie es in der Tosefta E und j. vorliegt*, stammt nach ausdrücklicher Bezeugung des j. aus dem Lehrhause R. Ḥijjas,[169] *es zeigt somit im großen ganzen den Stand der jüdischen Grenzsiedlungen im 3. Jahrhundert.*

Eine interessante und lehrreiche Analogie bietet hierzu ein ähnliches, im Jeruschalmi mitgeteiltes Verzeichnis der im Gebiete von Tyrus gelegenen jüdischen Ortschaften. R. Ami, der im 4. Jahrhundert in Tiberias lebte, bemerkt dazu: „Dieses Verzeichnis bezieht sich auf die frühere Zeit, aber heute gibt es andere Städte, die von Juden besetzt sind und deren Bodenerträgnisse im siebenten Jahre verboten sind.“ [170]

Das *ursprüngliche* Verzeichnis in seiner Gänze herzustellen, ist heute nicht mehr möglich; doch dürfte die Sifrèrezension, als die kürzeste, dem ursprünglichen am nächsten stehen.

* * *

[168] Schürer I⁴, 372. Vgl. Neubauer, *Geogr.* 12, Anm. 1.

[169] j. Schewiit VI 1, 36ᶜ letzte Zeile: RSb Lakisch fragt R. Ḥanina bezüglich Ammon und Moab, ob das dort gekaufte Land als palästinensisch zu betrachten sei. Der Befragte antwortet darauf (36ᵈ 1): אני לא שמעתי מרי חייה הגדול אלא מפרשת אשקלון ולחוץ. R. Ḥanina weist offenbar auf unsere Barajta hin, wo die erste Angabe פרשת אשקלון lautet; ולחוץ dürfte wohl die Bedeutung „und so weiter“ haben (vgl. zur Stelle Hildesheimer p. XII f.). Diese j.-Stelle beweist übrigens, daß עמון ומואב im ursprünglichen Verzeichnis *nicht* enthalten waren, vgl. oben Abschnitt V, 11.

[170] j. Demaj II 1 (22ᵈ), Tos. Schewiit IV, 9 wird das Ortsverzeichnis mitgeteilt; dazu bemerkt R. Ammi nach dem Text der j.-Handschrift Rom, die mir in Photographie durch die Güte Prof. Epsteins (Jerusalem) vorlag: הדא דאת אמר בראשונה, אבל עכשיו יש * עיירות אחרות שהחזיקו בהם ישׂ[ראל] שהם אסורות *. (Von * bis * fehlt in dem Vulgärtext des j.)

Über das Schicksal der jüdischen Grenzler kann leider nur sehr wenig gesagt werden. Nach Philippus' Tod (34) wurden seine Gebiete zur Provinz Syrien geschlagen; aber schon drei Jahre später erhielt sie Agrippa I. von Caligula zurück, und sie verblieben aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach auch nach 70 im Besitz Agrippas II.

Die jüdische Besiedlung der nichtjüdischen, sogar mit Götzentempeln und Götzenbildern gefüllten ostjordanischen Städte wurde von den Lehrern der Mischna sehr warm befürwortet: sie sollten, soweit es nur ging, wieder einmal jüdisch werden.[171] — Weniger erfolgreich dürfte die Besiedlung der syrischen Grenzorte gewesen sein. Von den zahlreichen Grenzorten ist — wie schon oben bemerkt wurde — in der talmudischen Literatur sonst kein einziger erwähnt, was dafür spricht, daß ihre Bewohner nur mit sehr schwachen Fäden mit den Juden Galiläas und ihren Lehrern verbunden waren. Immerhin muß auf die recht zahlreichen halachischen Sätze hingewiesen werden, die von diesen Grenzlern und von solchen Juden sprechen, die in Syrien Grund und Boden sich erworben haben. (Abschnitt VI.)

Nicht sämtliche im Norden genannten Orte lagen in der ehemaligen Ituräa, also im neuen Gebiet der Herodeaner. Aber auch die Grenzpunkte von 5 bis 12 unseres Verzeichnisses gehörten nicht zum eigentlichen Galiläa; sie lagen an der Grenze der Stadtgebiete von Ptolemaïs und Tyrus. Diese wie jene waren allerlei feindlichen oder kriegerischen Angriffen in hohem Maße ausgesetzt. Ihre Bewohner heißen in einer apokalyptischen Schilderung אנשי הגבול, von denen gesagt wird, daß sie in den leidvollen Tagen vor dem Erscheinen des Messias herumirren würden. Das besagt für uns, daß diese Grenzorte in einer Zeit der höchsten Not, da man die Ankunft des Messias sicher erwartete, viel gelitten hätten, zum Teil auch untergegangen seien.[172] Das mag sich auf die Zeit der hadrianischen Verfolgungen beziehen.

Im Ostjordanlande haben die jüdischen und proselytischen Siedlungen (vgl. Abschnitt I, 25) dem Christentume vorgearbeitet, d. h. die neue Religion konnte dort deshalb so rasche Erfolge er-

[171] Siehe dazu die Einleitung zu meinem עבר הירדן היהודי.

[172] Siehe die Quellen bei Klausner, הרעיון המשיחי בישראל (Jerusalem תר״פז), 285 f. Auf diese Beziehung jener Schilderung auf die „Grenzler" hat mich Immanuel Löw (brieflich) aufmerksam gemacht.

zielen (dies erkennt man an den überaus zahlreichen Kirchenruinen der Ḥaurangegend), weil dort eine Schicht jüdischer Siedler vorhanden war. Ob ein Teil dieser Siedler etwa zur Zeit der byzantinischen Religionsverfolgungen selber zum Christentum oder später zum Islam übergetreten sei — wer vermag es heute zu sagen?

* * *

Ist nun unser Grenzverzeichnis seinem Ursprung nach der Zeit des Herodes und seiner Nachkommen zuzuweisen, so gewinnt es über seinen ursprünglichen religionsgesetzlichen Zweck hinaus eine besondere Bedeutung als ein wichtiges Dokument zur Kenntnis der Besitz- und Siedlungsverhältnisse der herodeanischen Zeit.

Daß außer den trachonitischen und ḥauranischen Orten kein ostjordanischer Grenzpunkt darin genannt ist, findet seine Erklärung in dem bestimmten Zweck des Verzeichnisses: *es sollten darin die äußersten Grenzpunkte jüdischer Siedlungen in ursprünglich nichtjüdischen Gegenden angegeben werden.* Das eigentlich jüdische Ostjordanland (עבר הירדן, Peräa) brauchte und durfte also darin nicht berücksichtigt werden; dort mußten die Boden- und Priestergesetze selbstverständlich beobachtet werden. Seine Grenzen sind aus anderen Quellen bekannt; diese in das Verzeichnis aufzunehmen, war ebenso überflüssig wie jene von Judäa oder Galiläa. — Tief im Süden des Landes, gleichfalls in nichtjüdischer, edomitischer oder nabatäischer Umgebung, gab es eine jüdische Siedlung bei *Petra*, die im Verzeichnis (33) genannt ist.

Noch ein Wort über die Überschrift des Grenzverzeichnisses!

In der Tosefta lautet diese: תחום ארץ ישראל; in j. תחומי ארץ ישראל כל שהחזיקו עולי בבל; ähnlich im Sifrè: תחומ[י] ארץ ישראל ועד מקום שהחזיקו עולי בבל. Es kann nicht zweifelhaft sein, daß die kürzere Überschrift die ursprünglichere ist. Die längere weist eine Erweiterung auf, die mit Rücksicht auf die Mischna Schewiit VI 1 (vgl. Ḥalla IV 8) vorgenommen wurde. An den betreffenden Stellen wird von der Besitzergreifung (חזקה) der aus Babel Hinaufziehenden, die „von Erez Israel bis Kezib" sich erstreckte, gesprochen, ohne nähere Angaben über die Grenzen mitzuteilen.

Unser Verzeichnis wurde später als die nähere Ausführung jener kurzen Halacha angesehen, daher die erweiterte Aufschrift: בל שהחזיקו עולי בבל, die wörtlich der obigen Mischna entnommen ist.

ANHANG

Kanaans Grenzen in den palästinischen Targumim zu Num. 34*

1. Es seien hier die beiden Texte,** in parallelen Kolumnen geordnet, wiedergegeben:

ת׳ יונתן:	ת׳ ירושלמי:
(3)[1] ויהי לכון תחום דרומא מן מדברא דציני טור פרזלא על תחומי אדום ויהוי תחום דרומא מן סייפי ימא דמלחא מדינחא.	(3)[1] ויהוי לכון תחומא מדרומא ממדברא דרקם כל קביל תחומיהון דאדומאי ויהי לכון [תחום] דרומא מסייפי ימא דמלחא מן מדינחא.
(4) ויקיף לכון תחומא מן דרומא למסיקתא דעקרבים ויעבר לציני טור פרזלא ויהון מפקנוי מן דרומא לרקם ניאה ויפוק לטורית אדריא ויעיבר לקיסם.	(4) ויקיף לכון תחומא דרומיא מן מסקיותא דעקרבין ויעבר[a] בטור פרזלא ויהוי מפקנוי מדרום לרקם דניעא ויפוק דירת אדריא ויעבר לקסם[b].
(5) ויקיף תחומא מקיסם לנילוס דמצראי ויהון מפקנוי למערבא.	(5) ויקיף תחמא מן קסם לנילוס מצרים ויהון מפקנוי מערבא.

[a] So ist zu lesen statt דעבר.
[b] So ist zu lesen statt בק׳.

* Zu den targumischen Paraphrasen s. Neubauer, *La Géographie du Talmud*, 430—432; Friedmann, גבולות א״י ושוריא in Luncz' ירושלם II, 46—67. Keine dieser Arbeiten ist befriedigend. Ich selbst habe schon im Jahre 1907 in einer Abhandlung (*Magyar Zsidó Szemle* XXIV, 238—258) diese Targumim sowohl nach der textlichen, als auch nach der geographischen Seite zu beleuchten, bzw. herzustellen versucht. Daß die hier gegebene Untersuchung von der dortigen in vielen Punkten abweicht, versteht sich, nach einer zwanzigjährigen Beschäftigung mit der Materie, von selbst.

** Beide Texte nach מקראות גדולות Wilna (Rom) mit mehreren Korrekturen.

[1] Die in Klammern gesetzten Ziffern beziehen sich auf den Vers, in dessen Targum die betreffende Stelle sich findet.

ת׳ יונתן:

(6) ותחום מערבא ויהוי לכון ימא רבא אוקיינוס ותחומיה הינון מי בראשית עם מיא קדמאין דהוון בגויה אבירוי ופרכירוי[a] כרכוי ומדנתיה ניסוי ומחווי ספינתיה ואלנותיה דין יהוי לכון תחום מערביא.

(7) ודין יהוי לכון תחום צפונא מן ימא רבא תכוונון לכון לטוורום אומנום.

(8) מטוורום אומנום תכוונון לכון מעלך לאנטוכיא[b] ויהון מפקנוי דתחומא לתרי[c] צטרוי מכוונין לכרכוי דבר ועמה ולכרכוי דבר סנידורא[d] ודיוקינום [ד]ותרננולא[e] דקסרין מעלך לאבלם דקילקאי.

(9) ויפוק תחומא [לופירין] ויהון מפקנוי (ו)למציעות דרתא רבתא דממצעא בין טירת עינוותא לבין[f] דרמשק דין יהוי לכון תחום ציפונא.

(10) ותכוונון לכון לתחום מדינחא מטירת עינוותא לאפמיאם[g].

(11) וייחות תדומא מן אפמיאם[g] לדפני מן מדנח לעינוותא ויחות תחומא ויקוף לתחום ימא דנניסר ממדינחא.

(12) וייחות תחומא ליורדנא ויהוון מפקנוי לימא דמלחא. רקם[h] ניעא מן דרומא טוורום אומנום מן צפונא ימא רבא מן מערבא ימא דמלחא מן מדנחא דא תהוי לכון ארעא דישראל למצרני חזור חזור.

ת׳ ירושלמי:

(6) ותחום [מערבא] ימא רבא הוא אוקינוס נסוי ומחווי[c] וספינתא עם מיא קדמיא דאית בגויה הינון מי בראשית דין יהוי לכון תחום מערביא.

(7) ודין יהוי לכון תחום צפונא[d] מן ימא רבא תכוונון לכון לטוורום [א]מנום.

(8) מטוורום [א]מנום תכוונון לכון למעלי אנטוכייא ויהון מפקנוי [ד]תחומא לאוולם דקלקאי.

(9) ויפוק[e] תחומא לזופירין ויהון מפקנוי דירת עיינותא דין דיהוי לכון תחום ציפונא[d].

(10) ותכוונון לכון תחומא מדינחא[f] מדירת עיינותא לאפמים.

(11) ויחות תחומא מאפמים[g] לדפני מדינחא לעינותא ויחות תחומא וימטי סמיך לימא דגניסר מדינחא[h].

(12) ויחות [תחומא] לירדנא ויהוון מפקנוי ימא דמלחא דא תהי לכון ארעא לתחומהא חזור חזור.

[a] So ist zu lesen statt פרכידוי.
[b] So ist mit Targ. Jerusch. zu lesen.
[c] So ist zu lesen statt מן תרי.
[d] S. oben IV, 3.
[e] So ist zu lesen statt ות׳.
[f] So ist zu lesen statt בית.
[g] So ist zu lesen statt אפמיאה
[h] So ist zu lesen statt ריקם.

[c] So ist zu lesen statt מחדוי.
[d] So ist zu lesen statt צפוניא.
[e] So ist zu lesen statt ויפקון.
[f] So ist zu lesen statt מערביא.
[g] So ist zu lesen statt לא׳.
[h] So ist zu lesen statt מן מערבא.

ת' יונתן:

(15) תרין שבטין ופלגות שבטא קבילו אחסנתהון מעברא ליורדנא מדינחא.

(11) סמיך לגינסר[i] כרך מלכותהון (דאדומאי) [דאמראי]...

(8) ודיוקינום [ד]תרנגולא דקסרין[j]

(11) וייחות תחומא למערת פניאם וממערת פניאם יחות תחומא לטור תלנא ומטור תלנא יחות תחומא לעינן ומעינן ייחות תחומא ויסב מישרא נחלא ארנונא

(9) [ויפוק] לקרין זכותא ולגבתא דחטמונא ולביריא[k] ובית[l] סכל

(11) וייתי למדברא וציני טור פרולא מי מצותא אבלו ודמוכא אחסנות שיבט ראובן וגד ופלגות שיבט מנשה.

ת' ירושלמי:

(15) תרין שבטיא ופלגות שבטא קבילו אחסנתהון מן ירדנא דיריחו קדמאין מן מדינחא מן מישר ימא דמלחא נפק להון תחומא לכנרת כרך דמלכתהון דאמוראי ומכנרת כרך מלכותהון דאמוראי נפק להון תחומא לטור תלנא ולחמתא[i] דלבנן ומטור תלנא ומחמתא[i] דלבנן נפק להון תחומא לחובא דימ(י)ן צפון עיניותא דדמשק ומן חובא די מן צפון עיניותא דדמשק נפק להון תחומא לדיוקינום הורנגלא[j] דקיסריון די מן מדנח מערת[k] דן ומן [ד]זוקינום תורנגלא דקסריון די מן מדנח מערת[k] דן נפק להון תחומא לנהרא רבא נהרא פרת דעלוי סדר נצחני קרבוי דיי מתעברין ומן נהרא רבא נהרא פרת נפק להון תחומא לקרון זכ[ו]תא [וגבתא דחטמונא][l] כל טרכון[m] זמרא ובית מלכותא דעוג מלכא דמתנן נפיק לרפיח ולשוקמוין[n] עד דמטי ספר ימא (דמילחא) הדין הוא חולקהון דתרין שבטיא ופלגות שבטא.

i So ist zu lesen statt לגניסת.
j In der Ausgabe: ודיוקנום והרנגולא עד קסרין.
k So ist zu lesen statt ביריא, s. Abschnitt IV, 7—8.
l So ist zu lesen statt דבית.

i So ist zu lesen statt ולחומתא.
j So ist zu lesen statt טור תלנא.
k So ist zu lesen statt מעי־ב.
l So ist zu lesen statt נתרא, vgl. weiter in den Erläuterungen.
m So ist zu lesen statt טריכון.
n So ist zu lesen statt ולשוקמזוי.

Die Gegenüberstellung und Vergleichung der beiden Texte zeigt deutlich, daß im sogenannten *Targum Jeruschalmi* eine vollständige Paraphrase zu den Versen 3—12 und zu V. 15 (wo die Grenzen des *Ostjordanlandes* im Pentateuch nur kurz angedeutet sind) vorhanden ist, während *Targum* (Pseudo-)*Jonatan* nur die Paraphrase zu den Versen 3—12 ursprünglich enthielt. Es scheint aber, daß es zu der Paraphrase des V. 15 im Targum Jeruschalmi eine große Anzahl von Varianten gab, die, am Rand des Targums geschrieben, irrtümlich in verschiedene Stellen des (Pseudo-)Jonatan

Targums hineingeschoben wurden. Bei Auslösung dieser Glossen aus dem Text dieses Targums erhält man die Fragmente einer anderen Paraphrase, welche mehrere wertvolle Varianten zu Targum Jeruschalmi (V. 15) enthalten. Oben sind diese Fragmente in die parallele Kolumne des ת' יונתן aufgenommen worden.

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2. Erläuterung der Paraphrasen

Diese Targumim sind aus folgenden Bestandteilen zusammengesetzt: *a*) aus der wortgetreuen Übersetzung der betreffenden pentateuchischen Stellen, wobei aber schon einige biblische Ortsnamen durch *neuere* ersetzt wurden; *b*) aus Einschaltungen gewisser Stellen aus dem Buche Ezechiel; *c*) aus aggadischen Zusätzen, deren Quellen zumeist nachweisbar sind; *d*) aus Angaben, die dem großen tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis entnommen sind.

a) *Vers 3:* מדבר צין wird in Jer. mit מ' דרקם wiedergegeben. רקם ist sonst die targumische Übersetzung von קָדֵשׁ, das in der Wüste Zin lag, weshalb der Targumist, pars pro toto gebrauchend, für צין – רקם verwendete. — Die Paraphrase von Ps. Jon. צין = ציני טור פרזלא geht auf eine Ezechiel- und eine Mischnastelle zurück. Ezech. 47. 19 wird als *südlicher* Grenzpunkt des Landes תָּמָר genannt. Der Targumist faßte diesen Ortsnamen = „Palme" auf und dachte dabei an die ציני הר הברזל „Palmen des Eisenberges", die in Mischna Sukka III 1 genannt sind,[3] ohne zu bedenken, daß der „Eisenberg" im südlichen Moab[4] lag und mit der Wüste Zin nichts zu tun hat. — In der im Targ. Jon. zu V. (11) enthaltenen Glosse zu V. 15 wird gleichfalls צין mit ציני טור פרזלא paraphrasiert, wo natürlich gleichfalls an תמר gedacht wurde. Vgl. noch Num. 33. 36: *Jon.* Targ. צין = ציני טוור פרזלא היא רקם; dagegen 13. 21: מדברא דצין.

Vers 4 und 5: Für עקרבים des Bibeltextes bietet Targ. Jer. עקרבין, dagegen Ps. Jon. עקרבים, Var. עקרבית. Während ersteres als aramäische, bzw. hebräische Form gut begreiflich ist, dürfte es sich bei letzterem um eine Verwechslung dieses südlichen עקרבים mit einem nordjudäischen עקרבית handeln.[5] — Merkwürdigerweise

[3] Vgl. dazu Sukka 32[b], Erubin 19a.

[4] Josephus, Bellum j. IV 8, 2: τὸ Σιδηροῦν καλούμενον ὄρος.

[5] M. Maasser sch. V 2, s. dazu meine Ausführungen in *MGWJ* 1917, 144.

findet sich hier auch im Targ. *Jerusch.* die Wiedergabe von צין mit טור פרזלא, während es oben (V. 3) רקם dafür setzte — ein Beweis für die oberflächliche Arbeit der volkstümlichen, von den Talmudgelehrten nicht besonders geachteten Targumisten![6]

רקם דניעא oder ר' ניאה steht für קדש ברנע des Bibeltextes hier und an vielen anderen Stellen.

טיר(·)ת א' = דירת אדריא ist die Übersetzung von חַצַר א'; vgl. noch weiter zu V. 9.

קסם, bzw. קיסם hier und V. 5 ist die Wiedergabe von עצמון. Hildesheimer[7] und Dalman[8] denken an *El-Kuṣēme* beim östlichen Ende des Wādi el-ʿArisch in der Wüste. Während aber נחל מצרים (V. 5) sonst in den alten Übersetzungen mit dem genannten Wādi gleichgesetzt wird, geben dafür die palästinischen Targumim hier und Gen. 15. 18 den *Nil* als Grenzpunkt an. Daher glaube ich קיסם, קסם mit *Kasion* an der ägyptischen Küste unweit vom Nil gleichzusetzen.[9] Dagegen wendet Dalman ein, daß demnach die Grenze schon hier am Mittelmeer angekommen wäre, während sie doch erst beim folgenden Punkt (נחל מצרים = Nilus) erreicht werden soll. Dieser Einwand wäre berechtigt, wenn diese Targumim überall besondere Genauigkeit bezüglich der topographischen Verhältnisse an den Tag legten. Dies ist jedoch (wie wir z. B. bei ציני הר הברזל sahen) nicht der Fall. Ihnen genügt es, wenn sie — indem die Grenze des Landes bis zum Nil ausgedehnt wird — eine *bekannte* Grenzstation zwischen Petra = רקם (V. 4) und dem Nil mit einer der biblischen Stationen gleichsetzen können.

Vers 7: הד ההר des Bibeltextes wird mit (Omanus, אימנים) טוורום אמנום *Taurus Amanus* dem Amanusgebirge im Norden gleichgesetzt, und zwar auf Grund gewisser tannaitischer Sätze, die wir später (sub *c*) anführen werden. Die palästinischen Targumim setzen diesen Namen ganz sinnlos sogar an Stelle des im *Süden* gelegenen הר ההר (Num. 20. 22; 33. 37; Deut. 32. 50) — ein Vorgang, der kein gutes Zeugnis für ihre Genauigkeit stellt!

Vers 8: חמת wird hier, wie sonst, mit אנטוכיא Antiochia wiedergegeben. — Für צְדָדָה erscheint hier im Targ. Jerusch. איולם דקלקאי

[6] Vgl. Zunz, *Gottesd. Vorträge*[2], 78 Anm. c—d.
[7] *Beiträge*, S. 77 Anm. 570.
[8] *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 58 Anm. 1.
[9] *Die Küstenstraße Palästinas*, S. 2 Anm. 1.

= אבלם דק' im Pseudo-Jon., wo (nach Ezech. 47. 15 ל ב א צדדה) dem Namen מַעֲלֶה vorangestellt wird. קלקא ist natürlich *Cilicien*. Zur Gleichsetzung mit צְדָדָה kamen die Targumim infolge der wörtlichen Übersetzung dieses Namens „*seitwärts*", wobei an das seitlich von Palästina(-Syrien) gelegene *Cilicien*, bzw. seine Inseln gedacht wird. Da aber hier nur eine bestimmte *Örtlichkeit* in Betracht kommen kann, so mußte man den Grenzpunkt genauer mit אוולם דק' fixieren. Man denkt dabei gewöhnlich an Αὐλῶν Κιλίκιος „die cilicische Pforte"; [10] jedoch dürfte die Ansicht Nöldekes die einzig richtige sein, wonach א' die Insel Ελαουσα (bei arabischen Geographen أوﻻس) in der Nähe von Cilicien bezeichnet.[11] — Eine so weite Ausdehnung den palästinensischen Grenzen zu geben, entspricht einer in der talmudischen Literatur öfters vertretenen Ansicht, wonach alle von Juden bewohnten Länder in gewissem Sinne zu Palästina gehörten.[12] So sagt auch Philo,[13] Jerusalem sei die Hauptstadt nicht nur von Judäa (d. h. von Palästina), sondern von den meisten Ländern wegen der Kolonien, die es ausgesandt hat. Unter diesen Ländern nennt er dann Cilicien, ferner mehrere Inseln und Satrapien. Die jüdische Diaspora stellt in gewisser Beziehung Großpalästina dar! Vgl. noch weiter sub *c* (wo die tannaitische Grundlage von צדדה = einer „Insel" aufgezeigt wird).

Im Ps. Jon. Targ. findet sich hier ein größerer Einschub. Demnach würde צדדה „die beiden entsprechenden *Seiten*" bedeuten. Dies ist offenbar eine andere Übersetzung des Textwortes צדדה, da dieses Targum unter den „beiden entsprechenden Seiten" die im tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis genannten beiden *ituräischen* Festungen versteht, denen er noch das gleichfalls von dort bekannte „Hahnenbild von Cäsarea (Philippi)" hinzufügt (s. Abschnitt IV).

[10] Hildesheimer, Anm. 255.

[11] Jos., Ant. XVI 4, 6. Ich kenne diese Ansicht Nöldekes aus seinen handschriftlichen Glossen zu Neubauers Geographie, die mir durch die gütige Vermittlung I. Löws zur Verfügung stehen. Die Josephus-Stelle zeigt, daß die Insel den palästinensischen Juden bekannt war.

[12] Tos. Terum. II 12, T. Ḥalla II 11; j. Schewiit VI 1, j. Ḥalla IV 4; b. Gittin 8a: ר' יהודה אומר: כל שבנגד א"י הרי הוא כא"י שנ' וגבול ים והיה לכם הים הגדול וגבול, vgl. dazu Tossafot z. St.

[13] Im Briefe Agrippas an Caligula; angeführt bei Schürer III⁴, 5 f.

Vers 9: Für das biblische וְפֻרִין wird hier das ähnlich lautende זפירין verwendet, wobei an *Zephyrion* in Cilicien gedacht wird, wo eine jüdische Diasporagemeinde bestand.[14] — עיינותא (טירת) דירת ist die Übersetzung von חצר עינן (vgl. oben zu V. 4), wobei עינן als Plural aufgefaßt wurde. Über den Zusatz des Ps. Jon. Targ. siehe sub *b*.

Vers 10: Für שָׁפָם wird אפמים (אפמיאם) = *Panias* gesetzt, was durch die Metathese der Buchstaben (שפם = פמש = פמים = אפמים) erreicht wird.

Vers 11: רִבְלָה wird mit דפני wiedergegeben. Gemeint ist Δαφνη,[15] heute Tel-*Defne*, in der Nähe der Jordanquellen (bei *Panias*). Wie kam man zu dieser Gleichsetzung (die sich übrigens auch in der Vulgata findet, wo es heißt: ... descendent termini in *Ribla* contra fontem *Daphnim*)? — Im „Lande Ḥamat" gab es ein anderes רבלה (Jer. 39. 5; 52. 27), das in der Aggada mit דפני *Dafne bei Antiochia* gleichgesetzt wird.[16] Es scheint überhaupt, daß der Ortsname Dafne bei den Jordanquellen dem Umstande seine Entstehung verdankt, daß dort der Grenzpunkt *Ribla* gesucht wurde, und da das antiochische *Ribla* = *Dafne* war, so wurde dieser Name von dort an die Jordanquellen verpflanzt. Dabei mochte noch der Umstand mitgespielt haben, daß Ezech. 6. 14 für Ribla דִּבְלָה steht und dieses ein wenig mit דפני gleich klingt. — ימא דגיסר ist die ständige Wiedergabe von יַם כִּנֶּרֶת in den Targumim.

Zu Vers 12 ist nichts zu bemerken, während die Erläuterung zu Vers 15 später folgt.

b) Oben wurde schon auf einige auf *Ezech.* zurückgehende Stellen hingewiesen. Ferner sei bemerkt: Der Einschub im Ps. Jon. Targ. *V. 9*: למציעות דרתא רבתא דממצעא בין טירת עינוותא לבין דרמשק (vgl. auch V. 15 Jer. Targ.: עיינותא דד׳) geht auf Ezech. 47. 16 zurück, wo חצר התיכון und nachher אשר בין גבול דמשק, ferner חצר עינן גבול דמשק (vgl. auch 48. 1) vorkommen. — רבתא ist die eigene Zutat des Targumisten; vgl. z. B. Gen. 10. 10 בבל רבתא, wo das Appellativum im hebräischen Text nicht vorhanden ist.

[14] Sifrè Num. 5, 8; Tos. BK VI, b. 113a, j. Ab. z. II 4: Rabbi Akiba hielt sich eine Zeitlang dort auf.

[15] Bellum j. IV 1, 1.

[16] j. Schekalim VI 2; j. Sanhedr. X 6; Pesikta r. 31 (146^{b} l. Z. דפני של רבלתה). Josephus, Ant. XVII 2, 1 nennt Antiochia ἡ ἐπὶ Δάφνης.

c) *Aggadische* Zusätze sind in *Vers 6*: das große Meer, das ist der *Ozean* samt seinen Inseln (יסוי = νῆσος), Provinzen und Schiffen, auch mit den Urgewässern. Ps. Jon. Targ. ist noch ausführlicher in der Aufzählung. Da wird gesagt, die Grenzen des Ozeans seien: die Urgewässer,[17] die Luft (אבירוי = ἀήρ), welche über dem Ozean (bis zum Firmament) lagert; die Bezirke (περιχώρη), die befestigten Städte (כרכוי) der Meeresprovinzen und auch אלניתיה (dessen Bedeutung vielleicht „Küste" ist).

Diese ganze Darstellung hat eine an mehreren Stellen mitgeteilte Barajta zur Grundlage,[18] wo gesagt wird, daß jene Inseln (ניסין) im Meere, die innerhalb der vom Bache Ägyptens bis zum Breitengrad des Berges Amana (= Taurus Amanus) gezogenen Linie liegen, als zu Erez Israel gehörig angesehen werden. R. Jehuda geht noch weiter und folgert aus Num. 34. 6 (also aus der Stelle, zu der unsere Targum-Paraphrase gehört), daß alle dem Lande Israel gegenüber gelegenen Länder zu ihm gehörten. Diese letztere Ansicht macht sich der Targumist zu eigen, wobei er die einzelnen am und im Meere, d. h. dem großen Ozean gelegenen Gebiete, ja sogar die dort fahrenden Schiffe, aufführt. — Auch die Gleichsetzung von צרדה mit einer *Insel* von Cilicien (s. oben sub *a*) geht auf die Worte R. Jehudas zurück, der von den „seitwärts gelegenen Inseln", הנימין שבצדדים, spricht und meint, man müsse sich eine Linie denken von קפל(ו)ריא bis zum Okeanos im Norden und vom Bache Ägyptens bis zum Okeanos; die dazwischenliegenden Inseln gehörten alle zu Erez Israel. — Die Lage von קפלוריא ist nicht sicher bekannt.[19] Doch darf es *nicht* südlich vom Taurus Amanus gesucht werden; es dürfte eine Örtlichkeit an der cilicischen Küste sein.

[17] Vgl. Ber. r. 5, 2 (Theodor 33. 2): דרך הק״בה כל מי בראשית וצלקן בים) אוקינוס.

[18] Vgl. Anm. 12; vgl. auch *ZDPV* 1910, 221 ff.

[19] Siehe dazu Dalman, *Pal.-Jahrb.* 1924, 55, Anm. Er denkt an die Station *Cappareas* (also etwa קפריא?!) zwischen Aleppo und Epiphania (*ZDPV* 1917, 24 sub VIII). Nach dem im Text Ausgeführten muß es aber weit nördlicher gesucht werden. Es seien noch die Worte I. Löws aus einem Briefe (7. Mai 1914) angeführt: „Die einstimmige Überlieferung* schließt *caput* oder κεφαλή + ὄρος aus. Serillos קפצריא kommt angesichts der einhelligen Tradition in T, j und b nicht in Betracht."

* Hier die von Löw verzeichneten Varianten: „קפלריא La TTer II 28₄; TChall II 99 28; j Švi VI 36ᵈ₃; j Chall IV 60ᵃ₄₄. קפלוריא TChall a. O. Zuck-

d) Aus dem tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis stammen die oben Abschnitt IV behandelten Namen und einige in der Paraphrase zu *Vers 15* enthaltene Punkte, die wir im folgenden besprechen wollen.

Nach dieser Paraphrase ist der Ausgangspunkt der ostjordanischen Grenze von der „Ebene des Toten Meeres". Dies geht auf Deut. 3, 10; Jos. 13, 9, 10 zurück, wo מישור vom Targumisten als die Ebene, d. h. die *ʿAraba*, nördlich vom Toten Meer erklärt wurde. Nun heißt es weiter, von dieser Ebene habe sich die Grenze gezogen nach „*Kinneret*, der Königsstadt der Emoräer". Hier kann כנרת unmöglich richtig sein, liegt doch diese Stadt am *West*ufer des nach ihr benannten Sees (vgl. Jos. 19. 35), während es sich hier um das Gebiet der *ost*jordanischen Stämme handelt. Ferner ist zu beachten, daß im Targ. Jerusch. das biblische Kinneret überall, auch hier V. 11, mit dem später gebräuchlichen גיסר(י) wiedergegeben wird; warum sollte gerade hier der alte *biblische* Name erscheinen? — Unbegreiflich ist ferner, wieso Kinneret als eine „Königsstadt der Emoräer" bezeichnet wird, während es ja im Gebiete Naftalis lag! Das Wort bedarf offenbar der Zurechtstellung.

Als eine *emoritische Grenzstadt* wird in der Bibel יַעְזֵר genannt (Num. 21. 32; 32. 3, 35). Dafür verwenden die Targumim den Namen der Festung von *Machaerus*: מכבר oder מכוור. Die Gleichsetzung ist sicher falsch; aber das störte nicht den Targumisten, diesen Namen auch hier zu verwenden. Aus dem ursprünglichen מכבר oder מכוור kann durch einen Abschreiber sehr leicht כנרת gemacht worden sein, und da dieser Name einmal schon im Texte war, so hat daraus der Glossator, dessen Bemerkungen wir im Pseudo-Jon. Targ. zu V. 11 vor uns haben, folgerichtig גניסר gemacht.[20] Natürlich ist dort דאדימאי in דאמוראי zu ändern.

Die Grenzlinie reicht im Norden bis zum „Schneeberg", d. h. dem Ḥermon (vgl. Deut. 3. 8; Jos. 13. 11[21] und zum „*Ḥammat* im

קי׳ TTer a. O. קסלוריא Gitt. 8ª auch Ms M und כו״ם 60ª Ven; 42ª 18 Berlin, I 252 Luncz. Auch Ratner zu j. Švi p 54 aus מלאכת שלמה."

[20] Dabei mochte er auch an Deut. 3, 17 gedacht haben, wo כנרת (aber der See!) als Grenzpunkt erscheint.

[21] Ps. Jon. zu Deut. 3, 9. Hebräisch: הר השלג Sifrè Num. 131 (47ᵇ), j. Sanhedr. X 2.

Libanon". Dieses ist Ezech. 47. 16 entnommen (wo freilich der Libanon nicht erwähnt ist). — Der folgende Grenzpunkt ist „*Ḥoba*, nördlich von den Quellen von Damaskus". Die biblische Grundlage ist in Gen. 14. 15 (vgl. die Targumim dort, שְׂמֹאל = Nord), bzw. Ezech. 47. 17 (חצר עינון) zu finden. Dann folgt der dem tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis entnommene Punkt: „das Hahnenbild von Cäsarea", „das östlich von der Höhle Dans", d. h. der Grotte von Panias, liegt.

Hier folgt eine merkwürdige Angabe: „vom Hahnenbilde zieht sich die Grenze zum großen Strome Euphrat, wo die Reihe der göttlichen Kämpfe gemacht wurden." Die Stelle ist, so wie sie uns vorliegt, unverständlich. Die im Pseudo-Jon. Targ. enthaltene Glosse zu V. 11 hilft aber ein wenig weiter. — An Stelle von נהרא רבא נהרא פרת liest man dort מישרא מישר נחלא ארנונא; die Angabe bezieht sich also auf den Bach *Arnon*, wo nach Num. 21. 14 große Kämpfe stattfanden, die von der aggadischen Dichtung ganz besonders verherrlicht wurden.[22] Diese Kämpfe fanden aber ihre Schilderung schon im ספר מלחמות ה'. Die aramäische Übersetzung dieser Worte lautet ספר קרביא דה' im Targ. Jerusch. Num. 21, 14; aber ebenso richtig wäre ספר קרבוי דה'. Diese Worte glaube ich im korrupten Text unseres Targums סדר...קרבוי דה' zu erkennen, wo vielleicht statt סדר – ספר zu lesen ist. Vor קרבוי setzt dort der Targumist noch das Wort נצחני. Ursprünglich stand auch im Targ. Jerusch., wie eben diese Andeutung auf die Kämpfe am Arnon zeigt, נחלא ארנונא; erst später hat ein unwissender Abschreiber, der an Stellen, wo als äußerster Grenzpunkt des Landes der Euphrat genannt ist, denken mochte,[23] aus נחלא ארנונא – נהרא רבא נהרא פרת gemacht.

Doch weiter bleibt es schwierig, wieso der Arnon in den Zusammenhang eingefügt werden konnte? Wurden doch unmittelbar vorher *nördliche* Grenzpunkte genannt (Ḥermon, Ḥamat im Libanon, Ḥoba bei Damesek, Ēnan bei Damesek, Cäsarea Philippi), und folgen nach dem Arnon wieder eine Anzahl dem tannaitischen Verzeichnis entnommene Grenzpunkte, die der Targumist ganz richtig in die Nähe des Königreiches von Og, des Königs von

[22] Vgl. Berachot 54a/b; Raschi zu Num. 21. 14–15.
[23] Exodus 23. 31; Deut. 1. 7.

Basan (= מתנן), verlegt; wie erklärt sich dann inmitten dieser Grenzpunkte, die im Nordosten lagen, die Erwähnung des Arnon? — Ich glaube, die Lösung des Rätsels in einer mißverstandenen, bzw. schlecht gelesenen Angabe unseres tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnisses zu finden.

Wir haben oben (Abschnitt I, 29) einen Grenzpunkt נחלא דורד festgestellt. Aber wir sahen auch, daß dieser Name frühzeitig schon als נחלא דזרד, d. h. der Bach *Zered* gelesen und geschrieben wurde. Diese Lesart lag auch wohl dem Verfasser des palästinischen Targums vor. Nun wird in Num. 21. 12, also unmittelbar vor der Erwähnung der Kämpfe am Arnon, der Bach Zered genannt. Da glaubte nun der Targumist damit zugleich den Arnon verbinden, bzw. an seine Stelle setzen zu dürfen, was ihn dann weiter dazu veranlaßte, auch der dortigen Kämpfe zu gedenken.

Die weiteren Grenzpunkte, ebenso auch שוקמון, sind schon oben (Abschnitt IV) besprochen worden. Auch in der Angabe des Pseudo-Jon. Targ. (11) וייתי למדברא ist eine Angabe des tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnisses דרך הנדולה ההולכת למדבר (s. oben, Abschnitt III) verwertet worden. Hier wird noch מי מצותא, d. h. מֵי מְרִיבָה auf Grund von Ezech. 47. 19 neben תָּמָר (= ציני טור פרולא) genannt, worauf noch zwei Worte, אבלו ודמוכה, folgen. Sie sind wohl zu מֵי zu ziehen, also אבלו ודמוכה [מֵי] „Wasser der Trauer und des Todes". Gemeint ist wohl die Trauer um den Tod Ahrons, wie dies in Num. 20. 28–29 in Zusammenhang mit dem Haderwasser, V. 13 mitgeteilt wird.

Auf Grund dieser Untersuchung können wir unser Urteil bilden: Die Grenzangaben der targumischen Paraphrasen zu Num. 34 tragen nichts zur Kenntnis der Grenzen Palästinas in der biblischen Zeit bei. Die in ihnen enthaltenen Gleichsetzungen mit späteren Namen sind zumeist aggadischen Charakters. Die Zusätze zum Text des Pentateuchs sind dem Buche Ezechiel, dem tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnis und anderen tannaitischen Texten entnommen. Ihr eigentlicher Wert besteht darin, daß sie zur Feststellung mancher Angaben des tannaitischen Grenzverzeichnisses ein kritisches Hilfsmittel uns an die Hand geben.

Nachtrag

Zu Abschnitt VI, S. 41 vor 4. ist als 3a einzufügen:

Wenn Heiden an einem Sabattag an der Grenze gelegene Städte — sei auch nur mit der Absicht, Stroh oder Stoppel von dort zu nehmen — überfallen, so dürfen die jüdischen Bewohner gegen sie mit Waffen ausziehen und überhaupt den Sabbat entweihen.[158a]

158a Tos. Erub. III 3, b. 45a: באו [גוים] לעיירות הסמוכות לספר, אפילו ליטול את התבן, את הקש, יוצאין עליהן בזיין ומחללין את השבת; j. fügt hinzu (IV, 21d unten): באו לעיירות הסובלעות, אין יוצאין עליהן בזיין, אלא אם כן באו לעיפקי נפשות... Über die סובלעות s. weiter Anm. 167; zur Sache vgl. meine Ausführungen in *Jeschurun* IX, 165 ff.

Register der alten Ortsnamen.

Die mit einem * versehenen Namen sind die des Grenzverzeichnisses.
Petitzahlen weisen auf die Anmerkungen hin.
cor. = corruptela, worauf die richtige Namensform folgt.

אבלם דקלקאי 52f.
אגדור 130
בית ענת *19, s. אנר וניתא וניתא
אבלם, s. אולם
אולם (Galiläa) 21
אולם רבתא *21
אומנום, s. מזורום
אכזיב 35, s. כזיב
אמנה 142
אנטיוכיה s. Antiochia
אפמים s. Panias
ארנונא 57
ארץ ישראל = א״י* 157, 159, 160, 167, 47, 53 12
ארץ מצרים 37
אשקלון* 11, 5, 18f.
פרשת א׳ s., 167, 30f.

באימה 44
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SPUREN DES MATRIARCHATS IM JÜDISCHEN SCHRIFTTUM (SCHLUSS)

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EXKURSE

Exkurs I. Das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin.

A. DIE KINDER DER VON ESRA UND NEHEMIA AUSGESONDERTEN FRAUEN.

Wir haben im Text S. 221 (*HUCA* IV) die Ansicht erwähnt, daß diese Frauen Proselytinnen waren, mit der Bemerkung, daß diese Ansicht entschieden falsch ist. Dies soll hier ausgeführt werden.

Der Repräsentant dieser Theorie ist Graetz:[1]

„Es ist von allen Historikern übersehen worden, daß, da der Hohepriester und die Leviten usw., also die geistlichen Spitzen, solche Mischehen eingegangen sind, sie dieselben für erlaubt, selbst nach dem Gesetze der Thora erlaubt gehalten haben müssen. Sie haben also die עמי הארצות, wie sie Esra und Nehemia nannten, nicht als Götzendiener, sondern als גרים, Proselyten, betrachtet und haben damit das als gesetzlich sanktioniert, was später als selbstverständlich galt (Mischnah Kidduschin IV, 1): לויי וישראלי גירי וחרורי מותרים לבא זה בזה, daß Ehen mit Proselyten gestattet sind." Ferner *ibid.* S. 120: „Die Vertreter des Volkes und Tempels haben sich zum Hohne des Gesetzes mit Heiden verschwägert! Esra hielt es für eine entsetzliche Sünde; nach seiner Anschauung bildete der judäische oder israelitische Stamm eine ‚Heilige Nachkommenschaft' und erleide durch Vermischung mit fremden Völkerschaften, auch wenn sie das Götzentum fahren gelassen, eine Entweihung." Wozu in der Anmerkung: „Esra 9, 1 f. Man beachte den Ausdruck והתערבו זרע קדש בעמי הארצות."

[1] *Geschichte* II 3, S. 108.

Dies nimmt L. Freund[2] mit Begeisterung auf. Er meint, daß aus diesen Worten Esras „mit Recht geschlossen wird, daß die Ursache seiner Entrüstung eher in der Verletzung des nationalen Bewußtseins als in der religiösen Überzeugung zu suchen ist".

Diese Theorie kann aber schon deshalb nicht richtig sein, weil es nach ihr heißen müßte: התערבו עמי הארצות בזרע הקדש „Es vermischten sich die Völker des Landes mit dem heiligen Samen."

התערבו זרע הקדש בעמי הארצות kann nur bedeuten, daß jüdische Frauen sich an fremde Männer verheiratet haben, wie ja in der Tat beide Arten der Vermischung vorhanden waren.[3] Auch Esra 9, 14 ist allgemein von Verschwägerung mit den Völkern des Landes die Rede. Es ist also aus Esra 9, 2 für die Motive der Maßnahmen Esras nicht das allergeringste zu entnehmen. Dagegen sagt Nehemia (13, 25—27): „und beschwor sie bei Gott: Ihr sollt eure Töchter nicht ihren Söhnen geben und von ihren Töchtern keine für eure Söhne und für euch selbst nehmen. Hat nicht ihretwegen Salomo, der König von Israel, gesündigt? ... Auch ihn verführten die ausländischen Frauen zur Sünde. Und nun müssen wir von euch hören, daß ihr all dieses große Unrecht begeht, euch an unserem Gotte zu versündigen, indem ihr ausländische Weiber heimführt?"

Hier wird also ausdrücklich gesagt, daß die Entfernung der fremden Frauen aus religiösen Motiven erfolgte und daß die Frauen der Judäer ebenso ihr Heidentum behielten wie die Frauen Salomos. War etwa der Schriftgelehrte Esra mehr Nationalpolitiker als der Staatsmann Nehemia?

Diese Nehemia-Verse hat auch L. Löw[4] übersehen. Er schreibt: „Die Motivierung beider (Esras und Nehemias) stimmt nur insofern überein, als sie eine Beeinträchtigung der väterlichen Religion durch die Mischehe nicht zur Sprache bringt. Von Verleitung zu einem fremden Kultus konnte auch bei dem

[2] *Schwarz-Festschrift* S. 168.
[3] Vgl. Nehem. 13, 25.
[4] *Gesammelte Schriften* III, 149.

gänzlichen Verfalle der nichtjüdischen Kulte in Palästina zu jener Zeit keine Rede sein."

Löw meint ferner (S. 150) in bezug auf Nehemia: „Er begnügt sich mit einem Promissiveid für die Zukunft, ohne auf die Auflösung der bestehenden gemischten Ehen zu denken."

Er hat Nehemia 13, 3 übersehen: „Und als sie das Gesetz vernahmen, sonderten sie alle Frauen von Israel ab."

B. DIE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER GEONIM IM FALLE BOSTONAI.

Hammurapi § 171: „Aber auch wenn der Vater bei seinen Lebzeiten zu den Kindern, welche ihm die Magd geboren hat, ‚Meine Kinder' nicht sagt, und der Vater stirbt und die Söhne der Magd mit den Söhnen der Gattin die väterliche Habe nicht teilen — wird die Freilassung der Magd und ihrer Kinder bewirkt. Die Kinder der Gattin haben keinen Anspruch auf Sklavendienst gegen die Kinder der Magd."

Die Bestimmung im § 171 erklärt sich daraus, daß die Adoption, wenn auch nicht ausdrücklich erfolgt, doch immerhin möglich, ja wahrscheinlich ist, aber nicht sicher. Daher kann hier nicht das strikte Recht zur Anwendung kommen, sondern ein Ausgleich, ähnlich wie im talmudischen Recht: Vermögen, auf welches zwei Parteien gleichberechtigte Ansprüche haben, wird unter die Streitenden geteilt.[5] Daraus ergibt sich, daß im Falle der sicheren Nichtadoption die Kinder der Magd Vollsklaven sind. So auch im talmudischen Recht: wenn der Herr Kinder hat von s e i n e r Sklavin, so sind sie Sklaven.[6]

Um so interessanter ist es, daß in frühgaonischer Zeit, im Falle der Kinder Bostonais von seiner persischen Kriegsgefangenen (Sklavin), manche Geonim dahin entschieden, daß die Kinder der Perserin w o h l n i c h t m i t d e n l e g i t i m e n K i n d e r n B o s t o n a i s m i t e r b e n, a b e r a u c h n i c h t a l s S k l a v e n b e h a n d e l t w e r d e n d ü r f e n.[7]

[5] מטון המוטל בספק חולקין. Baba Kama 35b, 46a; Baba Mezia 2b, 6a u. a.

[6] Mechilta z. St. 76a: להביא את הרב שבא על שפחתו שילדיה עבדים (Ex. 21, 4) וילדה לו; Sifra בהר, Parascha VI, 3: ישראל שבא על שפחתו וילדה מטמו בן כותר אתה לשעבדו עבד. Vgl. auch *Responsen der Geonim Scha'are Zedek* 28b, N. 46.

[7] *Responsen der Geonim* שערי צדק 2b—3a, N. 17, 25a, N. 15: וכל כי האי לא שרו רבנן מעולם לובנינה ולא סיחש בעבד אלא תורת משוחרר עליו.

Diese Entscheidung widerspricht, wie wir sehen, der strikten Halacha in der Mechilta und im Sifra, wo ausdrücklich gesagt wird, daß man solche Mischkinder als Sklaven behandeln darf. In den anderen halachischen Quellen wird die Frage nicht berührt. In der Agada gibt es einen Anhaltspunkt dafür, daß in der alttalmudischen Zeit dieselbe Anschauung über diese Frage geherrscht hatte, wie wir sie bei den Geonim finden. Die Agada erzählt nämlich:

„Die Bewohner Kanaans kamen vor Alexander, um mit den Kindern Israels Prozeß zu führen. Palästina, sagten die Kanaanäer, war unser Besitz, und die Kinder Israels hatten es uns geraubt. Gebiha ben Pesisa, der Vertreter der Juden, antwortete: Kanaan wurde von Noah dazu verflucht, Sklave seiner Brüder zu sein; ein Sklave kann aber keinen Besitz haben, sondern alles, was er hat, gehört seinem Herrn. Ein anderes Mal kamen die Nachkommen Ismaels und die Nachkommen der Ketura vor Alexander, um mit Israel über den Besitz Palästinas Prozeß zu führen. Sie meinten: Palästina wurde Abraham für seine Nachkommen verheißen; nun sind wir Nachkommen Abrahams und haben Anspruch auf Palästina. Gebiha ben Pesisa antwortete ihnen: Die Nachkommen Ismaels und der Ketura hat Abraham bei seinen Lebzeiten abgefertigt, wie es heißt: ‚Aber den Söhnen der Kebsweiber, die Abraham hatte, gab Abraham Geschenke und ließ sie noch bei seinen Lebzeiten von seinem Sohne Isaak hinweg östlich in das Ostland ziehen.' (Gen. 25, 6)." [8]

Der Anwalt der Juden antwortete also nicht, daß die Nachkommen Hagars und Keturas den Nachkommen von Sarah, der Herrin, Sklavendienste leisten müssen.

[8] Synh. 91a: כשבאו בני אפריקא לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו לו ארץ כנען שלנו היא דכתיב (במדבר ל״ד ב׳) ארץ כנען לגבולותיה וכנען אבוהון דהכהו אינשי הוה אמר להן גביהא בן פסיכא וכו׳ אמר להן מהיכן אתם מביאים ראיה אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא ראיה אלא מן התורה שנאמר (בראשית ט׳ כ״ה) ארור כנען עבד עבדים יהיה לאחיו עבד שקנה נכסים עבד לטי נכסים לטי וכו׳ וכו׳ ושוב פעם אחת באו בני ישמעאל ובני קטורה לדון עם ישראל לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון אמרו ארץ כנען שלנו ושלכם דכתיב (בראשית כ״ה י״ב) ואלה תולדות ישמעאל בן אברהם וכתיב (שם י״ג) ואלה תולדות יצחק בן אברהם אמר להן גביהא בן פסיכא לחכמים תנו לי רשות ואלך ואדון עמהם לפני אלכסנדרוס מוקדון וכו׳ אמר להם מהיכן אתם מביאין ראיה אמרו לו מן התורה אמר להן אף אני לא אביא ראיה אלא מן התורה שנאמר (שם) ויתן אברהם את כל אשר לו ליצחק ולבני הפלגשים אשר לאברהם נתן אברהם מתנות. Vgl. Gen. r. XLI, 7. Vgl. noch oben IV. 219 Anm. 34.

Andere Geonim gingen noch weiter und meinten, es sei vorauszusetzen, daß Bostonai selbst sie freigelassen habe, so daß seine Kinder von ihr im vollen Sinne legitim seien.[9]

Maimunis scharfe Zurückweisung dieser gaonäischen Entscheidung ist, wie wir gesehen, vollkommen berechtigt, und alle Versuche der Späteren, die Geonim vor Maimuni in Schutz zu nehmen, müssen als mißlungen bezeichnet werden. In den talmudischen Quellen ist von dieser Theorie keine Spur vorhanden und sie hat den Wortlaut in Mechilta und Sifra gegen sich und auch die Auffassung der Thora, die Hagar, Bilha und Silpa Sklavinnen nennt, auch nachdem sie Abraham und Jakob übergeben wurden. Es scheint daher jener Gaon recht zu haben, der andeutet, daß die Legitimierung der Kinder Bostonais von der Perserin auf politische Einflüsse zurückzuführen sei.[10]

Für die Entscheidung des Gaon war vielleicht auch das islamitische Landesgesetz maßgebend gewesen. Im islamitischen Recht gilt nämlich folgendes: Die Sklavin, mit der der Herr Umgang hat und deren Kind er als das seinige anerkennt, wird mit dem Tode des Herrn von selber frei; aber auch schon bei seinen Lebzeiten darf sie nicht veräußert werden: sie ist eine sogenannte *umwalad*. Ihr von dem Herrn anerkanntes Kind tritt in dieselbe Rechtslage: es wird ebenfalls mit dem Tode des Herrn frei und hat die Rechte eines legitimen Kindes. Dies gilt auch von den folgenden Kindern der Sklavin, die nicht ausdrücklich anerkannt zu werden brauchen, es genügt, wenn der Herr sie nicht verleugnet.[11]

[9] *Scha'are Zedek* a. a. O. Genizah Fragments in *JQR* 1902 S. 244; Schechters *Saadyana* SS. 76, 78. Vgl. noch Alfassi und Ascheri zu Jeb. 23a, Mischneh Thora גירושין X, 19 und נחלות IV, 6.

[10] ואף אינון איתלו בשלישי ובטלבותא שהיו קרובים למלכות והוה אחי אמם מרובאנא ובתר הכין עקל כי בריה דשאהריואבא בת רב הונאי ואיפשיטא מילתא לאבשואגן ... והני מילי לא אקילו בה רבנן אלא לענין בני נשיא ואף ביד דטלבותא. *Saadyana* S. 76. Vgl. auch Tykoczinski, *Debir* I, S. 150 und zum Thema überhaupt Aptowitzer, *Die syrischen Rechtsbücher* S. 84 ff.

[11] Vgl. Kohler, *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, II VII, 1 (1914) S. 88. Ebenda 126 aus dem budhistischen Recht: „Wenn der Herr die Sklavin notzüchtigt, so wird sie entweder von selber frei oder sie kann sich um einen geringen Preis loskaufen."

Die Geonim deuten auch an, daß zur Legitimierung der Kinder Isdadwars auch der Umstand beigetragen hat, daß ihre Nachkommen sich mit vornehmen Familien verschwägert hatten, aus denen manche Exilarchen und Häupter der Lehrhäuser hervorgegangen sind.[12] Etwas Ähnliches findet man schon im Talmud, wo R. Jochanan sagt, daß er von Familien weiß, daß sie illegitim sind, er sie aber nicht namhaft machen will, weil sie mit den Großen des Geschlechtes verschwägert sind.[13]

C. DIE AGADA ZU UNSERER FRAGE.

Wir haben gesehen, daß die Halacha einstimmig das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin oder Sklavin für einen Nichtjuden, bzw. Sklaven erklärt. Wir haben auch gesehen, daß diese Anschauung in der Agada verwertet wird. Nun gibt es aber in der Agada eine Stelle, in der scheinbar eine ganz merkwürdige Anschauung über unser Thema zum Ausdruck kommt, daß nämlich das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin ein Mamser ist. Es wird nämlich erzählt: Als Rabbi Zaddok als Gefangener nach Rom gebracht wurde und eine Matrone ihm eine Sklavin zum ehelichen Umgange sandte, lehnte er ab und gab als Grund folgendes an: Was soll ich tun, ich stamme von Hohepriestern ab und möchte nicht die Zahl der Mamserim in Israel vermehren.[14] Büchler bemerkt unter Hinweis auf diese Stelle: „Auch ein Kind aus dem Umgange eines Juden mit einer Nichtjüdin wird als Mamser bezeichnet." Er bemerkt dazu: „Dieses könnte allerdings als Übertreibung gelten, da nach rabbinischem Gesetz das Kind eines Juden von einer Heidin als Heide gilt, wie es auch in der bekannten Auslegung von Lev. 18, 21 im Buche der Jubiläen 30, 10 und im Talmud von R. Ismael als an das Heidentum verloren erklärt wird, da es bei der Mutter aufwächst."

[12] *Saadyana* a. a. O. *Debir* I, SS 146, 147.

[13] אמר ר' יוחנן היכלא בידינו היא אבל טה אעשה שהרי גדולי הדור נשמעו בה Kidd. 71 a. Vgl. Jerusch. Jeb. VIII, 9a; Kidd. IV, 3 65 d.

[14] רבי צדוק היה גדול הדור כשנשבה לרומי נשלחו מטרוניתא אחת ושלחה לו שפחה אחת יפה כיון שראה אותה נתן עיניו בבותל שלא יראנה והיה יושב ושונה כל הלילה. לשחרית הלכה והקבילה אצל גבירתה אמרה לה שוה לי חמות משתתנני לאיש הזה שלחה וקראה לו. טפני טה לא עשית עם אשה זאת כדרך שיעשו בני אדם. אמר לה ומה אעשה מבהונה גדולה אני אמרתי שמא אבא עליה והרבתי ממזרים בישראל. Aboth R. Nathan, Kap. XVI. Vgl. Büchler, *Schwarz-Festschrift* S. 146.

Aber gerade dadurch wird der Ausspruch R. Zaddoks, „er möchte nicht die Zahl der Mamserim in Israel vermehren", desto unverständlicher. Es ist daher klar, daß R. Zaddok unmöglich daran denken konnte, das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin als Mamser zu bezeichnen. Dies hätte auch Büchler erkannt, wenn er nicht das Wort בישראל übersehen hätte. Der Ausspruch R. Zaddoks kann nur den Sinn haben: Das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin ist Nichtjude; wenn er dann mit einer Jüdin Kinder zeugt, so sind diese Kinder Mamserim.[15]

Exkurs II. Das Kind einer Jüdin von einem Nichtjuden.

Es gibt darüber eine Meinungsverschiedenheit, die durch Jahrhunderte sich hinzog. Nach der einen Ansicht, die im Babli rezipiert wurde, ist das Kind ein Volljude, es darf eine Jüdin heiraten.

Die Talmudstellen, die unsere Frage behandeln, sind: Mischnah Jeb. 69 b; Sifra אמור, Perek IV, 5; Babli Jeb. 16 b, 23 a, 44 b—45 b, 70 a; Kidd. 70 a, 75 b; Ab. Sara 59 a; Jerusch. Jeb. V, 15 6 c; VII, 5 8 b; Kidd. III, 14 64 d; Tosefta Kidd. V, 12; Jeb. 99 a.

Philo bezeichnet den Lästerer (Lev. 24, 10 ff.) als νόθος, d. h. als uneheliches Kind.[16] Dies sagt aber nach jüdischem Recht nichts über den Charakter des Kindes.

Über den Grund, warum ein Kind solcher Verbindung als Mamser gilt, gehen die Ansichten der alten Kommentare auseinander. Die einen erklären: das Kind richtet sich nach der Mutter, es wird ihr „nachgeworfen", wie der Terminus lautet, für sie aber war die Verbindung mit dem Nichtjuden verboten.[17] Nach anderen ist es die Berücksichtigung der Abstammung väterlicherseits, die das Kind zum Mamser macht.[18] Aber auch nach dieser Ansicht ist die Mutterseite

[15] So R. J. Emden in seinen Glossen zu Aboth R. Nathan.

[16] *De Vita Mosis*, II, § 24 (Cohn-Wendland IV, S. 245 § 192).

[17] So Raschi Kidd. 75 b; Tossafoth Jeb. 23 a v. קסבר; vgl. Toss. Kidd. 75 b v. ורבי und Or Zarua I N. 607.

[18] Sche'eltoth N. 25; vgl. העמק שאלה z. St. Anm. 6. Vgl. auch Raschi Jeb. 45 b v. כגון.

maßgebend, da nur sie das Verbot trifft. Wäre die Vaterseite ausschlaggebend, so wäre das Kind ein Nichtjude, bzw. ein Unfreier. In jedem Falle also richtet sich die Abstammung des Kindes nach der Mutter (vgl. weiter unten).

In bezug auf הולד כשר gibt es eine merkwürdige Auffassung, daß nämlich gemeint sei: Das Kind ist Nichtjude und darf, wenn es Proselyt wird, eine Jüdin heiraten.[19]

Aber הולד כשר kann unmöglich diese Bedeutung haben. In der Tat blieb diese Ansicht vereinzelt, da alle alten Autoritäten ein solches Kind als legitim ohne jegliche Einschränkung erklären.[20]

Was aus der Halacha sich ergibt, wird auch von der Geschichte bestätigt. Ein radikaler Gegner Johann Hyrkans ruft ihm zu: „Übergenug für dich die Königskrone! Überlasse das Priesterdiadem den Nachkommen Arons." Denn es war das Gerücht verbreitet, daß die Mutter Hyrkans in Modiim gefangen war.[21] Also selbst bei der Annahme, daß ein Nichtjude der natürliche Vater Hyrkans war, war dieser bloß für das Priesteramt untauglich, galt aber sonst als Volljude und sogar als regierungsfähig. Die Abstammung väterlicherseits kommt also nicht in Betracht.

Anders aber im Falle Agrippas. Er stammte väterlicherseits von Proselyten ab, daher haben ihn die radikalen Pharisäer für regierungsunfähig erklärt.[22]

Dieselbe Auffassung betreffend Mischkinder bei jüdischer Mutter finden wir schon zur Zeit Esras und Nehemias, denn nur aus ihr sind die Berichte über die Ausscheidung der fremden Frauen verständlich. Es heißt zunächst bei der Feststel-

[19] So Raschi Kidd. 68b; vgl. Toss. Kidd. 75b v. ורבי und מהרש"א z. St. So auch Raschi Jeb. 23a (wo es mit Unrecht von R. S. Lurja und R. J. Serkes gestrichen wird. Vgl. Or Zarua a. a. O).

[20] Vgl. Sche'eltoth NN. 25, 95; Hal. Gedoloth, ed. Warschau 175b (ed. Berlin S. 308), RIF Jeb. IV N. 60 und besonders Nimuke z. St. Raschi Kidd. 76a; Mischneh Thora, Issure Biah XV 3—4, Meiri Jeb. 45a, Minchath Jehuda z. Ex. 2, 12 (Daath Zekenim 29c oben), Pentateuchtossafoth (Hadar Zekenim 51c), Hizkuni und Nachmanides zu Lev. 24, 10. Wichtig ist Traktat גרים III, 7: בת ישראל שבא על בת ישראל עובד כוכבים ירון כדיני עובד כוכבים ועובד כוכבים שבא על בת ישראל ירון בדיני ישראל.

[21] Kidd. 66a; Josephus, *Antiq.* XIII 10, 5. Niese III, 204, § 291.

[22] Vgl. Text II c.

lung der Tatsachen: „Denn sie haben welche von deren Töchtern für sich und ihre Söhne zu Weibern genommen und der heilige Samen vermischte sich mit den Bewohnern des Landes" (Esra 9, 2). Es wird also festgestellt, daß jüdische Männer heidnische Frauen und heidnische Männer jüdische Frauen geheiratet haben.[23] Daher ist auch weiter (Vers 14) allgemein von der Verschwägerung mit den „Völkern der Greuel" die Rede.[24] Um so auffallender ist es, daß in dem weiteren Verlauf der Erzählung im Berichte von den Maßnahmen Esras zur Entfernung der fremden Elemente nur von den heidnischen Frauen und deren Kindern die Rede ist (10, 3): „So laßt uns jetzt feierlich geloben, alle solche Weiber und was von ihnen geboren ist, kraft der Entschließung meines Herrn und derer, die vor dem Gesetze unseres Gottes Ehrfurcht haben, fortzuschaffen, und nach dem Gesetze soll verfahren werden."[25] Wie ist es nun zu verstehen, daß von der Entfernung der männlichen Fremden mit keiner Silbe die Rede ist? Aber Esra, der hauptsächlich aus religiösen Motiven handelte, mußte das Hauptgewicht auf die Entfernung der fremden Frauen und ihrer Nachkommen legen; diese Kinder waren gesetzlich Nichtjuden, wuchsen aber unter Juden auf, sie bildeten einen Fremdkörper im Volksorganismus und trübten die Reinheit der Familie. Die fremden Männer aber, die jüdische Frauen geheiratet, kommen in dieser Beziehung nicht in Betracht. In der Regel kommen die jüdischen Frauen in die Familien ihrer heidnischen Männer, gingen dort unter und kamen für das jüdische Volk nicht mehr in Betracht. In den seltenen Fällen aber, wo die heidnischen Männer in die Familien ihrer jüdischen Frauen hineingeheiratet haben, bildeten sie in ihrer Person keine Gefahr für die Reinheit des Volkes, da sie für sich kenntlich waren; ihre Kinder aber von den jüdischen Frauen waren Juden. Durch sie war also die Reinheit des Volkes nicht bedroht. Derselben Erscheinung begegnen

[23] Vgl. Exkurs I A.

[24] ולהתחתן בעמי התועבות.

[25] Vgl. noch 10. 10, 11, 14, 17—19 und Vers 44, wo wiederum die Frauen mit ihren Kindern erwähnt werden. Im 3. Buch Esra 9, 36: „Alle diese haben fremde Frauen heimgeführt und entließen sie samt den Kindern."

wir bei Nehemia. Auch er verwirft natürlich beide Arten der Verschwägerung mit den heidnischen Völkern; das Hauptübel sieht er aber in den fremden Frauen: „Auch besuchte ich zu jener Zeit die Juden, welche Weiber aus Asdod, Ammoniterinnen und Moabiterinnen, heimgeführt haben. Deren Kinder redeten zur Hälfte asdoditisch oder entsprechend der Sprache des betreffenden Volkes und verstanden nicht, jüdisch zu reden. Und ich machte ihnen Vorwürfe und fluchte ihnen, ja, ich schlug und raufte einige von den Männern und beschwor sie bei Gott: Ihr sollt eure Töchter nicht ihren Söhnen geben und von ihren Töchtern keine für eure Söhne und euch selbst nehmen. Hat nicht ihretwegen Salomo, König von Israel, gesündigt? Unter allen den vielen Völkern gab es keinen König wie er, und also war er von seinem Gotte geliebt, daß ihn Gott zum König über ganz Israel machte! Aber auch ihn verführten die ausländischen Frauen zur Sünde. Und nun müssen wir von euch hören, daß ihr all dies große Unrecht begeht, euch an unserem Gotte zu versündigen, indem ihr ausländische Weiber heimführt." (Neh. 13, 23—27).

Nun ist aber Neh. 13, 1 besonders auffallend: „Damals wurde dem Volke aus dem Buche Moses vorgelesen, und es fand sich darin geschrieben, daß kein Ammoniter oder Moabiter jemals der Gemeinde Gottes angehören dürfe."

Aus Esra (9, 1) wissen wir, daß die Bevölkerung Judäas mit allen das Land bewohnenden Völkern verschwägert war: Kanaaniter, Hetiter, Pheresiter, Jebusiter, Ammoniter, Moabiter, Ägypter und Amoriter. Von diesen zehn Völkern wird in unserer Stelle aus der Thora Moses bloß das Verbot betreffend Ammoniter und Moabiter verlesen. Warum dies? Warum nicht auch das Verbot der Verschwägerung mit den kanaanitischen Völkern und den Ägyptern?[26] Dies kann nur daraus erklärt werden, daß es sich hier um M ä n n e r dieser Völker handelt und jene Stelle deshalb zur Vorlesung gewählt wurde, um besonders den Ammoniter Tobia, den Verwandten des Priesters Eljasib (13, 4), den Feind Nehemias und des Aufbauwerkes, zu treffen, wie in der Tat im Zusammenhang

[26] Ex. 34, 12—16; Deut. 7, 2—4.

dieser Erzählung die Vertreibung Tobias aus der Tempelkammer berichtet wird. Daher heißt es im Vers 3: „Und als sie das Gesetz vernahmen, sonderten sie alle Fremden von Israel ab." Die Fremden, aber nicht auch ihre Nachkommen?! Weil diese als Kinder jüdischer Mütter Juden waren und zum Volke gehörten. Ihre Väter aber mußten aus national-politischen Gründen entfernt werden.

Aus unseren Ausführungen ergibt sich nun die Unrichtigkeit der Theorie Geigers betreffend die Bedeutung und die Wandlung des Begriffes Mamser, die auch aus anderen Gründen unhaltbar ist.

Geiger behauptet: Mamser bedeutete ursprünglich einen Mischling aus Juden und Philistäern, dann auch allgemein ein Kind, von dessen Eltern ein Teil Nichtjude war. Später aber, als die Nationalität zurückgedrängt und die Religion alleinherrscherin wurde, besonders in der jüngeren Halacha, wurden die Fremden den Juden gleichgestellt und der Ausdruck Mamser wurde für ein Kind aus verbotener Ehe gebraucht.[27] Er führt für seine Theorie eine „alte talmudische Tradition" an, nämlich den Satz: „Das Kind, welches aus dem Umgange eines Nichtjuden oder Sklaven und einer Jüdin entspringt, ist ein Mamser."

Dies ist doppelt unrichtig. Erstens heißt es nicht „Mamser ist ein Kind eines Nichtjuden von einer Jüdin", sondern „das Kind eines Nichtjuden von einer Jüdin ist ein Mamser"; also ist Mamser der weitere Begriff, in dessen Inhalt auch der Mischling gehört, ohne aber den Begriff auszufüllen. Zweitens darf hier nicht im Sinne Geigers von einer alten Tradition gesprochen werden, da gerade R. Akiba, der nach Geiger der Repräsentant der jüngeren Halacha ist, diese Ansicht vertritt, der auch mehrere Amoräer folgen.

Geiger meint ferner, daß die Übersetzung Mamser in der Septuaginta zu Deut. 25, 3 ἐκ πόρνης daraus sich erklärt, daß die Frau, die Umgang mit einem Nichtjuden pflegt, als Buhlerin zu betrachten ist. Demnach wäre ein Mamser nur das Kind einer Jüdin von einem Nichtjuden, nicht aber auch um-

[27] *Urschrift* 52 f., 350 f.

gekehrt das Kind eines Juden von einer Nichtjüdin; wie verträgt sich das mit der Theorie Geigers, daß für die Ausschließung des Mamsers nur nationale Rücksichten maßgebend waren? Ist die heidnische Frau weniger fremd als der heidnische Mann?

Daher kann die Septuaginta nur an das Kind einer jüdischen Mutter aus verbotener Ehe denken, wie die Halacha, ohne Unterschied des Alters, es tut. Sprachlich läßt sich die Übersetzung der LXX so erklären, daß sie auf Grund des Wechsels von ר und נ, ממזר = ממון = מעם זונה = ἐκ πόρνης deutet. Daß die LXX zu Zach. 9, 6 ממזר mit ἀλλογενεῖς — Fremdstämmling übersetzt, beweist weder die Richtigkeit dieser Auffassung noch ihre allgemeine Geltung wie auch ihr Alter. Der späte griechische Übersetzer von Zach. 9, 6 hat seine Übersetzung des Ausdrucks ממזר aus dem Zusammenhang erraten, ohne erkannt zu haben, daß seine Vorlage Mamser als Schimpfname für die Philistäer gebraucht.

Die Ansicht, daß ein Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten ein Mamser ist, ist gewiß zelotischen Ursprungs und stammt frühestens aus der Zeit des ersten Zusammenstoßes zwischen Juden und Römern, also etwa aus dem Jahre 60 ante. Im rabbinischen Schrifttum erscheint als ältester Vertreter dieser Ansicht R. Zaddok, der Priester, Augenzeuge der Vernichtung des jüdischen Staates und der Zerstörung des Tempels durch die Römer, der selbst als Gefangener nach Rom geschleppt wurde.[28]

Ein wichtiger Anhaltspunkt für den zelotischen Ursprung der in Rede stehenden Ansicht ist die Tatsache, daß unter den „18 Verordnungen", die von den zelotisch gestimmten Schammaiten ausgegangen sind und für die sie die Zustimmung der Hilleliten nur durch Waffengewalt erlangen konnten, zwei den geschlechtlichen Verkehr von Juden mit Heidinnen und umgekehrt von Jüdinnen mit Heiden betreffen.[29]

[28] Vgl. Exkurs I c.

[29] Mischna Sab. I, 4; Tosefta das. I, 16—21; Babli 14b, 15a, 17b; Aboda Sara 36a—b, Jer. Sab. I, 4 3c. Das. heißt es: תלטידי ב״ש עמדו להם בלמטה והיו הורגין בתלמידי ב״ה. תני ששה מהן עלו והשאר עמדו עליהם בחרבות וברמחים. Das. 3d: בתוך שמונה עשרה אפילו גדול אינו מבטל מפני שעמדו להן בנפשותיהן.

Wichtig ist es, daß ausdrücklich als Praxis der Zeloten angegeben wird, an einem Juden, der einer Heidin beigewohnt hat, Lynchjustiz zu üben.[30] Warum aber sind die Zeloten nur im Falle des Verkehrs eines Juden mit einer Heidin so streng vorgegangen und nicht auch im umgekehrten Falle des Verkehrs einer Jüdin mit einem Heiden? Dies erklärt sich aus den Beweggründen ihres Zelotismus: nationalpolitischer und patriotischer Eifer. Das aus der Verbindung eines Juden mit einer Heidin entsprossene Kind ist Heide und wird in praxi von seiner heidnischen Mutter erzogen, es vermehrt so die Zahl der Feinde Gottes und seines Volkes. Anders aber das Kind einer Jüdin von einem Heiden. Theoretisch gilt es als Jude, wenn es auch — nach der Ansicht der Zeloten — illegitim ist, und wird faktisch als Jude erzogen. Es ist nicht von Natur Feind des Volkes, kann sogar auch für dessen Freiheit kämpfen.

Daraus erklärt sich auch die merkwürdige Erscheinung, daß in der bekannten allegorischen Deutung von Lev. 18, 19 bloß der geschlechtliche Umgang eines Juden mit einer Heidin dem Molochdienst gleichgestellt wird. Nur in diesem Falle geht das Kind dem Judentum verloren, es wird ein Feind Gottes — אויב למקום.[31]

Dagegen ist im Buche der Jubiläen (30, 7—10), wo ebenfalls diese allegorische Deutung vorkommt, von der Übergabe einer jüdischen Frau an einen heidnischen Mann die Rede. Dies wohl deshalb, um das Verbot an das Ereignis Dina-Sichem anlehnen zu können.

L. Freund verweist zur Unterstützung der Theorie Geigers auf den Fall Agrippa. Er findet eine Schwierigkeit in der Meinungsverschiedenheit zwischen Agrippa und den Weisen. „Die Schwierigkeit wird aber beseitigt, wenn man annimmt, daß zu Agrippas Zeit noch die alte Auffassung Geltung hatte, wonach der Sohn aus einer Mischehe Mamser ist. Agrippa als Abkömmling des Herodes, der im Talmud

[30] הבועל ארמית קנאים הוו סוגעים בו. Mischna Synhed. IX, 6. Vgl. dazu Lerner, *Magazin* IX, 125 Anm. 2.

[31] Mischna Megilla IV, 9; Jonathan zu Lev. 18, 21; Sifre Deut. 171; Megilla 25a; Jer. Meg. IV, 9 75c und Synhed. IX, 7 27b.

als Sklave und Fremder bezeichnet wird, müßte daher als Bastard, respektive Fremder betrachtet werden und dürfte nicht König sein. Die Weisen, bei denen damals der Sturz der Sadduzäer Begeisterung hervorgerufen hatte, dürften auch wegen Agrippa, der sich ihren Verordnungen angepaßt hatte, eine neue Bestimmung getroffen haben, wonach in Mischehen die Abstammung der Mutter ausschlaggebend sei, die auch nicht allgemeine Zustimmung fand."

Ich bedaure es, meinem Freunde Freund sagen zu müssen, daß er nichts weniger übersehen hat, als daß Agrippa von den — unter Johann Hyrkan bekehrten — Idumäern stammte, die nach der biblischen Vorschrift (Deut. 23, 8) schon im dritten Geschlecht zur Ehe mit Juden zugelassen sind. Agrippa — nach Freund sogar der zweite dieses Namens — konnte sich also unmöglich als Bastard betrachten.

Es sei hier auch noch auf die Beschneidung des Timotheus in Apostelgeschichte 16, 1—3 erinnert. Da L. Löw zuerst darauf hingewiesen hat,[32] überlasse ich ihm das Wort:

„Daher hieß auch Paulus, welcher nur gegen die Beschneidung der Heidenchristen eiferte, hingegen die Pflichtmäßigkeit derselben bei den Judenchristen anerkannte, den Timotheus als den Sohn einer jüdischen Mutter und eines heidnischen Vaters im Sinne des ihm ohne Zweifel bekannten Gesetzes beschneiden."

Der Verfasser der Apostelgeschichte gibt als Grund der Beschneidung des Timotheus an: „Wegen der Juden in jenen Gegenden, die alle wußten, daß sein Vater ein Grieche ist." Dies kann keinen anderen Sinn haben als den: Die Juden in jenen Gegenden kannten den Vater des Timotheus und konnten daher mit Recht voraussetzen, daß der Grieche seinen Sohn nicht beschneiden ließ, daher mußte ihn Paulus beschneiden.

Die Agada weicht hier, wie sonst nicht selten, von der Halacha ab. Sie gibt nämlich als Ursache des Streites, von dem Lev. 24, 10 die Rede ist, folgendes an: Der „Sohn der Israelitin, dessen Vater ein Ägypter war", wollte, da er mütterlicherseits von Dan stammte, sein Zelt im Lager Dans aufschlagen. Die Daniten ließen es nicht zu, weil — meinten sie —

[32] *Gesammelte Schriften* III, 123.

die Familien nur nach väterlicher Abstammung sich richten, so sei er als Sohn eines Ägypters selbst ein Ägypter und habe im Lager Israels nichts zu suchen. In diesem Sinne entschied auch Mose. Aus Zorn über die Abweisung lästert er den Namen Gottes.[33] Die letzte Bemerkung, er wurde Proselyt, bereitet den Kommentatoren große Schwierigkeit: warum — fragen sie — mußte er Proselyt werden, da er doch nach der rezipierten Halacha ein Israelit war? [34]

Dieser Schwierigkeit suchen R A b D. und R. Simson aus Sens zum Sifra dadurch zu entgehen, daß sie erklären, der Sifra stehe auf dem Standpunkt, daß der Sohn einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten ein Mamser sei. Dies trifft insofern zu, als der Sifra diesen Standpunkt einnimmt,[35] aber daraus ist für die Hauptfrage nichts gewonnen, denn ein Mamser ist in jeder Beziehung Jude.[36] Dann aber heißt es in der Mischna Jeb. VII, 5 und in der erwähnten Sifrastelle, daß das Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten, obwohl es Mamser ist, seiner Großmutter den Genuß der Priesterhebe ermöglicht, bzw. sie von demselben ausschließt, je nachdem sie als Nichtahronidin mit einem Ahroniden oder umgekehrt als Ahronidin mit einem Nichtahroniden verheiratet war.[37] Also ist das Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten, obwohl illegitim, das Kind seiner Mutter. Mit welchem Recht also wurde der Sohn der Israelitin und des Ägypters aus dem Lager seines Mutterstammes gewiesen?

Über diese Schwierigkeit setzten sich R A b D. und R. Simson hinweg. Daß aber ein Mamser ein Jude ist und sich nicht erst bekehren muß, konnte ihnen auch nicht für einen

[33] Sifra אמור, Parascha 14: ויצא בן האשה הישראלית מנין יצא מבית דינו של משה שבא ליטע אהלו בתוך מחנה דן אמרו לו מה טובך ליטע בתוך מחנה דן. אמר להן מבנות דן אני. אמרו לו הכתוב אומר איש על דגלו באותות לבית אבותם יחנו בני ישראל. נכנס לבית דינו של משה ויצא מחוייב ועמד וגידף, בתוך בני ישראל מלמד שנתגייר. ויצו במחנה על עסקי מחנה בן הישראלית ואיש הישראלי זה שכנגדו.

[34] Vgl. Pentateuch-Tossafoth, Hizkuni, Minchath Jehuda und Nachmanides an den oben angeführten Stellen.

[35] אמור Perek V § 4.

[36] Mischna Jeb. II, 5.

[37] ממזר פוסל ומאכיל כיצד בת ישראל לכהן וכת כהן לישראל וילדה היטנו בת והלכה הבת ונשאית לעבד או לכותי וילדה הימנו בן הרי הוא ממזר היתה אם אמו בת ישראל לכהן תאכל בתרומה. בת כהן לישראל לא תאכל בתרומה.

Augenblick entgehen. Deshalb erklären sie: Nicht der Lästerer selbst, sondern sein Vater war Proselyte. Aber diese Erklärung ist aus diesem Grunde unhaltbar, weil die Bemerkung des Sifra auf den Bibelsatz „in der Mitte der Kinder Israels" sich bezieht und offenbar erklären will, wie es kam, daß der Sohn des Ägypters sich im Lager Israels aufhielt.

R. Simson macht gegen seine eigene Erklärung den Widerspruch geltend, der sich aus ihr zu dem Midrasch[38] ergibt, daß der Lästerer der Sohn des von Mose getöteten Ägypters war. Er läßt daher seine Erklärung fallen und meint: Die Bemerkung des Sifra bezieht sich auf den Lästerer selbst, der, obwohl von Geburt Jude, deshalb Proselyt werden mußte, weil er von dem Judentum abgefallen war. Damit aber ist nicht viel erreicht, da das Proselytentum des Lästerers ebenfalls in Widerspruch steht zur Agada,[39] nach der Mose im prophetischen Schauen erkannt hatte, daß von dem Ägypter kein Proselyt abstammen wird. Aber auch die Erklärung an sich ist unannehmbar. Dies braucht nicht erst bewiesen zu werden.

Aber all die Schwierigkeiten entfallen, wenn man sich zu der Behauptung entschließt, daß die Agada im Sifra von der Halacha abweicht und das Kind einer Israelitin von einem Nichtisraeliten für einen Nichtisraeliten hält. Der Lästerer war also seiner Nationalität nach ein Ägypter. Wie kam es nun — fragt der Sifra — daß er im Lager Israels auferzogen wurde und sich dort aufhielt? Darauf die Antwort, daß er Proselyt wurde.

Diese Agada ist gewiß polemischen Charakters und ist gegen diejenigen gerichtet, die auf Grund der mütterlichen Abstammung Anspruch auf die höchsten Würden erhoben. So die Hasmonäer und andere. Doch darüber an anderer Stelle ausführlich.

Im Sifra folgt nach der Angabe betreffend die Ursache des Streites folgende Bemerkung: Wiewohl es zu jener Zeit

[38] Lev. r. XXXII, 3; Tan. אמור § 24 (ed. Buber § 32). Vgl. noch Tan. שמות § 9 und Ex. r. I, 28.

[39] Mid. Ps. XXIV § 7; Mid. Abchir in Jalkut Ex. § 167; Jonathan, Fragmententargum und Raschi zu Ex. 2, 12. Vgl. noch Ex. r. I, 29.

keine ממזרים gegeben hat, so war er (der Lästerer) gleichsam ein ממזר.[40] Der Sinn der Meinungsverschiedenheit ist folgender: Wiewohl — sagen die Gelehrten — es zu jener Zeit, das ist vor der sinaitischen Gesetzgebung, keine Mamserim im eigentlichen Sinne gab, so war doch der im Ehebruch gezeugte Lästerer gleichsam ein Mamser, da Israel sich in Ägypten aus eigenem von Unzucht fernhielt — wie es die Agada so oft betont.[41] R. Levi hingegen meint, daß der Lästerer ein eigentlicher Mamser war, da Ehebruch auch den Noachiden verboten war.[42]

Exkurs III. Agrippa.

Im Jeruschalmi Sotah z. St., 22 a, wird von R. Hananja ben Gamliel überliefert, daß an dem Tage, an dem die Juden dem Agrippa geschmeichelt haben, es viele Erschlagene gegeben: תני ר' חנניה בן גמליאל אומר הרבה חללים נפלו באותו יום שהחניפו לו. Daraus hat schon Derenbourg[43] geschlossen, daß die Erzählung der Mischna Sotah VII, 8 sich auf Agrippa II. bezieht:

« Ceci paraît se rapporter à Agrippa II, sous lequel les luttes entre les Juifs et les Romains ne cessaient guère tandis que rien de semblable n'eut lieu sous Agrippa I^er^. »

Dies führt Brann[44] folgendermaßen aus:

„Der Bericht ist sicher historisch.... Von den übrigen (d. h. nichttalmudischen) Quellen haben wir aber gar keine Andeutung für einen Aufstand, der in dieser Zeit, und besonders im Jahre 41, stattgefunden hätte und in welchem viele Opfer gefallen wären.“[45]

Aber über einen am Tage der Thoravorlesung durch Agrippa II. im Jahre 63 aus Anlaß des heuchlerischen Zurufes an den Vortragenden stattgefundenen Aufstand ist in

[40] אף על פי שלא היו ממזרים באותה שעה הוא היה ממזר. Dasselbe in Lev. r. XXXII, 4, wo hinzugefügt wird: Nach der Ansicht des R. Levi war er ein wirklicher ממזר: ר' לוי אומר ממזר ברור היה. Vgl. noch Tan. אמור § 24 (ed. Buber § 32).

[41] Vgl. z. B. Mechilta בא V und Parallelen.

[42] Vgl. Synhed. 56b, u. a.

[43] *Essai* S. 217.

[44] *Monatsschrift* 1870 S. 542 f.

[45] Diesen Beweis betont auch Büchler, *Die Priester und der Cultus im letzten Jahrzehnt des jerusalemischen Tempels* S. 12 f.

den nichttalmudischen Quellen ebenfalls keine Andeutung vorhanden. Die Nachricht im Jerusch. ist also entweder historisch trotz des Schweigens der nichttalmudischen Quellen — dann kann sie auch auf Agrippa I. bezogen werden, oder sie ist nicht historisch — dann sagt sie auch nichts für Agrippa II. Hat aber der Berichterstatter die Aufstände gegen die Römer als Strafe für die Heuchelei gegen Agrippa erklärt, dann ist ja seine Nachricht historisch völlig wertlos. Ein so unzuverlässiger Chronist kann auch leicht Agrippa I. mit Agrippa II. verwechselt haben.

Man hat aber gar nicht das Recht, R. Chananja b. Gamliel den Unsinn zuzumuten: Weil die Pharisäer dem Agrippa geschmeichelt haben, haben die Juden einen Aufstand gegen die Römer hervorgerufen. In der Nachricht des Jerusch. handelt es sich gewiß nicht um einen „Aufstand", sondern bloß um eine Schlägerei zwischen strengen und gemäßigten Pharisäern, indem die Zeloten die alte gesetzmäßige Auffassung von der Regierungsunfähigkeit der Idumäer trotz ihrer mütterlich-jüdischen Abstammung mit schlagenden Beweisen verteidigten — wie die Schammaiten bei den „18 Verordnungen" und die Pharisäer bei dem Versuch der Sadduzäer, das Connubium mit moabitischen Proselytinnen als unzulässig zu erklären.[46]

Brann macht überhaupt große Anstrengungen, den Bericht über die Vorlesung des Königsabschnittes und auch andere talmudische Nachrichten betreffend Agrippa auf den zweiten Träger dieses Namens zu beziehen, und gelangt dadurch zu sehr merkwürdigen Theorien. So bemerkt er am Schlusse seiner Ausführung:

„Schließlich war Agrippa beim Volke verhaßt, weil er nur den Römern diente, nach ihrem Wunsche und dem Meistgebot die hohepriesterliche Würde vergab, weil er ein durchaus sittlich schlechter und verkommener Mensch war. Daraus erklärt sich leicht, daß die talmudischen Weisen über das vom Volke gemachte Zugeständnis im höchsten Grade erbittert

[46] Vgl. oben Exkurs II.

waren und in dem bald darauf folgenden unglücklichen Ereignis das Werk der strafenden Vorsehung erblickten."[47]

Also: die Zeitgenossen Agrippas II., die ihn als sittlich verworfenen römischen Spion und Schergen haßten, die seine ganze Niedrigkeit und Gemeinheit unmittelbar erfahren haben, haben den Verräter als Bruder begrüßt, während die talmudischen Weisen etwa hundert Jahre später jene Begrüßung scharf tadelten. Das ist ein Zuviel des Sonderbaren.

Büchler, a. a. O. S. 14, führt für Agrippa II. ein viel schwereres Geschütz auf, nämlich die Tosefta Sota VII, 16, in der gesagt sein soll:

„daß Agrippa am selben Tage den Thoraabschnitt vortrug, an welchem R. Tarfon den lahmen Priester die Trompete blasen sah. Da R. Tarfon zur Zeit der Zerstörung des Tempels ein junger Priester war, ist es ausgeschlossen, daß er im Jahre 41 unter Agrippa I. seinen Onkel in der Festversammlung soll fungieren gesehen haben, so daß es unzweifelhaft wird, daß einzig und allein Agrippa II. im Jahre 62/63 gemeint sein kann."

Diesen Beweis sucht A. Epstein[48] dadurch zu entkräften, daß er meint, die Tosefta wolle nicht sagen, daß alle drei Ereignisse an einem und demselben Tage erfolgten, sondern bei einer und derselben periodisch wiederkehrenden Gelegenheit, aber in verschiedenen Zeiten. Dies sagt nicht viel. Es ist bloß Behauptung gegen Behauptung. Wichtiger ist, daß Büchler den Toseftatext ungenau zitiert. In allen Ausgaben heißt es משום רבי נתן אמרו, so auch B. Sota 41 b; der Satz bezieht sich auf den Bericht über die Thoravorlesung Agrippas in der Mischna und hat mit der Erzählung R. Tarfons nicht das allergeringste zu tun.[49]

In der Tat hat Büchler in einer späteren Schrift[50] seine Meinung aufgegeben, denn er bemerkt dort: „daß die Vorschriften der Mischna über die Beteiligung des Königs an dem Gottesdienste und Opfer im Tempel und an öffentlichen

[47] Brann, a. a. O. S. 548.
[48] *Monatsschrift* 1896 S. 140 f.
[49] Vgl. noch Josef Lehman, *REJ* XXXVII (1898) S. 31.
[50] *Das Synhedrion in Jerusalem* S. 61.

Aufzügen sich gleichfalls auf einen der beiden Agrippa beziehen."

Spricht nun nichts für Agrippa II., so spricht alles gegen ihn:

1. Agrippa II. war nicht König der Juden und war daher nicht zur Thoravorlesung berechtigt. Brann a. a. O. S. 547 meint:

„Vor allem wurde Agrippa II. seit dem Jahre 49, obgleich er eigentlich nur Fürst von Chalkis war, von den Juden als König angesehen, weil er, wie bereits bemerkt, das Aufsichtsrecht über den Tempel hatte und die Ein- und Absetzung der Hohepriester von ihm abhing."

Aber das Recht auf Schacher mit dem Hohepriesteramt konnte unmöglich Agrippa II. die Geltung als König verschaffen. Das Recht auf Einsetzung der Hohepriester haben die Römer für sich und dann für ihre herodäischen Sklaven usurpiert; für die Juden aber war einzig und allein das Synhedrion befugt, Hohepriester einzusetzen.[51] Wenn also die Juden den wirklichen Königen dieses Recht absprachen, so konnten sie unmöglich einen Privatmann, der dieses Recht usurpiert hatte, eben wegen dieser Usurpation als König ansehen.

2. Es ist ausgeschlossen, daß ein Mensch von der sittlichen Verworfenheit Agrippas II., der jahrelang mit seiner Schwester in Unzucht lebte, je das Bedürfnis empfunden haben konnte, an einer religiösen Handlung teilzunehmen und bei der Wahrnehmung, daß er ein Gebot übertrete, Tränen zu vergießen.

Brann (S. 547) meint: „Um die Meinung zu verstärken und sich gleichsam einen Schein von Legitimität zu verschaffen, wird Agrippa gerade dieses Gesetz, das eine öffentliche Demonstration involvierte, strikter beobachtet haben." Aber gerade eine solche Demonstration ist bei dem feigen Knechtssinn Agrippas II. ausgeschlossen.

Es bleibt daher bei der alten, natürlichen Auffassung, daß der Bericht über den Vortrag des Königsabschnittes auf Agrippa I. sich beziehe. Dasselbe gilt von allen anderen talmudischen Nachrichten, in denen von Agrippa ein religiöser oder sonst vornehmer Zug mitgeteilt wird.

[51] Tosefta Synhed. III, 4.

Exkurs IV. Kaufehe im alten Israel.[52]

Für den Bestand der Kaufehe in Altisrael ist besonders die Arbeit Jakobs um Rahel und Lea (Gen. 29, 18, 27) wichtig. Es ist dies ein alter Brauch in der Kaufehe: das Erdienen der Ehe. Wenn der Bräutigam den Kaufpreis nicht bezahlt, leistet er ihn in Arbeit ab.

Wir finden das Erdienen der Ehe auch bei Mose. Daß er einen Kaufpreis für Zipporah bezahlte, wird nicht erwähnt (Ex. 2, 20), dafür hütete er aber nach der Ehe die Schafe seines Schwiegervaters (Ex. 3, 1). Dieselbe Arbeit, wie Jakob bei Laban.

In der Kaufehe galten aber folgende Bestimmungen:

1. Wird der Kaufpreis vor der Ehe gezahlt oder durch Arbeit geleistet, geht die Frau in den Besitz des Mannes über, sie wird sein Eigentum; die Kinder aus dieser Ehe gehören ihm.

2. Wird aber kein Frauenpreis bezahlt, dann wird der Mann zum Knechte in der Familie der Frau und hat ihr zu dienen, nicht nur, indem er die Kinder zeugt, sondern indem er sonst für die Schwiegereltern und Schwäger Arbeit verrichtet.

3. Wird aber der Kaufpreis nach der Ehe gezahlt oder durch Arbeit abgetragen, so geht zwar die Frau in den Besitz des Mannes über und er wird Herr der Familie, jedoch verbleibt ein Teil der Kinder bei der Familie der Mutter.[53]

Daraus erklärt sich die „Meinungsverschiedenheit" zwischen Jakob, Rahel und Lea einer- und Laban andererseits. Jakob hat den Kaufpreis für Lea vor der Ehe abgedient, hingegen den für Rahel erst nach der Ehe abgetragen. So hätte von rechtswegen ein Teil der Kinder Jakobs im Hause Labans verbleiben müssen. Laban aber, der in puncto Redlichkeit nicht sehr pedantisch war, dehnte dieses Recht auf alle Kinder und auch auf die Frauen und das Vermögen Jakobs aus und meint: „Mein sind die Frauen, mein sind die Kinder und mein ist das Vieh, und alles, was du hier erblickst, das ist mein"

[52] Über die Kaufehe im alten Israel vgl. besonders L. Freund, *Zur Geschichte des Ehegüterrechtes bei den Semiten* S. 20. Vgl. noch J. Neubauer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des biblisch-talmudischen Eheschließungsrechtes* SS. 8 f., 33 und 206.

[53] Vgl. Kohler, *Kultur der Gegenwart* II, VII, 1 SS. 22 f., 53 f., 132.

(Gen. 31, 43). Rahel und Lea dagegen meinten, da die Arbeit Jakobs um Rahel nur durch einen Betrug ihres Vaters erzwungen wurde, so hat Laban gar keinen Anspruch mehr an Jakob. „Haben wir etwa noch Teil und Erbe im Hause unseres Vaters? Gelten wir ihm nicht als Fremde, nachdem er uns verkauft und das Geld, das er für uns bekam, längst verzehrt hat" (Gen. 31, 14, 15).

Aus dem Brauche der Teilung der Kinder erklärt sich folgende Agada:

Auf die Frage, wie es kam, daß Mose seinen Sohn nicht beschnitten hat, antwortet die Agada: Jethro hat mit Mose einen Pakt geschlossen, daß der erstgeborene Sohn Moses von Zipporah ihm gehören soll.[54] Da Mose den Kaufpreis für Zipporah erst nach der Ehe abgetragen (Ex. 3, 1), so gehörte von rechtswegen ein Teil der Kinder der Mutterfamilie.

Aus der Kaufehe erklärt sich die Geschichte Juda-Thamar. In der Kaufehe ging die Witwe in den Nachlaß des Mannes über und wurde von seiner Familie als Nachlaßstück in Anspruch genommen.[55] Thamar fiel nach dem Tode ihres Mannes in den Besitz seines Bruders Onan und wurde nach dessen Tode für den jüngsten Sohn Judas, Sela, bestimmt. Inzwischen aber erfolgte ihr Verkehr mit Juda, und als ihre Schwangerschaft bemerkt wurde, wurde Juda berichtet: Deine Schwiegertochter Thamar hat gebuhlt und ist richtig dadurch schwanger geworden. Da gebot Juda: Führt sie hinaus, daß sie verbrannt werde! (Gen. 38, 24.) Als sich aber herausstellte, daß sie von Juda schwanger war, sprach Juda: „Sie ist in ihrem Rechte gegen mich. Warum habe ich sie auch nicht meinem Sohne Sela zum Weibe gegeben?" Dies ist nur in folgender Weise zu verstehen: Thamar, als Eigentum der Familie Judas, verfiel wegen ihres Verkehrs mit einem nicht zur Familie gehörenden Manne der Todesstrafe. Aber gegen den Verkehr mit ihrem Schwiegervater, dem Erben seiner kinderlos verstorbenen Söhne, war nichts einzuwenden.

[54] שבשעה שאמר משה ליתרו תן לי צפורה בתך לאשה אמר לו קבל עליך דבר זה שאומר לך ואני נותנה לך לאשה אמר לו טהו אמר לו בן שיהיה לך תחלה יהיה לעבודה זרה מכאן ואילך לשם שמים וקבל עליו. Mechilta יתרו I (ed. Friedmann S. 57b f.), Jonathan Ex. 4, 24.

[55] Kohler a. a. O. SS. 22, 108, 122, 134.

Das Erbrecht der Familie des Mannes an seiner Witwe wurde später von der mosaischen Gesetzgebung auf die Ehe mit dem Bruder des kinderlos Verstorbenen beschränkt.

Exkurs V. Das Erbrecht der Tochter bei den Sadduzäern.

Vgl. Poznański, *JQR* VIII, 692 Anm. und seine Bemerkung in seiner Ausgabe von Geigers *Hebräischen Aufsätzen* (קבוצת מאמרים) S. 93. Poznański stützt sich auf die Angabe Ahron b. Elias, Gan Eden 165 d. Dies beweist aber nichts, da Ahron b. Elia sich auf die Angabe B. Bathra 115 b beruft; er kann also nicht als selbständiger Zeuge geführt werden. Wichtiger ist, daß ältere Karäer auf dem Standpunkt stehen, daß die Tochter ein gleiches Erbrecht mit dem Sohne hat.[56] Dazu gehört auch die Ansicht Daniel al-Kumsis, daß die Tochter den dritten Sohnesteil erbt.[57] Der Zusammenhang aber zwischen Karäern und Sadduzäern ist, wenn auch nicht absolut sicher, so doch höchstwahrscheinlich.[58]

Gegen den Zusammenhang der Karäer mit den Sadduzäern macht Revel[59] die Tatsache geltend, daß die Karäer häufig eher mit den Pharisäern übereinstimmen als mit den Sadduzäern. Dies beweist natürlich nichts. Erstens ist Zusammenhang noch nicht Kopie, zweitens ist es Tatsache, daß die jüngeren Karäer, besonders seit Ahron b. Eliah, eine Schwenkung zum Rabbinismus vollzogen haben.

Was aber unseren speziellen Fall betrifft, können auch aus Angaben im Talmud wichtige Anhaltspunkte dafür gewonnen werden, daß in der Tat die Sadduzäer der Tochter ein gleiches Erbrecht mit dem Sohne zugesprochen haben:

1. Der von den Sadduzäern für die Gleichstellung der Tochter mit der Sohnestochter geltend gemachte axiomatische

[56] Gan Eden 165 d—166 a.

[57] Pinsker, *Likkute Kadmonioth* S. 85; Gan Eden 169 d; Baschjazzi, Adereth Eliahu 101 a.

[58] Vgl. die bekannte Theorie Geigers an zahlreichen Stellen seiner Schriften; s. Poznański in *Abraham Geiger* S. 382—386, besonders 382 Anm. 2; Harkavy zu Graetz V, 4 S. 477; Poznański, *REJ* XLIV, 176 f.; Schechter, *Jewish Sectaries* I, S. XXI. Vgl. noch Aptowitzer, *WZKM* 1910 S. 8.

[59] *JQR NS* III, 352 f.

Schluß (קל וחומר) lautet ja allgemein: Wenn die Enkelin erbt, um so mehr die Tochter. Um aber dem Einwande der Pharisäer zu entgehen, mußten die Sadduzäer entweder der Sohnestochter das Repräsentationsrecht neben den Onkeln absprechen oder der Tochter ein Erbrecht neben den Söhnen zuerkennen; daß sie den ersteren Weg eingeschlagen hätten, ist deshalb unwahrscheinlich, da sie ja eine Begünstigung der Tochter anstrebten — folglich blieb ihnen nur der zweite Ausweg: die Tochter hat ein gleiches Erbrecht wie der Sohn.

2. Im Babli[60] wird erzählt, daß manche jüdischen Richter nach der Theorie des R. Sacharja ben ha-Qasab judizierten, daß aber Samuel und Rabbi Nachman gegen jene Richter heftig auftraten und ihnen sogar die Anwendung von Gewalt, Verhängung des Bannes, angedroht haben. Auch im Jerusch.[61] wird gegen die Ansicht R. Sacharias Sturm gelaufen und bemerkt: Unsere Brüder im Auslande sind unwissende Laien, die die Halacha entstellen, indem sie wie R. Sacharia entscheiden.[62] Ferner wird im Babli erzählt:

„Der Patriarch Juda II. begegnete dem Rabbi Janai und richtete an ihn folgende Frage: Woher wissen wir, daß in bezug auf die Güter der Mutter der Sohn den Vorzug hat vor der Tochter? R. Janai antwortete: Es heißt in der Thora (Num. 36, 8) ‚von den Stämmen', damit ist der Stamm der Mutter dem Stamm des Vaters gleichgestellt; wie nun beim Stamme des Vaters der Sohn den Vorzug hat vor der Tochter, ebenso beim Stamme der Mutter hat der Sohn den Vorzug vor der Tochter. Darauf Jehuda II.: Demnach müßte der Erstgeborene auch bei den Gütern der Mutter einen Anspruch auf einen Doppelanteil haben. Anstatt einer Antwort sagte R. Janai zu seinem Begleiter: Weg von hier, dieser Mann da will keine Belehrung annehmen."[63]

[60] B. Bathra 111a.

[61] B. Bathra VIII, 1 16a.

[62] אחינו שבהוצה לארץ הדיוטות הן והן טועין את ההלכה.

[63] בעא מיניה מנין לבן שקודם לבת בנכסי האם אמר ליה דכתיב (במדבר ל״ו ח׳) מטות מקוש מטה האם למטה האב מה מטה האב בן קודם לבת אף מטה האם בן קודם לבת. א״ל אי מה מטה האב בכור נוטל פי שנים אף מטה האם בכור נוטל פי שנים. אמר ליה לשמעיה גור ליה דין צבי למילף.

Woraus erklärt sich diese Heftigkeit, Gereiztheit und Erbitterung gegen eine Rechtsanschauung, die von angesehenen Tannaiten und auch von keinem Geringeren als R. Simon ben Jochai [64] vertreten und mit einer anerkannten hermeneutischen Regel (דין) begründet wird? [65] Darauf kann es nur eine Antwort geben: Die Gleichstellung der Tochter mit dem Sohne in bezug auf Muttergüter wurde nicht ihrer selbst willen als irrige Rechtsauffassung so heftig bekämpft, sondern weil sie heterodoxer Abstammung war. Ihre heterodoxen Ahnen konnten aber nur die Sadduzäer gewesen sein. In der Tat war R. Sacharia ben ha-Qasab, der älteste Vertreter dieser Ansicht unter den Pharisäern, ein Zeitgenosse Rabbi Jochanan ben Sakkais, der den erbrechtlichen Kampf gegen die Sadduzäer ausgefochten hat.

Vom logischen und juristischen Standpunkte aus kann es aber gar keinen Unterschied geben zwischen Muttergüter und Vatergüter. Wer daher in bezug auf Materna die Tochter dem Sohne gleichgestellt, muß konsequenterweise dasselbe auch bei Paterna tun. Wenn aber R. Sacharia und die späteren pharisäischen Anhänger seiner Theorie diese Konsequenz nicht gezogen und bei Paterna den Sohn in seinem Vorzugsrecht beließen, so haben sie sich diese Inkonsequenz deshalb zuschulden kommen lassen, weil der natürliche Wortsinn von Num. 27, 8 der Tochter nur in Ermangelung eines Sohnes das Erbrecht zuerkennt. In bezug auf Materna aber, von denen in der Bibel nicht ausdrücklich die Rede ist, konnten sie der Tochter zu ihrem natürlichen Rechte verhelfen.

Die Sadduzäer hingegen haben die Gleichstellung der Tochter mit dem Sohne konsequent durchgeführt und ihr ein volles Erbrecht zugesprochen. Sie taten dies nicht so sehr aus Rücksicht auf das schwache Geschlecht, für das sie bekanntlich eine starke Schwäche zeigten, sondern vielmehr aus politischen Gründen: um sowohl den Hasmonäern wie auch später den Herodäern, die mütterlicherseits von Juda (Ex. 6, 23), bzw.

[64] Siehe oben, IV 227, Anm. 62.
[65] B. Bathra a. a. O.

den Hasmonäern stammten, einen Anspruch auf das Königtum zu sichern.[66]

Wie die Sadduzäer sich mit Num. 27, 8 abgefunden, werden wir bald sehen. Wichtig ist zunächst folgende Erzählung im Jerusch. a. a. O.:

„R. Janai und R. Jochanan saßen beisammen, da kam zu ihnen der Patriarch Jehuda II. und fragte: Was bedeutet der Satz: ‚und jede Tochter, die ein Erbe erbt von den Stämmen'? Sie antworteten: Damit werden Mutterstamm und Vaterstamm gleichgestellt, wie beim Vaterstamme die Tochter bei Vorhandensein eines Sohnes nichts hat, ebenso beim Mutterstamme. Darauf Jehuda II.: Vielleicht umgekehrt, wie die Tochter ein Erbrecht hat neben dem Sohne beim Stamme der Mutter, so auch beim Stamme des Vaters. Darauf R. Janai: Ist jemand dort? Dieser Mann will die Worte der Thora nicht hören." [67]

Also wieder dieselbe Erbitterung und Gereiztheit, die aber hier deshalb verständlicher erscheint, weil Jehuda II. die aus der Ansicht R. Sacharias sich ergebende Konsequenz zieht und der Tochter auch bei Vatergütern neben dem Sohne ein Erbrecht zuspricht. Num. 27, 8 hat Jehuda II. sich in der Weise zurechtgelegt, wie R. Papa im Babli:[68] In Ermanglung eines Sohnes erbt die Tochter den ganzen Nachlaß, neben dem Sohne aber erhält sie die Hälfte. Daß Jehuda II. gewagt hätte, seine Theorie auch in die Tat umzusetzen, ist nicht wahrscheinlich. Wahrscheinlich aber ist es, daß er im Falle von Tochter und Sohnestochter mit seiner Theorie Ernst gemacht hat oder Ernst machen wollte. Denn nur so ist die Emphase in dem Ausspruche Rabs zu verstehen: Wer behauptet, die Tochter erbt neben der Sohnestochter, selbst wenn er ein Patriarch in Israel ist, achtet man auf ihn nicht.

[66] Aus ähnlichen Motiven haben auch judenchristliche Kreise ein Interesse für das Erbrecht der Tochter gehabt. Vgl. oben, IV 239, Anm. 107.

[67] ר׳ ינאי ור׳ יוחנן הוון יתבין עאל ר׳ יודן נשייא ושאל וכל בת יורשת נחלה מטטות מהו א״ל מקיש מטה האב למטה האם, מה מטה האב אין לבת במקום בן אף מטה האם אין לבת במקום בן. או חילוף מה מטה האם יש לבת במקום בן, אף מטה האב יש לבת במקום בן. א״ל ר׳ (יוחנן) [ינאי] איתא מן תמן ליית אהן ניבראּ בעי מישמע טילי דאורייא.

[68] B. Bathra 110b oben.

In der Tat finden wir auch bei einer anderen Gelegenheit Rab in Opposition gegen Jehuda II.: Jehuda II. hat heidnisches Öl zum Genusse freigegeben. Rab aber hielt das Verbot aufrecht, worauf Samuel zu ihm sagte: Iß, wenn nicht, werde ich dich als einen widerspenstigen Gelehrten (זקן ממרא) bezeichnen.[69] Diese halachisch ganz und gar ungerechtfertigte Bezeichnung[70] kann nur daraus erklärt werden, daß Samuel gewußt hatte, Rab enthalte sich nur aus Protest gegen Jehuda II. des Genusses heidnischen Öls.

Wir haben nun gesehen, daß Jehuda II. bestrebt war, die Frau in bezug auf das Erbrecht dem Manne gleichzustellen, so hatte er zweifellos auch der Mutter dasselbe Erbrecht zugesprochen wie dem Vater.[71] Wir haben auch gesehen, daß diese seine Stellungnahme für die Frau Gegenstand heftigen Protestes war. Vielleicht nun läßt sich daraus folgende merkwürdige Erzählung verstehen:

„Jose aus Maon machte in einer Predigt einen heftigen Ausfall gegen Jehuda II., der darüber in Zorn geriet, vor dem der Prediger flüchtete. Durch die Vermittlung des R. Simon ben Lakisch ließ sich Jehuda II. besänftigen und den Prediger zu sich kommen, um sich zu überzeugen, ob er thorakundig sei und Belehrung annehme. Er richtete an ihn folgende Frage: Was bedeutet der Bibelvers (Ez. 16, 44): Fürwahr, jeder Spottversdichter wird den Spruch auf dich anwenden: ‚Wie die Mutter so die Tochter'. Der Prediger antwortete: Wie die Mutter so die Tochter, wie das Geschlecht so der Patriarch, wie der Altar so die Priester."[72]

Es ist nun merkwürdig, daß Jehuda II. gerade diesen Bibelvers gewählt; es gibt in der Bibel viel schwierigere Stellen, deren Erklärung ein besseres Zeugnis für die Kenntnisse und

[69] אכל דלא כן אנא כתב עליך זקן ממרא. Jerusch. Ab. Sarah II, 9 41 d.

[70] Vgl. Synhed. 86 b f.

[71] Vgl. oben, IV 226, Anm. 59.

[72] Gen. r. LXXX, 1; Jerusch. Synhed. II Ende 20 d, wo ausdrücklich Juda II. genannt wird. (Im Jeruschalmi fragt der Patriarch zuerst um die Bedeutung von Hosea 2, 7. Aber wie aus Gen. r. und Ruth r. I, 2 hervorgeht, sind die beiden Fragen nicht bei einer und derselben Gelegenheit und auch nicht an eine und dieselbe Person gerichtet worden. Der Jeruschalmitext ist überdies äußerst verworren).

den Scharfsinn des Erklärers wäre; warum hat also Jehuda II. gerade diesen Vers hervorgesucht? Aber als der Patriarch von dem Inhalte der Predigt Joses erfahren und dadurch erkannt hatte, daß er zu seinen Gegnern gehörte, wollte er auch wissen, wie er und seine Kreise über seine (des Patriarchen) Stellungnahme in der Frage des Erbrechtes von Tochter und Mutter denken, daher wählte er den Vers Ez. 16, 44, der sich am besten dazu eignete, dem Prediger Gelegenheit zu geben, sich über das Erbrecht von Mutter und Tochter zu äußern.

Der Prediger hat entweder den Wink nicht verstanden oder wollte auf das Thema, das auch halachische Kenntnisse und Schlagfertigkeit erfordert, nicht eingehen. So ist der Patriarch nicht auf seine Rechnung gekommen, aber er hat aus der allgemein gehaltenen Antwort Joses genug erfahren, mehr als ihm lieb war.[73]

Es ist wohl auch möglich, daß die Gegner des Patriarchen seinen Standpunkt im Erbrecht — eine Begünstigung von Mutter und Tochter und Beeinträchtigung der Männer — damit verspotteten, daß sie ihn durch den Ezechiel-Vers zum Ausdruck brachten: „Fürwahr, jeder Spottversdichter wird den Spruch auf dich anwenden: wie die Mutter so die Tochter.“ „Eine echte Tochter deiner Mutter bist du, die ihres Mannes und ihrer Söhne überdrüssig ward.“

Die oben erwähnte Deutung von Num. 27, 8 wird im Jerusch. a. a. O. als Ansicht der Gelehrten der Völker angeführt, zugleich mit der Widerlegung, die sie seitens jüdischer Gelehrter erfahren. Wer sind diese Gelehrten der Völker?

J. T., Z f h B IX 135, bespricht Megillath Ta'anith c. 5 mit der richtigen Erkenntnis, daß dort zwei Versionen zur Erklärung von תבוא לדינוא zusammengeflossen sind. Die eine Version bezieht dies auf die griechische Zeit und lautet: ביומי מלכות יון היו דנין בדיני נכרים וכשגברה יד בית חשמונאי וכטלום היו דנין בדיני ישראל יאיתי יום שכטלים עשאוהו יום טוב. Die zweite (jüngere) Version bezieht den Gedenktag auf einen Sieg über die Sadduzäer

[73] Daraus erklärt sich auch die merkwürdige Erkundigung, die der Patriarch über den Prediger aus Maon eingezogen hat: Ob er Belehrung annimmt. Es ist dies eine ironisch-bittere Anspielung auf die von R. Janai in bezug auf den Patriarchen gebrauchte Phrase, dieser Mann nimmt keine Belehrung an: לית דין צבי לטילף.

zur Zeit R. Jochanan b. Sakkais. Diese Version ist im babylonischen Talmud B. Bathra 115 b angeführt. Er setzt dann fort: „Daß die דיני נכרים der ersten Version von der sadduzäischen Ansicht verschieden sind, beweist Jerusch. B. Bathra VIII, 1, wo zuerst die Ansicht der חכמי גוים, dann die der צדוקים widerlegt wird." Also sind die נכרים in Megillath Ta'anith identisch mit den גוים im Jeruschalmi, demnach hätten die griechischen Juristen des Antiochus Epiphanes ihre Rechtssätze aus der Bibel abgeleitet und mit Juden darüber disputiert. Dies klingt nicht sehr wahrscheinlich.

Wreschner[74] versteht unter den Gelehrten der Völker die Samaritaner. Dagegen sprechen folgende Tatsachen: Erstens werden die Samaritaner im Talmud nicht als גוים bezeichnet, zweitens sprechen die Samaritaner, wie Wreschner selbst S. 40 feststellt, der Tochter nur ein Teilerbrecht zu.

Revel[75] verweist auf Sabbath 116 b. Dies ist ein Irrtum. Erstens handelt es sich in dieser Stelle in Sabbath um Judenchristen, die im Talmud מינים und nicht גוים genannt werden. Zweitens sagt dort der judenchristliche Richter, daß das mosaische Gesetz, welches die Tochter vom Erbrecht ausschließt, durch das Evangelium aufgehoben wurde, das der Tochter ein gleiches Erbrecht wie dem Sohne zuspricht. Die Gelehrten der Völker im Jeruschalmi dagegen berufen sich für ihre Rechtsanschauung auf Num. 27, 8.

Es bleibt daher nichts anderes übrig, als unter den Gelehrten der Völker syrische Christen zu verstehen, die ihre Deutung der fraglichen Numeristelle bei ihrer jüdischen Umgebung kennengelernt haben.[76] So erfahren wir von den Gelehrten der Völker, daß ihre Ansicht bei den Juden verbreitet war.

Exkurs VI. Endogamie.

1. Abraham, Isaak und Jakob heirateten in ihrer Familie.[77]

2. Num. 36, 6—9: „Das ist, was Gott in betreff der Töchter Zelaphchads befohlen hat: Sie mögen sich verheiraten,

[74] *Samaritanische Traditionen* S. 39.
[75] *JQR NS* III, 340 Anm.
[76] Vgl. Aptowitzer, *JQR* XIX, 609.
[77] Gen. 20, 12; 24, 4; 28, 2.

mit wem es ihnen gefällt; nur müssen sie einen Angehörigen ihres väterlichen Stammes heiraten, damit nicht israelitischer Erbbesitz von einem Stamme zum anderen übergehe; vielmehr sollen sämtliche Israeliten an dem Erbbesitz ihres väterlichen Stammes festhalten. Und alle Mädchen, die in einem der israelitischen Stämme zu Erbbesitz gelangen, müssen einen Angehörigen ihres väterlichen Stammes heiraten, damit sämtliche Israeliten den väterlichen Erbbesitz behaupten und nicht Erbbesitz von einem Stamme zum anderen übergehe; vielmehr sollen sämtliche israelitischen Stämme an ihrem Erbbesitze festhalten."

3. Mit der Endogamie hängt wohl die Vorschrift zusammen, daß der Hohepriester nur eine Jungfrau aus seinem Stamme zur Frau nehmen darf.[78] Die Bedeutung מעמיו — aus seinem Stamme — hat Geiger[79] genügend nachgewiesen. Hinzuzufügen ist noch folgendes:

Es könnte gegen die Bedeutung מעמיו aus seinem Stamme eine wichtige Instanz angeführt werden, nämlich die Übersetzung der LXX ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ. Aber dieser Einwand ist nicht allzu mächtig, denn nicht bloß Kodex A, sondern auch andere wichtige Kodizes bei Field[80] lesen ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ. Diese Lesart wird auch von Philo bestätigt und noch mehr von der LXX selbst, die auch in Vers 13 ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ liest. Der Zusatz erklärt sich aus der Methode der LXX, die Bibeltexte zu parallelisieren. Diese Erklärung ist viel natürlicher als die Annahme Frankels,[81] die Worte ἐκ τοῦ γένους in Vers 13 seien nichts weiter als eine Randglosse zu Vers 14, „die aber in den Text kam und dann herauf zu Vers 13 gezogen wurde". Auf Philo verweist auch Ritter:[82] „Aus Philo dürfte wohl zu schließen sein, daß die eigentliche Übersetzung der LXX für מעמיו (Vers 14) ἐκ τοῦ γένους (Stamm?) war und gerade ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ ein durch die palästinische Halacha entstandenes Glossem ist." Wie er aber unmittelbar vorher

[78] Lev. 21, 14 בי אם בתולה מעמיו יקח אשה.
[79] *He-Chaluz* V, 73—75 (קבוצת מאמרים ed. Poznański, S. 131 ff.).
[80] Hexapla I, 203b Anm. 17.
[81] *Einfluß* S. 160.
[82] *Philo und die Halacha* S. 73.

meinen kann, „man muß entschieden Frankel beistimmen", ist mir ein Rätsel.

L. Ginzberg, in seinen Bemerkungen zu קבוצת מאמרים ed. Poznański S. 405, erklärt die Übersetzung der LXX folgendermaßen: Da die LXX auch in Vers 13 מעמיו gelesen hat, so hat sie, um nicht das Wort beidemal gleich zu übersetzen, מעמיו in Vers 13 mit „aus seinem Stamme" und in Vers 14 mit „aus seinem Volke" wiedergegeben.[83]

Aber es dürfte schwerfallen, eine solche Vorliebe für Abwechslung in der LXX nachzuweisen; vielmehr ist das Streben der LXX nach Harmonisierung bekannt. Man würde diese Abwechslung noch begreifen, wenn durch sie ein Fortschritt erzielt wäre, wenn sie nämlich zuerst „aus seinem Volke" und dann als nähere Bestimmung „aus seinem Stamme" geboten hätte. So wie der LXX-Text uns vorliegt, macht er die Erklärung Ginzbergs unmöglich.

Freilich heißt es Ezechiel 44, 22: Sie dürfen sich keine Witwe oder Verstoßene zum Weibe nehmen, sondern nur Jungfrauen vom Samen des Hauses Israel. Aber Ezechiel weicht ja jedenfalls von Leviticus ab, da er in der Fortsetzung sagt: „Eine solche Witwe jedoch, die von einem Priester als Witwe hinterlassen ward, dürfen sie heiraten." Dies ist entweder gegen die Vorschrift des Leviticus, wenn er an den Hohepriester denkt, oder geht über den Leviticus hinaus, wenn vom einfachen Priester die Rede ist. Die halachische Umdeutung der Ezechielstelle ist in diesem Falle nicht ausschlaggebend.

Wie Josephus מעמיו auffaßt, kann nicht festgestellt werden, da er in der betreffenden Bestimmung das Wort gar nicht wiedergibt. Er sagt bloß, der Hohepriester muß eine Jungfrau heiraten und muß diese behalten καὶ ταύτην φυλάττειν. Zwar wollen manche, die dem φυλάττειν keinen Sinn abgewinnen können, es in φυλέτην ändern, aber abgesehen von der sprachlichen Schwierigkeit und davon, daß diese Lesart von keinem Kodex bestätigt wird, ist Ginzbergs Erklärung des

[83] אין ספק שפילון יסד דבריו על השבעים שהם קראו בויקרא כ״א י״ג אשה בבתוליה מעמיו יקח, וכאשר היה קשה להם למה שנה הכתוב מעמיו שתי פעמים תרגמו מעמיו הראשון משבטו ועמיו השני תרגמו עמו מעמיו.

φυλάττειν aus der Halacha, daß der Hohepriester nicht unverheiratet sein darf, sehr wahrscheinlich.[84]

Besonders großes Gewicht auf die Endogamie wird im Buche Tobit gelegt:

„Und als ich ein Mann geworden, nahm ich Anna aus unserem väterlichen Geschlechte zum Weibe und zeugte mit ihr den Tobias (1, 9). Hüte dich, Kind, vor aller Unkeuschheit — und vor allem: nimm ein Weib aus dem Geschlechte deines Vaters. Nimm kein fremdes Weib, welches nicht aus dem Stamme deines Vaters ist; denn wir sind Nachkommen von Propheten: Noah, Abraham, Isaak und Jakob. Unserer Väter vor Alters gedenke, mein Kind, daß diese alle Weiber nahmen von ihren Brüdern und gesegnet wurden in ihren Kindern, und ihr Geschlecht wird das Land besitzen (4, 12). Als sie sich aber Rages näherten, sprach der Engel zu dem Jüngling: Bruder, heute werden wir bei Raguel übernachten. Er ist dein Verwandter und hat einzig eine Tochter mit Namen Sara. Ich werde ihretwegen mit ihm sprechen, daß sie dir zur Frau gegeben werde. Denn dir kommt ihr Erbe zu, weil du allein aus ihrem Geschlechte bist. Und das Mädchen ist schön und klug (6, 10—13). Da besprach er die Sache mit Raguel, und Raguel sprach zu Tobias: Iß und trink und laß dir's wohl sein, denn dir gebührt es, mein Kind zu nehmen.... Doch jetzt laß dir's wohl sein. Tobias aber sprach: Ich genieße nichts, bis ihr sie mir feierlich zugeführt habt. Da sprach Raguel: So nimm sie hin von nun an nach dem Gesetze. Du bist ihr Bruder und sie gehört dir. Der barmherzige Gott geleite euch aufs beste (7, 10—11). Sodann rief Raguel sein Weib Edna und sprach zu ihr: Schwester, richte das andere Gemach und führe sie hinein (7, 15)."

Das Gesetz, an das Raguel denkt, kann nur Num. 36, 6—9 gemeint sein.

4. An diese Bibelstelle denkt auch Philo:

„Die vorgesetzte Behörde soll sich um die Behütung der hinterbliebenen Mädchen kümmern .... und wenn sie herangewachsen sind, um passende Verheiratung, indem sie unter

[84] Vgl. Ritter a. a. O., Ginzberg a. a. O. S. 406.

Männern von unbestrittenem Ansehen die besten auswählt. In erster Reihe sollen Verwandte (ausersehen werden); finden sich solche nicht, dann auf jeden Fall Angehörige desselben Geschlechtes und desselben Stammes, damit die Mitgiftgüter nicht durch Verschwägerung in den Besitz eines anderen Stammes übergehen, sondern bei den Losen bleiben, die zu Anbeginn unter die Stämme verteilt wurden." [85]

Zu „Verwandte" bemerkt Heinemann: „Das ist 4. Mos. 36, 6 nicht vorgeschrieben; Philo scheint der Meinung zu sein, daß auf alle erbfähigen Töchter Bestimmungen, wie sie für die Erbtöchter in Griechenland galten, wenn auch nicht in voller Schärfe, anzuwenden seien." Wahrscheinlicher aber ist es, daß Philo an Num. 36, 10 denkt: „Wie Gott Moses befohlen hatte, so taten die Töchter Zelophhads, indem Mahla, Thirza, Hogla, Milka und Noa, die Töchter Zelophhads, die Söhne ihrer Oheime heirateten. Mit Männern aus den Geschlechtern der Söhne Manasses, des Sohnes Josephs, verheirateten sie sich, so daß ihr Erbbesitz bei dem Stamme verblieb, zu dem das Geschlecht ihres Vaters gehörte." Philo verstand die Stelle so, daß das Gebot Gottes an Mose in erster Reihe an Verwandte dachte. So verstand ja auch der Verfasser des Buches Tobit.

5. „Es war ein altes Gesetz in Israel, daß kein Erbbesitz von einem Stamm zu dem anderen übergehen durfte, daher konnte kein Mann eine Frau heiraten, die nicht seine Stammesgenossin war. Folgte aber eine Frau aus Neigung einem Manne, der nicht aus ihrem Stamme war, so verließ sie ihr Vaterhaus ohne Erbteil, und die Leute nannten sie Gastwirtin, weil sie einen Mann liebte, der nicht zu ihrem Stamme gehörte." [86]

[85] Philo, *De spec. leg.* II, 16. Cohn V, 116 § 125 f. Deutsch von Heinemann in *Schriften der jüdisch-hellenistischen Literatur* II, 141.

[86] ניסוסא הות בישראל מלקדמין דלא מיסתחרא אחסנתא משבטא לשבטא ובכן לא הוה יכיל גברא למיסב איתתא דלא משבטא וכד הות איתתא דרחמא גברא דלא משבטהא הות נסקא מבי נשא בלא אחסנתא והוו אנשי קרון לה פונדקיתא דרחימת גברא דלא משבטהא. Zusatztargum zu Richter 11, 1 bei Kimchi z. St. Vgl. betreffs des Verzichtes auf die Erbschaft Josephus, *Antiq.* IV, 7, 5 und Ginzberg in seinen Bemerkungen zu קבוצת מאמרים ed. Poznański S. 405.

6. Der vom Targum mitgeteilte alte Brauch des Verbotes der Ehe von Stamm zu Stamm wird auch im Talmud als bekannt vorausgesetzt. Es wird nämlich das in der Mischna Ta'anith IV, 8 erwähnte Volksfest am 15. Ab dahin erklärt, daß zu einer gewissen Zeit das Connubium zwischen den einzelnen Stämmen freigegeben wurde.[87]

7. Aber auch in viel späterer Zeit finden wir, daß Heiraten außerhalb der Familie unbeliebt waren. So wird gesagt, daß sowohl bei Heiraten zwischen einer Ahronidin mit einem Nichtahroniden wie auch umgekehrt zwischen einer Nichtahronidin mit einem Ahroniden der in Priesterfamilien übliche Betrag der Kethuba nicht eingehoben werden kann. „Es ist eine Strafe, damit jeder sich an seinen Stamm und an seine Familie anschließe." [88]

Ferner heißt es in der Mischna Kidd. IV, 4: Wenn jemand (ein Priester) eine Priestertochter heiratet, muß er ihre Stammesreinheit in weiblicher Linie vier Grade aufwärts prüfen. Heiraten aber Leviten oder Israeliten eine Priesterin, müssen sie noch einen Grad höher hinauf die Stammesreinheit prüfen. Dazu im Jeruschalmi 66 a die Frage: Forderst du da nicht bei Israeliten eine strengere Stammesreinheit als bei Priestern? Jawohl, es ist eine Strafe, damit jeder sich an seinen Stamm und seine Familie anschließe.[89]

So nach dem Text des Jeruschalmi. Nach der Mischna im Babli (76 a) und in den Mischnaausgaben handelt es sich im zweiten Absatz um einen Priester, der eine Levitin oder eine Israelitin heiratet, was Ginzberg a. a. O. dazu brachte, irrtümlich auch den Ausspruch des Jeruschalmi in diesem Sinne zu verstehen. Der Ausspruch אחת זו ואחת זו in Jerusch. Kidduschin ist eine assoziative Angleichung an Jerusch. Kethuboth. In beiden Stellen ist der Autor des Ausspruches R. Jose b. Bun im 4. Jahrhundert.

[87] יום שהותרו השבטים לבא זה בזה. Ta'anith 29b; Baba Bathra 121a; Jerusch. Ta'anith 69c; Threni r. Proömium 33.

[88] קנס קנסו בהן כדי שיהא אדם מידבק בשבטו ובמשפחתו. Jerusch. Kethuboth I, 5 25c.

[89] לויים וישראלים מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחת, ולא נמצאת טהטיר בישראל יותר מן הכהנים. א"ר יוסי בי ר' בון אחת זו ואחת זו קנסו הכתוב כדי שיהא אדם דבק בשבטו ובמשפחתו.

8. Von besonderer Wichtigkeit ist folgende Baraitha:

„Du sollst deine Tochter nicht entweihen (Lev. 19, 29). Da hätte ich daraus entnehmen können, daß ein Priester seine Tochter nicht an einen Leviten oder Israeliten verheiraten darf, daher heißt es: ‚indem du sie der Buhlerei zuführst' (Lev. das.), es ist bloß von einer Entweihung durch Buhlerei die Rede." [90]

Also ohne ausdrückliche Angabe der Thora wäre eine Heirat zwischen einer Ahronidin und einem Nichtahroniden verboten! In diesem Sinne heißt es an einer anderen Stelle, daß das Hochzeitsmahl bei einer Heirat zwischen einer Ahronidin mit einem Nichtahroniden keine סעודה של מצוה ist und ein Gelehrter daran nicht teilnehmen darf. Eine solche Verbindung führt zu keinem guten Ende: entweder frühzeitiger Tod oder Armut stellt sich ein.[91]

NACHTRÄGE

Annual IV I. Bibel. — Die beiden Söhne der Rizpa, der Tochter Ajas: II Sam. 21, 8.

S. 212 Anm. 20. Absalom Sohn einer Kriegsgefangenen. — Auch Synhed. 107a.

S. 229 Nr. 3. Rechabiten. — Vgl. Midr. Abchir in Jal. Ex. § 169 (= Bubers *Likkutim* S. 15 Nr. 34): Jethro wird mit Rücksicht darauf als Priester bezeichnet, daß dereinst von seinen Töchtern Hohenpriester abstammen werden. Vielleicht aber wird hier an Pinchas gedacht, der mütterlicherseits von Jethro abstammte. Vgl. dazu Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik der Hasmonäerzeit* S. 27f.

S. 233ff. Nichtenehe. — Daß die Empfehlung der Nichtenehe eine Demonstration gegen die diese Ehe verbietenden Samaritaner war, schon bei Reifmann, *Bet Talmud* I, 78; Büchler, *Hazofeh* X, 42 scheint sich der Ansicht Reifmanns anzuschließen. Dagegen Krauss, *Studies in Jewish literature issued in honor of Professor Kaufmann Kohler* S. 171 zitiert für diese Ansicht Ginzberg und bemerkt gegen sie: „Ich kann es auch nicht als Erklärung ansehen, daß die Pharisäer die fragliche Ehe aus bloßer Opposition gegen die Gegenpartei erlaubt hätten." In der Tat ein gewichtiger Einwand. Meine Erklärung, daß die Nichtenehe ein Überbleibsel der Verwandtenehe ist, finde ich in anderer Formulierung bei Krauss, a. a. O. S. 172.

S. 238 Nr. 12. Rabbi Zaddok Priester und mütterlicherseits von Benjamin. — In manchen rabbinischen Quellen wird der Patriarch Jehuda I. als Nachkomme des Hauses David bezeichnet. Sab. 56b; Keth. 62b.

[90] אל תחלל את בתך להזנותה יכול לא יתננה ללוי לא יתננה לישראל, ת"ל להזנותה, לא אמרתי אלא חילול שהוא לשם זנות. Sifra קדושים, Perek VII, 1; Synhed. 76a.

[91] Pes. 48a.

In anderen Quellen dagegen gibt der Patriarch seine Genealogie an: Von Benjamin und von den weiblichen Angehörigen des Hauses David. Jerusch. Kilajim IX, 3, 32b; Keth. XII, 3, 35a; Gen. r. XXXIII, 3. Vgl. noch Theodor zu Gen. r., S. 305f. Über diesen Widerspruch wurde schon R. Hai Gaon befragt. Er antwortete, daß in der Tat die beiden Talmude darüber auseinandergehen und daß für uns die Angabe des babylonischen Talmuds die ausschlaggebende ist: der Patriarch stammte wirklich von David ab. *Resp. der Geonim* ed. Harkavy Nr. 349 S. 176. Nachdem wir aber solch starke Reminiszenzen an das Matriarchat auch in talmudischen Quellen haben, ist die Annahme einer Verschiedenheit der Traditionen über die Abstammung des Patriarchen nicht notwendig: der babylonische Talmud denkt an die Abstammung mütterlicherseits. So schon M. Kunitzer, הבצרף II Nr. 147.

Über die Angabe des zweiten Makkabäerbuches, daß Menelaos aus Benjamin stammte, vgl. ausführlich Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik der Hasmonäerzeit* S. 317. Vielleicht ist an die benjaminitische Abstammung des Menelaos mütterlicherseits zu denken wie bei R. Zaddok.

S. 239 Anm. 107. — Vgl. Nachmani, ספר ויכוח הרמב"ן ed. Steinschneider S. 18: Vom heiligen Geiste gezeugt, wäre er kein Sprößling Isais, und selbst vom Schoße eines Weibes aus dessen Nachkommenschaft geboren, würde er am Königtume kein Erbrecht haben, weil Töchter und deren Söhne, wo männliche Erben vorhanden sind, nach dem Gesetz nicht erben können und David allezeit männliche Nachkommen hatte (Poznański, *Schiloh* S. 209, XLVII).

Annual V Exkurs I c. Lev. 18, 21 in der Deutung R. Ismaels und des Jubiläenbuches. — Vgl. dazu Synhed. 82a: Wer mit einer Heidin verkehrt, der verschwägert sich gleichsam mit den Götzen.

Exkurs IV Kaufehe. Einer der Söhne Moses sollte dem Jethro gehören. — Die Agada auch bei Ephraem zu Ex. IV mit der Variante, daß Zippora es war, die das eine Kind nicht beschneiden ließ. Vgl. Ginzberg, *Livre d'Hommage à la mémoire du Dr Samuel Poznański* S. 204.

Exkurs V Erbrecht der Tochter bei den Sadduzäern. — Zipser, *Ben Chananja* 1867, S. 168: „Gegen die Usurpation des Herodes jedoch, als noch männliche Nachkommen der Hasmonäer vorhanden waren, scheint R. Joch. ben Sakkai in seiner Polemik mit jenem Sadduzäer, welcher behaupten wollte תירש הבת עם הבן (B. Bathra 115), energisch aufgetreten zu sein. Besagter Sadduzäer wäre ein Verfechter der herodischen Erbrechte gewesen. Daß aber von Seite der Sadduzäer die Erbschaft den Töchtern auch gegen Söhne zugesprochen wurde, ist aus Sabbath 116b zu ersehen."

Was den Disput R. Jochanans mit den Sadduzäern betrifft, so hat den politischen Hintergrund desselben schon Geiger erkannt. *Urschrift* S. 143f. Ausführlicher in *Ozar Nechmad* III 1860, wiederabgedruckt in *Kebuzath Ma'amarim* ed. Poznański S. 92f. Was aber die Stelle Sab. 116b betrifft, so ist Zipsers Bemerkung ein unbegreifliches Mißverständnis, da dort von Sadduzäern keine Spur vorhanden ist.

Exkurs VI Endogamie. — Vgl. noch zum Thema Judith VIII, 1—2; Krauss, *Studies in Jewish literature issued in honor of Professor Kaufmann Kohler* S. 172 und die Literatur in Anm. 2; Büchler, *Hazofeh* X, 42.

IV 210f. Anm. 11 Das Zitat Kimchis. — Pes. r. XXII (ed. Friedmann 111b): אל תאמן בגר עד עשרים ושתים דורות. Ebenso Or Zarua I N. 531 aus Jelamdenu (= Pes. r.). Aber Jal. Ruth § 601 aus Mid. Ruth (fehlt in unseren Texten) עד עשרים וארבעה. Ebenso in einem Genizahfragment in גנזי שכטר III ed. Davidson S. 223: בזכים רבותינו שאמרו אל תאמן בגר עד ארבעה ועשרים דורות. Zur Sache vgl. Friedmann zu Pes. r. und Davidson a. a. O.

IV 220 „Die Söhne Rahels und Leas, die die Adoption der Sklavinnen nicht anerkannten und diese für Sklaven hielten, mußten konsequenterweise auch die Söhne Josefs von der Ägypterin Aseneth als Fremde ansehen, die nicht, zur Familie Jakobs gehören. Daher mußte Jakob die Söhne Josefs adoptieren, sie zu seinen Kindern machen." — Herr Dr. H. J. Zimmels macht mich auf folgende Bemerkung des berühmten R. Abigedor b. Eliah ha-Kohen aus Wien (13. Jahrh.) in Cod. Uff. 235 der Hamburger Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek f. 139b aufmerksam: ויקרא שמו בישראל (רות ד׳ י״ד) פי׳ שיתחתנו עמו ועם זרעו וכן ויקרא בהם שמי ושם אבותי (בראשית ט״ח ט״ז) לפי שכל בני יעקב בחרו להן צדקניות בנות נימולי׳ לנשים ולא רצו להתחתן בבני יוסף שילדה לו אסנ׳ בת פוטיפרע לכ׳ הוצרך יעקב לומר יקרא בהם שמי שיעבדו לאלהי ושיהיו כל כך חשובי׳ בני יוסף כשאר בני יעקב.

IV 235 unt. Erblichkeit der Berufe. Ausspruch der Agada: man soll nicht den Beruf seines Vaters lassen. — Dieser Brauch und diese Anschauung bei den Persern; als Theorie bei den lautern Brüdern:

„Die Kunst der Väter und Ahnen verleiht der der Kinder große Vollendung, besonders wenn auch ihre Geburtsstunde darauf hinweist. Deswegen ward in der Herrschaft Ardaschir Babagans einer jeden Stufe der Menschen bestimmt, daß sie notwendig die Kunst ihrer Väter und Ahnen treiben und sie von derselben nicht abweichen sollte. Man meinte, dies gehöre zu den Bestimmungen Gottes nach dem Buche Zaraduschts." Dieterici, *Logik und Psychologie der Araber* S. 98.

V 262. — Graetz beweist aus der Tatsache, daß auch der Hohepriester eine fremdnationale Frau geheiratet hat, daß solche Mischehen auch nach dem Gesetze der Thora für erlaubt galten, was nur möglich war, wenn diese Frauen Proselytinnen waren. Er hat aber übersehen, daß der Hohepriester auch nach dem Gesetze der Thora eine Proselytin nicht heiraten darf (vgl. Exkurs VI S. 290f.); nach der Halacha darf es auch nicht ein einfacher Priester, was er aus der von ihm angeführten Mischna Kidd. IV 1 hätte ersehen können.

V 270 Absatz 2 „Von diesen zehn Völkern". — In dem angeführten Vers Esra 9, 1 werden wohl bloß acht Völker genannt, aus Neh. 2, 10 und 13, 28 und 13, 23 erfahren wir, daß auch Verschwägerungen mit den Völkern Chori und Asdod stattgefunden haben.

V 276 „Hasmonäer und andere usw.". — Betreffend die Hasmonäer vgl. Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik der Hasmonäerzeit* S. 95; die anderen sind Sadduzäer und Judenchristen, vgl. hier S. 286 und Anm. 66.

V 271 Mitte. Kampf um die Zulässigkeit des Connubiums mit moabitischen Proselytinnen. — Vgl. Aptowitzer, *Parteipolitik* Kap. IV S. 31—48, besonders S. 38.

V 291 Ez. 44, 22. — Ausführlich darüber, *Parteipolitik* S. XXIII.

THE JEWISH CATACOMBS AND INSCRIPTIONS OF ROME: AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR DISCOVERY AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY

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THE existence of Jewish catacombs at Rome was entirely unknown until the year 1602, when, on December 14th, Antonio Bosio, the celebrated explorer of the Christian catacombs, found a cemetery which he identified as being of Jewish origin.[1] It was in a vineyard on the Via Portuense about a mile outside the Porta Portese on the hill called Rosato in the district of Monteverde. I shall quote from Bosio's own account, which, though often referred to, is not easily accessible. After describing how, in company with the Marchese Giovanni Pietro Caffarelli and Giovanni Zaratino Castellini, he explored the vineyards and regions about the Via Portuensis, he goes on: "On Saturday, Dec. 14, 1602, issuing from the aforementioned gate (Porta Portese), we entered the first branch road at the right, and ascending the Colle Rosato, we came into a vineyard, which was formerly the property of Bishop Ruffino, but was at this time owned by the children of Muzio Vitozzi. At the extremity of this vineyard, which faces the Tiber, we found a narrow opening to a cave, difficult and dangerous to negotiate, situated in a precipitous cliff, below which lies a valley, where there are large tufa quarries beneath the cemetery. Making our way through this opening with bodies bent, we entered the catacomb. It is excavated in the tufa (in some parts exceedingly unfirm) and is of moderate extent. Still, in the two hours that we remained there we apparently traversed it all. We noticed however that there were other entrances and galleries, choked with earth, which may possibly extend considerably further. This cemetery is similar in construction to the others, with its tombs cut in the walls, and in some spots

[1] Bosio, *Roma Sotterranea*, Rome 1632, 141 ff. In the second edition (1650), which is less rare, see pp. 186–192.

containing trenches and sepulchres excavated in the pavement. We did however observe one feature in which it differs from the other catacombs: the tombs are, for the most part, closed not with tiles and slabs of marble, but with bricks covered with stucco, on which the epitaphs were in nearly every case painted in red letters. Some of the inscriptions were even cut into the stucco, and of these we found a good number. The inscriptions were all in Greek and in a fragmentary condition, for the tombs had been opened by inquisitive and greedy excavators, who had destroyed portions of the bricks and stucco which had borne the inscriptions. Consequently no complete sense can be derived from them, for there survive only the first words, which are practically always the same, as follows: ἐνθάδε κῖτε ἐν εἰρήνῃ. On one tomb there was still entirely visible in red letters the name ΑΣΑΠΡΙΚΙΙ. The cemetery, which is very crudely constructed, contains only two private chambers (*cubicoli*), and even these are very small and mean, as is, in fact, the entire cemetery; for therein one can see not a fragment of marble nor a sign of painting, except that on nearly every sepulchre there is painted in red or imprinted in the stucco the seven-branched candlestick. We found there many lamps of terra cotta, crudely made and practically all broken. One only was intact and bore the figure of the aforementioned candlestick. From the fact that we found in this cemetery no sign of Christianity, and we read on the fragment of one inscription the brief word ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓ, and from other details mentioned above, we decided that this was the particular cemetery of the ancient Hebrews."[2] Bosio's great work, *Roma Sotterranea*, was published in 1632, three years after the author's death, by Giovanni Severani.[3] This first folio edition was followed in 1650 by a second quarto edition with far fewer plates. Soon afterward there appeared a shabbily written

[2] *Op. cit.*, 142 f. The passage is quoted by Kirchhoff in *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, IV, 587. Kirchhoff quotes also Castellini's brief description from a MS at Verona.

[3] It actually appeared in 1634. See H. Leclercq, *Manuel d'archéologie chrétienne*, Paris 1907, I, 35.

Latin version by Paolo Aringhi, who made many additions of his own.[4]

In the course of the century which followed ten Jewish inscriptions were found at Rome. It was believed, without adequate proof, that they all came from the catacomb on the Via Portuense, the only Jewish catacomb known at that time. These inscriptions, eight of which are in Greek and two in Latin,[5] were published in part—to cite only the earliest works—by Spon in 1685,[6] Fabretti in 1699,[7] Doni in 1731,[8] Lupi in 1734,[9] Muratori in 1739,[10] Marangoni in 1740,[11] Venuti in 1748,[12] and Corsini in 1749.[13] These

[4] *Roma subterranea novissima*, Rome 1651. On the Jews and their catacomb see vol. I, 390–402.

[5] *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (CIG) 6337, 9904, 9906, 9907, 9908, 9920, 9921, 9923; *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (CIL) VI. 29756, 29757. Of these, CIG 9907 and CIL VI. 29757 most probably came from the Monteverde catacomb, since they mention, respectively, the synagogues of the *Agrippenses* and the *Augustenses*, the members of which used this catacomb.

[6] Jacob Spon, *Miscellanea eruditae antiquitatis*, Lyons 1685, p. 371, Nos. 118–120 (= CIG 9906, 9907, CIL VI. 29756).

[7] Raphael Fabretti, *Inscriptionum antiquarum quae in aedibus paternis asservantur explicatio et supplementum*, Rome 1699, p. 389, Nos. 246–248 (= CIG 9907, 9923, 9906); p. 465, No. 101 (= CIL VI. 29756).

[8] J. B. Doni, *Inscriptiones antiquae cum notis*, Florence 1731, p. 528, No. 22 (= CIG 9921); a posthumous work, edited by A. Gori.

[9] Antonio Lupi, *Dissertatio et animadversiones ad nuper inventum S. Severae Martyris epitaphium*, Palermo 1734, p. 51, pl. VIII [misprint for VII] (= CIG 9908, 9906), p. 140 (= CIG 6337), p. 177 (= CIG 9920), p. 178 (= CIG 9904). Lupi's readings are fairly accurate, but his explanations are of no value.

[10] Lodovico Antonio Muratori, *Novus thesaurus veterum inscriptionum*, Milan 1739, I, 152, No. 4 and II, 708, No. 3 (= CIG 9906; the first version is from Lupi); II, 1129, No. 6 (= CIG 6337; from Lupi); III, 1674, No. 3 (= CIG 9920); IV, 2045, No. 7 (= CIL VI. 29757; from Marangoni). Muratori's readings are unreliable (cf. his two different versions of CIG 9906) and his attempts at interpretation are ludicrous.

[11] Giovanni Marangoni, *Acta S. Victorini, Episcopi Amiterni et Martyris*, Rome 1740, 151 (= CIL VI. 29757). On the manuscript notes of Marangoni see *infra*, note 24.

[12] Ridolfino Venuti, "Dissertazione sopra due antiche greche iscrizioni" in *Giornale dei Letterati*, Rome 1748, 149 (= CIG 9920), 151 (= CIL VI. 29756, from Fabretti), 152 (= CIG 9904), 153 (= CIG 9907, from Fabretti, and 9906, from Spon).

[13] Edoardo Corsini, *Notae Graecorum sive vocum et numerorum compendia*, Florence 1749, Appendix, Diss. II, p. 30 (= CIG 9921, from Doni). I had no

scholars, unacquainted as they were with Jewish antiquities, not infrequently failed to recognize the Jewish character of these inscriptions and classified them as pagan or Christian.[14] It appears that even before Bosio discovered the Jewish catacomb, Claudius Menestrier (died 1639) had seen two of these inscriptions in 1592 and transcribed them in a manuscript, which is now preserved in the Vatican Library.[15] His readings, which differ somewhat from all the other versions, have hitherto been unnoticed. Two of the ten inscriptions are still extant, one (CIG 9920) in the Museo delle Terme[16] and the other (CIG 9904) in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran Museum.[17] The other eight I was unable to find in their last recorded locations, nor am I acquainted with any notice of their having been seen after the 18th century, with the exception of one (CIG 9906), which Padre Garrucci saw near the church of Santa Chiara before 1862.[18]

The catacomb itself was still accessible in the middle of the 18th century. The antiquarian, Giuseppe Bianchini, claims to have visited it (before 1747) in company with Cardinal

opportunity to consult the following additional references: T. S. Baier, *Lucubrationes de inscriptionibus Iudaeorum graecis et latinis*, Königsberg 1721, 15 (= CIL VI. 29756), cited by Brunati, *Leggendario, etc.* (see *infra*, note 33), p. 190; Ciacconio, *Inscriptiones sacrae et prophanae collectae Romae et in aliis Italiae urbibus*, MS at Ferrara, fol. 40 (= CIL VI. 29756), cited in CIL, *l. c.*; Giovenazzi, *Della città di Aveia ne' Vestini*, 1773, 57 (= CIG 6337), cited in CIG, *l. c.*; Reinesius, *Syntagma inscriptionum*, 1001, No. 444 (= CIG 9907) and *Epistulae ad Hoffm. et Rup.*, Ep. XLI, p. 359, No. 300 (= CIG 9907), both citations in CIG, *l. c.*

[14] *e.g.* CIG 6337 is classified as pagan by Lupi and by Kirchhoff (in CIG); CIG 9921 as Christian by Corsini; CIL VI. 29757 as pagan by Muratori and by Marangoni; CIG 9920 is hesitatingly called Jewish by Lupi, who thinks it may possibly be Christian, although the stone shows the *menorah*, *shofar*, *lulab*, and even the Hebrew word, שלום.

[15] Cod. Vat. Lat. 10545, fol. 150 (= CIL VI. 29756), fol. 239 (= CIG 9907).

[16] No. 67613. It had previously been in the Museo Kircheriano (Brunati, *Musei Kircheriani Inscriptiones*, Milan 1837, 119), from which it was removed when the archaeological collection was transferred, about 1889, to the new National Museum in the Baths of Diocletian.

[17] Among the *inscriptiones veterum Iudaeorum ex variis coemeteriis*, No. 13.

[18] *Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei*, 38 f.

Domenico Passionei, a noted archaeologist.[19] Since however his description of the place is very indefinite, and the two cuts with which he illustrates the seven-branched candlestick are almost identical with those which had been published in Bosio's work more than a century earlier, I am inclined to think that he may not have seen the catacomb at all but that he appropriated both description and illustrations from Bosio. His reliability as an archaeologist is called in question also by De Rossi, who says of him: "His epigraphical notes are of practically no value since they either present material taken from published works or are based on very inaccurate copies of the inscribed stones."[20] Ridolfino Venuti refers to the catacomb as still existing in 1748, but, despite references in modern writers, he does not describe it nor does he state that he even visited it.[21] The catacomb appears to have been visited in 1748 by Gaetano Migliore, who claimed to have seen a number of tombs and a few cubicula, some fragments of inscriptions and representations of Jewish cult symbols before the danger of being buried alive compelled him to withdraw.[22]

In the decade between 1740 and 1750 thirteen inscriptions[23] were found in this catacomb of Via Portuense. Early

[19] *Delle magnificenze di Roma antica e moderna*, Rome 1747, I, 57. The reference is wrongly given as page 70 by Venuti, *Giornale dei Letterati*, 1748, 147; Lanciani, *New Tales of Old Rome*, 247; Berliner, *Geschichte der Juden in Rom*, I, 47.

[20] *Inscriptiones Christianae*, I, Rome 1861, p. xxx.

[21] *Giornale dei Letterati*, 1748, 147 f. For his alleged description of the catacomb see De Ricci, *Comptes-Rendus Acad. Inscr.*, 1905, 245 and *JE*, IX, 471; Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*, III[4], 65 and note 101.

[22] *Ad inscriptionem Flaviae Antoniae commentarius sive de antiquis Iudaeis exercitatio epigraphica*, Cod. Vat. Lat. 9143, fol. 113 ff. Cf. Lanciani, *New Tales of Old Rome*, 247; Berliner, *Gesch. d. Jud. in Rom*, I, 47. De Ricci in *JE*, IX, 471 refers to this MS as being in *Codex Ferrar.* 269. The MS, if indeed it is the same, is in the Vatican Library under the number indicated above.

[23] CIG 9901–9903, 9912–9919; Fiorelli, *Catal. del Mus. Naz. di Napoli, Raccolta epigr.*, II, No. 1965; and an inscription published by Oderici, *Dissertationes*, 254 (see the following note) and by Greppo, *Notices*, 27, No. 8 (see *infra* note 38), but ignored by modern writers. It is not included in Vogelstein and Rieger's collection (*Gesch. d. Jud. in Rom*, I, 459–483) nor in Müller-Bees, *Inschr. d. jüd. Kat. am Monteverde*. That this inscription was found at the Monteverde catacomb is attested by Marini (Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 938, No. 6), Oderici, and Greppo. That it is Jewish is proved by the *menorah* engraved upon it.

copies are found in the manuscript notes or published works of Marangoni,[24] Venuti,[25] Uhden,[26] Raponi,[27] Migliore,[28] Marini,[29] Nicolai,[30] Cardinali,[31] Osann,[32] Bru-

[24] Marangoni's manuscript notes contained CIG 9919 and the inscription discussed in the previous note. His copies of these inscriptions were first published by G. A. Oderici, *Dissertationes et adnotationes in aliquot ineditas veterum inscriptiones et numismata*, Rome 1765, 253 f. Marangoni's texts of these inscriptions were copied also by Fabio Danzetta (wrongly referred to as "Faldo Danzelta" in Müller-Bees, *Inschr. d. jüd. Kat. am Monteverde*, p. 168) in a MS now in the Vatican (Cod. Vat. Lat. 8324, fol. 109).

[25] *Giornale dei Letterati*, 1748, 145 (= CIG 9903), 146 = (Fiorelli 1965).

[26] The readings of Uhden, whose manuscript notes are in the Berlin Museum, are reproduced by Kirchhoff in CIG 9901–9903, 9912–9916.

[27] *Inscriptiones ad Iudaeos Italicos spectantes Velitris in museo Borgiano*, 1789, Cod. Vat. Lat. Mus. Borg. 278, fol. 154–160 (= CIG 9901–9903, 9912–9916, and Fiorelli 1965). Raponi's readings of these nine inscriptions, which were then in the museum at Velletri (see p. 305), are entirely accurate.

[28] *Ad inscriptionem Flaviae Antoniae, etc.* (see *supra* note 22), Cod. Vat. Lat. 9143, fol. 114 (= CIG 9903), 120 (= CIG 9919), 122 (= CIG 9912, 9913), 124 (= Fiorelli 1965), 125 (= CIG 9914), 140 (= CIG 9902), 149 (= CIG 9901).

[29] Gaetano Marini, *Gli atti e monumenti de' fratelli Arvali*, Rome 1795, 342 (= CIG 9917), 347 (= CIG 9918); *Iscrizioni cristiane greche*, Cod. Vat. Lat. 9102, fol. 197 (= Fiorelli 1965), 212 (= CIG 9919); *Epitaphia Hebraeorum*, Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 938–941, includes all thirteen of the Monteverde inscriptions, several of the Jewish inscriptions which had been found earlier, and a number of others which he was probably the first to copy and identify as Jewish. A few of these are, as far as I have been able to determine, still unpublished, including one (fol. 939, No. 2), which is stated to be from the Monteverde catacomb; it is now in the monastery at St. Paul's on the Via Ostiense. Marini's readings, though on the whole fairly accurate, are not always reliable.

[30] Niccola Maria Nicolai, *Della basilica di S. Paolo*, Rome 1815, 161, No. 264 (= CIG 9917); 163, No. 268 (= CIG 9918). Nicolai adds three other Jewish inscriptions of the collection at St. Paul's. His readings are very inaccurate.

[31] Clemente Cardinali, "Iscrizioni antiche inedite" in *Giornale arcadico di scienze, lettere, ed arti*, XI (Rome 1821), 229–235, Nos. xx–xxiv (= CIG 9901, 9913–9915, Fiorelli 1965). I have not seen his version of CIG 9902 in his *Opuscoli letterarii*, Bologna 1819, II, p. 245, No. xc, cited by Kirchhoff in CIG; nor his *Iscrizioni antiche inedite*, Bologna 1819, No. 432 (= CIG 9913), No. 433 (= CIG 9915), cited by Müller-Bees, *Inschr. d. jüd. Kat.*, 162, 168. Cardinali's readings, which are based on manuscript copies of the stones, are not reliable.

[32] Friedrich Osann, *Sylloge inscriptionum antiquarum graecarum et latinarum*, Leipzig 1834, 472, No. 2 (=CIG 9918); 474, No. 12 (=CIG 9917)—among the "inscriptiones Basilicae S. Pauli ad Viam Ostiensem." Osann includes all the Jewish inscriptions which he found at the Vatican (these are now at the Lateran), at St. Paul's, and in the Palazzo Rondanini (these are now in the Museo delle Terme), eight in all.

nati,[33] and, to add few later names, Burgon,[34] and Garrucci.[35] Two of these inscriptions (CIG 9919 and Oderici 254) have apparently disappeared; of the others, two (CIG 9917, 9918) may now be seen among the inscriptions on the walls of the monastery adjoining the basilica of St. Paul on the Via Ostiense; nine were taken to the Museo Borgiano at Velletri, from which later[36] five (CIG 9901, 9902, 9903, 9913, Fiorelli 1965) were removed to Naples and are now in the Museo Nazionale; the remaining four were taken to Rome: of these, two (CIG 9912, 9914) are in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran Museum, and two (CIG 9915, 9916) are in the Capitoline Museum.[37]

[33] Giuseppe Brunati, *Leggendario o vite di santi bresciani*, Brescia 1834, 191 (= CIG 9903).

[34] Rev. John William Burgon, *Letters from Rome to Friends in England*, London 1862, 165, No. 27 (= CIG 9916); 167, No. 30 (= CIG 9902); 169, No. 32 (= CIG 9913), No. 33 (= CIG 9902). In the section headed "Specimens of early Jewish sepulchral inscriptions," pp. 162–174, the Rev. Burgon presents accurate copies of both these and other inscriptions which he saw at Rome and in the Naples Museum.

[35] Raffaele Garrucci, *Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei scoperto recentemente in Vigna Randanini*, Rome 1862, 26 (= CIG 9916); *Dissertazioni archeologiche di vario argomento*, II, Rome 1865, 188, No. 5 (= CIG 9918), No. 6 (= CIG 9913); 190, No. 12 (= CIG 9903); 192, No. 17 (= Fiorelli 1965); *Storia della arte cristiana*, VI, Prato 1880, pl. 492, Nos. 2, 3 (= CIG 9901, Fiorelli 1965).

[36] At some time before 1834, for Brunati saw and copied CIG 9903 at Naples before that year (see *supra* note 33).

[37] Twelve of this group of thirteen inscriptions (Oderici, p. 254 is omitted; cf. note 23) were published with facsimiles and detailed notes by N. A. Bees in Müller's, *Inschriften der jüdischen Katakomben am Monteverde zu Rom*, Leipzig 1919, pp. 151–172, Nos. 173–184. Bees states (p. 164) that CIG 9917 was formerly at Velletri, but this is hardly possible, for neither Raponi (see note 27) nor Marini (see note 29) included it among the inscriptions of the museum at Velletri, while Marini himself saw this inscription at Rome before 1795 (*Atti de' fratelli Arvali*, 342 and Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 940, No. 6). It was already in St. Paul's by 1815 (Nicolai, *op. cit.*, 161; cf. *supra* note 30). Dessau wrongly conjectures (in Müller-Bees, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 and 160) that CIG 9917 and 9918 are in the cloister of St. Paul's ("im anstoßenden Klosterhof"). They are actually on the walls of the monastery itself, where they have been for a number of years. That they were once in the cloister is indicated by the fact that Nicolai included them among "iscrizioni affisse al muro nel chiostro." Bees, further, fails to note (*op. cit.*, p. 165, No. 180) that Fiorelli 1965 was at Velletri before it came to Naples. It is included among the inscriptions of the Velletri Museum

For a century after the discovery of these inscriptions nothing further seems to have been done with the catacomb, nor was anything of importance written about it. J. H. G. Greppo did, to be sure, in 1835 publish a pamphlet entitled "Notes on Inscriptions found in certain Jewish Tombs at Rome."[38] In this essay he described only nine inscriptions,[39] thinking that these were all that existed at the time.[40] His readings have no independent value for he had not seen the inscriptions which he described, but had copied them from the above cited works of Spon, Fabretti, Muratori, Oderici, and Lupi. Of the thirteen inscriptions which had been found at the Monteverde catacomb after 1740 he knew only one.[41] Greppo announced that he was planning a great work on all the monuments of the ancient Jews, but I can find no trace of it.

After a century of neglect even the site of the Jewish catacomb was forgotten. In 1843 the archaeologist, Padre Giuseppe Marchi, aided by the engineer, Themistocle Marucchi, and the architect, Francesco Fontana, made a vain search for the entrance to the cemetery.[42] They carefully examined, foot by foot, the entire region where the catacomb was believed to lie. When they thought that they had discovered the site, they had a path laid open by two master masons to an aperture, through which the explorers crawled part way, when they discovered that they were entering not the celebrated catacomb, but what was probably an ancient reservoir for rain water. After two more equally unsuccessful

by Raponi (Cod. Vat. Mus. Borg. 278, fol. 155) and by Marini (Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 940, No. 9). Bees has omitted the reference to Raponi and has given the Marini reference incorrectly.

[38] *Notices sur des inscriptions antiques tirées de quelques tombeaux juifs à Rome*, Lyons 1835.

[39] Pp. 8–28 = CIG 9907, 9906, 9908, 9919, 9904, 9923, 9920, CIL VI. 29756, and the inscription published by Oderici, *op. cit.*, 254 (cf. *supra* notes 23 and 24).

[40] The manuscript notes of Migliore and Marini (see *supra* notes 28 and 29) contain at least 31 Jewish inscriptions of Rome, but some of these had probably not yet been published by 1835.

[41] CIG 9919, which he had found in Oderici, *op. cit.*, 253.

[42] Marchi, *I monumenti delle arti cristiane primitive nella metropoli del cristianesimo*, Rome 1844, 22.

attempts Marchi was convinced that the catacomb was completely inaccessible and that the entrance would never be found. In 1879 Mariano Armellini, one of the leading Christian archaeologists of his time, announced with a mistaken confidence that he had rediscovered the entrance, but that it was so choked with earth that excavation was necessary.[43] Then Nikolaus Müller, who was to contribute more than any other archaeologist to the study of the Jewish catacombs, made a vain search in 1884 and again in 1888.[44] In 1900 and in 1904 M. Seymour de Ricci unsuccessfully attempted to rediscover the lost catacomb.[45]

Finally, in October 1904 word was received by the Commissione di Archeologia Sacra that laborers, who were blasting at Monteverde outside the Porta Portese, had come upon some ancient tombs. Nikolaus Müller, who was given the opportunity to examine the discovery, announced that this was the catacomb which had been discovered by Bosio three centuries earlier.[46] The excavation was carried on under Müller's direction with the co-operation of the owner of the vineyard, Marchese Pellegrini-Quarantotti, from November 1904 to January 1905, and again in the spring and fall of 1906. Lack of funds delayed further operations until 1909, when after a small amount of work the excavation was abandoned, and the catacomb was allowed to collapse so completely that restoration was impossible.[47] In the meantime, in 1907, all the inscriptions and other relics which could be saved had been taken to the Christian Museum of the Lateran, where they were arranged under Müller's direction in a separate room called the Sala Giudaica. In 1912 Müller,

[43] "Il cimitero degli antichi Ebrei presso la Via Portuense" in *Cronachetta Mensuale*, ser. II, vol. V (Rome 1879), 27–30.

[44] Müller, *Die jüdische Katakombe am Monteverde*, Leipzig 1912, 20.

[45] *Comptes-Rendus Acad. Inscr.*, 1905, 245 ff.

[46] Müller, *op. cit.*, 18 ff.

[47] *Ibid.* 20. When the catacomb was discovered, an unsuccessful effort was made to induce the wealthier Jews of Rome to bear the expense of excavation, since the papal archaeological commission had all it could do to excavate the Christian catacombs. See Anton de Waal, in *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde*, XIX (1905), 141.

who was preparing a comprehensive work on the Jewish catacombs of Italy, published a small preliminary monograph on the Monteverde catacomb.[48] In the same year Müller's untimely death deprived Jewish archaeology of one of its greatest investigators. The inscriptions of the Monteverde catacomb were published several years later under the auspices of the *Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums* by Dr. Nikos A. Bees, one of Müller's pupils, with a very detailed commentary and excellent facsimiles of nearly all the inscriptions.[49] This work, though magnificently edited and enriched with notes by Deissmann, Dessau, and other distinguished scholars, unfortunately contains many errors of reading and interpretation.

At the end of the year 1913 a new region of the catacomb was found, and stripped of its inscriptions in June 1914.[50] These inscriptions, which were few and comparatively unimportant, were added to the collection in the Lateran. All the Jewish inscriptions of the Sala Giudaica were published, very inadequately, by G. Schneider-Graziosi,[51] a young archaeologist, who lost his life at the battlefront. After the war Professor Roberto Paribeni, the director of excavations in the Roman district and director of the Museo delle Terme, published 25 new inscriptions which were found at the catacomb.[52] Through the courtesy of Professor Paribeni, I was

[48] *Op. cit.* After the author's death his description of the catacomb was published in Italian: "Il cimitero degli antichi Ebrei posto sulla Via Portuense" in *Dissertazioni della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia*, ser. II, vol. XII (1915), 207–318.

[49] *Die Inschriften der jüdischen Katakombe am Monteverde zu Rom*, Leipzig 1919. For reviews of this work see Th. Reinach, "La cimetière juive de Monteverde" in *REJ*, LXXI (1920), 113–126; P. Kretschmer in *Glotta*, XII (1923), 192 f.; H. J. Leon in *American Journal of Archaeology*, xxxi (1927), 392 ff.

[50] R. Kanzler, "Scoperta di una nuova regione del cimitero giudaico della Via Portuense" in *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXI (1915), 152–157.

[51] "La nuova Sala Giudaica nel Museo Cristiano Lateranense" in *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXI (1915). 13–56.

[52] "Iscrizioni del cimitero giudaico di Monteverde" in *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1919, 60–70; "Iscrizione latina del sepolcreto giudaico di Monteverde sulla Via Portuense," *ibid.*, 1921, 358 ff.

permitted to examine these in the basement of the Museo delle Terme, where they were temporarily placed.

The catacomb itself has so completely fallen into ruin that it is no longer accessible. In all, 207 Jewish inscriptions have been found in this catacomb. Of the 185 items in the Müller-Bees collection, only 166 may properly be counted, for at least seven are clearly pagan inscriptions,[53] and twelve others are to be excluded either because they bear not a single letter or for other reasons.[54] Five inscriptions, which had been found at an earlier time, were omitted from the collection,[55] and 36 others were found after Müller's death.[56] Of the 207 inscriptions, 138 are now in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran, 3 in the Capitoline Museum, 3 in the monastery at St. Paul's, 24 in the Museo delle Terme, 5 in the Museo Nazionale at Naples; the remaining 34 are either lost—for the most part in the ruins of the catacomb—or their present locations are unknown to me.

In the meantime other Jewish catacombs had been discovered. A large catacomb was found on May 1, 1859 at the Via Appia in the Vigna Randanini a short distance from the basilica of St. Sebastian near the branch road called Via Appia Pignatelli. This cemetery, which is very well preserved, was thoroughly explored and described by Padre Raffaele

[53] Nos. 4, 43, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105.

[54] Nos. 64, 72, 157, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171 show no letters; No. 161 has only traces of two sigmas; Nos. 17 and 18 are clearly parts of the same inscription (cf. Vaccari in *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXVIII, 1922, 44–47); No. 75 is the same as 142, as noted in the "Nachträge und Berichtigungen" (to Müller-Bees) on p. 174.

[55] CIG 9907 and CIL VI. 29757 (cf. *supra* note 5); the inscription published in Oderici, *Dissertationes*, 254 (*supra* note 23); an apparently unpublished inscription, now in the collection at St. Paul's, copied by Marini in Cod. Vat. Lat. 9074, fol. 939, No. 2 (*supra* note 29); an inscription, found about 1900 (*Notizie degli Scavi*, 1900, 88 and *Bull. Comm. Arch. Comun.*, 1900, 223), which is almost certainly from the Monteverde catacomb, because it not only refers to the synagogue of the *Augustenses*, which is mentioned in five other inscriptions found in this catacomb, but the stone itself was found near the Piazza di S. Francesco alla Ripa a short distance inside the Porta Portese. This last inscription, which was on a sarcophagus, is now in the Capitoline Museum.

[56] Eleven were published in 1915 by Kanzler and by Schneider-Graziosi, twenty-five by Paribeni in 1919 and 1921 (*supra* notes 50–52).

Garrucci, one of the most eminent of Christian archaeologists.[57] Jewish cemeteries had now been found in those two sections of the city where it was known from the literary sources that the Jews had settled; namely, the Transtiberine region[58] and the district outside the Porta Capena at the Via Appia.[59] In the catacomb there were found among other objects about 180 inscriptions, 130 of which were published by Garrucci[60] and 5 by Marucchi.[61] The rest, with the exception of three,[62] are still unpublished. When the vineyard was sold in 1884, many of the inscriptions were removed, but some were later replaced.[63] In 1904 M. de Ricci found 136 inscriptions in the catacomb;[64] in 1922 I was able to find only 121. Not a few of those which Garrucci and Marucchi saw entire are now in a fragmentary condition. All of the inscribed stones have been inserted in the walls of the catacomb, but with no apparent attempt to place them near the spot where they were found. Portions of the same inscription are sometimes divided between widely separated parts of the catacomb. Some of the inscriptions which were in the catacomb when Marucchi published his *Guida* in 1884 are now to be found elsewhere. Four are in the Museo delle Terme;[65] one is in the Capitoline

[57] *Cimitero degli antichi Ebrei scoperto recentemente in Vigna Randanini*, Rome 1862, and "Descrizione del cimitero ebraico di Vigna Randanini" in his *Dissertazioni archeologiche di vario argomento*, II, Rome 1865, 168–178. Before Garrucci's monograph a very incomplete and inaccurate description had been published by E. Herzog: "Le catacombe degli Ebrei in Vigna Rondanini (sic)" in *Bull. Ist. Corr. Arch.*, 1861, 91–104.

[58] Philo, *Legat. ad Gaium* 23. 155 (Cohn-Wendland).

[59] Juvenal 3. 12–16.

[60] In *Cimitero*, 23–69; "Nuove epigrafi ebraiche di Vigna Randanini" in *Diss. Arch.*, II, 153–167 and "Epigrafi inedite di Vigna Randanini," *ibid.*, 178–185.

[61] "Scavi nella Vigna Randanini" in *Cronachetta Mensuale*, ser. III, vol. II (1883), 188 ff. Marucchi refers to a large number of the inscriptions without giving the full texts in his pamphlet, *Breve guida del cimitero giudaico in Vigna Randanini*, Rome 1884 (reproduced in his *Le catacombe romane*, Rome 1905, 234–247 and *Éléments d'archéologie chrétienne*, II, Paris 1903, 208–226.

[62] CIL VI. 7649, 7663 and Müller, *Mitteil. Deutsch. Arch. Inst., Röm. Abt.*, I (1886), 56.

[63] Marucchi, *Catacombe romane*, 244, note 2.

[64] *JE*, IX, 471.

[65] Those published in Garrucci, *Cimitero*, 31, 51, 52, 60.

Museum;[66] I found half of one stone at Columbia University in New York City, while the other half is still inside the catacomb, as I have shown elsewhere.[67] Also a small fragment, which the late Schneider-Graziosi saw in the Vigna Angelucci at Velletri,[68] is clearly from the missing portion of a stone, the greater part of which is in the catacomb.[69] Of the published inscriptions from this catacomb I was unable to locate 32, but I copied 19 which have not yet been published.

This catacomb, which is on property now owned by the Marchese di Roccagiovine, is the only Jewish catacomb in Rome which is accessible to visitors. It is described in many of the guide-books, and there is usually some guide available to conduct visitors through the subterranean corridors. Some of the galleries, which are thought to be insecure, are closed to visitors, and may be examined only with the permission of the owner. In these galleries I found several inscriptions. Some parts of the catacomb are unfortunately still unexcavated.

In 1867 Giovanni Battista de Rossi, the greatest Christian archaeologist of the 19th century, found a small Jewish catacomb in the vineyard of Conte Cimarra by the Via Appia, beyond St. Sebastian's. De Rossi published only a brief announcement of his discovery with the promise of a plan and full description,[70] but the promise was not carried out. Abraham Berliner published De Rossi's copies of six of the inscriptions.[71] Neither the catacomb nor its inscriptions appear to be available.

A fourth Jewish catacomb was discovered in 1882 by Commendatore Orazio Marucchi, who was then at the beginning of a distinguished career in the field of Christian

[66] Garrucci, *Diss. Arch.*, II, 179, No. 8.

[67] "A Jewish Inscription at Columbia University" in *American Journal of Archaeology*, XXVIII (1924), 251 f.

[68] *Nuov. Bull. Arch. Crist.*, XXI (1915), 53 f. Possibly more of the missing inscriptions are at Velletri, for the Angelucci family once owned Vigna Randanini.

[69] It was almost entire when Garrucci copied it (*Cimitero*, 54).

[70] "Scoperta d'un cimitero giudaico presso l'Appia" in *Bull. Arch. Crist.*, V (1867), 16.

[71] *Gesch. d. Jud. in Rom*, I, Frankfurt 1893, 90 ff.

archaeology.[72] It was situated on the left of the Via Labicana in the Vigna Apolloni, more than a mile outside the Porta Maggiore. It had accidentally been found by workmen, who were reopening an ancient *pozzolana* quarry. No actual excavation was attempted until January 1884, when after only three days of digging under Marucchi's direction, the work was discontinued on account of lack of funds, nor has it ever been resumed. The five inscriptions which were found there are so fragmentary that they are of small value.

In 1885 Nikolaus Müller found another small Jewish catacomb on the Via Appia Pignatelli, near the main Via Appia and close to the large catacomb of Vigna Randanini and the Christian catacomb of Praetextatus.[73] Müller found there three Jewish inscriptions, and several pagan inscriptions on stones which had been used to close the openings of the *loculi*. The brief preliminary description was to be followed by a detailed account, which was to be included in Müller's work on all the Jewish catacombs of Italy, a work which was unhappily cut off by the author's death. Both this catacomb and that of the Via Labicana are no longer accessible.

Lastly, in 1919 a sixth Jewish catacomb was discovered on the grounds of Villa Torlonia on the Via Nomentana at the intersection of Via Lazzaro Spallanzani about a half mile from the Porta Pia. The discovery was made by the workmen of Prince Don Giovanni Torlonia while they were digging the foundations for a new stable. The catacomb was excavated at Prince Torlonia's expense under the supervision of the engineer, Agostino Valente. An investigation was made by Professor Roberto Paribeni and the architect, Italo Gismondi. Paribeni published a brief description of the catacomb with

[72] Marucchi, "Di un nuovo cimitero giudaico sulla Via Labicana" in *Dissert. Pontif. Accad. Arch.*, ser. II, vol. II (1884), 499–532; also published separately. The account is reproduced in his *Catacombe romane*, 279–297 and *Élém. d'arch. chrét.*, II, 259–275. Cf. *Bull. Arch. Crist.*, 1883, 79 f and 1884, 42 f.

[73] Müller, "Le catacombe ebraiche presso la Via Appia Pignatelli" in *Mitteil. Deutsch. Arch. Inst., Röm. Abt.*, I (1886), 49–56. Cf. Fiorelli in *Mem. Accad. Lincei*, I (1885), 334 (= *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1885, 158).

the texts of 52 inscriptions and a plan by Gismondi.[74] Through the generous permission of Prince Torlonia, I made two visits to this catacomb, which is not otherwise accessible, and made copies and measurements of 68 inscriptions, 22 of which have not yet been published. Of those published by Paribeni I found all but six. His readings, which were taken under difficulties, can be corrected in many important details. Nearly all the inscriptions are still in their original places inside the catacomb, for they are painted on the stuccoed closures of the *loculi*. The few inscriptions on marble had been removed to the stable. The catacomb has not yet been completely excavated. Certain portions, which threaten to collapse, have been buttressed with wooden supports.

To sum up, six Jewish catacombs have been found at Rome: three by the Via Appia, one each at the Via Portuense, the Via Labicana, and the Via Nomentana. These catacombs have yielded, to my knowledge, the texts of 452 Jewish inscriptions,[75] 42 of which are still unpublished. Besides, there are 34 others (four still unpublished) which were found at Rome, but the specific catacomb from which each came cannot be determined with certainty.[76] In addition, eight Jewish inscriptions (one unpublished) were found at Porto, about fifteen miles from Rome, where there was a Jewish community which may have had some connection with the community at Rome.[77] This makes a total of 494 Jewish

[74] "Catacomba giudaica sulla Via Nomentana" in *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1920, 143–155. Cf. the briefer notice in *Atene e Roma*, 1920, 181 ff.

[75] Monteverde 207, Vigna Randanini 157, Vigna Conte Cimarra 6, Via Appia Pignatelli 3, Via Labicana 5, Via Nomentana 74.

[76] Seven of these are in the Museo delle Terme, four at St. Paul's, three in the Lateran Museum, two in the Capitoline Museum, one at S. Maria in Trastevere, four at Naples; the remaining thirteen I was unable to find. Of those at the Terme, three (CIG 9909, 9922, and Garrucci, *Diss. Arch.*, II, 191, No. 13) had once been in the Palazzo Rondanini on the Corso.

[77] G. B. De Rossi in *Bull. Arch. Crist.*, IV (1866), 40; Lanciani in *Ann. Ist. Corr. Arch.*, XL (1868), 191; Le Blant in *Comptes-Rend. Acad. Inscr.* XIV (1886), 195 f.; J. Dérenbourg, "Elazar, Le Peitan" in *Mélanges Renier*, Paris 1887, 438 ff.; J. Ficker, *Die altchristlichen Bildwerke im christlichen Museum des Laterans*, Leipzig 1890, 36, No. 86. These inscriptions are now in the court of the Bishop's Palace at Porto, with the exception of the inscription published by Ficker and half of

inscriptions found at or near Rome. Whether or not Rome will yield more Jewish catacombs and inscriptions, the material at present available is sufficient to permit a partial reconstruction of certain aspects of the ancient community.

the long epitaph in Dérenbourg, *op. cit.*, 440, which are now in the Sala Giudaica of the Lateran. De Ricci, *JE*, XI, 471 and Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*, III⁴, 66 assert that a Jewish catacomb was found at Porto, but there is no such statement in the authorities which they cite.

AN UNKNOWN HEBREW VERSION OF THE SAYINGS OF AESOP

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IN the library of Columbia University there is preserved a manuscript which I think is unique, by one Elijah ben Menaḥem Raba, at once the author and the scribe. The manuscript was formerly in the possession of the Temple Emanuel in New York City, having been in the collection bought of Müller of Amsterdam in the year 1868, and presented by the Trustees of the Temple to Columbia in the year 1893. Elijah ben Menaḥem Raba lived in Carpi, in the Dukedom of Modena.[1] Raba's father resided in Padua, where he composed, so far as our knowledge reaches, seven different writings, of which mention is made in Wolf's *Bibliotheca Hebraea*. Only three of these seem to have reached the printer, the one entitled *Beṭ Moed* having been edited by his son in the year 1604–1605.[2]

The manuscript before us contains several compilatory works by the younger Raba: a collection of Talmudic sayings arranged alphabetically and commented on pithily by the collector; a similarly ordered collection of wise saws culled from the Midrash and Talmud, arranged according to the occurrence in them of the numbers 1, 2, etc., up to 10—likewise commented

[1] Cf. *Ben Chananja*, Szegedin 1866, p. 215; *Catalogo dei Manoscritti Ebraici della Biblioteca della Communita Israelitica di Mantova, compilato dal Rabbino Maggiore Marco Mortara*, Livorno 1878, p. 58. (For the use of this little book I am indebted to the late Rev. Dr. S. Morais of Philadelphia). Mortara says that Raba lived in Padua, but the MS. is stated distinctly to have been written in Carpi. On the title-page we read, תהת ממשלת טיעלת אדונינו דוכוס דון אלפונסו יר״ה דאיסטה נתנשה אבן אמן כי״ה. Of course, Alfonso II (1559–1597), the persecutor of Tasso, and the last legitimate offspring of the Italian branch of the *Este* house, is meant. Cf. Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, x, pp. 365 ff. Cf., also, *REJ.*, 1925, p. 72; Eisenstadt-Wiener, *Da'at Ḳedoshim*, p. 147; Steinschneider, *Purim and Parody* for a bibliography of the Raba family, as well as Neubauer, *Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Juden*, 3rd let. *al fin.*

[2] And not 1608, as Fürst, *Bibliotheca Judaica*, ii, p. 352, and Benjacob, *Ozar Ha-Sepharim*, p. 75, No. 363 state. Cf. Steinschneider, *Catalogus*, col. 1733.

upon and, together with the first, provided with careful references to the originals. Then comes another list of sayings taken from philosophic and moral works in alphabetical order, and lengthily commented upon by the collector.[3]

The last place in the manuscript is taken by the Hebrew translation from an Italian original, which is also given.[4] The 355 sayings bear the Hebrew title *Aderet Eliyahu*; Italian title they have none. In a long, rhymed prose introduction, his own work—Raba, the younger, gives the reason for this, his choice of name. The collection itself in short sentences of two στίχοι, which rhyme with each other, is headed thus: "Behold this: it existed, however, in olden times, in a Gentile speech. The writer composed it who is called by name Aesopo of Phrygia,[5] a Gentile who composed many proverbs, in number without end. By the aid of Heaven, the high, the exalted, I shall translate it into the Assyrian[6] speech. I open my lips and take up my parable and I say."

I know not by what right these sentences are dubbed "Of Aesop," for he it is without doubt who is here set up as their author. The Italian translations and "Bearbeitungen" of Aesop are many;[7] but in none of them have I been able to discover—from the title—a likeness to these "sayings" (which

[3] A fragment from the Genizah, now in the British Museum (Or. 5560 E) contains a collection of sayings arranged in series of twelve, according to the subject-matter. I have a copy of this fragment and hope to publish it. Cf., also, *Jehuda Bonsenyor and his Collection of Aphorisms*, *JQR.*, viii, pp. 632 *et seq.*

[4] Cf. Steinschneider in *MGWJ.*, xliii, p. 268.

[5] Wiener (*Ben Chananja*, *loc. cit.*) misread the title, and fashioned out of it one "Aesopo, מאיגיו a fruitful Christian author of the Middle Ages," of whose existence I find no proof.

[6] This term is applied usually to the script only and not to the language of the later Hebrew. See Kohut, *Aruch Ha-Shalem*, i, p. 324. I know of a few cases only where it is used for the *language*. Cf. Yerushalmi, Sotah, vii, 21 b; *ZDMG.*, xliii, p. 258; Levi, *Elia Levita und seine Leistungen als Grammatiker*, Breslau 1888, p. 35. אשורית = Syriac; cf. *Ozar Neḥmad*, ii, p. 242; Steinschneider, *Catalogus ... Lug. Batav.*, p. 66; Fürst, *Der Kanon des Alten Testaments*, p. 118. סורסי is used more commonly in this connection. Cf. Steinschneider, *Catalogus*, p. 66; *Jewish Literature*, p. 353; *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, xiv, p. 13. The same meaning attaches to the Arabic אלסריאני—which Harkavy has not noticed in *MGWJ.*, xiv, p. 32.

[7] Cf. S. F. W. Hoffmann, *Bibliographisches Lexicon*, i, p. 89.

word might, in the Hebrew, as well mean "proverbs"). The Hebrew itself indeed possesses a recension of the real pseudo-Aesop[8] and another collection which has been thrice done by the printer—1516, 1544, 1605;[9] but nothing, so far as I can ascertain, like the work of Raba. It may be that the name Aesop was used for any collection of wise saws or proverbs. Wilhelm von Christo in his *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*[10] says: "Auch mit Sprichwörtersammlungen wird Aesopos als Συρεπις λόγου καὶ αποκριματος in Verbindung gebracht."[10]

The translation is very free. The effort to produce clauses of the desired shortness and rhyme has, in some cases, effaced nearly all traces of the original. I doubt whether the translator was well up in his Italian; at times he seems to have made some bad mistakes.

[The editor of the Italian original comments as follows: I wish to express my perplexity as regards the Italian part of the MS. As it has come down to us, it leaves the impression that it is the work either of an author unworthy of the name or of an ignorant scribe. There are no doubt certain dialectal traits in it, although these are not homogeneous, and cannot with precision be ascribed to any one locality. There may also be certain words and locutions which are peculiarities of Judeo-Italian. But the many gross errors in grammar and orthography, the utter disregard of gender and number, of nominative and accusative, of agreement between subject and verb, between noun and adjective, confusion between homonyms,—all these can hardly be said to be due to any locality or any period. Yet it is just as rash to state that a man as versatile as our author can have been ignorant of his mother-tongue, or that its original Christian author did not know his native language. A solution of these problems might prove to be a contribution.—A.S.H.]

[8] Landsberger, *Die Fabeln des Sophos*, Posen 1859; cf. Geiger in *ZDMG.*, xiv, pp. 586 *et seq.*; Frankel, *Monatsschrift*, ix, p. 72; Jacobs, *The Fables of Aesop*, p. 216; Steinschneider, *Hebr. Übersetz.*, p. 844.

[9] These are the dates given by Steinschneider, *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, xiv, p. 53. Landsberger, *Fabulae aliquot Aramaeae*, p. 13, gives 1516, 1546, 1697. Paulus Cassel, however, in his critical edition of these fables (*Mischle Sindbad*, Berlin 1888, p. 307) says that the dates are 1517, 1543 and 1608. In the Bodleian there is a MS. containing an Italian and a Hebrew translation of Aesop's fables; but I know nothing of its character. See Neubauer, *Catalogue*, p. 1123.

[10] Ed. Wilhelm Schmid, München 1912, i, p. 193. See, also, *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift*, 1908, pp. 1144 *et seq.* on Victor Jensted's *Opuscula*, St. Petersburg 1907. "No. 20 Αἰσώπου λόγοι 'Sprüche des Aesop' in Moskau und Dresden, pp. 217–231." Cf., also, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, i, p. 170: Αἰσώπου παροιμίοι; also v. p. 331.

As I have already said, I have cause to believe that the manuscript is unique. I do not doubt that this very one was at one time in the possession of Dr. M. Wiener, who has described it.[11] In 1866 it became the property of N. Coronel,[12] from whom it passed (presumably through the hands of Giuseppe Almanzi)[13] to the auction room of Frederick Müller of Amsterdam, and thence to its present resting place.[14] I had also among my own books (it may be well to mention) a little manuscript volume containing the *Toledot Aezopu* in a late Italian hand. It seemed to have a big gap at the end; but, so far as I can see, there is nothing like it in the libraries whose catalogues I have. It is a Judaizing adaptation of the Aesopian history, for which responsibility was believed to rest[15] upon the shoulders of the 14th century monk Planudes; whom it seems best, since the days of Meziriac's *Vie d'Aesop*, to revile as hard as one can, speaking of nought but " the gross forgeries of that lying monk Planudes."[16]

In the following publication I have had the excellent assistance of my student, Mr. Abraham S. Halkin, who has taken upon his shoulders the responsibility of editing the whole Italian original. I owe him many thanks for this.

[11] *Ben Chananja, loc. cit.*

[12] On whom cf. Geiger, *Zeitschrift*, 1872, p. 124; *JE.*, *s. v.*

[13] The best part of the collection given by the Trustees of Temple Emanuel to the Library of Columbia University, has come from his collection, which, originally, was meant to go to the *Beth Hamidrash* in London (*Jewish Chronicle*, London, March 25, 1865). On Müller's sale see *ibid.*, August 28, 1868, p. 7. On Almanzi himself, see *JE.*, *s. v.* (where, in the Bibliography, my own article should be cited as having appeared in Vol. V, not IV of the *JQR.*) and *Rivista Israelitica*, viii, pp. 230 *et seq.*

[14] Cf. his *Catalog.*, Amsterdam 1868, p. 346. The MS. also contains the signatures, as it seems, of two Censors. On fol. 192 b, there is that of " Fra Luigi da Bologna, 1599," which name appears often upon Hebrew MSS. and prints of this period; cf., *e.g.*, *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, xiv, p. 60; Neubauer, *Catalogue*, col. 1099. On fol. 195 b there appears also the name " Camillo Jaghel, 1613." See *Hebr. Bibliogr.*, v, pp. 100 and 125; and William Popper, *The Censorship of Hebrew Books*, Index.

[15] But see Jacobs, *The Fables of Aesop*, p. 19.

[16] The words of the anonymous author of the *Select Fables of Esob and other Fabulists*, Birmingham 1764, Preface, p. 111. He was, also, the author of a collection of wise saws. See M. Tren in *Philologus*, xlix, p. 185.

1. L'huomo deue molto bene considerare il fine prima che uẽga a fare cosa alcuna.
2. E' molto piu bella la Bellezza del animo che quella del corpo.
3. Se gli huomini scelerati mutano ben stato et condecione no muteno però i custumi.
4. Le cose humani come dice Sãlustio ugualmẽte p[17] la concordia crescono e p la discordia rouinano.
5. Gli huomini p l'usuria et abondanza si marciscono et ritardono dal ben fare.
6. Se noi nascõderemo i nr̃i pecati da gli huomini nõ gli potremo nascondre da dio il qual sole uede ogni cosa.
7. Fuggiamo quelli amici che ne pericoli fugano per non darci haiuto.
8. Quelli che ha i piu forti a tempo cedono sonno migliori di quelli che nõ li cedono.
9. Quelli che piu che li altri pecano che persuedano a i principi de far male.
10. Spesse uolti il danno esser dotrina al' huomo.
11. Li adulatori sonno da essere ripresi.
12. Quelli che lasciano i loro consueti esercitij et uogliano fare quel che nõ sano sonno deleggiati et spesse uolti uengono ha pericolo.
13. L'huomini diuentono sauij con il danno et pericolo.
14. La contineua conuersatione fa che quelle cose che noi tememo grandemente ne paiono piaceuole.
15. Un huomo sauio deue comp[or]tare l'ingiurij che se li fano da quelli che nõ li sonno p sangue congiunti quando uede che quelli si fano ingiuria ancora fra lor medesimi.
16. Quelli che sonno belli di Corpo nõ ano senso d'animo ne industrio alcuno.
17. Con li tristi et scelerati nõ douemo hauer Compagnia.
18. Quel che si può prouare in fatti nõ fano bisogna paroli.
19. A Dio niuna cosa è ascosa ne anco esse si puo gabare.

[17] This is the author's usual abbreviation for per.

20. E matto colui che p speranza de maggior guadagno lascia andare cio che a in mano ben che sia picciolo.
21. I maggiori deuano partire li fatichi con i minori acio che tutti si saluano.
22. Fuggiamo l'amicicia di quelli huomini la cui uita et dopia et il parlare dubioso.
23. Dobiamo fuggire quelli che tratano malo li lor famigliare et domestichi.
24. L'huomini catiui quando año maggior piacere tanto piu se inam̃ano a far male.
25. Dobiamo patientemente soportare il male quando uedemo che chi ne e causa pate male egli ancorra.
26. Spesse uolti alcuni sperãdo prendere altri uiẽ preso lui.
27. Quelli che nõ saño gouernare le cose lore et uogliono hauer cura de quelli che nõ importano ad essi.[18]
28. Le cose publichi et priuati si distrugieno quãdo i principi eserceteno la crudeltà.
29. L'hauaro p l'auaritia gabbare ancor a Dio.
30. Quelli che nel prencipio de far male nõ sonno castigati fano semp magior male.
31. Niuno potere schiuare quel che deue intrauenere.
32. Nõ ci douemo atristare quando perdemo le Richezze che nõ hauemo hauuto dalla natura che nõ pono stare di cõtineuo cõ noi.
33. Molti huomini facilmento prometeno quel che con effetto nõ possõ dare.
34. Le cose nõ si deuono fare inconsideratamente.
35. L'huomini prudenti mandano gli nemici cõ astutia a i piu forti.
36. Alcuno guadagnare p l'altri fatichi.
37. Noi ricadere in quelle cose alli quali hauemmo ateso.
38. Li Rè nõ si deueno aleggersi p belezza ma p fortezza e prudẽza.

[18] This saying, as also a few others, is unfinished.

39. L'huomo deue stare in ordine p̄ ogni bisogno che possa sucedre.
40. L'huomo p̄ un picciolo guadagno si metta a grã pericolo.
41. Un timido p̄ qual si uoglia amonetione nõ si puo fortificare.
42. Se tu hai una cosa che nõ l'adopri è quanto se tu nõ[19] l'hauessi.
43. Quando si piglia una cità l' poueri subito fogano è li Richi sono presi.
44. Molti p̄ nõ hauer obbidito alli sauij e prudenti s hano fatto male a lor medesimi.
45. Alcuna uolta quelle cose che paiano nociui soño utili è quelli che paiano utili sonno nociui.
46. Molti fugendo i piccioli pericoli incorrono in maggiori.
47. Chi fa dispiacere a quelli da quali ha hauuto benificio Dio il castiga.
48. Molti huomini fingendo hauer pauura e poi amazzono i suo nemici.
49. Quelli che sonno oratori prudenti quelle cose che li sono dati contra dalli nemici si conuertono in proprio laudo.
50. Le cose nõ si deuono giudicare p̄ celerità ma p̄ prefetione.
51. Quelli che cercono inganare l'amici essi soño prima offesi.
52. Una trista natura nõ nodrisce mai buoni Costumi.
53. Quello che ogni giorno machina male spesso cada nel lacio suo medesimo.
54. Non bisogna perseuerare nel male p̄ che la consuetudine piega assai l'huomo mal fare benche nõ uoglia.
55. La musicha spesso fa diferire la morte.
56. La natura de prima stare semp̄ ferma e che egli tentò l'impossibile.
57. La forza del corpo esser migliora che la belezza.
58. Nella auersita e in[20] utile[20] la penitenza.
59. Cio che si fa fuora di tempo e uitoperoso.

[19] MS. has dõ.
[20] MS. has two separate words.

60. Molti huomini i consigli loro essergli causa di lor mali.
61. Molti prometono grã cose et nõ pono fare le picciole.
62. Si deue conoscere il ben fatore e a quello esser obligato.
63. Quelli che nõ soño stati pertecipi del bene ne del male nõ sogliono esser fermi amici.
64. L'huomini che hano usanza catiua piu tosto moiono che mutar natura.
65. Alcuni huomini p la loro ingnoranza lasciar andare gli nemici e scaciare l'amici come lor traditori.
66. Molti huomini si guardano da nemici e poi ritrouano amici che sonno de quelli pigiori.
67. L'huomini della Città allora fanno miglior guadagno quando hanno messo sedetione in essi.
68. Quelli che nõ sapendo il uero pensano inganare l'altri.
69. La gola è causa de molti mali.
70. Un huomo glurioso esser puoco stimato.
71. Questi giouani che nõ sano fare alcuna cosa non soño da esser ripresi ma i lor parenti che nõ l'año insegnato.
72. Da piccioli cose si conosciono le grande et da cose manifesti si conosce li dobiosi.
73. Quelli che lasciano le cose alli quali sonno atti et uogliano fare altro meritamente patiscono l' uersità.
74. L'huomini che lasciano i lor esercitij et atendono a quelli che nõ se li conuengono meritamẽto soño sfurtunati.
75. Molti insegnando l'arte ritoricha nelle scuole si pensono essere qualche cosa ma quando uanõ in publico sonno di puoco prezzo.
76. Quelli cosi che sonno uttili a buoni a catiui soño danosi e inutile.
77. Tutti gli inamorati soño senza uergogna.
78. Molti huomini uogliono piu tosto uiuere da sè poueramente che con altri Ricamente.
79. Un Ribaldo con simulatione uole tradire i simplici.
80. Queli che combatano cõ i piu forti di loro disprezzano la salute.

81. Quelli che p natura soño Catiui se mutano stato nõ mutano Costumi.
82. Noi nõ dobiamo essere quelli medesimi semp p che quelli che si mutano fugano spesso i pericoli.
83. L'huomini che d'improuiso paiano teribili come fai isperiẽza di loro nõ sonõ poi di tanto prezzo.
84. Non douemo seguire i guadagni quando sonõ pieni de pericoli e miserij.
85. La sorta data dalli fatti nõ si puo mutare.
86. Molti ignoranti paiano saper qualche cosa a che nõ gli conosce ma come parlano sonõ scoperti.
87. Li mal fatori sonõ conosciuti solamente ala uista.
88. Quelli che tradiscono i loro compagni spessi uolti rouinano se medesimi.
89. La Crudeltà nõ si puo mai placare ben che li siano fatti grã benificij.
90. Le cose teribili si fanõ con la consuetudine di puoca stimã.
91. Quelli che resisteno a i primi che li fano ingiuria da li altri sonõ piu rispetati.
92. Alcuni p troppo alegrozza fanõ le cose senza Consiglio et si meteno in ruuina.
93. Tra li serui quelli sonõ piu infelici che parturiscono piu fig:li[21] in seruitù.
94. Alcuni huomini guardano delli Ruuini delli altri.
95. Molti huomini p pazzia fanõ piacer alli strani e danõ all'amici.
96. E gran doloro quando alcuno pate da suoi proprij.
97. Quel che si dice et nõ si puo prouare cõ isperienza esser poco creduto.
98. L'huomo si deue contentare delle cosi presenti e fugire l'ingordigia.
99. L'huomo nõ deue fare una cosa e dire un altra.

[21] The author employs this abbreviation for figliuoli.

100. Sonno alcuni che uinceno i grandi et sonõ uinti da piccioli.
101. P̄ la pietra pretiosa considera la sapienza et p il gallo considra l'huomo catiuo p̄ che i catiui nõ amano le uirtù ne sanõ a che cosa se adoprino.
102. Facilmento si troua il bastõ p̄ far male al cane se un huomo potẽto ti uol nocere facilmente trouara la causa assai haerato quel che nõ puo resistere.
103. Il simile acade a citadini partegiani che quando p̄ copodità di sognerigiare se ofendono l'un l'altro metono a pericolo la lor uita.
104. Non lasciamo le cose certi p̄ le incerti.
105. La fede semp̄ fu rara e massimo in questa ettà è piu rarra apresso li potenti, e semp̄ fu cosi onde e meglio uiuere cõ tutti para p̄ che chi uiua cõ huomini di lui piu potenti bisogna semp̄ che ci lascia andare del suo e cõ un par suo semp̄ la ragione sarà oguala.
106. E prouerbio anticho che cio che fai ad un ingrato è gitato uia.
107. Spessi uolti quelli che cerchi de giouare ti nocono.
108. Ci douemo sforzare quando odiamo cose che se dispiaceno che nõ facciamo ne dicciamo cose indegni di noi p̄ che spesso uolti i tristi et scelerati si alegrano quando gli huomini da bene li resistono assai che cerchino uendicarsi di loro e debiamo inmitare i Caualli che quando i Cagnioli loro abaiano li disprezzõ.
109. Le Ricezzi paiano dileteuoli ma chi guarda bene anõ in se pericoli e maritudine.
110. Non dobiamo dare feda ad ogni uno.
111. Sonno alcuni tanti desiderosi di lodi che con sua uergogna e danno in preda a parasiti i guatoni.
112. Nella fortuna prospera tu nõ ti deue alzare ne esser superbo p̄ che se la fortuna si muta quelli che tu ai offesi si uendicaraño e fà che facci differenza fra l'amici p̄ che sonõ certi di quelli che nõ sono tuoi ma della tua tauola e della tua fortuna la quale come si muta quelli ancora ti uoltano le spalle.

113. L'huomo nõ deue tentare cosa alcuna di fare doue ei[22] si conosci mal atto dalla natura.
114. Qualche uolte l'huomini grãdi hanõ bisogno de piu umile e bassi.
115. Dio esaudisce i Relegiosi e buoni ma gli scelerati nõ ode.
116. Molti sonno da puoco et nõ si sanõ consigliare ne anco atẽdono a chi li consiglia bene ma quando soño ne pericoli e danõ cominciono a conoscere et condaneno lalor pacia et alora dicono è quell'altra cosa bisognaua fare.
117. Auiene alla plebba come alle rane che si anõ un Ra mansueto dicono che e tristo et lodono la begnenità del primo questo hauiene p̄ che semp̄ odino le cosi presenti e desidrono le noue.
118. Nisuno dice la fauola della sua sorte sauerchio si lamẽti molti cercando la noua la uecchia di nuouo desidrano.
119. Guarda che p̄ una picciola comodità tu nõ ne perdi un granda et guardati de nõ hauer fede ad ogni homo p̄ che sonõ molti che p̄ inganare non solamẽte parlano beg:te, ma ancora si portano beg:te.
120. Non si uol creder ad ogni cosa p̄ che molti si offeriscono farti piacere nõ p̄ tua comodità ma p̄ sua.
121. Dobiamo proibiri il temore senza causa p̄ che spesi uolti è piu graue il temore del pericolo che esso pericolo anzi qualche uolte quel che temiamo e cosa redicola.
122. Semp̄ e amata la presenta utiltà.
123. In ogni cosa bisogna l'animo l'uirtù giace senza confidãza e la confidanza duce e Regine d'ogni uirtù.
124. E cosa utile al fig:lo obbidire el padre e alla madre et al gioueno si conuiene obbidire el uechio.
125. La frauda con la fraude si scacia e chi prenda diletto di fare frode nõ si deue lamentare s'altri l'inganeno.
126. Ad un mancador di fede nõ hauer mai fede perdonare l'ingiuria è cosa de misericordia ma hauersi cura e cosa di prudenza.

[22] The reading ei is the more probable, but it may possibly be ci.

127. iL[23] riso merita il riso et il giocho merita il gioco e l'inganõ l'inganno.
128. Sonno aburiti quelli li quali uogliano alzarsi piu de' quelli cõ i qual uiueno.
129. Ciascun la sua dote costui de la bellezza quello delle forze del corpo questo delle richezze quello delli amici potenti ogni uno deue essere del suo cõtento ne si sforza hauendo inuidia al superiore contendre con lui miserio è il primo il secondo uera paccia.
130. Il nemico è da esser temuto ma molto piu quel che e nemico et fingie de esser amico.
131. Non puochi sonõ coloro che nella felicità di se stessi ne della modesttia si ricordano ma p̄ che nella prosperità insolenti diuentano nelle auersita facilmento incorono ondi siano cauati i felici p̄ che se la fortuna la saurota li uolta e li trabucha in qualche insortamò l'esser stato de prima prosporo l'induce al sommo della miseria che meglio saria p̄ lui nõ esser mai stato felice ne contento.
132. Chi lascia i compagni nelle hauersità nõ deue esser partecipe della sua felicità.
133. L'inuidia e danosa e il piu delle uolte rouina quello che a inuidia.
134. Quello che è da fugirse con gran deligenza cerchiamo e quel che fuggiamo sopra il tutto è da ricercarsi desiamo la beatitudine prima che sapiamo doue ella se sttia onde nõ da marauigliarsi se ruiniamo nelle felicità e morti fuori de ogni nostro intendimento come senza ragione ci gouerniamo.
135. Guarda molto bene à chi tu uoi nuocere p̄ che se tu te imbatti in un piu galiardo di te nõ a lui ma a̲ te nocerai.
136. E paccia se quando fai trigua tutta la tua guardia dai in mano al nemico p̄ che chi una uolta è stato nemico mai nõ cessi d'esser nemico et trouara causa di nocerti quando ti uedra spogliato de ogni aiuto.

[23] Author had originally Li; but he crossed out the last i and placed an i before the capital L.

137. Guarda bene a chi fai del bene p̄ che sonno molti che fanõ male a quelli da quali hano hauuto bene.
138. La Compagnia dei membri et del uenire sonno come l'huomana società il membro ha bisogno del altro membro e l'amico a bisogno dell'amico però douemo aiutarci l'un l'altro p̄ che li ricchezzi e l'honori non bastono ad un huomo ma a bisogno de l'amici ancora.
139. Sonno molti che anõ bisogno et a molti hauanzano le richezze ma niun richo uol dare al pouero quel che gli auanza.
140. Nelli pericoli e cosa dificile il nascondersi p̄ che come la fortuna comincia perseguitare alcuno mai nõ lo lascia fina alla fine ouero l'huomo si perda da lui medesimo.
141. Non ti fidare di paroli ma guarda a i fatti di quello che ti da paroli.
142. Uedrai molti nella mediocrità esser lieti senza penssieri ma se tu l' uedi fatti richi sarano mal contenti pieni di fastidij e di curi.
143. Molti combatono contra la pouertà et come l'ano superata diuentano serui de le Ricchezze.
144. Per l'aquila intenda i Richi e potenti che semp̄ fano ingiuria a poueri pur qualche uolte i poueri cercando de uendicarsi hanõ cio che da richi gli era tolto.
145. Chi praticha cose cattiui che fanõ qualche male auenga che sia inocente e castigato della medesima pena.
146. Un huomo scelerato quando uol nocerti facilmente troua la causa.
147. Li poueri sonõ spesso opresi da i Ricchi con falsi testimonij.
148. Nõ dar fede ad ogni uno che sõ molti che dimostrando di giouare nocono.
149. Quando uno a in uso dire buggie quãdo dice il uero nõ li a creduto.
150. L'huomo deue misurare se medesimo et nõ fare quãto uede fare ad altri ma quanto uogliono le forze sue.
151. Soño molti che p̄ inuidia nõ lascian ofar ad altri quel che nõ possono far loro.

152. Ad un huomo quieto e begnigno facilmente si fa ingiuria ma ad un huomo feroce nõ cosi p che semp̄ e riguardato.
153. Cio che da dio ci uien dato cõ grato hanimo l'habbiamo da riceuere douendo sap̄ che ogni cosa che egli fa è cõ ordino peso e misura.
154. Doue nõ sonno le forze fa misterio hauer ingiegno.
155. Ecosa strana coregere i gia inuechiati in un usãza il c̄h douemo fare quando quelli erano giouani che piu facilmẽte haurebbero lor obiditi.
156. Douemo hauer semp̄ gratij a chi ci fa del bene.
157. Felice quel che alli altriij spesso impara.
158. Il tempo e il luogo danno spesso uolti audacio à un uile.
159. Li seruitori desiderono i primi patroni quando de pigiori espremẽtono.
160. Quelli che al uolgo sonno felici sonno infelici piu de li altri.
161. Non sono hamici tutti quelli che fano buoni paroli p̄ che sotto quelle spesse uolte stà nascosto il ueleno.
162. A tutti la cosa sua par bella.
163. Quando hauemo forza douemo cercare qualche cosa p̄ la uecchiezza che e debola.
164. Ad uno afflitto nõ si uol dare piu afflitione per che assai è misero chi e misero.
165. Non riprendere mai alcuno del uitto tuo propio.
166. Qualche uolte un glorioso pensa che li sia honore cio che gli e uituperio e uergogna.
167. E meglio uiuere con un compagno uguale sẽza pericolo che con un piu potento cõ pericolo.
168. Niuno deue disprezare gli altri p̄ che la natura a dato la dote sua à ogni persona e chi nõ ha la tua uirtù forsi ne ha un altra che nõ e meno bella della tua.
169. Niuna cosa e più ferma che la concordia e la discordia ogni cosa la fa debola.
170. Per che li huomini sonno pigeri nelli cosi d'altri quãdo uolemo c̄h una cosa sia bẽ fatta la douemo far noi proprij.

171. Che cosa e piggiora che l'auaritia e che piu pazza che l'inuidia la qual più che ad altri noccia male a se stessa desidera.
172. Quel che tu nõ poi fare con la forza fallo cõ la prudentia e astutia.
173. Ogni uno deue fare cio che pote p̄ fauorire la sua causa.
174. Alli uolti sonno gabati quelli che sogliono gabbare li altri.
175. Alcuni sonno tanti intratabili che con arte e ingegno alcuno nõ si possono metigare.
176. Sonno alcuni che fanno tanto pazzo attione che si può giudicare che nõ habbiano cura.
177. Niun deue disprezzare il suo nemico ben che sia picciolo.
178. Li uoti otiosi niente giouano p̄ che Dio nõ gli essaudisce ma fa misterio che tu ti aiuto da̅ te medesimo e così ti aiutarà iddio.
179. Sol spesso acadre che il fig:lo che e manco amato da suoi parenti diuenta migliore de quel che è amato.
180. Per uiuer bene bisogna afaticarsi p̄ che un huomo otioso e datto in tutto à piaceri rare uolti fa̅ bon fine.
181. La libertà è meza signoria.
182. Quelli che si dolono da lor medesimi sonno befeggiati e alle uolte odono cose che li arencresce e f[a]gnole tacere.
183. Quelli che rompano l'amicitia ben che gli offesi nõ possono uendicarsi nõ fuggono mai la uendetta de Dio.
184. Quelli che lasciano quel che hanno in mano cõ speranza de guadagnare piu sonno pazzi e fuora de raggione.
185. Sonno alcuni che sotto colore de carità consigliano ad altri il propio comodo.
186. E pazzia dimandare aiuto da q:lli che nuocono piu presto che giouar possino.
187. Gli catiui prometono de far benefitio e faño il cõtrario.
188. Sonno alcuni se alle uolte giouano ad alcuno lo fano ben p̄ forza.
189. Non deue l'huomo alegrarsi de q:lli cose li quali à da dolersi.
190. La contineua fatica parturischa gran tresoro.

191. Ogni cosa si fa bene quando si fa al suo tempo.
192. Quel che nõ puo fare l'arte qualche uolta fa la fortuna.
193. Non dobiamo pensare d'inganare i Dei.
194. Chi considera la sorte humana nelli casi auersi mai si aflige.
195. Ben che un sttia in gran pericolo nõ mai uoria morire.
196. Quelli che sonno troppo hauari spesse uolti nocono a lor medesimi.
197. Alle uolti le mente humana è tanta cieca nell'odia che l'huomo nõ cura de morire pur che moia il suo nemico prima de lui.
198. La maggior parte de i pericoli ne quali incoriamo è p ñra caggione e nõ ne accusiamo la fortuna.
199. Un prudento se è gabbato una uolta mai piu nõ si fida de simulatori.
200. Quelli che incorrono pazzamente in qualche disgr[a]tie sonno piu befeggiati da tutti.
201. Che si orna de cosi d'altri come le perde si conosci qual egli è.
202. Li pazzi nelle prosperità si scordano di lor medesimi e ne gli auuersità si ricordano di q:l che sonno.
203. Quando si deue consigliare un hamico si deue farlo che quando nõ importa è un beffegiarlo.
204. L'huomo saggio niente lassa per fuggire gli pericoli.
205. Il saggio quando si salua d'un pericolo si sa guardare da q:llo.
206. Li prudenti facilmente scropono i consigli de cattiui.
207. L'huomo nõ si deue metere in mano de nemici se nõ è sicuro de potersi difendre.
208. La belezza nõ consista in quantità ma in qualità.
209. Apressi l'huomini catiui nõ uale raggioni ne uerità.
210. Nelle prosperità l'huomo nõ si deue molto ralegrare aciò che nõ cade in qualche rouina.
211. Cio che noi desideramo contra li nemici alle uolti cade sopra di noi.
212. Le cose. che si faño quando nõ è il suo tempo nõ possono durare.

213. Quanto piu dio è amico a buoni tanto è piu nemico a i catiui.
214. Quando l'ingiuria è granda l'odio mai nõ si può leuare.
215. La presentia de i nemici semp e molesta et è da essere schiuata p che mai nõ puo portare se nõ danno scorne e dishonore.
216. Un huomo prudente deue singere nõ uoler q:lle cose che nõ può conseguire.
217. Un astuto conosce quel che de' seguire et quello deue fuggire.
218. Chi uol far tradimento a suoi dispiace a ogni uno.
219. L'huomini catiui o poco o assai che peccano nõ si uol hauer compassione alcuna.
220. Quelli che nõ usano le commodità presenti p lor ingnoranza le perdono.
221. Non disprezare il consiglio de quei ti ammoniscono.
222. Nelle prosperità l'huomo nõ si deue confidare molto ne anco nelle hauersità atristarsi.
223. È da guardare quando uno ti fa un piacere con chi animo lo fa per che molti sotto ombra de seruir ad altri seruano a se medesimi.
224. Alle uolte regna magior clementia ne li animali brutti che ne gli huomini che nõ hanno altro di buone che il nome.
225. in[24] La casa di poueri e maggior libertà che in casa de ricchi.
226. Nõ così è da amarsi la patria se ignobile sei che ad altri luoghi nõ andiamo potendo altroue essere beati.
227. Le picciole incomodità si uogliano ricompensare con l'utilità.
228. Meritamẽte si deuano castigare q:lli che cercono far dispiazere a psoni dalli quali nõ haño offeso alcuna.
229. Non douemo fare cosa maggiori delle ñre forze.
230. Non douemo temere i frapatori me q:lli che sonno de puochi parole.
231. Al huomo liberale iddio li dona molte cose accio che ua fidelmente et nõ pensa che la malignità de catiui è semp pronta a mal fare.

[24] The word in was inserted after the saying was written, and therefore the L of la is capitalized.

232. Quello che uiua del suo e piu sicuro che q:llo che uiue della robba d'altri.
233. Nõ douemo temere de mutare padroni pur che nõ siano piggiori de primi.
234. La uita dei poueri è piu sicura che quella de ricchi.
235. Nõ ci douemo corucciare con q:lli i quali ci ofendono costretti da altri.
236. Nõ ci deue rincrescere d'esser nati brutti cõcio sia che la belezza noce il piu delle uolte.
237. Noi nõ douem̃o temere la morte p̲ cui tutte le miserie e calamità del mondo si dissoluono.
238. Morto che sia il marito l'amor della doña e passato.
239. Per mostrare le cose pretiose se incita altrui a rapirli.
240. Quel mal che l'huomo si fa da lui medesimo e molto fastedioso.
241. Nõ e al mondo cosa piu misera che l'essere auaro nõ sapendosi pigliare de quel bene che la natura li conciedi.
242. Al huomo liberale Iddio dona molte cose accio che a i molti bisogni possa suuenire.
[243.[25] Noi nõ hauemmo quello arbitrio nelle cose d'altro che ui hanno i padroni.
244. Uane sonno l'insidie delle donne cõ l'huomo prudente.
245. L'huomini hanno d'istimarsi da lor fatti e nõ dal corpo giudicarli.
246. Scostateui da pazzi e quanto da q:lli ui alongati tanto ui acostati a saggi.
247. L' ricchezzi della eredità fanno passare il dolore del padre morto.
248. Un padre di famiglia otioso qualche uolta fà più che nõ faño q:lli che di contineuo lauoreno.
249. Le Ricchezzi sonno q:lli che aquistono l'amici anzi nemici uestiti cõ panni d'amicitia gli quali tanto durano quanto utile sentono da te preuenirli.

[25] The saying is in brackets. Is it due to its liberal tone?

250. À un huomo falace mai nõ douemo dar fede ne perdonargli quando lo potemo ponire.
251. Mai l'huomo nõ si deue ralegrare della morta del nemico p̄ che ella e comuna a tutti.
252. Molti laudano quel che e da farsi ma pochi esser c̄h si metono all'impresa de farlo.
253. Non ci douemo pore a pericolo imprudentemente.
254. Nõ dobiamo credere a sogni tanto piu intorno a q:lle cose che dalla uolentà libera dell'huomo dipẽdono.
255. Quanto l'huomo sia inclinato a lodarsi se stesso tentando di quel bene che da iddio li uien dato come da lui dipenda gloriarsi et dal male de' che egli stesso ne e caggione la colpa in altri ritorcere.
256. Quanto puoco frutto facci colui che acongregare si prenda uno che da la natura poco saggio sia in cui la fortuna il piu delle uolte dimostrare uole quanto sia il suo fauore.
257. Quanto li giouani semplici debiano esser acorti p̄ nõ esser colti dalle falsce lusinghe delle meretrici.
258. Quelli che se uendicano sonno manco offesi da altri et se gli ha rispetto.
259. Noi soporttiamo i ñri guai patientemẽte quando uedemo altri hauer peggio de noi.
260. Per fuggire un pericolo presente spesse uolte noi incoriamo in un maggiore.
261. Dobiamo chiedre aiuto a chi si pò socorere il qual è sol iddio.
262. La uecchiezza nõ deue esser dispretiata.
263. Nõ si douemo fare amici a coloro che sonno à noi diferenti de costumi.
264. Nelle prosperità molti habbiamo che fanno l'amico i quali se uedono che la fortuna riuolta da noi i piedi coloro nõ restono anco de fargli compagnia ma alcuna uolto auuiene che a loro mal grado restono ancora essi in q:lla anersita inuolupati.
265. Quando alcuno cometta errore nõ deue acusare la fortuna ne il diauolo ma se medesimo.

266. Nelle corte soño stimati più i cinedi che i uertuosi.
267. Niuna cosa si deue sprezzare quantunque uila p̄ che nõ e cosa si picciola e bassa che nõ sia buona a un bisogno.
268. Meglio è a morir presto e gloriasomente che uiuere lungo tempo cõ uergogna e uituperio.
269. Molti lasciano il uitio p̄ che nõ lo possono piu esercitare.
270. Ogni uno deue esser contento dell'arte sue p̄ che p̄ tutto si trouano calamità et angustia e insoportabile desaggi.
271. La gratia che si ha e q:lla p̄ la quale alcuno è grato cosa che nõ li auiene solo p̄ l'operare che egli fà.
272. Quanti piu sig:ri habbiamo sopra di noi p̄ la lora tirania tanti più guai necessarie è che habbiamo.
273. Niuno ama tanto altri che uoglia morire p̄ lui.
274. Alcuni fingono che la morte de qualche uno gli rincresca nientedimeno la desiderano sommamente.
275. La pessima qualità de alcuna donna che cio che di bene faño il fanõ p̄ il timore nõ p̄ carita che egli habbiano.
276. L'huomo nõ si deue considerare all'aspetto ma all'opre sue p̄ che alle uolte sotto alla pella d'una pecora e ascoso un Lupe.
277. L'huomo prudente deue star semper a ordine cõtra i nemici.
278. Quando farai piacere al tuo nemico p̄ semp̄ ti pagarà d'ingratitudine.
279. Un mal uecino cõ ogni incomodità si deue fuggire.
280. Tu nõ ti dei mai fare compagni q:lli che nõ puoi caciare di casa et che sonno piu potenti di te.
281. L'ingegno supera la uelocità et la forza del corpo.
282. Un huomo etratto e solo quando stà fra gli ingnoranti.
283. L'huomini de catiua nattura rarrissimi uolti si possõ leuare da i uicij p̄ alcuna esortatione.
284. Nõ douemo combatere cõ q:lli che soño piu gagliardi de noi.
285. Niuna cosa è tanto miracolosa che in spatio di tempo nõ si pongono in tacere.
286. Niuno nõ si deue tanto confidare nella sua grandezza che faccia dispiacere a i poueri con speranza che q:lli nõ siano bastanti a uendicarsi.

287. Noi douemo esser cõtẽti dlle cose ñre e nõ desideare q:lle che a noi nõ sonno uguali.
288. Douemo hauere pacientia quãdo iddio ci toglia la robba et i fig:li p che a arbitrio de fare maggior cose d'q:ti.
289. La fortuna auersa fa isperientia delli amici.
290. Alcuni uolte si lauda qualche uno nõ p honorarlo ma p farlo rouinare in qualche male trouãdo poi q:ti falsi laudatori semp qualche scusa al suo ingaño.
291. Nõ douemo giudicare gli huomini secondo l'habito ma secondo la uirtù.
292. Niuno è tanto dure e deficile che nõ si plache per li doni.
293. L'huomo sauio deue tentare tutti li uie prima che uenire all'arme.
294. Le cosi utili si deuono propore alle deletteuoli.
295. Noi douemo fare imparare alli ñri fig:li un arte dalla quale possono cauare qualche frutto.
296. Niuno e tanto da puoco che nõ sia buono a qualche cosa.
297. Quando i citadini cattiui sonno in guerra fra lor lasciano stare i buoni.
298. Come alcuna donna entra in una casa ci entra il fuoco.
299. Siamo semp aparecchiati al ben morire p che nõ sapiamo ne il di ne l'ora della ñra morta.
300. Nõ debiamo far tesoro qui in terra doue nõ è la ñra patria ma nel ciel doue etarnalmẽte il goderemo.
301. La fortuna e semper amica a un felice et ancora che egli nõ uole gli da le richezze et altri beni et è semp nemica al pouero.
302. L'animo deficilmente si può celare che con parole nõ si scopra all' uolte massimamẽte nelli affetti amorosi.
303. Nisuno sapiento e acetto nella sua patria.
304. Le cose di potenti nõ si lodono p uerità ma p timore.
305. Nõ dobiamo disprezare alcuno che egli nõ sarà tanto inutile et uano che a qualche ñro bisogno nõ ne possi aiutare.
306. Alcuna uolta q:llo che noi penssiamo ce sia daño ci aporta grandinissima utilità et però nõ douemo semp dol erci de q:l che ci hauiene quantunque ci mostra spauenteuole.

307. Le Ricchezze nõ si aquistono p̄ lo più senõ con perdita dell'anima e desaggio del Corpo.
308. À tutti i lori fig:li paiano belli benche siano brutissimi.
309. A q:lli che paiano felice nõ douemo hauer inuidia p̄ che alle uolte la felicità e piena de miserij.
310. Quanta e ostinata la natura delli donni li quali p̄ nõ cedere qualche cosa di puoco o niun mumento a loro maggiori nõ si curano de esser fieramẽti [per]cossi.[26]
311. Chi e morso del serpente ha pauura della lucerta.
312. L'huomo deue semp̄ considerare donde possa esser ofeso dal nemico.
313. Meglio e uiuer sicurmente in pouertà che in richezza con pauura.
314. Quelli che sonno in trauaglio et pericolo la tardità aiuta.
315. Molti si faño religiosi p̄ uiuere senza fatica.
316. Molti uolti p̄ l'ingratitudine che alcuno ha de qualche benifitio riceuuto incorre in q:l medesimo trauaglio di prima onde desideraua esser scacciato fuora.
317. Nõ ci douemo mai fidare de q:lli i quali hauemo offesi.
318. Quelli che nõ obidiscono i suoi parenti capitono male.
319. Quel che si ralegra del mal d'altri qualche uolta pate quel medesimo.
320. Quelli che cercano gabbari li altri nõ si deuono dolere se sonno loro gabbati.
321. L'huomo sauio deue fingere ogni escusatione per leuarsi del furore del tirraño.
322. Se il padrone e negligente in guardare le cose sue nõ die hauer speräza che i famigliari le guardino.
323. Non douemo giodicare la uirtù d'un huomo dalla grandezza delle parole ne del corpo.
324. Nõ debiamo fondare le ñre speranze in questi cose dal mondo che sonno cosi fralli.

[26] MS. obscure; conjecture based on Hebrew paraphrase.

325. L'huomo deue stare auertito de nõ cadere in mano de qualche tiranno che nõ gli perdoni ne Alla robba ne alla uita unde ne causi lutto a se stesso et a i suoi amici.
326. Li pazzi p̄ leuarsi un peso da dosso se ne metono un maggiore.
327. Niuno dura fatica senza speranza d'alcun premio.
328. Douemmo temere piu i quietti e taciti che i parabolani che brauano de parole.
329. Niuna cosa indebolisce i soldati piu che il coito e la desuetudine del combattore.
330. Quanto uno è piu benifitio meno può tolerare la ingiuria.
331. Quelli che pigliono moglie incorrono in gran pericolo.
332. Che tutto uole tutto perde.
333. Douemmo imparrare le science liberale accio che siamo tenuti in prezzo.
334. Il più delle uolte il perdonare noce più al mal fatore che la uendetta che cõtra d'esso si pensa fare.
335. Nõ si deue domandare addio se nõ q:l che a lui piace p̄ che qualche uolta domandiamo cosa che sonno contra de noi.
336. Quelli che uogliano contendere cõ i maggiori di loro oltra che nõ possono figli uguali spesso danno da ridere alli altri.
337. Molti cercano far piacere a lor nemici per ricõcigliarseglio.
338. L'huomo spesse uolte p̄ cupidigia di guadagno ua in pericolo della uita.
339. Coloro como se dice p̄ prouerbio si sforzano tener un piede in due staffe et al'ultimo ne in q:ta ne in q:lla lo ferma.
340. Alcuni uolendosi liberare da un pericolo mediocoro cascano in un maggiore.
341. La libertà e sopra ogni altra cosa pretiosa et amabile.
342. Quello che con la forza del corpo ci e uietato de fare deua si con l'ingegno.
343. Douemo esser contenti da doni da Dio dateci et dalla natura.
344. L'huomo prudente deue considerare nõ solamẽte il tempo presente ma ancora il futture.

345. Il male si a d'atribuire a quello il qual ne e causa.
346. È manco male soferire l'ingiuria d'un solo che uolendo q:llo ponire farsi molti nemici.
347. Quelli che uogliano prendere ogna cosa spesse uolte appena pigliano il puoco.
348. L'instabilità de li huomini i quali sogliano antepore le cose nuoue ancora che siano piggiori alli uecchie.
349. Dobiamo patientemente tolerare le batteturi de maestri p̄ che sogliono essere causa de molti beni.
350. La liberta della uita esser d'antepore a tutti li delicij de q:to mondo.
351. Nõ uogliamo ricercare q:lle cose che ne sonno negati dalla natura.
352. Nõ si deuono giudicare l'huomini dall'abito ma de le opre p̄ che molti sotto uestimenti de pecore sonno lupi rapaci.
353. L̄e cose troppo afretati nõ sonno durabili.
354. Quãdo uno e in pericolo dell' uita nõ si a da consumare il tempo in ciãce ma si a d'aiutare piu presto che si puo.
355. Chi a patito mali graui teme ancora i ligieri.

IL FINE

בשם השם

אמר המחב׳

מתוקה שנה העובד הבורא מאהבה, ואשר בחייו רדף אחר עבודתו ית״ש בחבה, וכעבד העובד אדונו בלי תקוה, ושלא על מנת לקבל פרס ומתנה, אם מעט ואם הרבה אשר שמר ועשה, מהמצות והחקים אשר נצטוה, יאבל ויערן מזיו תאר השכינה, בעולם שכולו עונג ושמחה, ובחיים נצחיים ובמנוחה רבה, והשבע ורבי הריעה מחבמ׳ התורה, לעשיר בבינה ובמדע ובכל הכמה, אינו מניח הנוף מובדל מהצורה, בכלח אשר הובא שם למטרה, לישן שנת קבע עד עת התחייה, כי שפתותיו דובבות שם בתורה, כמו שעשה כל ימי חייו אשר חיה, וזה לך המעיין האות והראיה, על דברי אשר עדן אונך שמעה, מרעת אנקלום הגר בוצינא קדישא, אשר תרגם הפסוק אשר התחלתי ההקדמה, ע״ד האמת והקבלה, כפי אשר אמרני בלי הסירתא ויתירתא, שתרגם בסימת דמיכת גברא די פלח למרי עלמא[27] דיוק ושבח ותמצא, ותבא עליך ברכה, אם בן איפה ראוי לנעור מתרדמת הילדות, כי כולו הוללות וסבלות, ולחזק בקרנות מעלת החכמות, אשר יהיו לבעליהם מעלה וכבוד, וכל אדם צריך לבדוק עד שידו מגעת, ועד אשר יניע עיני השכל והדעת, כפי אשר נשמע לו מאת הבורא, ובזה מן השמים יורוהו את אשר יעשה, כי הבא לטהר מסייעין אותו, ופוקחין עיני שכלו כפי תאותו, וממלאין חשקו ורצון תשוקתו, בחכמה ובשכל כאשר השיג ידו, ללמוד וללמד לדעת ולהורות, ולחבר חבורים ע״צ הנאות, לתועלת המבקש דרך אמונה, ואת פני מבין חכמה, ולהיות כי חפשתי מצאתי הון לי, יקר מכספי ויתר והבי, ה״ה דברי תוכחת מוסר ומשלים, למראה נאים וליופי נחמדים, בלשון וכתיבה נוצרית, אשר חברו מחוסר ברית, אמרתי לא טוב היות דבר של תיעלת ומעלה, בלשון וכתיבה בלתי שלימה, ובזה העתקתי דבריו התועלתיים, בעט סופר ולשון למודים, ובלשון הקדש הנקרא אשורית, כדי שיהיה מובן לכל רב ותלמיד, וקראתי את שמו אדרת אליהו כי הבא׳ אליו ישמעו ויראו ועל שמי כי כן נקרא אני הצעיר והנכנע אליה, בן לסמא דכולא בה, כ״ת א״א מ״צ מנחם רבא, וכמו שהאדרת הוא מעיל ומעטה, וכסות אשר האדם בו יתכסה, להציל ולהגן עצמו מציניתה של כימה, אשר ישלוט עליו בימי הקור בחימה, כן ראוי ומחוייב לכל גברא, לעשוק במעיל זה הנירא, אשר מזהיר האדם ומוכיחו, ויורה הדרך הראוי לילך בו, ויצילהו ממדות הפחותות והמגונות, וילמדהו ארח חיים ומעלות המדות, כפי אשר עיני המעיין יראה, ויקבע אותו בשכל ובפה, ולאיש אשר אלה לו יאכל ויעדן בעולם אור כולו, ויזכה לראות בנחמת ישראל, בבא לציון גואל, ויבנה בית הבחירה, ונשמח בבית השואבה בב״א.

וסי׳ לדבר כי אדרת עולה תר״ה ועם מספר אותיות שם הספר שהוא אדרת אליה שהם שמונה עולה למספר תרי״ג כנגד התרי״ג מצות וזה להורות כי דברי הספר אינן נגד כוונת תורתינו הקדושה, אך הוא סיג ומגן לכל המצות ושמו יוכיח.

ראה זה חדש הוא ככר היה לעולמים בלשון
נצרי חברו המחבר הנקרא בשם
איסופו מפרגיו נצרי אשר דבר משלים הרבה לאין
קץ, ובסעדא דשמייא מרומא עילאה אעתקנו בלשון אשורית.

אפתח נא שפתי ואשא משלי ואומר

א. יש לאדם להבין אחרית דבר מראשיתו, טרם במלאכה יתחיל לשלח ידו.
ב. אינו דומה יופי הנשמה השכלית, ליופי היולית הגוף החומרית.
ג. אם הכסילים ישנו מקום דירתם, לא על זה ישנו רוע מעלילותם.
ד. כל הדברים באחדות ואחוה יפרו וירבו, ובמחלוקת ואיבה ישחיתו ויחריבו.
ה. העושר והממון הם לאדם סבות, להרחיקו מפעולות הטובות.
ו. אם נסתיר חטאתינו מחברינו, לא נסתירם מהאל כי הוא לבדו רואנו.
ז. רחק מחבורת האוהבי' אשר ירחקו ממך ובצרתך ינוסו ללא עורך.
ח. מי שלעת המצטרך לגבורים ממנו יודה הנה ימצא תועלת הרבה.
ט. החטא יותר כאב נמרץ הוא המסית המלך להרע ויעץ.
י. פעמים הרבה הנזק והחסרון, יהיה לאדם משל ודמיון.
יא. הנואף והמנאפת יצטרכו לתוכחת.
יב. מי שמניח אומנותו הרגיל בו, ומתחיל דבר אשר לא ידע עשותה כהלכתו, מטיל עצמו בסכנה לרעתו.
יג. בני אדם יחכמו וישכילו בינה, עם הנזק ורוב הסבנה.
יד. החבורה התמידית מסבב סיבה שהפעולה גדולה נראה נוחה וקלה.
טו. ממרות ודרכי החכמים, לשמוע חרפתם ואינם משיבים. מאשר לא יהיו להם קרובים, כשיראו כי ג"כ איש לרעהו מחרפים.
טז. מי שיש לו תמונת הגוף נאה, יודע חסרונו בשכל ובנשמה.
יז. עם הכסילים ובלתי מדרגה, אין ראוי לילך עמם בחבורה.
יח. במקום שיוכיחו מעשים, אין ראוי להרבות דברים.
יט. אין דבר מן הבורא נסתר, וגם לראותו מי יוכל.
כ. מי שמניח מה שקנה, כדי להרבות ברווחה, סבלותו גדולה וטמא יקרא.
כא. המושפע בהון יתחייב להשפיע לאחרים, ומהונו יפזר ויעזור דלים.
כב. התרחק מן המדברים אחד בפה ואחד בלב, וגם מאשר אמר בזה אולי לא אדע דבר.
כג. התרחק מן האנשים אשר יזקו למיודעיהם, כי גם לך יזקו ותאבד עמהם.
כד. מי שסורו רע כאשר ירבה טוב טעם תאותו, כן ירבה וכן יפרוץ רעתו ורשעתו.
כה. סבול הרע והנזק אשר יקרך, כשהמסבבו גם הוא ייצר בצערך.
כו. פעמים יחשב אדם לצוד זולתו, ויהפך המחשבה וילכד הוא ברשתו.
כז. הכסיל לאולתו לא ידע לכלכל את עצמו, ולפעמים ירצה לעשות את אשר אינו מועיל לו.
כח. כשהמלך והשר יהיה אכזר ישוממו העם ויהיו בעפר.
כט. השוע לגודל מדת בלייותו, יאנה אלוקו אם יהיה ביכולתו.
ל. מי שבתחילת הרעתו לא נתוכח, תדע כי בן יירע ויאמר האח.

לא. אין מי שבחכמתו ינצל, ממקרה הזמן והמזל.
לב. אין להתעצב על אבדת העושר, כי אין זה קנין הכושר.
לג. יש מי שמבטיח דבר לחבירו, והנה אין ידו משגת לעשותו.
לד. עושה פעולותיו בלא תבונה, לא תסתייעא מילתא.
לה. המשכיל יצפון עצמו מאויביו, ויניחם לעזים ונבורי' ויקלו מעליו.
לו. טורח האדם ועמלו, לפעמים יכינם לחבירו.
לז. כשהתחלת מלאכה לעשות, אל העזבנה בידו רפות.
לח. אין להמליך מלך ביופיו, אך לטוב מעשיו וצמח פריו.
לט. החכם ישב תמיד למטרה, לעת המצטרך ויהיה לעזרה.
מ. הכסיל כדי להשיג השגה קטנה, ישים עצמו בגורל הסבנה.
מא. מי שלבושו מעטה בושה, לא יועיל הוכחת לתרופה.
מב. מי שיש לו כלי ואינו פועל בו, הוא כאילו לעולם לא בא לידו.
מג. בלכידת העיר ובשביית שללתה, העניים ינוסו והעש[ו]רים ילכדו בה.
מד. רבים מאשר לא שמעו אל דברי חכמי' וחידותם, גללו עליהם רע בגלל הילוך אחרי שרירות לבם הרע.
מה. לפעמים הדברים מועילים נראים ניזוקים, והניזוקי' לפעמים נראים מועילים.
מו. יש מרחיק עצמו מנזק הקל, והנה בכבר ממנו הנו נכשל.
מז. משלם רעה תחת טובה, בוראי יפרע ממנו בחולי ודאגה.
מח. יש מי שמחניף לירא מהאויב, והנה טמן רשת אשר בה אויבו ילכד.
מט. המתפללים הישרים אשר הם החסידים, על הנזק והרע אשר יקבלו מהאויבים יודי לאל ותפלה אליו יערכים.
נ. אין לרומם דבר לטוב תואר יופיה, אך מצד שלימותה ותמימי' ויוה.
נא. המבקש לאונות אוהבו, הוא יתחיל לישא בעוונו.
נב. מי שטבעו רע כל הימים, לא יצאו ממנו כי אם רוע מעללים.
נג. מי שיארוב על חבירו רק רע, הוא יפול בפחו ויכשל ויפשע.
נד. אין להמשך אחד חומר תאות העבירה, כי יצרו הרע יסיתהו להרע וימשול עליו להבא.
נה. [28]
נו. טבע האדם יאהב הבטלנות, והנה הוא איפשרי[29] רע והוללות.
נז. כח הגוף וגבורתו, טובה מזיו פניו ומראיתו.
נח. כשהאדם בייסורין יצטער, לבו יחזק ואל ימר.
נט. העושה דבר ועתו עבר, כאוכל פגה ולבישולה לא ישמר.
ס. עצת אדם תסלף דרכו, ויגלגל עליו רעה כפי דעתו.
סא. יש בוטה ומבטיח לעשות גדולות, ולא יוכל לשמור הקטנות.
סב. יתחייב לאדם לשלם נמול תודות, למי שעשה לו חסדים וטובות.
סג. מי שלטוב ולרע לא נתוכח, אהבתו לא ישלם ולא יזרח.
סד. מי שהרגיל עצמו למלאות תאותו, יותר נקל יומת מלשנות רוע טבעו.
סה. הכסיל לכסלותו לא ינקם מאויבו, ויתרחק כשונאים חבורת אוהביו.
סו. יש ירא ומפחיד מאויבו, והנה ימצא אוהב אורב לו יותר לרעתו.

כז. מדינה ועיר בלי יועץ וחכם חרשים, דומים לצאן שאין להם רועים.
כח. אוהב השקר ודובר הכזב, יחשב בדבריו לטעות כל שומעיו.
כט. חומר התאוה וגוף ההמדה, טורד[30] האדם מרעה אל רעה.
ע. כל המתגאה ולבו עליו יכבד, מיודעיו ירחיקוהו ויבוז ויקל.
עא. נער ערום מחכמה אין להוכיחו, אך קרוביו אשר היה מוטל עליהם ללמדו.
עב. מהדברים הקטנים הגדולים יגלו, ומהמעשים הזודאים הספקים ידעו.
עג. המניח אומנותו הרגיל בו ועוסק בזולתו, אל יתמה אם ישחית וירע מזלו.
עד. את אשר יניח מעשות צריכיו בעבור אחרים, כדי יהיה לחוב את עצמו בסבנים(t) גדולים.
עה. הרבה מהמלמדים דעת במדרשים, יחשבו עצמם לחכמי' גדולים, וכאשר יצאו ממסגר לרחובות ושווקים, כסלותם יגלה ולכלום יהיו נחשבים.
עו. את אשר יהי לחכם טוב ונאות, לכסיל יהיה ראש ומר ולענות.
עז. רוב האנשים הרודפים ומה, הם בלי הרפה וכלימה.
עח. יש שיתאב יותר להתענג במעט שלו, מחשע קבין של חבירו.
עט. האויל בדברי חניפותו, יעשוק חכם ונבון בכסלותו.
פ. לוחם את לוחמיו חוקים ממשלות ידיו, נבזה יהיה וילבד בפח רגליו.
פא. את אשר ניהגו להרע בטבע ובהנהגה, אף אם ישנה מקו' לא יהיה למכתם רפואה.
פב. טוב לפעמים לשנות הטבע אשר עדן היה, כפי הצורך מהטובה או מהתחלואה.
פג. יש אנשים שלכאורה נראים עזים וחזקים, ואם תנסם יגרע כחם ולא ירים.
פד. אין לרדוף אחר ריוח ממון, כשיסתכן מצרה וכל יגון.
פה. את אשר נוכח מן המעשה, לעולם יהיה ולא ישתנה.
פו. הרבה מהבסילים לזרים נראים חכמים, אך כשישמעו דבריהם נהוקו לאוילים.
פז. הפועלים רעה בלבם ובלשונם, הכרת פניהם יענה בם.
פח. הפורשים רשת ללכד חברם, הם יפלו וילכדו ברשתם.
פט. מי שהוא אכזרי עם חבריו, לא יועיל הון ומתנה לשנות מדותיו.
צ. הדברים שהם עמוקים לעשותם, ימציאו ברגילות ובתמידותם.
צא. מי שירגיש לראשונים שיעלבוהו, לא יבואו עוד אחרים כדברים ויבזוהו.
צב. יש משמחתו פועל פעולה בלי עצה, והנה משים עצמו בסבנה עצומה.
צג. אין בעבדים נאנח וחדל אישים, כמוליד בנים הרבה וינחילם לאדונים.
צד. יש מסתכל ברעת חבירו, ומרחיק עצמו והוא יהיה לנם לו.
צה. יש אנשים סבלים אשר יועילו לאויבים, ויזיקו גם ישחיתו קמת אוהבי'.
צו. העול המניע מהקרוב ומהאה, הוא יהיר מזיק ונאנח.
צז. מי שידבר דבר ולא יוכל להנבה, לא ישמעו דבריו כי לא נסה בזה.
צח. יש לו לאדם לשמח בחלקו הווה, מלתור אחר המותרות וילאה.
צט. אין לעשות פעולה מהפעולות, ולדבר ההפך ושקר הכזבות.
ק. יש אנשים שידם עזה לגבורים, ועליה' יעבר קטני' נבזי' ומאוסי'.
קא. מהאבן היקרה נכיר החכמה, ומהתרגול חושב הרשע לעשות רעה, כי לא יאהב הרשע דעת בינה, ולא ידע למה יועיל ולמה.

קכ. כמו שנקל מהרה נמצא המקל כדי להכות הכלב, כמו כן הגיבור ימצא עילה וסיבה כשירצה להזיק לך ולארוב.

קכא. הנגידים כאשר יתאוו כלם למלכות, ישימו עצמם בסכנה ובאלמנו' חיית.

קכב. אין להניח דבר אשר לא יפול עליו ספק, על דבר אשר תבליתו יסתפק.

קכה. הנאמנות לעולם היתה מדה טובה, ולגבורים העזים לעד כן היה, הן אמת טוב להתחבר עם כלם באחוה, כי העומד עם העזים ממנו בגבורה, הונו גם ממונו יוציאנו במהרה, ועם בן גילו המשפט יהיה כדין וכשורה.

קכו. את אשר תעשה להנאת כילי וכסיל, הנה אבדת יגיעך כי כל זה לא יועיל.

קכז. יש אנשים אשר תיקר נפשם בעיניך, והם יזקו לך ויבקשו להאבידך.

קכח. אין לדבר ולעשות נבלות, כשנשמע דבר אשר לא יאות, כי הכסיל יעשה בגילות, כשישמע החכם פורץ גדרות, ונדמה לסוסים כשהכלבים ניבחים להם בקולות, מבזים אותם בקלונות ובחרפות.

קכט. העושר נראה לארם טוב וערב, אך הוא מלא סכנות ורעיון לב.

קל. אין להאמין דברי כל המדברים, אם לא יהיו נבונים וחכמים.

קלא. יש אנשים אשר יאהבי האודאות והשבחים, ובחרפתם ישבו ויחברו עם כסלים ואולים.

קלב. כשמולך טוב ותרבה נכסים, אל יתנאה לבך בהבלים, כי אם המול ישתנה כפי הימים, אשר נוקת עתה ישיבו לך מרורי' וקרב אוהביך לעד ולעילמים כי יהיו לך לגם ולמגינים, אשר לא כן אוכלים בשולחנך למעדנים, כי כשירע מולך ותאבד יפנו עורף ולא פנים.

קלג. לא יחשוב אדם מלאכה לעשות, כאשר יראה כי לא נסה עוד בואת.

קלד. לפעמים אדם גבור בגבורים, יצטרך לאנשים נדכאים ושפלים.

קלו. הבורא יקשיב לתפילת הצדיקים, ויטרוף שאלת ורצין הכסילי'.

קלז. יש אשר לאולתם לא ישאלו עצה, ולא ישמעו ללימדים אותם בינה, ובשהם בסכנה וצרה עצומה, תולים החסרון בסכלות' אשר ערן היה, ואומרים זאת המחשבה היתה יותר נכונה.

קלז. ההמון הרב דומה לדבריהם לצפרדעים, אשר המליכו עליהם מלך שומר אמונים, ואומ' כי הוא נבוה וחדל אישים, ומשבחים[31] את אשר היה לעולמים, וזה כי ישנאו הדברים החדשים, ויאהבו ויחקרו אחרי הדברים החדשים.

קלח. כל איש מרוע מולו מדבר שקר כזבים, ויש מחפש החדש והישן מפני החדש מתאוויב.

קלט. המתכל שלהשגת מעט טיבה לא תאבד שלוה נבונה, ואל תאמין לדברי המדבר במובה, כי יחניף לך ותוכו מלא מרמה, כי לא לבד ידברו לך דברי נחמה, אך יראו לך פנים טוב מראה.

קמ. יש אנשים אשר יתנו כוחותם לך נתונים, והנה לא יעשו זה לתועלתך אך לתועלתם הם עושים.

קמא. אין לירא מדבר בלי סיבה, כי לפעמים היראה קשה מן הסכנ'.

קמב. הדבר היותר נחשק מבני אדם, הוא הטוב ההוה ובריות קיים.

קכג. גבורת הנפש בכל דבר יהיה שלטון, והאימנות תתקיים בלי הבטחון, והבטחון על האומנות שליט ואדון.

קכד. ראוי וטוב לבן לשמוע לדברי הורים, וכמו כן חוייב לשמוע אל דברי וקנים.

קכה. המבקש לאונות חבירו ברכילות ובמרמות, אל יתמה אם יעשׂ לו כאשר זמם הוא לעשות.

קכו. לכל משקר ומכזב דבריו אל תאמין, והמיחל עלבונו ושיתק הוא מרת מאמין, ומי שמשניח על מעשיו הוא חכם מבין.

קכז. השחוק והלצנית ינרו דומהו, והצחוק והכסלות ישחיתו בעליה, והעישה מרמה רעה תבואהו.

קכח. לא יאית לאנשים להתגאה בנאוה יתירה, מאשר הם חיים והולכי׳ על פני האדמה.

קכט. כל אדם משיג שביל מהמדות, יש אשר יופיו גדול וגם נאות, ויש אשר גופו יחוק ויאמץ באילות, ויש אשר השיגה ידו עושר רב והונו׳, ומי שהשיג חברים גבורי׳ אנשי מלחמות, וכל אדם יהיה שמח בחלקו ממה שהגיע לו אלו מהמדות, ואין להלחם עם חבירו בשביל קנאות אשר יקנא אליו מאשר קנה עד הנה מהטובי׳.

קל. הנה שמירת האדם מאויבו הוא דבר נקל, אבל הוא מסוכן שמיר׳ אוהב אשר לו פנים קלקל.

קלא. יש אשר בשלותם מהצניעות לא יזכורו, ובהצלחתם בגדר כילי ושוע יעמורו, ובהתהפכות הומן הטוב יפלו ויכשולו, וכאשר מזלם יהפך מ(ו)גם ישמרו וישתנו למדת הכילות ולא יעבורו, וטוב מהן אשר בשלוה ערן לא זוכו כי לא יגעו לריק ולא לבהלה יעסוקו, כאלה היום אשר כל מגמתם לקבץ ולא יפסוקו.

קלב. המניח ועוזב אוהבו בעת צרתו, לא יוכה לראות בשמחת נחמתו.

קלג. הקנא׳ מלאה נזק ולענה ומר, יריע אף יצריח על בעליו יתגבר.

קלד. את אשר הוא דבר להתרחק נחפש אותה בשכל ובחכמה, וראוי נתאוה להניע אל האושר הטוב מכלי נדע את מקומה, ואין לתמיה אם שלותינו לא תהיה לה תקומה, באשר לא נרדוף הדרך הטובה והישרה.

קלה. הסתכל אל אשר תרצה להזיק ולארוב, כי אם ממך יהיה יותר גבור, לא אליו תזיק, אך עליך הגורל יפול.

קלו. סכל יקרא מאנשים, את אשר עדן שמר נפשו מאויבים, והנה לסוף נפל ביד מרעים, ויזיקוהו להיותו בלי עוזרים.

קלז. הסתכל אל אשר תטיב ותועיל, כי יש מרעים לאשר קבלו מהם רב להועיל.

קלח. התקשרות והתחברות יחד האיברים, הוא מוכרח כי כל אבר יתקיי׳ עבור האחרים, וכמו כן כל חבר יצטרך לאוהבים, כי על כן ראוי לעזור עניי דלים, כי לא העושר לבדו האדם ישלים, אך שלימותו הוא חבורת החברים.

קלט. הרבה הם המוצרכי׳ האביונים, ונם יש אשר להם העושר עודפים, אבל לא ימצא עשיר בעשירים, אשר מעדפו יעזור ויתן לדלים.

קמ. בסבנה גדולה יש יגיעה להנצל, כי כשמוּל רע יתחיל על אדם להתגבר לא
ירפנו עד סופו אשר יפרד, או עד אשר לא יוכל לפתח פה לדבר.
קמא. אל תביט אל טוב נעימות הדברים, אך הסתכל אל מעשה המדברי'.
קמב. הן העני אשר בעושר לא נסה, יהיה חיים נעימים בלי אונס וצרה, אבל אם
יתעשר והונו ירבה, לא ישמח בחלקו וימלא תחבולות ומחשבה.
קמג. יש לוחם נגד דלי העניות, וכשיגברו עליהם יהיו עבדים לעשירות.
קמד. מהנשר העשירים הגבורים והגדולים, ידברו נבלה ויפצו פה כנגד עניים,
ולפעמים גם הם יבקשו לנקום מהצרים, ויקחו שללם אשר טרפו מידם
העשירים.
קמה. את אשר יילך בעקבות הפועלים רעות, הגם כי הוא נקי וטהור מסיגות,
עונשו רב ויענש כפועליו בעונשים רבות.
קמו. הרשע בשירצה ליסר לך ולהויקך, נקל ימצא סיבה ולא יירך.
קמז. העני' הם מעושקי' מן העשירים, ברברי שקרים וערות כוזבים.
קמח. אל תאמין לכל פוצה פיו לדבר, כי יש מראה להועיל ולהרע יומר.
קמט. מי שהרגיל עצמו לשקר, כאשר האמת והנכון גם יאמ', לא יאמינו לדבריו
אשר ידבר.
קנ. יש לו לאדם להתנהג בטבע כפי מסת ידו הצעירה, ולא יעשה את אשר רואה
אחרי עושי' נקל מהרה, אך כפי אשר יוכלו כוחותיו להגיע לא יותר ולא רבה.
קנא. הרבה יש מהאנשים שמעטם לביש קנאה, ולא יניחו לעשות לאחרים את
אשר יוכלו הם להוציא לאורה.
קנב. לאיש רך הלבב וחכם נבון, נקל יחרפוה בחרפה ובבזיון, אך לאיש גבור
ועז כרמון אל ישלח ידו בו בסיל ושגעין.
קנג. את אשר מה(א)לקים ניתן נקבל ברצון ובשמחה, כי כל אשר הוא עושה הוא
במדה במשקל ובמשורה.
קנד. במקום אשר יגרע הכח והגבורה, יצטרך למלאות ברעת ובשכל ובינה.
קנה. הנה דבר קשה להוכיח את אשר הוקינו במדה רעה, כי התוכחה בחיק
הבחורים ינוח ויאות לעשותה תכף העבירה, כי יותר נקל ישמעו אז אשר
לא נעשית להם עוד כהיתר וכשורה.
קנו. חוייב למקבל חסד וטובה, לשלם למסבבו שבח והודאה.
קנז. אין שלם בשלמים כמלמד דעת מאחרים.
קנח. הזמן והמקום יועילו הרבה, לחרל אישים ובינה אשר יבוזה.
קנט. העבדים יתאוו לבעליהם הראשונים, באשר מהם ימצאו יותר קשים ורעים.
קס. את אשר להמון הם נחשבי' שקטי' הם בהפך דעת החושבים.
קסא. לא כל אשר ידברו דברים טובים נחשבים אוהבים, כי יש מהם אשר
תחתיהם יצפנו סם מר כלענים.
קסב. כל איש ייטב בעיניו יותר חלקו, כאמר' ז"ל חן מקח על מקחו.
קסג. כאשר אנחנו נעלה בכח ובגבורה, ראוי לזכור מימי הזקנה כי היא חלושה.
קסד. לאיש נדכא רוח אין לרכאו, ולהוסיף עוד על צערו.
קסה. לא תוביח חברך, במום אשר בך.

קכו. יש מהמתנאים אשר יחשבו עצמם לפאר ולכבוד, והנם להרפה ולמשפה בשוק וברחובות.

קכז. טוב להתנהג ולחיות עם חבר בגוירה שוה, מאיש גבור יעיר קנאה וישים עצמו בסכנה.

קכח. אין להלעיג שום אנוש ולבזותו, כי הטבע נתן לכל אדם מעלה הראויה לו, ומי שאין לו מעלותיך, אולי יש לו אחרת כי לא יגרע ויחסר ממדרגותיך.

קכט. אין יתד[32] תקועה וחוקה כהאחרות, והמחלוקת הוא מוכן לחלשות.[33]

קל. לחיות כי יתעצלו האנשים בפעלם בעד אחרים, כשנרצה לפעול פעולה טוב לנו להיות הממצאים.

קלא. מה יותר רע ושקוץ מהבילות, והקנאה מכל שטות והוללות, כי אשר יותר מלאחרים יזיק וישחית, רעה רבה עליו יתאוה ויתמיד.

קלב. את אשר לא תוכל לעשות בכח ובחזקה, תעשהו בחכמה ודעת ובמזימה.

קלג. כל אדם יש לעשות כל יכולתו, כדי לפאר ולגדל את פעילתו.

קלד. לפעמים יהיו נאינאים ומוטעים, המורגלים לאינאות ולהטעות אחרים.

קלה. יש אשר הם כל כך משוגעים, כי בשום חכמה ובשכל לא יוכלו עשות לו תרופים.

קלו. יש אשר עושים מעשיהם בסכלות ובהלות, אשר מהם נלמד שאין להם השגחה ותחרות.

קלז. אין לבזות האויב ולחרפהו, הגם שיהיה קטן ושפל מראהו.

קלח. הנדרים השעמים לא יועילו כאין, כי הבורא לא יטה להם אזנים, אבל יצטרך שתעזור אתה בכחך, וכמו כן בוראך יסעדך ויעזרך.

קלט. לפעמים הבן אשר אינו אהוב מהקרובים, מטהו יציץ ויפרח מהנאהב לרחוקים.

קמ. לחיות היטב צריך לעמול בעבודות, כי איש רב שעימום[34] ינתן לתענוג ולרווחות, ולפעמים הרבה יעשה אחרית טיב ונוראות.

קמא. החפשיות חצי מלכות.

קמב. האנשים אשר יכאבו מעצמם משוקצים יהיו, ולפעמים שומעים דברים אשר ירגזון ויחשו.

קמג. המפירים האהבה גם כי הניזוק לא יוכל להתנקם, לא ינום מנקמת אלקים אשר יכם.

קמד. המניחים חלקם אשר השיגה ידם, בבטחה שיסנה ריוחם, כסילים יחשבו וחוץ מן הדין הבטחתם.

קמה. יש אשר מראים לעשות חסד גמול לעם, ויועצים אחרים את רצונם וכוונתם.

קמו. הנה הוא הוללות עור לשאול, מאשר יזיק יותר נקל מהועיל יכול.

קמז. הרעים יבטיחו לעשות הטובות, ועושים הפך מההבטחות.

קמח. יש אשר אם לפעמים יועילו לשום אדם, יפעלו בהכרח לא בתמימות ויושר לבם.

קמט. אין לשמוח מן הדברים, אשר הם ראויים לאנינות ואבלים.

קנ. התמידית שעיבוד[35] ועבודה, יוליד אוצר מה מאוד רבה.

קנא. כל דבר נעשה כראוי לו, כאשר עשוי אל ומנו.

קצב. את אשר לא יוכל הטבע לעשות, לפעמים יעשה אותה רוע המקרות.
קצג. אין לחשוב במחשבה, לרמות שוכן מענה.
קצד. המבין דרך המין האנושי ומנהגו, במקרים הפכיים לא ינור רעה לו.
קצה. הגם שאחד עומד בסכנה גדולה, לעולם לא יבחר לו המיתה.
קצו. האנשים אשר הם כליים, לפעמים מויקים לעצמם ומרעים.
קצז. לפעמים השכל האנושי הוא כל כך עמום ומעוור בשנאה, כי לא יתפעל מלמות, כשינוע שונאו קודם בא עליו ההחלואה.
קצח. רוב הצרות אשר אנו נלכדים בם, הם בסבתינו ולא בסבת המקרה הרע.
קצט. החכם אשר פעם אחד יהיה מעישק ומאונה, לעולם לא יאמין לחנף ולכסיל מתעה.
ר. אשר יקרו בסבלותם בצרה ותחלואים, הם יותר משוקצים ומכולם הם גבזים ומאוסים.
רא. המעטה עדי של אחרים, כשיאבדו יַודע מי הוא ולא יערים.
רב. הכסילים בהצלחתם שוכחים מעצמם, וברעתם ושאונם זוכרים את מדרגותם.
רג. ראוי ליעץ האוהב בעת המצטרך, כי בעת שאין לו צורך הוא כמתלוצץ.
רד. החכם והמבין אין מניח שום דבר, כדי לנום מן הסכנה ומהמר.
רה. הרעתן כשינצל מהסכנה, יזהר ממנה פעם שניה.
רו. החכמים בנקל בלי מעיקים, מגלים עצות הרעים.
רז. אין לאדם למסור עצמו ביד האויב, אם לא יהיה בטוח ממנו להנצל.
רח. היופי לא ישלם בכמות, אלא בגדולת האיכות.
רט. עם האנשי' רעי' וחטאים, לא יועיל דין ומשפט ודברי' נאמני'.
רי. בהצלחה אין לאדם לשמוח כל כך, כדי שלא יפול באיזה מכשול ופח ויאנח.
ריא. כל דבר שאנו מתאוים נגד האויב, לפעמים יפול עלינו לאורב.
ריב. הדברים הנעשים הין זמנם, אין להם העמדה ולאין קיומם.
ריג. כאשר יותר דבורא אוהב הטובים, כמו כן הוא שונא יותר את הרעים.
ריד. כאשר העולבים הם גדולים, השנאה לא יסור לעולם מן הנעלבים.
ריו. פרקונם של האויבים לעולם היא מזקת, והיא ראוי להיות משוקצת, כי לעולם לא יהיה אלא נזק, חרפה ובוזון טיט ורפש.
ריז. איש נבון יש לו לשקץ ולתעוב, הדברים אשר לא יוכלו לשים לאור.
ריז. הערום יודע את אשר ראוי לעשות, ואת אשר ראוי לנום ממנו ולדחות.
ריח. העושק ומצר לקרוביו, שקוץ ומותעב הוא ממיודעיו.
ריט. הרעים החיטאים בין רב בין מעט שיחטאו, אין לרחם ולחמול עליהם אם יאבדו.
רכ. את אשר לא יתענגו במנוחה ההוה, בכסלותם יאבדו הכל קל מהרה.
רכא. אין לשקץ העצה היעוצה, מאנשי דעת ומרבי תוכחה.
רכב. בהצלחה אין לאדם לבטוח ולרבות שמחה, וכמו כן לא ידאג כל כך בבא עליו הצרה.
רכג. יש לך להבין כאשר איש יפעל אליך טובה, באיזה נפש ודעת עושה אותה הטו[ו]בה, כי יש רבים אשר מראים לעשות לאחרים שרות ועבודה, ולא להם אך לעצמם יעסקו ויאבדו לב מתנה.

רכה. לפעמים ימשול יותר מעלה בחיות מכוערות, מאשר יהיה באנשים אשר אין להם שום טוב זולת השמות.

רכה. בבית דלי העניים והאביונים, יש יותר חפשיות מבית העשירים.

רכו.

רכז. קטני המנוחות והמרגועית, ראוי להשוותם אל הערבות והתועלות.

רכח. יאות ליסר אותם אשר להרע מבקשים, לאנשים אשר לא נזקו לשום אדם לעד ולעולמים.

רכט. אין לעשות שום דבר, גדול מכחינו אשר לנו נמסר.

רל. אין לירא מהאנשים מרבים דברי לצון, אך מאשר לא יפצו פה ולשון.

רלא. לנדיב הבורא נותן במתנה רוב דברים, כי הוא באמונה ובישר לבב ירים, ולא יחשוב כי רוע המרעים, היא נכונה ומזומנת לרוע מעשים.

רלב. את אשר יחיה ממעט שלו, הוא יותר בטוח מאשר יחיה מרוב ממון זולתו.

רלג. אין לירא משנות אדונים ומושלים, ובלבד שלא יהיו רעים מהראשונים.

רלד. הוא יותר בטוח חינת העניים, מאשר היא אותה של העשירים.

רלה. אין לבעום עם המזיקים ומצירים, אשר יפעלו בהברח ואניסים הם מאחרים.

רלו. אין להתאונן להיות נולד מכוער, להיות כי היופי לרוב זיק וסופו לענה ומר.

רלז. אין לירא מיום המות והפרידה, כי כל הצרות שבעולם יושלמו בתעודה.

רלח. אחר מיתת הבעל, אהבת האשה עברה ותחתיו מעל.

רלט. הראות הפנינים והדברים היקרים, לטרף קורא ומעורר הנבים.

רמ. הרע המגיע לאדם בסבתו, הוא מציק ומזיק לו יותר מזולתו.

רמא. אין דבר בעולם יותר בילי בהיות שוע, להיות בלתי מתענג מן הטוב אשר הגנו הטבע והוא בא למנוע.

רמב. לנדיב הבורא מנחיל אליו מתנות הרבה, כדי שלעת המצטרך יוכל לציל עצמו ויחיה.

רמג. [36] אין לנו חפשיות בדברי ועניני אחרים, כמו שיש להם לבעלים.

רמד. הבל הוא חבורת הנשים, בעיני האנשים נבונים.

רמה. האנשים יש להם להדמות בפי מעשיהם ולא לשפיט אותם בפי הגוף מחמריהם.

רמו. רחקו מהכסילים, וכמה יותר מהם תרחקו, הנה אל החכמים יותר תקרבו.

רמז. העושר מהירושה, מעביר האנחה, מהאב המת בשפה רפה.

רמח. בעל הבית רב שעימום ובטל, לפעמים יפעל יותר מהאחר, אשר תמיד עומד ופועל.

רמט. העושר מקנה חבורת האוהבים, אף אויבים מלובשי בכנדי אהבים, אשר הם יקיימו כפי שי[ש]מעו תועלות ממך מושלחים.

רנ. לאיש מושגה וחסר לב אין להאמין, ואין למחול לו בשיש לאל ידיני להענישו ולהלשין.

רנא. אין לשמוח לעולם ממיתת האויב, כי היא כללית לכל החי׳ ולהם תמיד אירב.

רנב. יש רבים משבחים פעולות הראויים להעשה, אבל מעטים הם שישימו עצמם לעשותם בכל פה.

רנג. אין לשים עצמנו בסכנה, בבלי דעת ומחוסר צידה.

רנד. אין להאמין לחזיונות ולחלומות, קל וחומר לדברים אשר מרצון וחפץ האדם הם באות.

רנה. כשהאדם הוא מוכנע לשבוח הוא בעצמו, עבור הטובות אשר הבורא חננו, כאשר ממנו ישתלשל גאותו וגאונו, ומהרע שהוא סבה ממנו, הוא מסבב אחרים לרעתו.

רנו.

רנו. כמה הבחורים פתאים יש להם להיות ערומים, כדי שלא ילבדו בחניפות שקר הזונות והמנאפים.

רנח. אותם אשר ינקמו הם מעט ניזוקים, ויהיו מכובדים מכל עם ולאומים.

רנט. אנחנו מקבלים יסורינו באהבה, כשאנו רואים אחרים נתוסף עליהם הרוה על הצמאה.

רס. לנום מן הסכנה אשר היא הוה, לפעמים נכשל בצרה וצוקה גדולה.

רסא. יש לנו לתת שבח ועזרה לאשר יוכל להצילנו, אשר הוא לבדו הבורא מעוז מגיננו.

רסב. אין לחרף ולגדף הוקנה, כי נסיונות וחכמה היא מלאה.

רסג. אין לאהוב ולילך בחבורה, עם האנשים אשר הם משונים לנו במרה.

רסד. בההצלחה רבים מעשים[37] אוהבים, ואם יראו שמזלינו יטה לרע הופכים עורף ולא פנים, וימנעו מלילך בחבורתם כימים קדמונים, ועוד לפעמים בבזיונם, ישארו גם הם בצרה נבוכים.

רסה. כשאדם עושה חטא ואשמה, אין להאשים המזל והשטן בעבירה, אלא אל עצמו יכנה המיבה.

רסו. בחצרות וארמוני' יחשבו יותר המזנים, מהחכמים אשר הם נבונים.

רסז. אין לבזות שום דבר הגם שיהיה בזוי, כי אין דבר עם שיהיה קטנה ושפלה, שלא יהיה טובה לצורך אחר להשתמש בה.

רסח. טוב למות מהרה בכבוד ותפארה, מחיות זמן רב בחרפה וכלימה.

רסט. רבים מניחים המדות הרעות, לפי שלא יוכלו אותם עוד עשות.

רע. כל אדם יש לו לשוש ולשמוח באומנות מלאכתו, כי לכולם יש צרות ומלאות צוקה הם לבאים לידו.

רעא. החן אשר ינחיל האדם הוא בסבת אשר יחונה, אשר זה לא יקרהו לכד עבור מעשיו אשר יעשה.

רעב. כאשר יותר מושלים ואדונים יש עלינו, בכל יום עולות וצרות יעלו על צווארינו.

רעג. אין איש אוהב כ"ב חבירו, שירצה ויתאו למות הוא בעדו.

רעד. יש אשר מתניפים ומראים שמיתת איזה אדם יצר להם, ועם כל זה יתאוו אותה ויחפצוה וישר לפניהם.

רעה. המדה הרעה שבנשים, היא שכל דבר טוב שעושים, עושים מיראה ופחד לא מרצון ואילת אהבים.

רעו. אין להתבונן באיש כפי ראות פניו, אך ראוי לחקור אחר מעשיו, שלפעמים תחת עור רחלה, יצפון שם זאבה ונסתרה.

רעז. הרעתן יש לו לישב לעולם למטרה, נגד האויבים אשר יבלו לגלגל עלי צדק.
רעח. כשתטיב ותעשה חסד לאויבך, לעולם ישלם רעה אל פניך.
רעט. שבן רע בכל מיני צוקה, ראוי לרחק מעליו כמלא עינא.
רפ. אין להקנות חברים אשר לא תיכל לנרשם מביתיך, ואשר הם חוקים יאמצים יותר ממתניך.
רפא. השבל נובר על הקלות והמהירות, ועל הכח מהגוף ברוממות.
רפב. איש נבון יהיה לבדו יחיד, כשישב בין הכסילים תמיד.
רפג. האנשים מטבע רע, פעמים מעטים, יסירו מהמדות הרעות אף אם יהיו להם מוכיחים.
רפד. אין להלחם עם האנשים גבורים, אשר הם מאתנו יותר חוקים.
רפה. אין כל דבר כל כך נפלא, כי בזמן מה ישתקו ולא יפצי עליו לשון יפה.
רפו. אין לבטוח אדם כל כך בגדולתי וגאוני, ילעשיק אביונים בשיח פיו ולשונו, בבטחה שלא יוכלו להנקם מאתו.
רפז. יש לשמוח בחלקינו אשר השיגה ידינו, ולא לחמוד הדברים אשר אינם שוים אלינו.
רפח. יש לנו לסבול כשהבורא נוטל מאתנו הממון והבנים, כי יש לו חפשיות לעשות מעשים מאלו יותר גדולים.
רפט. המקרה והמזל רע, ינסה האוהב להרע.
רצ. לפעמים יש אדם אשר ישבח אחר לא לכבודו, אך להכשילו בפח לרעתו וימצא זה אשר שקר שבח אותו, איזו סיבה ועילה אל בדיו וכזבו.
רצא. אין לדון אנשים כפי מלבושיהם, אך כפי המדות מעולות ומדרגותיהם.
רצב. אין שום אדם כל כך רע ורובר קשות, אשר לא ישתנה טבעו במתנות.
רצג. איש נבון יש לו לנסות כל ארחות, טרם יבא לשלח ידו אל החרבות וזיינית.
רצד. הדברים תועלתיים ומועילים, ראוי ללמדם אל הנדיבי'.
רצה. יש לנו ללמד לבנינו איזו מלאכה, אשר יוכלו להיציא ממנו איזה פרי מהרה.
רצו. אין איש כל כך נדכא וחדל מעלה, שלא יהיה טוב לעשות איזו פעולה.
רצז. כשבמלחמה הם אנשי הערים הרעים, ביניהם מניחים את הטיבים.
רצח. כשהאשה נכנסה בבית אחת, נבנם עמה האש בוערת.
רצט. לעולם נהיה מיכנים אל טוב המיתה, כי לא נדע יום ושעת הפרידה.
ש. אין לעשות אוצר הנה בארץ כי אין פה מחצבתינו, אך בשמים אשר לנצח נתענג שם ויוציא לאור צדקינו.
שא. המזל רע[38] לעולם אוהב איש מנוחות, הגם כי הוא לא ירצה יתן לו עושר וטובות, ולעולם הוא אויב העני ונדכא רוחות.
שב. המחשבה והרצון בקושי יסת', כי בדברים לפעמים הספר יפר(?) ובמעשה האהבה היא כחמר ביד היוצר.
שג. אין שום חכם ונבון, מקובל ממולרתו אשר יכון.
שד. הדברים של החזק' ועוז גבירה, לא ישבחו אות' באמת אך בועת וביראה.
שה. אין לחרף ולנדף שום אדם, כי לא יהיה כ"כ בלי תועלת ומדע, אשר באיזה צרכינו לא יוכל להצילני מהרע.

שו. לפעמים הדברים אשר לנו נוק נראה, הוא תועלת ומועיל הרבה, כי לבן אין להאנח על אשר עלינו יקרה, הגם שלנו נבהל ומהומם יראה.
שז. העושר לא יקני אותה לרוב בעליה, אלא עם איבוד נפש ונוק הגוף ותחליאיה.
שח. לכל בניהם נראים יפים, הגם שיהיו מאד מכוערים.
שט. לאשר נראים מצליחים אין לקנאות קנאה, כי לפעמים המנוחה מלאה צרה וצוקה.
שי. כמה היא קשה טבע הנשים, אשר לא יודו על דבר מעט או מאין עקרים, ולא יחשבו להיות באבוריות הרבה מוכים.
שיא. הנשוך מפתן ונחש, ירא מהלטאה ויפרש.
שיב. יש לו לאדם להתבונן ולחשוב, איך יהיה יוכל להיות ניזוק מהאויב באריב.
שיג. טוב לחיות בעניות בהשקט ובבטחה, אשר עם עושר ברתת וביראה.
שיד. את אשר הם בצרה ובסכנה, האחדות והמתינות יועיל ויעזור בפתע הצוקה.
שטו. רבים עושים עצמם בחסידים, כדי להיות בלי יגיעות ועמלים.
שטז. פעמים הרבה עבור הכפוי טובה שיש לאיזה אדם מאיזה תועלת מקובל, יכשל באותו נוק ראשון אשר הוא היה חומד להוציא ממנו מהרה קל.
שיז. אין לבטוח לעולם מהאנשים, אשר אנחנו נוקנו לימים.
שיח. את אשר לא ישמעו לקרובים, ילכו לאבדון לעד ולעולמים.
שיט. השמח מרעת הבאה על אחרים, לפעמים יוכה באותם התחלואים.
שכ. המבקשים לאונאות אחרים, לא יתרעמו אם הם יהיו נאונאים.
שכא. החכם יש לו לחניף בכל טעם ותחבולה, כדי לרחק עצמו מחמת הבילי אשר יחרה.
שכב. אם הבעל עצל לראות את ענייניו, אין לו לבטוח שבני ביתו יראו את עסקיו.
שכג. אין לדון מעלת וחכמת האדם, מגודל הדברים ומהנוף הנרדם.
שכד. אין ליסד בטחוננו בעניני העולם, כי הם קלים ולאין בטחונם.
שכה. האדם יש לו לעמוד מזוהר, שלא ליפול ביד איש שוע[39] ואבזר, אשר לא ימחול ולא הממון והחיים בדבריו, אשר מזה ממציא אבל לו ולאוהביו.
שכו. הכסילים כדי להסיר מעליהם משא, משימים עליהם אחרת יותר כבדה.
שכז. אין שום אדם עמל בלי תקוה, משום שכר ותועלת אשר יושב עליו למטרה.
שכח. יש לנו לירא יותר מהשקטים שותקים, מהמצפצפים ומרבים מאד דברים.
שכט. אין שום דבר שמעיק ומכחיש השבירים, כתשמיש המטה ו[40]
של. כשהאדם מקבל יותר חסד והטבה, אינו יכול לסבול העלבון והקטטה.
שלא. אשר יקחו נשים יכשלו בסבנות וכמכשולים גדולים.
שלב. את אשר הכל ירצה, הכל יאבד וילאה.
שלג. יש לנו ללמד החכמות ספריות, כדי שנהיה מחוזקים בנדולות.
שלד. רוב הפעמים המחילה יוזק אל החוטא, מהנקמה אשר נגדו יחשוב העושה.
שלה. אין לשאול מהבורא אלא הדברים אשר בעיניו יקרו, לפי שלפעמים אנו שואלים דבר שהוא נגדינו במשהו.
שלו. את אשר ילחמו עם הגדולים מהם, נוסף שלא יוכלו להשוות להם, לפעמים רבות נותנים להתלוצץ ולשחוק ליודעיהם.

שלו. רבים מבקשים לעשות גמול חסד לאויבים, כדי למצא חן בעיניהם ולהשלים.
שלח. האדם פעמים בחמדת הריוח והממון, הולך בסכנה מהחיות בלי רעיון.
שלט. יש אשר ירצו לרכוב רגל אחר בתרי רכשי, ולבסוף לא יתקעו רגלם בחד מן תרי.
שמ. יש אשר ירצו להציל עצמם מסכנה, ונופלים באחרת יותר עצומה.
שמא. החופשיות היא על כל דבר יקרה, ומפנינים ומפז היא אהובה.
שמב. את אשר בכח הגוף לנו נמנע, ראוי לעשותו בשכל ובמדע.
שמג. יש לנו להתרצות מהמתנות נתונות מהבורא, אף מה' אשר ינתנו לנו מן הטבע אשר יורה.
שמד. הדעתן יש לו להתבונן, לא לבד הזמן ההוה, אלא א[ף הזמן ה][43]עתיד אשר יבא זמן יקרה.
שמה. [הרע ר][42]אוי להתכנה, לאשר הוא סיבה אשר יאונה.
שמו. [ר]ע יותר מעט לסבול העלבון מיחידים, אשר בהעניש [יע]שו לו אויבים רבים.
שמז. את אשר ירצו לתפוש הרבה מאד, פעמים הרבה לא יתפשו אלא המעט מן התאוות.
שמח. הבלבלנות מהאנשים, אשר יתקינו דברים חרשים, הגם שיהיו רעים לזקנים.
שמט. ראוי לסבול מכות המלמדים, כי הם סיבה מטובו' רבים.
שנ. חפשיות הגוף היא להשוות לכל העידונים מהעולם הזה ולבבור.
שנא. אין לחפש אחר הדברים, אשר מן הטבע ברים ונכונים.
שנב. אין לדון היצורים כפי המלבושים, אך מן טוב המעשים, כי לפעמים תחת עור הרחלים, יש זאבים[43] טורפי' ונסתרי'.
שנג. הדברים הנעשי' במהירות רבה, אין להם קיום והעמדה.
שנד. [בש]אחר הוא בסכנה גדולה, אין לו לאבד הזמן בפטפיא(?), אבל יש לו לעזור את עצמו יותר שיוכל מהרה.
שנה. את אשר סבל צרה עצומה, ירא עוד מהתחלואה נוחה וקלה.

תם ונשלם.

THE MEMOIRS OF A SIENNESE JEW (1625–1633)

By CECIL ROTH, London, England

JEWISH literature is notoriously poor in works of autobiography. It is indeed only what might have been expected. In a people so predominantly intellectual, the vicissitudes of worldly existence were of secondary importance by the side of the record of spiritual achievement. The Jew was interested in what a man thought and said, rather than in what he did. Nehemiah indeed had set a classic example in the writing of memoirs: yet the Rabbis condemned the personal touch, asserting that it was for this very reason that his work lost its identity, and was subordinated to Ezra's more modest account.[1] The aping of Hellenic models of autobiography by Josephus was itself not calculated to commend the practise to his more loyal co-religionists. And so, until comparatively modern times, these examples remained unimitated. While no literature perhaps reproduced so vast a body of opinions, none was more backward in the portrayal of the commonplaces of everyday existence. Though Boswell's *Life of Johnson* was confessedly inspired by Rabbinical recommendations,[2] the Jew himself was less punctilious. If the intimate details of the life of any person were set down, as in the case of the Maharil,[3] it was for the *Halachic* importance of his example rather than for the human interest of his doings. It is therefore to the vast uncharted sea of the Responsa literature almost exclusively that we must turn for glimpses of the social history of our people during their long middle age.

This generalization is not, of course, universal. Glückel von Hameln has been called, with a certain amount of justification, a German Jewish Pepys, all the more remarkable considering her sex. A century later, Solomon Maimon gave the world in his autobiography not only an extraordinary human document, but also the best conceivable synopsis of the Mendels-

sohnian epoch. Recently there have been published the memoirs, distinctly inferior to the forgoing in human and general interest, of the Galician Ber of Bolochow. A few minor works from Germany and the neighbouring countries may be added to this list.[4]

Elsewhere, the dearth is all the more remarkable. Italy should assuredly have been foremost in this branch of literature. Her Jewish settlements were of immemorial antiquity: they were deeply steeped in the traditions of their environment: they had before their eyes classical examples: while they were cultured to a degree, and had always been articulate in their literary expression. But the same essentially Jewish outlook, it seems, applied to Italy as well. It is only to be expected that Leone da Modena should have set himself against the current (with somewhat disappointing results) in this as he did in everything else, and his grandson, Isaac the Levite, followed him dutifully in this respect.[5] These two compositions give an invaluable account of life in the Venetian Ghetto in the seventeenth century —a life, as it would seem, made up largely of bickering and strife. There is also extant the diary of a Roman student of the commencement of the eighteenth century, one Judah Gonzago.[6] Here, however, we come to a halt. Save for the merest fragments, there is virtually nothing more of this sort extant for the Jews of Italy. Moreover, Jewish life was there so very individual, so strongly localised, and withal so extremely picturesque, that the gap is all the more regrettable from the point of view of the historian. For that reason, the *ricordi* which are here published for the first time are of peculiar interest.

The manuscript in which the original is to be found is a recent acquisition of the Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, to the Librarian of which I must here express my deepest gratitude for the generous facilities accorded me. It comprises the ledger of the business house of Jacob b. Eleazar Modena of Sienna, between the years 1562 and 1567. The accounts (as usual, in Hebrew) are of considerable importance from the historical as well as from the economic point of view.[7] What especially interests us here, however, are the additions made by a later hand on the blank pages of the volume (fol. 44a–b, 47b–57a).[8]

The identity of the author is not clear. His first name was Joseph, as we are once informed. His family name, on the other hand, he never lets slip; and attempts to trace it in the Siennese archives on the strength of the information he gives have proved fruitless. It may be assumed, however, that he was (despite the obvious difference in cultural and economic standards) of the same family as the original owner.

Of Joseph da Modena (as we may tentatively call him) we know nothing apart from what he himself tells us in these memoirs. His family (which as far as is known had no connection with its more famous Venetian namesake) had been settled for nearly a hundred years at Sienna, where he himself was probably born about the opening of the seventeenth century.[9] He seems to have become the head of his household at a comparatively early age through the death of his father, which left him the sole support of his mother and a not over-astute younger brother. It is this fact, perhaps, which explains his lack of education, for which we find him trying to make up at a later date. He married a certain Anna, daughter of Solomon Milano, who died in child-bed in 1633 after bearing him a number of children, one at least of whom died in infancy. By profession, Joseph was a mere huckster—a dealer in second-hand stuffs and clothing on no large scale, his business carrying him on occasion as far off as Lombardy. On the fly-leaves of the present manuscript there is an inventory in his writing of a variety of objects which no doubt passed through his hands in the course of business, with the prices paid and received. He was apparently especially interested in trading in masks and other objects used at the Carnival season. He makes mention of this in his memoirs; and on the second page of the volume there is to be found a list of such articles as he required for the Carnival of 1635. It seems to have been drawn up for the guidance of an agent—perhaps his feckless younger brother—whom he adjures in a note to drive the best bargain possible.

It would seem curious that a man so occupied should have thought of committing to paper those intimate details of private life which more distinguished and better-educated contemporaries so utterly neglected. The reason, however, is not difficult to

find. Joseph da Modena was a man with a grievance. What he committed to writing was not the personal happenings and impressions which interested a Pepys or a Cellini, but a memorandum of wrongs received. Indeed, so as to be certain not to forget, he made an index of them on the fly-leaf and set the initials of the wrong-doers in the margin of the passages which recorded their perversities. For Joseph was one of those unfortunate individuals who find themselves injured or insulted by all those with whom they come into contact with a fatal regularity, without harbouring the slightest suspicion that their own character may be at fault. If, when the Grand Duke came to Sienna, the articles which he had to contribute for the entertainment of the court were found unsuitable, it must be the machinations of his enemies which were responsible. When he was out of the city, they took advantage of his absence to mislead his brother into squandering the family property. Outside acquaintances were seduced from his friendship before they had been long in Sienna. Even a stranger Rabbi soon treated him in such a fashion that he felt justified in withholding his pay for lessons received. If a person would not lend him money, it must be out of malice, not inability. He could indeed take action against his own father-in-law in order to recover a debt, but if any one—even a helpless widow—took similar measures against himself, he considered it a shameful exhibition of unkindness and ingratitude. He could wrangle even over his son's death-bed. The only persons to whom he could ultimately turn for assistance in time of trouble were his recent acquaintances from abroad (despite their violent quarrel) and an accommodating gentile baker. Yet he was no coward, and belied the traditionally pacific Jewish nature by coming to blows in the open street with his enemies, who were—inevitably—three to one.

Finally, however, his opportunity came. He found himself involved in a case in which, as it seems, he had public opinion on his side against the arch-enemies who were always plotting his downfall. The case is related with a wealth of graphic detail. His widowed sister-in-law, Donna Stella, had the temerity to wish to marry again. Joseph's interests were involved. She had entrusted part of her property to his care, to save it from her rapacious brothers; and besides, he had hopes that she would

adopt his son—her nephew—or at least make provision for him out of her dowry. Moreover, it seems possible that a more intimate consideration was involved: for Joseph had himself just lost his wife, was living on terms of the closest familiarity with the lady, and even went so far on one occasion as to hint darkly that he did not desire his love to be responsible for any ill-feeling. However that may be, he attempted to obstruct the proposed match by threatening to hand over the lady's property to her brothers, and putting forward counter-claims to it on his own account. Worsted in the civil courts, he diplomatically attempted to win over popular opinion by appealing to Jewish law. The lady had meanwhile obtained from the Rabbinical authorities at Rome a ban of excommunication against any persons who withheld evidence as to the ownership of the disputed property. Confident of success, she committed the strategical blunder of refusing to submit to the decision of any local tribunal. Accordingly, one day, her partisans attempted to have the ban published in the synagogue, under the protection of the civil authorities. The scene that followed was worthy of the pencil of Hogarth, and yields to none in Jewish historical literature for sheer vividness.

It was during the morning service than news was brought to the synagogue that the document was on its way. The superstitious congregants, who detested the idea of an act of such general application, which any man might unwittingly offend, began to pour pell-mell out of the building to avoid hearing the reading. When they reached the outer gateway, they were met by the constables, who tried to drive them back with blows from the flats of their swords and the pommels of their daggers, reinforced without doubt by round curses. Others of the worshippers attempted to escape through the windows. Within the building, utter bedlam reigned. The few men who remained banged on their desks in order to prevent anything from being heard, while the terrified women, on their knees behind their grill, poured forth shrieks and imprecations. Finding the synagogue virtually deserted, the reader took his stand at an open window, and started bawling the terms of the excommunication to the seething mob without. By his side stood his nephew, the

ritual black candle in his hand, with its wax dripping down on the reader's head, while from below he was saluted by a fusilade of stones and garbage from the children grateful of the excuse, coupled with maledictions from their elders.

Where Joseph da Modena was all this time, he does not inform us: but it is to be imagined that he was in the thick of the tumult, openly exulting at the commotion which he had caused. The unique wave of popular sympathy comforted him for the outcome of the suit, which was not wholly in his favour—nor, as it would seem, unjustly. He had a superstitious satisfaction, too, in noting that the launching of the Ban had brought in its train the inevitable trail of disaster. During that year, many members of the community (not excepting himself). Suffered domestic losses of the most severe type. His memoirs end on a note of righteous exultation.

The historical importance of the diary is, it must be confessed, in inverse proportion to its human interest. Joseph da Modena was no Benvenuto Cellini, mixing with the great ones of the earth, nor a Solomon Maimon, in touch with the highest intellect of his generation, nor yet a Glückel von Hameln, delighting in intercourse and intermarriage with those distinguished by their wealth and their piety. He was not even spectator or sufferer in any really notable event which he considered worth his while to record. He was a child of the Ghetto in its worst sense—petty in his interests, limited in his outlook, sordid to a degree in his activities. He did not possess the saving graces of learning, nor, as it would seem, even of peculiar piety. Not only did he himself leave little trace, but barely a single one of those whom he mentions and with whom he habitually consorted is otherwise recorded. Nevertheless, for this very reason an importance of its own may perhaps be vindicated for what he wrote.

Jewish history has tended to be on the whole the history of scholarship, occasionally alternating, and sometimes combined, with the aristocracy of wealth. Save for the broadest of generalisations, the common people have been generally neglected. The reason is obvious enough: for it is precisely the common people who have remained inarticulate, leaving it to their spiritual leaders to bequeath a memorial to future generations. And so it is unlikely

that we will ever know what sort of life the Jewish agriculturalist lived in Spain in the golden age of Moslem rule, or how some poor tailor of Narbonne reacted towards the epoch-making Maimonidean controversy, or what the poverty-stricken artisans of Messina felt at the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish dominions. The poor lived, and suffered, in an obscurity which has few secular parallels. It is not perhaps too much to say that the present memoirs constitute the first wholly *popular* document of Jewish history which has been as yet discovered. It does not inform us of the sublime disputes between the masters of the law, nor of the achievements of those whose wealth or learning had made them the leaders of the community. It tells us of the dregs of the Ghetto—ill-educated, superstitious, quarrelsome, sordid, of the type hitherto unrecorded except perhaps in our martyrologies. We are not introduced into the controversies of the schools or the debates of the council chamber: but we obtain a unique insight into the daily life and daily squabbles of those who remained the vast majority of the people. In Joseph da Modena we see how they thought, we see how they acted, we see how they lived. When the time comes to write the social history of the Jews in Italy, this testimony cannot be neglected.

It is an unfamiliar world to which we are introduced. The houses are cramped and stuffy, so that any idea of privacy is not so much as thought of. The persons to whom we are presented are neither great merchants on the one hand nor pawn-brokers on the other, as one would have imagined, but the merest itinerant hucksters. The state of culture is surprisingly low, and Hebrew books figure principally as security for loans. The days were apparently long past when (according to a proverb still remembered in Italy), " From Sienna came forth the Law, and the word of the Lord from Tuscany." Morality, whether business or social, is none too high. There is gaming, and more than a suspicion of drinking, in the Ghetto tavern. Open robbery does not seem to occasion any great horror, save when the writer is the victim: nor does the immoral purpose to which the proceeds were put call forth a word of blame. Inside the Ghetto, we hear of little but constant feuds and bickering. Writs and distraints are the order of the day. The traditional pacific nature of the

Jew is belied by open brawls in the street, culminating sometimes in the shedding of blood. It is not a pleasant picture. But it was the inevitable result upon a small community of the cruel system which artificially cut off all natural intercourse with the outside world, and drove it back upon itself.

If Joseph da Modena presents to us the type of the Ghetto Jew of the lowest class, his writing is no less characteristic. The script itself indeed is none too bad, leaving room for doubt in only a very few cases. The spelling on the other hand could hardly be worse, outraging even the loose standards of seventeenth-century orthography. There is no idea of consistency, and not much, sometimes, even of phonetics. Words are left out, words put in, with a regal disregard for meaning. The few Hebrew phrases reflect the utter neglect of his early education—surely exceptional, even among the lowest classes, and it needs a careful reconstruction on the basis of the Italian method of pronunciation to make out their meaning. Punctuation is conspicuous by its utter absence, every paragraph forming one inordinately long sentence, but the text has here been broken up to a certain extent (though not quite consistently) in order to facilitate the reading. Even this depressingly low state of literacy is not without its scientific importance. If Joseph da Modena is a typical Ghetto Jew, his language is typical Ghetto speech. In the newly-awakened interest in Judaeo-Italian,[10] this is of considerable importance. Relics of the vernacular literature of the Jews in Italy indeed abound, but the majority of them derive from men of culture and attainments, in regular intercourse with the outside world, and composing frequently for gentile eyes, whose writings generally approximate to the accepted standards. In the memoirs of Joseph da Modena, on the other hand, despite his literary pretensions, it seems that we have the Ghetto speech in all of its incongruity and its unloveliness, virtually uncontaminated by outside influence. Care has been taken, therefore, to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, correcting only a few of the most obvious errors. A few notes are appended, but in most cases the English translation will serve as sufficient elucidation of the difficulties of the text.[11] In this, the attempt has been made to preserve as far as may be the archaic flavour of the original.

Yet, when all is said and done, the main interest in this fragment is not essentially scientific. The impression that remains is that of the figure of Joseph da Modena, the illiterate huckster of Carnival wear, moving, pack on shoulder, about his squalid native Ghetto looking for bargains and affronts, and rejoicing immoderately, albeit most unbiblically, at the downfall of his enemies. We are little wiser as to the history of the community, but we know more about its personalities and its atmosphere, of the rancours which embittered it and the passions which moved it. It is as a human document of no mean order, rather than as a contribution to the exact science of history, that these memoirs are here presented, for the first time, to the reader.

THE MEMOIRS OF A SIENNESE JEW (GIUSEPPE DA MODENA?) 1625–1633*

A. P. Ricordo che nell' anno 1625 vene il Granduca a Siena, e fu fatto rescotetore de le robi[12] m. Abramo Pesaro, e m. Bona Ventura Galichi, e me imposoro un paro de lenzola, un padiglione, una cuperta, e un capezale, dopia imposta de hogni altro, et io gli diede tutto quello che me imposero et mi fu butatato d.ª roba in mezo de la strada da d.° Abramo tre volti con gran' desprezzo e bravarij et dirmi che d.ª roba non era ricipiente, e volevano meglio roba, e d.ª roba era di valore più de scudi dieci, e nel med.° tempo per farmi magior desprescio e danno mi mandoreno le sbiri, e gli comesero che me dovesero fare il pegnio, e non pigliare d.ª roba del quale recevei più abilità da la corte che da loro, e presero la med.ma roba e non mi fecero pegnio, et volsero una lira, et m.ti volti d.° Abramo si è avantato de d.° desprescio. Il tutto ho messo a memoria per tenere a mente piacere e despiacere.

S. P. Ricordo che ne l'anno 1625, comprai da M. Salamone Palagrilli quatro libri chiamati רבנו משה[13] per prezo de scudi sette, e dopo ch' io me ne andai fora di Siena per causa de li lacri (?)

* Transcription finished in New York, 6 December 1925 (19 Kislev 5686) being the first anniversary of the death of my Father.

che su ne havevo, sud.° sframonì mio fratello con digli che me aveva datto pegno d.e libri per scudi tre, e gli le cavò di mano, e gli diede un testone per volta, et una volta per dagli uno scudo insieme, se fece pagare da mio fratello un paio de picioni, e dopo la mia tornata gli ho voluto rendere le med.me denari, e ce mese mezi e non me ha voluti mai rendere. De più dopo la mia tornata, che fu ne l'anno 1629, desiò m.ti volti mio fratello a l'ostaria [14] e gli prestò un testone sopra un חומש et il משנה, et io lo volsi rescotere se il fece vendere asuluto per poco prezo. Il tutto ho scrito per ricordo.

Ricordo che ne l'anno 1631 fui rechiesto da Donna Violante Galletti che gli dovese far' servizio de fargli vendere certo horo brusciato e horo rotto, e de essi denari desiderava darmelli nelle mani, il quale non mancai fare il tutto, e fargli vendere d.a roba, e ne med.e giorni mi vene l'ocasione de comprare una masarizia da un tale M. Lorenzo in Firenze, et tiene camera locante de Tedeschi, ch' importava circa a scudi hottanta, e io andai da d.a Donna Violante con conferigli q.to negozio, e gli dissi che se lei voleva sborsare tutto il denaro in d.a masarizia io l'arei messa a mezo guadagnio de quello che fusse statto, e lei acettò tal partitto, e me diede scudi 30 contanti e una colana con altri hori aciò io l'impegniasi, et erano in circa a quatro honci d'oro, e l'impegniai a Nicolino horefici per scudi 25, e dopo questo andai a contratare d.a masarisia, e non fumo da cordo, e tornai a casa, e resi subito a detta D.a Violante le scudi trenta di contanti dattemi, con digli che non era asortitta la compra, come era la verità, e l'ori che mi aveva datto che impegniai per scudi vinti cinque, gli dissi che se se contentava de lasarmeli nelle mani gli arei usato cortesia de qual cosa l'anno, e così se compiaque. E a capo a l'anno mi chiese scudi dieci di guadagnio, e la restotorizione della Roba, et io gli respose che non era dovere de chiedere scudi 10 di guadagnio in 25 scudi, perchè arebe auto a rascione di quaranta per cento, ma bensì che gli arei dato satisfazione a pieno con pregarla non me levasi detta roba de mano perchè non ero comido per alora a rescoterla, esendo ch' io in quel tempo avevo pagato una promessa ch' io feci per il marito a M. Antonio Lorenzoni de scudi quindici. E lei respose non mi volere aspetare

nè meno menarmi buono nulla di d.ª promessa che pagai per il marito, e si fece per dotta, e mi cavò la gatura per scudi cento con la restotorizione di d.ª roba, e hotto giorni avanti פורים che fummo שצ"א 1631 mi fece scassare la casa da tre birij, e mi botoreno l'uscio a tera a hore due di notte dandoli comisione che mi sgombrasero la casa per cento scudi, il quale se a intrapose M. Laudadio Rietti[15] e M. Abramo Meniati acomedare le nostre deferenzie, e condanereno a pagare le spese a famegli, ch' importereno lire sedici, e de le scudi quindici la condanereno a pagarmi scudi seci conforma di ciò ho scrito, e avanti mi cavasse detta gatura mi cavò un' aresto di cento scudi, e mi fece sgombrare la bottega, e promese per me M. Francesco fornaio a Samartino. Il tutto ho messo a memoria che per le benefizi fatogli ne ho recuti q.ti recompenzi.

Io ricordo che ne l'anno 1631 mossi litte a M. Salamone Milano mio sogero, quale per asegurare il mio credito gli cavai un aresto avantj gli movessi la litte: e facendolo eseguire, se chiamò intenuta M. Isache Meniati; e avantj entrassi impromessa, pregai a d.° M. Isache che non prometese, esendo che se io avesse auto mai sentenzia in favore, mi sarebe statto necisità di fare contra a lui, et esendo che a ongniuno dispiace de pagare per altrj, saremo venuti per tal fatto in imicizia, dove che siamo amici. E lui mi rispose « Che piace a Dio che tu abij sentenzia in favore, che tu sarei pagato, e non avere sospetto che noj veniamo in tal convenienti », e che non poteva fare di meno a non prometere. Et io andai a trovare Abramo figlio di d.° M. Isache, e gli dissi le predette parole che dissi a suo padre, e lui me diede la med.ma resposta che me diede suo padre. E dopo che le pregai gran pezo ambe due, cercai de refutare per promessa anco suo padre per giustizia, e non potei fare di meno de non il pigliare. Quale fecci la causa, e ottenni la sentenzia in favore di cento piastri. E Salvadore Galichi se ne apellò, quale lui facceva per d.° Salamone, e io ancora me apelai. E quando d.° Abramo Meniatj senttj ch' io ebij la sentenzia in favore, e che d.° Salvadore si era apelato, mi venne a trovare, e me richiese ch' io cavase di promessa suo padre, altre.te mi averebe fatto contro in q.ta causa, e in qual se voglia particolare. E io gli resposi che bisogniava

penzare a non promettere, se non voleva pagare per altri, magior.te ch' io glie ne fece scusa avanti che promettese, holtre che quando io avessi voluto fargli cosa grata di cavare di promessa suo padre, non potevo, esendo che d.° Salamone Milano era andato a Roma, e in questo modo non ne verei a cavare cosa alcuna. E per fargli vedere che disideravo fargli cosa grata, gli averei fatto tempo un anno e più se gli fusse fatto di bisognio, fin che lui avese fatto contro a d.° Milano, acciò non remetesse di suo. E lui me respose che lui non voleva abilità nisuno da me, solo ch' io lo cavassi di promessa, altr.te lui si sarebe aitato ne il miglior modo che fusse.

A. M. Ricordo che mentre io ero ne la Lombardia, Abramo Meniati desviò mio fratello che gli vendese roba di botiga e di casa, il quale gli vendè roba per più de ducento scudi, e lo desviò a giocare in casa sua proprio, holtre di q.to gli faceva pigliare stochi a mercanti e gli faceva scialequare e giocare quatrini subito, e di più gli prestava denari a usura sopra il pegnio, e poi comprava il med.mo pegnio a mezo prezo, e dopo ch' io fui tornato a Siene gli chiese de la d.a roba e gli dette pegnio mio fratello et imparticolare le robi da mascari che teneva pegnio. E lui mi dette roba per vinti hotto scudi che non valeva quindici, e perchè ereno robi di casa antichi, mi covene rescoteli ancor che stavano di più di quello valevano. E per voce publica, e per informazione auto da più personi, ho saputo che guadagniò con mio fratello ducento scudi. Il tutto ho messo a memoria.

E ne l'anno 1630, vene qui a Siena un רובי chiamato רובי Elia da Vigniola, il quale lo conoscevo a Modena, e anco al d.° paese; e per favorilo me hobligai mentre se pasava qui amparare a legere. Gli arei dato lire quindici l'anno. Mentre però mi avese dato una lizione a me ho a mio fratello il giorno, holtre che in prencipio de la sua venuta lo menai a l'oste et pagai per lui m.ti volte per fargli cosa grata, et fu messo innanzi da mio socero e mio cog.to Toscano e me, e per diliscenze fatte fu fermato dal קהל circa a due anni. Et in questo tempo prese gran' amicizia con d.° Abramo Meniati, et a me non mi dava più lizione, nemeno se curava più de mia amicizia, curandosi pocho del fatto mio. E ne la sua partenza gli rimase a dare lire nove, del quale non era la

mia volentà de darglieli per m.ti rascioni, come de sopra si è detto. E d.° Abramo, avendo lui roba in mano de mio, mi trovò in piaza, e me disse che pagase d.° רובי altrimente l'arei pagato con mio desgusto, e harebe fatto pagare lui, e perchè aveva roba in mano de mio, e per suoi me covene cavare da lui proprio lire quatro, e lire cinque gli rimasi a dare. De quali, quando se ne andò via da Abramo se fece dunare d.e cinque lire. Et esortò a d.° רובי che facese rescotere d.e denari a un Todesco suo descepolo, il qual d.° רובי così fece. E gli chiese in grazia che usase hogni deliscenza per rescotere da me d.e denari. E il med.mo Todesco così facendo mi mandò a chiamare m.ti volti menaciandomi di farme bastonare se non gli portavo d.e denari, e d.° Abramo hongni giorno gli handava a recordare a d.° Todesco. E a lungo andare, d.° Todesco se stracò, e non gli diede un quatrino. Et q.to ho scritto a memoria, giudicando che s'è voluto agratuire più a un forestiere che non ha visto nè conosciuto per dare desgusto, e danno a me.

Ricordo che quando io arivai a Modena ne l'anno 1625, lì era Salamone e Rafaello Nepi heb. Et apresentandosi la fiera di Sasolo, ce n'andai, e comprai alcuni pelli conci in quel paese per prezo de lire sesanta sette, e le portai a Modena, e li dei a serbare a d.° Salamone, che mi avese fatto forte de un pochi de denari fin che me venivano di casa, il quale mi prestaoreno lire cinquanta. E quando gli chiesi le sud.e pelli datoli in serbo per mandarli a Siena, me disero che havevano venduti per le med.e cinquanta lire prestatomi, quali ce vene a scapitare lire diciasette, e le vendereno senza mia comisione. E fra pochi giorni andò Rafaello a Sasolo a stare con altri et io il כבוד del med.° anno me vene hocasione di partirmi dal' alogiamento ch' io ero, et andare in casa un altro יהודי per m.ti desgusti receuti. E facendo le conti gli rimase a dare al mio padrone lire vinti due. Et esendo che d.° Salamone non stava più con Hosigli [16] e faceva camerata con me, mi se hoferì di farmi forte de dodici lire che aveva, et un zechino che gli mancava per complire le d.e lire vinti due de andare a trovare Rafaello a Sasolo aciò me le prestase. Il quale così facendo, andamo a trovare Rafaello, e gli naramo il fatto; e gli chiesi in grazia mi facese forte de un zechino, e perchè non mi poteva dire

che non, avendo lui in quel tempo vinto dieci Toleri senza il salario che avanzava da il padrone, disse che non me le poteva prestare, respetto che voleva andare a casa dopo כפור, e se voleva de d.e denari fare un vestito e un coletto. Et io, per mantenere il mio dicoro e dare sadisfazione al mio padrone di casa, hoperai che suo fratello se levase da dosso un gibone di cimbelotino stampato e un paro di calzette di filaticio, et io gli dei un taglio di coletto di pelle di fiore, aciò mi prestase d.o zechino: e d.e pelle erano di valuta de lire cinque: il quale ne recevei gran' desgusto per tal azione, e però ne feci memoria.

Fra alcuni giorni vene hocasione, che un de Husigli chiamato Lemacino ce dette a vendere più pezi d'oro che le pigliava in botega sua, e ci guadagniai in più volti incirca a trenta scudi. E perchè d.o Salamone me prestava quatrini, ce il mese a mezo: e trovandomi io in necesità de denari, mi prevalzi de la sua parte de denari, ch' erano in circa a quindici scudi. E apresentandosi l'ocasione, ch' ambe due venero a Siena, me richieseno de un scrito de d.e denari, il quale non mancai di farglielo. E subito fatoglielo, se ne venero a Siena, poblicono d.o scrito, con dire che me le avevano prestati ne la Lombardia di contanti. E per d.o scrito, mia madre e mio fratello gli fecero m.ti cortesij, con dargli da logiare nel mio letto proprio, perchè ereno in meschinità, che non avevano letto da dormire. E poi mia madre gli diede la casa a piscione per il med.mo prezo che ce la dava il Cristiano, e la piscione a scontiare a d.e scrito. Il quale venendo io nel 1629 a Siena senza sdegnio nisuno, per d.o dì Abramo Meniati mi mandò la poliza a regolatori per lire hotanta quatro; et io, per tal sdegnio, gli mandai la poliza a oscire di casa. Del qual non sapendo loro che remegio se pigliare, per non hoscire di casa, facemo pace. E restone le cose, impentino, e fra pochi giorni cercoreno de volermi citare d.o scrito de denari che gli devo a mercanti, e poi hagiro a Pesari ciò è Abramo e Chlemente fratelli, ancora che stavano in casa, e gli pagavo la piscione. E nel medesimo tempo, mi hocorse che D.a Fiore Galetti, gli ero debitore per una peza di musolini lire vinti una, e mi entrò in tenuta Rafaello Nepe. E in q.to tempo. d.o Rafaello se ne andò a Grosetto, et io gli dei a vendere alcuni robi di botiga a denari cifatti. E quando tornò di Grosetto, gli chiesi le denari de la roba

che mi aveva venduto: et lui me rispose che lui non mi voleva dare nula, se prima non pagava d.ª Fiore, hovero ch' io l'avesi levato di tenuta. Et io gli rispose che non conveniva a farmi tal afronto a farmi represaglia, esendo ch' ancora non aveva receuto nè dani nè afronto per me: e quando fusse hocorso che lui avese pagato per lui, stava in casa mia, ch' arebe pututo scontiare a piscione ad hongni modo. Con tutti q.ti rascioni, non mi volse dare cosa nisuna, se primo non pago D. Fiore: il qual mi è parso che q.ta azione me sia statto di gran affronto più de qual se volia altro, e però ne ho fatto memoria.

Ricordo che il dì 25 marzo 1632 שצ"ב, fui gaturato da
A. P. M. Abramo Pesaro e fratello, con gran' smaco e dispresciо, e diede comisione alli sbirri che dovesero pigliare per tenuta M. Isache Galicho, ho vero M. Rubino Frosolone,[17] altrim.te me sgombrasero la casa. E mi mandò a gaturare per scudi vinti per resto de trenta scudi ch' io gli devo dare, e le medessimi denari fureno per una scrita ch' avevano de mio per scudi dodici: quali scudi dodici sono per lire 30 che devano avere dal M.co Marone Michele in Firenze, e lire vinti sei prestati a mia madre quando io ero fora di paese, e lire vinti hotto prestatomi contanti quando io venij in paese, che sono in tutto scudi dodici; e scudi dodici dovevano avere per un scritto che gli concesero Salamone e Rafaello Nepi, come ne apare memoria nel presente librio indietro; e per esso scritto gli ni dereno tanto cimbelotino bianco a una lira il bracio, e loro il vendereno soldi dodici il bracio; e scudi tre per una gatura cavatomi per un feraiolo di settino nero che mi diede a vendere, e gli restotorij, e me ne cavò gatura per non potere provare quando gli lo rese; e scudi tre per una peza di mosolino che diede a M. Framinio Galetti mio zio, e io promesi per lui: tal che sono scudi trenta in tutto, e ne remase avere scudi vinti. E mi mandò la poliza tre giorni avanti פורים. La sera di פורים mi trovò fora del portone de M. Prospero, ch' ero in compagnia de M. Rubino Frosolona e M. Moise Saliaro, e mi disse che lui mi voleva fare come fece Papa Sisto, che quando volse caciare le יהודים dal suo statto, gli mandò la nova la sera di פורים,[18] e così voleva fare a me, acciò io non avessi il פורים conzolato. Ma per non essere giudicato dalli personi, non eseguì q.to gativo pensiero menaciatomi. Ma hotto

giorni avanti פסח, come ho detto di sopra, mi trovò in casa de M. Abramo Meniati, e mi menaciò che mi voleva fare stare priscione per detto debiti hotto giorni, e usare deliscenza che fra dette giorni ci stessi quatro giorni di פסח et altri minaci fattomi. E il giorno seguente, mi fece gaturare in casa per maggior smaco, e acciò io non gli dessi la promessa di sei mesi. Il tutto ho messo a memoria, per avere io receuto dal detto torto et afronto in più modi. Una si è che non mi doveva mandare la poliza hotto giorni avanti פסח: sigonda, non se doveva acordare con Abramo Meniati con digli che mi mandasse la poliza ancora lui per un altro scrito che aveva d.° Abramo contra di me de scudi 20, e mi mandoreno la poliza ambe due insieme: terza, non mi doveva conturbare la sera di פורים come fece: quarta, non mi doveva fare gaturare in modo nisuno, esendo che loro, ciò è d.° Abramo, aveva in mano de mio cento scudi di cervietti di Bolzano, e scudi vinti cinque di ספהרים[19] che non erano segniati ne le scriti: quinta, non mi doveva fare gaturare hotto giorni avanti פסח; e tutti q.ti afronti me le fece perchè io ho messo inanzi la קילה di מתיר הסורים,[20] il quale hebero a sdegno, e me fecero d.e afronti. Il tutto ho messo a memoria.

Ricordo che nel mese di luglio 1632, comprai da Chichio straciaiolo più pezi di damasco nero uso alla presenza de Moise Galletti e di Prospero Arcidosso, li quali in quel tempo lavoravano per Abramo Pelagrili nella bottiga di sotto in dove io abito, ch' io glie la pescionai. E d.° Moise e Prospero disero, che ne volevano parte, non havendo io compro nel mio uscio proprio: et io, per non volere contendere, gli respose che quando mi avesero reso le denari che mi costava, gli harei datto. Et accettando lui tal partito, rispose ch' io aspetasi d.° Abramo Pelagrile, che mi arebe datto denaro, ho vero me harei preso per me. E così mi contentai, et aspetai, che venise d.° Abramo. E venuto che fu, gli dissi se voleva d.° damasco, e me rispose che il voleva vedere. Et ancor che non era dovere ch' io gli il mostrasse avanti mi desse il denaro che mi costava, per compiacerlo glie il fece vedere. Disse che non lo voleva, e me lo renuziò a me. Di là a alcuni giorni, tagliai d.° damasco nel mio muriciolo di botiga, e d.° Abramo era presente, e me ne rubò un pezo, e ne fece tagliare tanti baretini da un יהודי Romano

chiamato M. Lazaro de Importanza, e a lui gli le fece cuscire. E il giorno de la Madona di Tor.e,20a che fummo a li..... 1632, mi mostrò uno de d.e baretini belli e fatti del med.mo damasco, e io subito reconoscendo che era robba mia gli dissi, in dove aveva auto d.o damasco. E lui andò ritroso a non me' l volere dire: et io resposegli ch' in nesun modo gli il volevo rendere se non me diceva da chi haveva auto, perchè nel med.mo tempo mi fu rubato una banda con finemento d'argiento di tafetta, capilino, et altra. Alora me rispose che haveva compro da Prospero Arcidosso: e io gli respose de volerlo mostrare a d.o Prospero, e sapere da lui se gli haveva venduto, e gli averei reso d.o barettino. E trovando io d.o Prospero, gli domandai se era vero ch'avesse vend.o d.o damasco a d.o Abramo, e lui respose presente al med.mo Abramo, e disse: « Qui Abramo mi è venuto a trovare, e mi a d.o ch' io ti dica ch' io gli ho venduto, et io gli o resposto che non vo' dire tal cosa, perchè non è vero, e non gli o venduto nulla: ma io fui presente quando tu tagliavi q.to damasco sopra al tuo muricolo, e lui era in bottiga tua, e te ne vede cadere un pezo, e corse averlo, e ne fece tagliari tre baretini. » Et io, sentendo così, dissi a d.o Abramo: « Io non ti voglio rendere il baretino, perchè è robba mia, e non è vero che tu habij compro da Prospero come tu dicevi. » E facendo lui forza de volermelo levare di mano per forza, ce atacamo alle pugnia, e fumo spartiti, e non ebe altrem.te il baretino. E stando in pendente così la cosa, la sera a ora de מנחה mi afrontò d.o Abramo Pelagrili con suo padre e Giuseppe suo fratello, e mi diedero le mani per dosso con dirmi « Rendimi il mio baretino, ho vero ne voglio tantto sangue ». Et io resposegli « Se fusse il tuo baretino, te harei reso, ma perchè è roba mia, non te la renderò mai ». E vedendomi io tre adosso, mi acostai in bottega de M. Samuello Nisim, e preso un paro de forbeci da homo, e le dei nel petto Abramo, dicendo « Statte adietro, e non mi siate tre adosso! » E lui, setendosi dare le forbici nel petto, gridò, dicendo « So mortto », e si buttò in terra: ma non gli fece mal nisuno. Et io, dubitando de non havere ferito, me volsi retornare a Sam Martino, e me sopragionzero sei bracia lontano di Sam Martino, e Abramo e suo padre mi tenero, e Giuseppe suo fratello mi diede una colte-
M. G. lata ne le reni, et mi firij a morte. E stei a letto 23 giorni, con
P. A. medico e due cerusichi. Et Prospero Arcidosso e Moise Galetti me

se esaminoreno contro, con dire che non era stato nè Salamone nè Abramo suo padre, ma che era statto Moise suo fratello: et q.to il dissero perche Moise era de minore ettà, e non potteva esere condanato. Ma non è vero altr.mte che fusse Moise, e se esaminoreno il falzo. E quella feritta mi costò più de scudi vinti.

Ricordo che il כ״ט כסלו שפ״ג, che fu il primo dì 9br 1633, il giorno de hongni samnti,[21] mi passò a miglior vita mio figliolo chiamato שבתי: e quando l'ebj a sopelire, vene a dire M. Angniolo Semilini se io avevo compro tavoli e tella per sotterare il mio figliolo, e io gli resposi di no, ma che avevo mandato zio אפרים e mio fratello a provedere di quello faceva bisognio vedendo l'ora tardi, e per esere il giorno de hongni santi, come ho d.° di sopra, non trovono nesuno aperto. Il qual tornò M. Angniolo, e gli dissi che, per esere festa, non anno pututo avere nulla, e che
S. B. dicesero alli ממהונים, ch' erano M. Samuello Blanis e M. Rafaello
R. G. Galichi, che mi provedesero loro, come hobligati in q.ti hocasione. E M. Angniolo me respose a lor' nome che me averebeno provisto del tutto, ma che io gli dese ho pegno ho denari; e io gli respose, che non volevo dargli nè pegnio nè denari, nè meno non intendo che me himpresti la חברא, ma ben si arei voluto come hobligati in giò che d.e פרנסים de חברא me avesero trovato la roba ch' io arei trovato il denaro, del qual non si impacioreno in cosa alcuna. E mi covene mandare a mio fratello che pregase un mercante che uprise botiga per darmi quello mi faceva de bisogni; e così fece. Il tutto ho messo a memoria, perchè se costuma quando more uno, ho rico, ho povero che sia, le חברים devano provedere del tutto, e se le parenti del morto non avese pronto il denaro in quel tempo, se devano pigliare dalla חברא, e così sempre si è usato, come apare nel libro de le rescosioni del קילה: ma a me cercono de farmi afronto, però non eseguireno d.° stile.

Ricordo che il dì 9 Aprile 1634, fui carcerato per scudi diciotto per una promessa che io feci per mio fratello, quale entrò cesonario M. Agustino Franci: e fui carcerato a sua istanza. Del quale, esendo otto giorni avanti פסח, e non avevo ancora compro il grano per le מצות nè altra provisione, e senza alcuno asegniamento di denari ho altro, me arecomandai a Dio, e poi

a Salamone e Rafaello Nepi, con pregarli che volesero prometere per me in forma de sei mesi. E non se aristiando a dirmi di no, me resposano che volevano da me un pegnio quivalente, del qual me richiesero de la חזקה [22] di casa sotto in dove io abitto, e acciò gli dovese remanere d.ª חזקה per d.ª diciotto scudi, che non la arei datta per scudi cinquanta, me legoreno ne lo scrito che ancor ch' io avese tempo sei mesi, e non avese pagato fra quatro, che d.ª חזקה sia sua, ancor che non avesero pagato niente de loro. Del quale, esendo io carcerato ne le sud.ᵉ giorni, me convene consentire in hongni mio pigior modo, e così gli hobligai: e andoreno per prometere, e fureno ambj due refutati dal magistrato mentre però non davano un aprobatore. Il quale loro andoreno a recercare per aprobatore M. Francesco, fornaio a S. Martino: il quale lui respose de volere aprobare, e si mese il feraiolo per venire. E trovandosi là M. Rubino Frosolona che sfornava le sue מצות, e in quel tempo era פרנס del קהילה, in cambio de dire cualche parola con solegitare d.º che mi facese il servizio, disse (aciò non ce ne andasse) « Se ve ne andate voi, me ne volio andare ancora io ». E quando il גוי sentì così, subito possò il feraiolo, e non volse venire. E quando fureno partiti Salamone e Rafaello da d.º גוי, d.º M. Rubino gli dise che non prometese, che non gli ne poteva tornare se non danno. Il quale il giorno seguente tornoreno d.º Salamone e Rafaello da d.º fornaio, con diglie gli venisse a fare il servizio, gli respose che lui non voleva prometere più, e che se provedese de altro aprobatore. E per le parole de M. Robino, me convene stare sei giorni più in priscione, per non trovare altro probatore. E a capo a sei giorni, per volere uscire, mandai quattro vestitti di bottiga a d.º fornaio acciò aprobase, e con gran' fatiga mi fece il servizio. E q.tº ho messo a memoria il tradimento de d.º M. Rubino, e devo io pigliare esempio da d.ᵉ Nepi che non volsero prometere senza pegnio, e mi legoreno in quel modo nel lo scritto: holtre che mi convene dare le quatro vestitti al fornaio.

Ricordo che l'anno 1633, Donna Stella del già Salamone Toscano rascione de maritare con Salvadore de Isache Galichi: qual matrimonio il tratava Donna Angniola de Moise Rietti. E nel medesimo anno mi morij Anna mia moglie, sorella di d.ª Stella, quale morij di parto, e fece un putto maschio; e feci

d.ª Donna Stella comare, e suo padre (mio sogero) fu compare. E il dei a baglia a Donna Dianora mia zia, che abita incontra a d.ª D.ª Stella, e con q.to hocasione pigliava cura del mio figliolo, e il teneva in casa tutto il giorno, per affizione grande che portava a me e a mio figliolo suo nipotte, quale diceva più volti ch' avanti lei si maritase, voleva lasare de la sua dote cento scudi a frutto per mio figliolo. Et holtre di questo gli andavo alla liberale in casa sua e in sua camera con hongni domesticheza e afabelità, il quale me dimostrava grande affizione e famigliarità. E un giorno fui chiamato da M. Angniolo Semiline, e mi menò fora de ghette, a mi disse: « Sai, che tua cogniata se tratta de maritare con Salvadore Galico. Però te conzeglio, che se lei a in mano nula di tuo, fattelo restotovire, perchè se confida con Salvadore, durarai fatiga a levargliela di mano. » E io gli risposi per la verità, che ce avevo tutto il momibele de mia moglie, e rami, e ottoni di casa mia: ma io avevo di suo alcuni robi di suo uso che me aveva datto in serbo quando remase vedova, per dubio che non venisero ho mandasero le fratelli del marito a ventariargli la roba, e poi glie la levasero, e però me la diede a serbare a me: quale roba poteva importare da vinti scudi in circa; e anco avevo alcuni polisi di monte che dicevano veste e zimare de suo uso, quali me le prestò che me ne prevalese, e me rimaseno in mano d.e polisi acciò ch' io gli le rescotese. E conferij con detto M. Angniolo le sopra detti paroli, dicendoli che se lei mi avese reso la mia roba, io gli averei reso la sua: e quando avesi creso ch' avese fatto il matrimonio con Salvadore come se diceva, io averei fatto qualsevoglia cosa per conturbalo, e quando non avesi saputo di fargli alcuno dispiacere dopo che avessi receuta la mia roba, volevo mandare la sua alli fratelli del morto, aciò non venise in mano di d.° Salvadore. De la qual cosa M. Angniolo ne sentiva gran contento ch' io facesi d.ª azione, e conturbasi d.° matrimonio, per eser che lui voleva male e portava odio a d.° Salvadore, ancor che gli parlava, e gli faceva l'amico. E l'odio che portava d.° M. Angniolo a d.° Salvadore era perchè d.° M. Angniolo andò a l'acqua bona, lui con tutta sua famiglia, l'anno 1632, e non lasciò nesuno in casa sua. Il quale d.° Salvadore conzigliò a Angniolo di Donato Semilini che dovese in qualche modo andare in casa suo zio mentre ch' era fora, e gli dovese rubare un pochi di denari. Quale d.° Angniolo eseguì il

fatto e scassò una cassa di d.° suo zio, e ce trovò una sachetta con mille piastri, e di essi ne prese cento. Il quale, quando il sepe d.° Salvadore gli menacciò de fargli la spia: e d.° Angnio, acciò non gli facese la spia, gli diede vinti piastri e che il tenese segreto. E de dette denari ce andava a putani: il quale un sabato sera a ori cinque di notte fu preso in casa la putana con le denari in sacucia: il quale gli fu datto la corda sì a lui come a d.ª putana, e stettero ambe due saldi, e oscireno senza esere condanati per il gran' sciocad שוחד che diede suo padre.[23] E il ladroscino di d.° Angniolo Semilini si scoprì con ocasione che d.° Angniolo conferì con un tal Abramo כהן, marito de Fiore, de le Levantini, e fureno de sconcordio nel spartire d.ⁱ denari, e con tal ocasione se scoprì il fatto: e per questo d.° M. Angniolo portò odio a d.° Salvadore, e d.° M. Angniolo andava intrametendosi con fare imbasciata fra d.ª Donna Stella e me, e sempre se dimostrava d'esere in mio aiuto, a mi fece imbasciata che d.ª Stella mi voleva dare otantta scudi per paregio de nostri contij. E così diede comisio a Abramo Meniati che mi facese l'imbasciata alla presenzia di d.° M. Angniolo. Il quale d.° Abramo mi fece d.ª imbaciata e poi me disse che Salvadore non voleva ne facese altro, e mi fece chiamare avanti il Capitano de Giustizia. Et io comparsi con il mio precuratore, ch' era il dottore Marzochi, e il Capitano de Giustizia mi fece una grande gravata, con dirmi che lui era informato del fatto mio, che non intendevo solo che a robe rubati e a furbarij, e che se io non rendevo tutto quello che domandava d.ª donna, lui mi menaciava di volermi farmi scopare, e mandarmi in una galea. Et io gli risposi che lui era male informato del fatto mio, e ch' erano gente che mi voleva male, e tutto quello ch' io avevo al mondo l'aveva d.ª donna, che glie havevo dato in serbo, per esere lei mia cog.ta, e acciò mio fratello non me le mandase male. Il quale d.° Capitano, rebusandomi più che mai, me disse ch' io non avessi ardire di rispondergli in tal particolare, che mi averebe messo in una segretta, e che gli rendese tutta la roba di d.ª donna, in particolare le polisi di monte. E io gli resposi segonda volta: « Sig.r Capitano, mentre che non vol ch' io dica le miei rascioni, non posso giostificare la mia noscenza. Et in quanto alli polisi di monte che lei dice avermi datto, ecco qui q.to scatolino di politi di monte quale mi ha datti lei, che non è quindici giorni ch' io gli

le o dati in serbo, come gli ho datto altra roba.» Quale il Capitano me le levò di mano, e disse: «A poi che tu confessi de averli auti da lei, prova tu che gli li abij datti, e che siano tuoi: e se tu non il proverai, te gastigarrò conforma te o detto.» E d.e polisi di monte fureno lesse alla presenzia di d.a Stella, e lei disse esere tuttj le sue. E il Capitano mi asegniò termine de quindici giorni a provare che d.e polisi fusero le mia, altrimente havese restoriati a d.a Stella: e così fumo licenziati. E voltandomi al mio procuratore, gli dissi che mi dovese consigliare quello dovevo fare in q.to particolare, e come mi devo difendere, esendo che mi sa deficile a provare sedici ho dicciotto polisi siano le miei, esendo che la magiore parte de quelle robe che sono contenuti in quelle polisi sono robi antichi di casa. E lui mi respose che gli era dificele a difendermi, esendo che non posso fare le miei provanzi, e poi ho il Capitano contra: e mi conzegliò che il dovese remetere in qualcuno. Et io gli respose che tutti li heb.i si vogliano vedere male l'uno con l'altro, e nisuno se ne sarrebe voluto impaciare. E lui mi rispose che lui averebe cercato de acomedarla lui con il precuratore de la parte contra, acciò io non dovessi stare a l'impito del Capitano: e a me piaque il conseglio, e dissi che arei rimesso in tutto e per tutto in lui; e così se contentò d.a Stella de rimetere nel suo procuratore. Il quale fu fatto il compromesso al'ofiziali de la mercanzia. E mentre che si stava per sentenziare, d.a Donna Stella fece venire di Roma un חרם: e quando fu saputo, vi erano di m.ti che non averebeno voluto che se fusse butatto; ma, per vedere il mio precepizio sotto mano, precurono che se butase: e di essi erano Chlemente a Abramo Pesari. E in quel tempo era פרנס d.° Chlemente: e per dimostrare sotto mano che loro non volevano che se butase d.° חרם, mi fecero chiamare in ועהד alla presenzia de M. Prospero Semilini, M. Isache del Borgo, M. Chlemente Pesaro, M. Riubino Frosolona, M. Samuello Nissim, M. Isache Gallichi, M. Salamone Milano, padre di d.a Stella et altri del ועהד, e mi disero: «Sapete bene che Donna Stelli per le pretenzioni che a con voi e per non avere che mostrare, a fatto venire un חרם di Roma, acciò chi niente il deba revilare. Però, ancor che noj siamo seguri che tutti diranno quello saperano, e simile voj, per non cascare in un pregiodizio sì grave, con tutto ciò aviamo voluto usare q.ta deliscenza de chiamarvi qui

avanti tutti questi s. s. con dirvi il gran pericolo che si porta quando se comportase che se butase d.° חרם, essendo che in questa benedetta קהילה non è sucieso mai tal cosa: holtre che, Dio ne guardi, ne potrebe patire tutto il קהל, e, come si suol dire, ne pate il giusto per il pecatore. » Quali mi fecero un sermone con q.ti e altri paroli più ben messi, et ongni uno ce disse il suo parere, del quale stei m.to bene a sentire. E poi, quando ebeno fenitto, gli resposi che « Io rengraziavo a tutti voj altri s. s. ch' avete usato tal deliscenza a chiamarmi in q.to santo loco per tal causa: e in resposta ve dico ch' io non intendo di volere nulla di quello di nisuno; et è vero ch' io me ritrovo alcuni robi di Donna Stella, ma lei a m.to più in mano de mio, ma in ongni modo intendo de volere dare hongni sadisfazia, sì a tutto il קהל come a d.a Donna Stella, acciò non si dica che per l'amore mia sia nato un trasordine tale in קהל. Holtre di questo, ancor' ch' io abij qua se volia rascione, chi vol esere buon יודי conviene stare a דינה ישראל e così so' pronto io remettere hongni diferenzia a un homo per uno, ho vero che il ועהד cria lui un בית דין, tantto di quello ch' io pretende da me, quanto quello ch' io pretendo da lei: e di ciò, nisuno non credo che mi possa opore. » Del quale quelli che mi volevano male e desideravano che se butase d.° חרם remaseno stupefatti de la mia resposta, e tutti da cordo resposero « ברוך תהיה, parlate m.to bene »; e si voltoreno a M. Salamone Milano e disero; « Potete dire a vostra figliola che Giuseppe vole stare a דין ישראל ». E lui respose: « Et io acetto in loco de mia figliola. » E così ce partimo tuttj: e andò a dire d.° Salamone a sua figliola quello si era remasto in והעד, e lei conzentj a quello fece suo padre, e cossì dette la parola alla presenzia de M. Prospero, M. Isache del Borgo, e M. Chlemente, uno de le ממונים. E quando Salvadore il sepe, mandò a dire a d.a Stella ch' ora ch' era venuto il חרם non voleva stare più a דינה ישראל, e che mi sarebe statto necisità per non cascare in חרם de arendeli tutto quello ch' io avevo di suo, e non lei quello ch' aveva de mio: e mandò a dire al והעד che non ne voleva fare altro. Il quale il והעד andò a trovare d.° Salamone Milano e sua figlia, e gli ributoreno con dire che chi vol esere יהודי gli conviene a stare a דינה ישראל in qual se voglia cosa, tanto magior.te che suo padre aveva dato la parola alla presenzia de tutto il קהל. E lei respose ch' in q.to paticolare non aveva che fare nulla con suo padre, e che

lei era vedova, e sapeva fare le suoj fatti da se, e non ne voleva farne altro di più. Gli fu resposto a poi che lei voleva butare d.° חרם fusse reciprico, che quanto se intenese per quello ch' io avevo a dare a lei, quanto per quello che lei deve dare a me. E lei replicò che però non voleva stare a דינה ישראל acciò de dichiarare il דין in favore suo. E tutto il קהל se partì con grande sdegnio da lei, per avere mancato di quello che aveva promesso a tutto un קהל, e anco gli dispiaceva che se butase d.° חרם, perchè non era intravenuto mai tal cosa, e per q.ti rascioni gli ne portoreno odiio e gli fureno contra. Quale da li a tre giorno a ora de שחרית venne Salamone Milano e Salvadore Gallichi con tutta la sbiraria, e con un precetto del vicario in mano che nisuno dovese impedire che non se butase d.° חרם. Il quale avanti che venisero a scola se ne avede Abramo Pesaro, e venne a scola avisare al קהל che oscisero da scola acciò che non sentisero leggere d.° חרם. E fu tralasciato il dire תפילה che se diceva עמידה, e cercò tutto il קהל de oscire de scola. E quando fureno a meza scala se incontroreno nela corte e fureno fattj tuttj tornare adietro a forza de piatonati e serono l'uscio per difora. Chlemente Pesaro cercò di fare m.ta difesa per oscire, et arlevò de m.ti piatonati e pomi di pugniali di birij. Parimente Salamone ebe m.ti piatonati da birij. E nel med.° tempo sopragiunse il Bargiello,[24] e glie ne dette m.ti altri a spada inuda. Altri fecero difesa de oscire per le finestri. E nel med.° tempo Bonaventura Gallichi, ch' era חזן in quella matina, prese il חרם in mano, e se mese a legere alla finestra di scola, perchè tutti erano oscitj; e mentre ch' il legeva, Salvadore suo nepotte gli teneva la torcia nera in mano, e la colava tutto in capo a Bonaventura mentre legeva. A scola ve rimase Salamone Milano e d.° Salvadore e d.° Bonaventura e Abramo da Bulognia, e un tal Abramo il romitto, e Sforzo Nissim, e tre ho quatro altri che non mi ricorde: quali quatro batevano le banchi, l'altri ch' erano fora de scola, le donne se posero tutti in ginochione gridando « Per il capo de chi il lege e de chi l'a fatto venire! »: le putti tiravano torzi e sasatti alla finestra a d.° Bonaventura mentre legeva, dicendoli « Per il capo tuo! ». Il quale in quel giorno fu fatto grandi strepidi e pianti: e subitto ch' oscireno da scola d.e Milano e Salvadore e Bonaventura, tutti gli gridono dietro, dicendoli, per il capo suo, dicendoli tutti ingiuri nefandi. E a d.a Stella tutti per una bocie

dicevano « Per quella puttana poltrona sono tutti questi romori »: e per le grandi ingiurij che gli diceva tutto il קהל, gli convenne levarsi dalla finestra, e non poteva più comparire nè a usci nè a finestrij, e per remediare a q.to gli convene mandare cinque ho sei precetti dal Capitano de Giustizia che nisuno la molestase, ne in paroli nè in fatti, sotto penna de vinticinque scudi. E a me ancor mandò il precetto, e così se quiettò la gente. E tutto il קהל in quel prencipio gli ritene la parola a Salamone Milano e a Salvatore Gallichi e a Bonaventura Gallichi che lese il חרם, ma Prospero Semilini non gli rettene la parola, perchè Isache Gallichi era suo parente, holtre che s' era ingerito de farlo venire a Siena nel suo falimento, e gli mandava le suoi figlioli amparare: e per questo lui se ingerì asai in q.to particola, e lui fecero venire le dunzie di d.o חרם con scusarsi che gli dispiaceva de ingerisi di tal fatto, ma perchè gli era comandato dal רב non poteva fare di meno de fare tutto quello gli veniva in posto: e con q.to ocasione metteva incarco di cuscienza alla gente che referise il tutto menutam.te de quello loro sapevano di tal fatto, acciò non cascasero in alcuno pregiodizio, e cometeva a tutti che non scrivesero solo chi sapeva che chi avese roba de d.a Stella ho io ho altri, ma se sapevano che d.a Stella avese auto roba de mio o d'altri, non lo dovesero scrivere, perchè lui non le voleva acettare. E io, conoscendo che d.o Prospero se mostrava parziale in tal fatto, per scarico de la mia coscienza me ne andai da zio אפרים che il pregai che me dovese dire quello conosceva in q.to particolare, perchè non ce voglio rimetere d'anima, ancor ch' io fussi seguro de rimeterci tutto quello che ho al mondo. E lui me disse che ce averebe studiato, e mi chiese un libro chiamato il Caro,[25] e io gli il portai: e dopo che lui c' ebe studiato, me dise che non mi dubitase, e me ne menase burla, perchè lui non teneva contio di tal חרם per più rascioni. Una si è, che non ci anno fatto le debitti אדרהות[26] che ce vano fatti: segonda, che tutto il קהל non è statto consente: terza, perchè non è statto inteso dal קהל: quarto, per non vi era מוניהן, e ancora ce fusse statto, erano tuttj fra di loro parenti e gente interesati: et altri rascioni ch' a me non se ricordano. E lui io gli replicai che di grazia non mi metese in pregiodizio alcuno, e lui me dise che me ne stesse a lui, e così feci, e non volsi fare denuzi. A capo a tre giorni, fureno presentattj tuttj le denuzi de tutti

homeni e donni e putti in mano di d.° M. Prospero Semilini, e lui l'apresentò in mano de l'arbitri che noi facemo il compromesso, come anco gli fureno consegniati tutti le polisi di monte che lasai in mano del sig.ri Capitano de Giustizia. Quali me revenero tutti ne le mani da due in poj che diceva, una, sciugatori e altro, e l'altra, colanini da bracia: e q.ti due sentenzioreno ch' io provase che d.e robij me fussero stattj dattj a conto di dotte fra dieci giorni. E io feci chiamare M. Angniolo Semilini e M. Rubino Frosolona, che loro fureno stimatori di d.° mobile: quale M. Rubino dise che non si recordava de cosa alcuna, e non se volse venire a esaminare, perchè lui era zio di d.° Salvadore, e non volse fare contra al nepotte. M.da Fiore del già Laudadio Galetti me se hoferij esaminare in mio favore in q.to particolare, perchè lei se rittrovò quando fu stimato il mio mobile, e in buona cuscienza il poteva reconosciere, per esere d.° Salamone Milano abitava lì in casa sua in quel tempo: e me dise ch' io la facese citare, che lei si sarebe esaminata per la verità; e q.to anco se proferiva perchè detto Salvadore gli aveva detto che se andase a vetare la scarzella, e glie la tocò: oltre di q.to gli die un schiafo. E per q.to odio se proferij. Quale la feci citare si a lei come anco a M. Angniolo Semilini: e dopo ch' io le fecci citare, se pentireno ambe due de esersi proferti di farme il servizio, ancor che fecero cosa lecita e giusta. Quale dopo m.ti preghi se esaminoreno, e indusciono tanto che pasò il tempo determinatomi da l'arbetrj: e per l'amore loro l'ofiziali me diedereno la sentenzia contra, dicendomi ch' avevo tracorso il tempo che diceva il lodo, e tuttj due le pegni importoro più de scudi hottantta. E q.to ho messo a memorij dicendo che non se trovano in q.to mondo se non homeni finti et traditorj: e ho messo ancora a memoria che nel med.mo anno che fu buttatto d.° חרם, morse la moglie de d.° M. Prospero Semilini, M. Amadio Betarbo, giovane di trentacinque anni, M. Arone Emiglio, giovane de diciotto anni, e era החן con la figliola di d.° Bonaventura Gallichi, la madre di d.° Salvadore morse otto giorni dopo il parto che fece un figliolo maschio, a me mi morse un figliolo maschio di dieci mesi, morse la moglie di d.° Bonaventura che lesse il חרם, se sconciò a un figliolo maschio la moglie de Rubino Frosolona, e anco se sconciò a un figliolo maschio la moglie di Chlemente Pesaro, e morse Abramo Pesaro che in quel tempo era פרנס, e la

sera che escì la matina s' amalò, e morse fra dicciotto giorni: quale pregarò Dio che me abij lasati bona vitta a me a tutto ישראל, che ce scampi di mano de traditorij אמן כן יהי רצון.

Translation

I record how, in the year 1625, the Grand Duke came to Sienna, and Messer Abraham Pesaro and Messer Buonaventura Gallichi were appointed to collect the levy.[12] From me, they demanded a pair of sheets, a bed-canopy, a blanket, and a pillow —twice as much as they imposed upon any one else. I gave them everything they asked, but the said Abraham thrice threw what I gave into the middle of the street with great contumely and derision, telling me that it was not enough, and that they desired better stuff. The said articles were however worth more than ten *scudi*. At the same time, in order to increase my dishonour and harm, they sent the constables and ordered them to distrain upon me, and not to accept the aforementioned goods. In this matter I received more consideration from the Court than from them, for they accepted the same articles and did not distrain upon me, though they fined me one *lira*. The aforementioned Abraham boasted many times of this contumely. I have put it all on record, in order to remember both pleasure and displeasure.

I record how, in the year 1625, I purchased from Messer Solomon Pelagrilli four books entitled *Rabbenu Moshe*,[13] for seven *scudi*. After I left Sienna by reason of the affairs which I had elsewhere (?), the aforementioned Solomon misled my brother, telling him that he had given me the said books in pledge for three *scudi*, and took them from him. He repaid him one *testone* at a time, and on one occasion, when he paid a whole *scudo*, he had my brother buy him a brace of pigeons. On my return, I wanted to give him back his money, but he raised objections, and would not let me. Moreover, after my return (which was in the year 1629) he invited my brother several times to the hostelry,[14] and lent him a *testone* on the security of a Pentateuch with the Targum. I wanted to redeem it, but he

sold it outright for a small price. I have written it all down for remembrance.

I record how, in the year 1631, I was asked by Donna Violante Galletti to do her the service of disposing of some burnt and broken gold ornaments, and she wished to leave the money received in my hands. I did not fail to do all she asked me, and sold the said articles for her. At about the same time, I had the opportunity of buying some furniture, worth about eighty *scudi*, belonging to a certain Messer Lorenzo in Florence, who kept a lodging-house for Germans. I went to the aforementioned Donna Violante to discuss the affair with her, and told her that if she would contribute all this money to purchase the said property, I would admit her to half the profits, whatever they might be. She accepted the proposition, and gave me thirty *scudi* in cash and a necklace with other jewellery amounting to about four ounces of gold in all for me to pledge. This I did with Nicolino the goldsmith for twenty-five *scudi*. Afterwards, I went to bargain about the above-mentioned furniture, but we did not come to an agreement. I therefore returned home, and immediately handed over to the said Donna Violante the thirty *scudi* in cash which she had given me, telling her (as was true) that the purchase had not gone through. As for the gold ornaments which she had given me, which I had pledged for twenty-five *scudi*, I told her that if she would leave the money in my hands, I would pay her a certain consideration every year. To this, she agreed. At the end of the year she asked for ten *scudi* profit, and for the return of her property. I told her that she ought not ask ten *scudi* profit on twenty-five, because that would be at the rate of forty per cent, but I would give her full satisfaction. As for her property, I begged her not to withdraw it from my hands, because it was not convenient for me to repay at the moment, for I had just paid a guarantee of fifteen *scudi* which I had made for her husband to Messer Antonio Lorenzoni. She replied that she would not wait, nor even shew me any consideration on account of the aforementioned guarantee which I had paid for her husband, which was done on account of the dowry. So she obtained a warrant of arrest against me for

a hundred *scudi*, with the alternative of restoring the above-mentioned property. Eight days therefore before Purim in the year 5391 (11 March 1631) she had my house broken into by three bailiffs. At two o'clock at night, they broke my door down, with commission to distrain upon my property to the value of one hundred *scudi*. Thereupon Messer Laudadio Rieti[15] and Messer Abraham Meniati interposed to accommodate our differences, and they ordered me to pay the expenses of the officers, which came to sixteen *lire*. Of the fifteen *scudi*, they condemned her to pay six *scudi*, in accordance with the agreement. Before obtaining the writ, she obtained a warrant against me on account of a claim for a hundred *scudi*, and forced me to clear out my shop, and Messer Francesco the baker, of San Martino, gave a guarantee for me. I have put it all on record, how for the favours done her I received this recompense.

I record how, in the year 1631, I brought a case against Messer Solomon Milano, my father-in-law. In order to secure my credit, on this occasion I obtained a warrant against him before bringing the case, and, when I had it executed, he asked Messer Isaac Meniati to act as surety. Before he gave his bond, I begged the aforesaid Messer Isaac not to do so, since if the decision were in my favour, I should have to act against him, and (as nobody likes to pay on behalf of another) we would thereby come into enmity instead of being friends. He answered me: "God grant that the decision be in your favour, for you will assuredly be paid. Have no fear that here will be any misunderstanding between us." He added that he could not do otherwise than promise. Thereupon I went to find Abraham, son of the said Messer Isaac, and spoke to him as I had done to his father, and he gave me the same reply as his father had done. After interceding with both for a long time, I tried to get the father's bond refused by the authorities, but finally was unable to escape accepting it. Whereupon I brought my suit, and obtained the decision in my favour for a hundred *piastri*. Salvador Gallichi, who acted on behalf of the above-mentioned Solomon, lodged an appeal and I appealed as well. When the said Abraham Meniati heard that I had obtained the decision in my favour,

and that the said Salvadore had appealed, he came to see me and asked me to free his father from his bond, as otherwise he would work against me in this case, and in every other matter also. I replied to him, that if a person desires not to pay for others, he should think before giving his bond; all the more since I had warned him before he pledged himself. Moreover, though I should have liked to oblige his father, I could not exempt him from his bond, since the said Solomon Milano had gone to Rome, so that hence I would not receive any payment at all. In order to prove that I wished to oblige him, I would have given him a year's grace, or more if it was needed, until he had time to proceed against the aforesaid Milano, so that he would not be the loser. He replied, that he desired no accommodation from me, only that I should liberate him from his bond: otherwise, he would help himself as best he could.

I record how, when I was in Lombardy, Abraham Meniati enticed my brother to sell him property from my shop and from my house, and he sold him wares to the value of upwards of two hundred *scudi*. He enticed him moreover to game in his house, besides making him buy stock from merchants, so that he caused him forthwith to squander and gamble this money away. Moreover, he lent him money on pledge at usury, and then he would purchase the self-same pledge for a half of its value. When I returned to Sienna, I asked him for the goods which my brother had given him in pledge, and in particular for the masquerade wear which he had taken. He gave me, for twenty-eight *scudi*, wares which were not worth fifteen, but, because they were old family possessions, I had to redeem them, though it cost twice what they were worth. From public report, and from information obtained from a variety of persons, I learned that he gained out of my brother two hundred *scudi*. I have placed it all on record.

And in the year 1630, there came here to Sienna a teacher named Rabbi Elijah of Vignola, whom I had known at Modena, as well as at the said place. In order to favour him, I obliged myself to learn to read while he was here, for which I would have paid him fifteen *lire* the year as long as he gave me or my

brother one lesson a day. For my part, I took him to the hostelry when he first came and paid for him several times, in order to please him. Besides this, he was put forward by my father-in-law, and my brother-in-law Toscano, and myself, so that through our diligence he was engaged by the community for two years. At this period, he became very friendly with the aforementioned Abraham Meniati, and stopped giving me lessons, not having the slightest regard for my friendship, and losing all interest in my affairs. When he left, I still owed him nine *lire*, which I did not wish to pay him for many reasons, as specified above. The said Abraham, having property of mine in his hands, came up to me one day in the Piazza and told me to pay the said Rabbi; otherwise, I would do it in spite of myself. His meaning was, that he would pay himself, having wares of mine in his possession. So, by his tricks, I had to borrow four lire from him, still owing the other five, which sum he procured from Abraham when he went away. The latter encouraged the said Rabbi to have the money collected by a pupil of his, a German, which the said Rabbi did, asking him as a favour to use all diligence in collecting the said money from me. The said German, obeying, summoned me several times, threatening to have me beaten if I did not bring him the said money, and the said Abraham went every day to remind the said German. Finally, the German gave up and I did not give him a farthing. I have put this on record, judging that he was the more inclined to favour a stranger whom he had not seen nor known previously, in order to do me offence and harm.

I record how, when I arrived at Modena in the year 1625, the Jews Solomon and Raphael Nepi were there. When the fair of Sassuolo came on, I went there and bought some dressed skins for sixty-seven *lire*; these I brought to Modena, and gave to the said Solomon to keep for me. Now, he had obliged me with a little money until some arrived from home, lending me fifty *lire*. When I asked them for the skins given them to mind, to send to Sienna, they told me that they had sold them for the fifty *lire* they had lent me, so that I lost seventeen lire, and the property was sold without my permission. A few days after-

wards, Raphael went with others to Sassuolo to stay with other persons. About the Day of Atonement of the same year, I had occasion to leave the lodging where I was and to go to the house of another Jew, because of many annoyances received. When we made up the accounts, I owed my landlord twenty-two *lire*. Now the said Solomon was no longer staying with the Ussigli,[16] and he shared my room; so he offered to oblige me with twelve *lire* which he had, and to go to Raphael at Sassuolo to lend me a zecchin to complete the twenty-two *lire*. We did so, and, going to find Raphael, told him what had happened; and I asked him to do me the favour of obliging me with a zecchin. Since he could not refuse, having gained at that time ten thalers without counting the salary which was due from his employer, he told me that he could not make me the loan, as he wanted to go home after the holidays, and he wanted to have a suit of clothes and a collar made with the said moneys. So, in order to preserve my reputation and to satisfy my landlord, I persuaded his brother to take off a jerkin of figured broadcloth and a pair of hose of coarse silk and I gave him a length of collar-material of fine leather, to persuade him to lend me the said zecchin. The said skins were worth five *lire*. I was much annoyed by this action, and therefore have placed it on record.

Some days after, it happened that one of the Ussigli named Lemacino gave us to sell several pieces of gold which he had taken at his shop, and I gained at various times about thirty *scudi*. Since the said Solomon had lent me money, I divided the profits with him; then, being in need of funds, I made use of his half, which was about fifteen *scudi*. Afterwards, occasion arising for them to go to Sienna, they asked me for a note of hand for the said moneys, which I did not fail to give them. Immediately after, they went to Sienna and told everybody about the said note, saying that they had lent me the money in cash in Lombardy. Through the said note, my mother and my brother did them divers favours, lodging them in my own bed, because they were destitute and had nowhere to sleep. Afterwards, my mother let them the house for the same price which she paid the Christian owner and the rent was reckoned against my note of hand. When accordingly I came to Sienna in 1629 without any

ill-feeling, they sent me by the advice of Abraham Meniati a demand for eighty-four *lire*. At such malice, I sent them a demand to clear out of the house. Whereupon, they not knowing what to do in order not to clear out of the house, we made peace. When matters were quiet, they changed their mind and within a few days they wished to summon me before the merchants for the said note of hand for the moneys which I owed them. Moreover, they worked upon the brothers Pesaro, to wit, Abraham and Clement; and this notwithstanding that they lived in my house, and that I paid their rent. At the same time, it happened that I owed Donna Fiore Galletti twenty-one *lire* for a piece of muslin and Raphael Nepi went surety for me. At this time, the said Raphael went to Grosetto, and I gave him some wares out of my shop to sell at fixed prices. When he returned from Grosetto, I asked him for the money for the wares which he had sold. He told me that he would give me nothing if I did not first pay Donna Fiore, or else free him from his surety. I replied that it was not right for him to do such an affront to me and to avenge himself on me, seeing that he had not yet received either harm or insult from me and that, even though he were to have to pay, he was lodging in my house and could anyhow have deducted what he paid from the rent. Despite all of these arguments, he would not give me anything, unless I first paid the said Fiore. Whereat it appeared to me that this action was a great affront to me, more than any other; and for this reason I have placed it on record.

I record how on the 25th March 1632, I was imprisoned for debt by Messer Abraham Pesaro and his brother, with great indignity and affront and they gave the bailiffs orders to take as guarantors Messer Isaac Gallico, or Messer Reuben Frosolone,[17] otherwise to clear out my house. He had me distrained on for twenty *scudi* left over from thirty *scudi* which I owed him; which moneys were for a note of hand of mine for twelve *scudi* which he had, which twelve *scudi* were for thirty lire which they had to receive from the illustrious Michael Maroni in Florence, and twenty-six *lire* which they had lent to my mother when I was not in the city, and twenty-eight *lire* lent to me when I returned,

making twelve *scudi* in all; and they had to receive twelve *scudi* for a note of hand which Solomon and Raphael Nepi had given them, as recorded in this present book above (for which they gave them a certain length of white camelot at one *lira* the yard, and they sold it at twelve *soldi* the yard), and three *scudi* for a warrant served upon me for a cloak of black silk which he had given me to sell, and I returned it, and he served a warrant on me because I could not prove when I had returned it, and three *scudi* for a piece of muslin which he gave to Messer Framinio Galletti, my uncle, and I went surety for him. There were therefore thirty *scudi* in all, and he still had to receive twenty. He sent me the demand three days before the New Year. On the eve of *Purim*, he found me outside the gateway of the house of Messer Prospero, in the company of Messer Reuben Frosolone and Messer Moses Salario, and told me that he wished to act towards me like Pope Sixtus, who, when he wished to expel the Jews from his state, sent them the news on the eve of *Purim*.[18] Thus he wished to act towards me, so that I should not pass *Purim* in peace. Because of public opinion, he did not carry out this evil intention which he threatened me. But, eight days before Passover, as I said before, he found me in the house of Messer Abraham Meniati, and threatened to have me put in prison for eight days on account of these debts, and to see to it that I should thus be there for four days of Passover: and he made other threats against me. The next day, he had me arrested in my own house for the greater indignity, because I would not give him an undertaking to pay in six months. I have put it all on record, because I receive from the said person injury and affront in divers respects. Firstly, he should not have sent me the demand eight days before the New Year. Secondly, he should not have come to an arrangement with Abraham Meniati, telling him to send me a demand for the payment of another note of hand which the said Abraham had against me for twenty *scudi*, so that they two sent me the demand together. Thirdly, he should not have disturbed me on the eve of *Purim* as he did. Fourthly, he should not have served a warrant against me under any circumstances, since they (to wit, the said Abraham) had in his hands deer-skins from Bolzano of mine to the value of one

hundred *scudi*, and Hebrew[19] books to the value of twenty *scudi*, which were not reckoned in the accounts. Fifthly, he should not have served the warrant on me eight days before Passover. And all these affronts he did me because I had worked for the confraternity for the Release of Prisoners;[20] whereat they were indignant, and did me these affronts. I have put it all on record.

I record how, in the month of July, 1632, I purchased from Chichio the ragman several pieces of second-hand black damask, in the presence of Moses Galletti and Prospero Arcidosso, who at that period were working for Abraham Pelagrilli in the shop beneath my house, which I let to him. The said Moses and Prospero said that they wanted a share, since I had made the purchase in the doorway. So as not to quarrel, I replied that if they gave me the money which it cost, I would let them have it. They agreed, and told me to wait for the said Abraham Pelagrilli, who would either give me the money, or else let me keep it for myself. I was willing, and waited until the said Abraham came. When he arrived and I asked him whether he wanted the said damask, he replied that he wanted to see it first. Although there was no need for me to shew him it until he gave me the money it cost, I let him see it in order to content him. He said that he did not want it, and left it to me. Some days after, I cut the said damask at the bench in my shop. The said Abraham, who was present, robbed me of a piece, and had it cut into a number of caps by a Jew from Rome named Messer Lazaro de Importanza, and had them made up by him. On the day of the Madonna of the Tower,[20a] on the..... 1632, he shewed me one of these caps, already made of this same damask. I immediately recognised my stuff, and asked him where he had got the said damask. He refused, and would not tell me; whereat I replied that I certainly would not give it back to him until he told me from whom he had received it, since at the same time there had been stolen from me a tafetta riband worked with silver, a bonnet, and other articles. He then told me that he had bought it from Prospero Arcidosso. I thereupon informed him that I wished to show it to the said Prospero, and know from him whether he had sold it

to him, and that then I would give him back the cap. So, finding the said Prospero, I asked him whether it was true that he had sold the said damask to the said Abraham. He immediately replied to the same Abraham and said: "Abraham here came to find me, and told me to tell you that I had sold it to him, and I answered him that I would not say such a thing, because it was not true, for I have not sold him anything. But I was present when you were cutting up this damask on your counter, and I saw a piece fall down, and he ran to pick it up, and had three caps made out of it." When I heard this, I said to the said Abraham: "I will not give you the cap back because it is my property, and it is not true that you bought it from Prospero, as you said." He tried to force it out of my hand, and we came to blows, and we were divided, and I kept the cap. While matters were at this stage, the said Abraham Pelagrilli with his father and his brother Joseph accosted me in the evening, at the time of the afternoon service, and laid hands on me, saying: "Give me back my cap, or else I will get it out of you in blood!" To which I replied: "If it were your cap, I would have given it back, but, because it is my stuff, I will never do so." Seeing all three of them on me, I backed into the shop of Messer Samuel Nissim, and took from the man a pair of scissors and struck the said Abraham in the breast with them, saying: "Keep back, and do not come all three of you on to me!" Feeling the scissors at his breast, he cried out: "I am a dead man," and threw himself to the ground, but it had not done him any harm at all. Fearing that I had wounded him, I turned back towards San Martino. They caught me up six yards from San Martino, and Abraham and his father held me, and Joseph his brother struck me behind with a knife, and wounded me to death. I stayed in bed for twenty-three days, with a physician and two surgeons. Prospero Arcidosso and Moses Galletti gave evidence unfavourable to me, saying that it was neither Solomon nor Abraham his father, but Moses his brother. They said this because Moses was under age, and could not be punished. But it was in no wise true that it was Moses, and they testified falsely; and that wound cost me upwards of twenty *scudi*.

I record how, on the 29th of Heshvan, 5394, which was the first day of November 1633, being All Saints' Day,[21] my son Sabbatai passed from this to a better life. When the time came to bury him, Messer Angelo Semilini came to ask whether I had bought boards and linen to bury my son. I told him that I had not, but that I had sent my uncle Ephraim and my brother to provide that which was necessary. The hour being late, and it being All Saints' Day, as I said above, they found nobody open. When therefore Messer Angelo returned, I told him that since it was a holiday, they had not been able to find anything, and that they should tell the Treasurers of the Burial Society (who were Messer Samuel Blanis and Messer Raphael Gallichi) that they should provide for me, as they were obliged to do on such occasion. Messer Angelo replied in their name that they would provide me with everything, but that I should give them either a surety or else money. I answered that I would give them neither surety nor money; nor had I intended that the Confraternity should make me a loan, but I desired that the officials of the Confraternity should find me the articles as they were obliged, and I would have found the money, wherein they would not be in any way troubled. So I had to send my brother to ask a merchant to open his shop and to give me what was necessary. I have put it all on record, because it is customary that if a person die, whether he be rich or poor, and the relatives have not the money ready at that time, they should be provided for by the Confraternity: and so has always been customary, as appears in the account books of the Community. But to me they seek to do affront, however, they did not succeed, as I have related.

I record how, on the ninth day of April 1634, I was imprisoned for a debt of eighteen *scudi* on account of a guarantee which I made on behalf of my brother: in which Messer Agostino Franci had entered as substitute, and I was imprisoned at his instance. Wherefore, it being eight days before Passover, and I not having as yet purchased the grain for the Unleavened Bread, nor made other provision, and being unprovided with money or aught else, I recommended myself to God, and then to Solomon

and Raphael Nepi, begging them to have the goodness to go surety for me formally for six months. Not daring to refuse, they told me that they wanted a security of equal value, for which they asked the *Hazakah*[22] of the lower part of the house in which I live. In order to make sure that they should have the said *Hazakah* for eighteen *scudi* (whereas I would not have sold it for fifty) they bound me in the deed in such wise that, though I had six months, the said *Hazakah* should be theirs, if I did not pay within four, even though they should not have paid anything of their own. Being in prison at the said season, I had to consent to my great disadvantage, and so I bound myself to them. They went to give their surety, but they were both refused by the magistrate unless they gave a guarantor. Whereupon they went to ask Messer Francesco, the baker, of San Martino, to come as reference. He replied that he was willing, and put on his cloak in order to come. Now there happened to be there taking his unleavened bread out of the oven, Messer Reuben Frosolone who was at that time one of the wardens of the community. Instead of saying a word to encourage the said gentile to do me the service, he said, in order to prevent his coming: " If you go away, I will go away too." When the Christian heard this, he immediately laid down his cloak, and would not come. After the said Solomon and Raphael had left the said gentile, the said Messer Reuben told him not to promise, since it could not but be to his disadvantage. On the next day, when the said Solomon and Raphael returned to the said baker, asking him to do this service, he replied that he was no longer willing to promise, and that they should find another guarantor. Thus, through the words of Messer Reuben, I had to stay in prison for six days more, since I could not find another guarantor. After six days, since I wished to be released, I sent the said baker four shop-jackets in order that he should act as guarantor, and after a great deal of trouble, he did me the service. I have put on record the treachery of Messer Reuben, and I should profit by the example of the said Nepi who would not give their bond without a surety, and bound me in the manner as I have written, besides which I had to give four jackets to the baker.

I record how, in the year 1633, Donna Stella, widow of Solomon Toscano, intended to marry Salvador, son of Isaac Gallichi. This match was treated by Donna Angela, wife of Moses Rieti. In the same year died my wife Anna, sister of the said Stella who died in child-bed, after bearing a male child. The said Donna Stella was godmother, and her father (my father-in-law) was godfather. I gave the child to nurse to my aunt Dianora, who lives over against the said Donna Stella. By reason of this, she took care of my son, and kept him in her house all day, for the great affection which she bore for me and for my son, her nephew, wherefore she declared many times that before she married, she would leave a hundred *scudi* out of her dowry on interest for my son. Besides this, I went freely into her house and into her chamber with all familiarity and liberty: she shewing me great affection and friendliness. One day, I was called by Messer Angelo Semilini, and he took me outside the Ghetto, and said to me: "You know, that your sister-in-law is in treaty to be married to Salvador Gallicho. I therefore advise you, if she has anything of yours in her hands, to have it restored, because, if she comes to an understanding with Salvador, you will have great trouble to get it out of his hands." I replied, as was true, that she had all my wife's furniture, with the brass and copper ware of my house. I, on the other hand, had some of her household goods which she had given me to mind when she was left a widow, for fear that her husband's brothers would come to make an inventory of his property and would take it away from her; wherefore she gave it to me to mind: which property was worth about twenty *scudi*. Moreover, I had certain pawn tickets for apparel and coats of hers, which she had lent me to use, and the said tickets were left in my hand in order that I should redeem them. All this I communicated to the said Messer Angelo, telling him that if she returned my property, I would return hers. But, if I thought that the match with Salvador would really come about, as he said, I would do anything to impede it, and though I did not desire to do her any annoyance, after receiving my property I desired to send hers to the dead man's brothers, to prevent it from coming into the hands of the said Salvador. Whereat

Messer Angelo was very content that I should act thus and disturb the said match, because he hated and wished no good to the said Salvador, although he still spoke to him, and treated him like a friend. Now the reason for the hatred which the said Messer Angelo bore for the said Salvador was as follows. In the year 1632 the said Messer Angelo had gone to Acquabona with all his household, and left no one at home. Whereat the said Salvador enticed Angelo, son of Donato Semilini, to enter his uncle's house by some means, while he was away, and rob him of a certain sum of money. The said Angelo did this, and broke open a chest belonging to his said uncle, and, finding there a bag containing a thousand *piastri*, took thereof one hundred. When the said Salvador learned this, he threatened to play the spy, and the said Angelo, in order that he should not play the spy, gave him twenty *piastri* to keep the secret. With the said moneys, he went with the wenches: whence it happened that one Saturday night at eleven o'clock he was caught in a wench's house with the money in a purse.[23] Whereat he was given the *strappado*, and the wench as well, but they both remained firm and were released without being condemned, by reason of the great bribe which his father gave. The theft of the said Angelo Semilini was discovered on a certain occasion when the said Angelo was in conversation with a certain Abraham Cohen, husband of Fiore, a Levantine, and they were in dispute about the division of the money; and on that occasion the affair was made known. It was for this reason that the said Messer Angelo hated the said Salvador. And so the said Messer Angelo acted as go-between, carrying messages between the said Donna Stella and myself, and always shewed himself to be on my side. He informed me that the said Stella desired to give me seventy *scudi* in order to settle our accounts, and she commissioned Abraham Meniati to inform me thereof in the presence of the said Messer Angelo. Whereupon the said Abraham gave me the said message, and then he informed me that Salvador would not have it, nor yet do anything else, and he summoned me before the Captain of Justice. I appeared with my attorney, who was Doctor Marzocchi, and the Captain of Justice made a serious charge against me, telling me that he had been informed about my affairs, how I was only occupied with

stolen goods and villainies, and if I did not give up all that the said woman asked, he threatened that he would have me flogged, and send me to the galleys. I answered, that he was ill informed about my affairs, and that they were persons who wished me ill, and that the said woman had all of my worldly property, which I had given her to keep (she being my sister-in-law) in order that my brother should not squander it. Whereat the said Captain, abusing me more than ever, told me not to dare to answer him on that point lest he should clap me into a dungeon, and that I should give up all of the property of the said woman, particularly the pawn tickets. I answered him a second time: "Master Captain, if you will not have me tell you my reasons, I cannot justify my innocence. As for the pawn tickets which she says she gave me, see, here is this box of pawn tickets she gave me which I had given her to keep no more than a fortnight ago, as I gave her other things." Whereat the Captain took it from my hand, and said: "Since you confess that you received them from her, you must prove that you gave them to her, and that they are yours, and if you do not, I will punish you, as I said." Then the said tickets were read before the said Stella, and she said that all were hers. The Captain then gave me a fortnight to prove that the said tickets were mine, and we were thus dismissed. Turning to my attorney, I told him that he should advise me what to do in this matter, and how I should defend myself; for it would be difficult to prove sixteen or eighteen tickets to be mine, since the greater number of the articles specified were old household articles. He replied that it was difficult for him to defend me, since I could not prove my case, and since the Captain was against me, and he advised me to submit it to some one. I replied, that all the Jews wished one another ill, and no one would desire to interfere. He answered that he would endeavour to settle it himself with the attorney of the other side, so as to prevent my bearing the resentment of the Captain. His advice pleased me, and I told him that I would leave it all and in every respect to him. Similarly, the said Stella consented to leave it all to her attorney. Whereupon, an accommodation was made before the officials of the Mercanzia. While they were about to come to a decision, the said Donna Stella obtained a ban of excommunica-

tion from Rome. When this was known, there were many who would not have desired it to be proclaimed, but who, seeing my disaster within their reach, procured that it should be, amongst these being Clement and Abraham Pesaro. At this time the said Clement was Warden; so, to demonstrate underhand that they did not wish the said ban to be proclaimed, they summoned me to attend a meeting of the Council before Messer Prospero Semilini, Messer Isaac del Borgo, Messer Clement Pesaro, Messer Reuben Frosolone, Messer Samuel Nissim, Messer Isaac Gallichi, Messer Solomon Milano, father of the said Stella, and others of the community; and they said to me: "You know full well that Donna Stella, having no proof to shew in support of her claim against you, has procured a ban of excommunication from Rome, so that any one who has any information should be forced to reveal it. We are sure that all will tell that which they know, and you as well, in order not to fall into so grave a sin. Nevertheless, we have thought fit to call you here before these gentlemen in order to inform you of the great danger involved if your conduct should be such that the said ban be proclaimed. For in this blessed community such a thing has never happened before, and moreover (God forbid!) the whole congregation may suffer, and, as the saying goes, the just man suffers with the sinful." Whereat they made me a sermon with these and other better chosen words, and each one gave his opinion, to which I listened attentively. Then when all had finished, I replied: "I thank you all, who have had the goodness to summon me to this holy place on this account. In reply, I tell you that I do not desire aught of the property of any other person. It is true that I have in my possession some wares belonging to Donna Stella, but she has more of mine in her hands. In any case, I desire to give full satisfaction to the whole community as well as to Donna Stella, so that it should not be said that through my love any disorder arose in the community. Moreover, though I have every right on my side, one who wishes to remain a good Jew must obey Jewish law. Therefore, I am ready to submit the whole dispute to two persons, one chosen by each of us, or else to a *Bet-Din* appointed by the Community, with regard to what she claims from me as well as what I claim from her. In this, I do not think that any

body can oppose me." Whereat those who wished me ill and desired that the said ban should be proclaimed remained stupefied at my reply, and all replied with one accord: "Bless you! you speak most well!" Then they turned to Messer Solomon Milano and said: "You can tell your daughter that Joseph here desires to abide by the Jewish law." He replied: "And I accept in the name of my daughter." Thus we all parted, and the said Solomon went to tell his daughter how matters had been left in the Council. She consented to what her father had done, and gave her word to that effect in the presence of Messer Prospero, Messer Isaac del Borgo, and Messer Clement, one of the Wardens. But when Salvador knew of it, he sent to tell the said Stella that, now the ban was arrived, she should no longer abide by the Jewish law; for, in order to avoid falling into excommunication, I would have to give up everything I had of hers, not she what she had of mine. She sent therefore to tell the Council that she did not want to proceed further. Whereupon the Council waited upon the said Solomon Milano and his daughter, and rebuked them, saying that whosoever wants to remain a good Jew must abide by Jewish law in any matter whatsoever, and all the more so since her father had given his word to that effect before the whole congregation. She made answer, that in this she had nothing to do with her father, being a widow, and able to manage her affairs by herself, and that she did not wish to proceed further in the matter. They replied that, if she insisted on having the ban published, it was reciprocal, applying to what I had to give her as well as to what she had to give me. She answered, that none the less she did not wish to abide by Jewish law, since the ban was in her favour. On this, all the congregation left her in great indignation for having failed to do that which she had promised a whole congregation, and they were displeased also that the said ban should be proclaimed, because such a thing had never happened before. For these reasons they commenced to hate her and were against her in this matter. And so it happened three days after during the morning service, Solomon Milano and Salvador Gallichi came with all the constabulary and with an order from the Governor that no one should prevent the said ban from being proclaimed. Before they arrived, they were

sighted by Abraham Pesaro, who came to the synagogue to tell the congregation to leave, in order not to hear the recital of the said ban. And so the reading of the prayers was interrupted (the *Amidah* being then in the course of repetition), and the whole congregation tried to leave the synagogue. When they were half way down the stairs, they were met by the constables, who made them turn back by force of blows with the flat of the sword, and locked the gate from outside. Clement Pesaro tried his hardest to get out, and received many blows from the constables with the flats of their swords and the pommels of their daggers. Similarly, Solomon received many blows from them. At the same time the Bargello[24] came up, and laid about many more with his naked sword, while others prevented people from going out by the windows. At this point, Bonaventura Gallichi, who was officiating as *Hazan* that morning, took the ban of excommunication in his hand and set about reading it from the window of the synagogue, because everybody had gone out. As he stood reading it, his nephew Salvador held the black candle in his hand, and it all dripped down on the head of Bonaventura while he was reading. Inside, there were remaining only Solomon Milano and the said Salvador and the said Bonaventura and Abraham da Bologna, and a certain Abraham the hermit, and Sforzo Nissim, and three or four more whose names I have forgotten. These were banging on the benches, while the others were outside the synagogue, and all the women were on their knees crying: "May it recoil on the head of him who is reading it and the person who has procured it!" Meanwhile the boys were throwing cabbage-stalks and stones at the said Bonaventura as he stood reading at the window. Thus on that day there was caused great outcry and uproar. Immediately the said Milano and Salvador and Bonaventura went out of the synagogue, everyone cried after them: "On your own head," adding all manner of opprobrious insults. And everyone with one voice said of the aforementioned Stella: "It is through that shameless hussy that this disturbance has come about." Through the great insults which were addressed to her by all the congregation, she did not dare to show herself either at her doors or windows: and to remedy this, she had to procure five or six precepts from the

Captain of Justice that no one should molest her, one of which was sent to me. Thus the people were quieted down. After this, the congregation would not speak for some time to Solomon Milano nor to Salvador Gallichi nor to Bonaventura Gallichi, who had read the ban. Only Prospero Semilini continued to speak to them, because Isaac Gallichi was his relative, besides having exerted himself to bring him to Sienna when he failed, and sending his sons to him to study. For this reason, he exerted himself considerably in this matter, and it was to him that they had delivered the denunciations made as a result of the said ban. He excused himself by saying that he did not like to meddle in such an affair, but because he was ordered to by the Rabbi, he could not do less than carry out whatsoever he was commanded. Under this pretext, he imposed upon everybody as a point of conscience to report to him in minute detail everything that they knew about the matter, in order not to fall into misdoing. He told the people however that they should write details only of those, whether myself or any other, whom they knew to have in their possession property belonging to the said Stella; but if they knew that the said Stella had some of my property, or any body else's, they should not write about that, as he would not accept their information. Knowing that the said Prospero was acting partially in this matter, for the discharge of my conscience, I went to my uncle Ephraim, and begged him to tell me what he knew about this question, since I did not wish to prejudice my soul thereby, even though I should indubitably lose all that I had in the world. He told me that he would study the matter, and told me to bring him a book entitled "Caro."[25] When he had studied it, he told me not to fear, and poked fun at me, since he did not think that the said ban was valid, for a variety of reasons. The first was, that they had not given the requisite warnings,[26] which are usually given. Secondly, the whole congregation was not in agreement. Thirdly, it was not heard by the whole congregation. Fourthly, there was not even *Minyan* present; and even if there had been, they were all relatives and interested persons. He gave moreover other reasons which I have forgotten. I replied begging him not to prejudice my spiritual welfare, to which he answered that I should rely upon him.

I therefore did so, and refused to make any denunciation. Three days later, all the denunciations were presented by all the men, women, and boys, to the said Messer Prospero Semilini, and he presented them to the arbitrators whom we had appointed according to the compromise, to whom were presented also the pawn tickets which I had left in the hands of the Captain of Justice. All these were returned to me with the exception of two, one for towels and other articles, and the other for bracelets: with respect to which they ordered me to prove within ten days that they had been given me on account of the dowry. I summoned as witnesses Messer Angelo Semilini and Messer Reuben Frosolone, who had valued the said articles. Messer Reuben said that he did not remember anything at all about it, and he refused to come to inspect: for he was uncle of the said Salvador, and did not wish to act against his own nephew. Madonna Fiore, widow of the late Laudadio Galletti, offered to give evidence in my favour in this matter, because she had been present when my property had been valued, and could recognise it in all good conscience, for the said Solomon Milano was living at that time there in her house. She told me therefore that I might summon her, and that she would testify truthfully. The reason for this was that the said Salvador had told her to go to empty her purse (?), besides which he gave her a blow. For this reason, hatred grew up between them. And so I had her summoned as witness, and Messer Angelo Semilini as well. After I had them summoned, both of them changed their minds about doing me this service, although they would have been doing what was both right and just. After many prayers, they consented to give evidence: but they had delayed so long that the time fixed by the arbitrators had passed. So, for love of the opposite party, the officials passed sentence against me, saying that the time allowed me by the award had elapsed. These two pledges together amounted to more than eighty *scudi*. I have put this on record, saying that there are to be found in this world none but hypocrites and traitors. I also place on record how, in the same year that the ban was proclaimed, there died the wife of the said Messer Prospero Semilini; Messer Amadeo Betarbo, a young man of thirty-five years of age; Messer Aaron Emilio, a youth of

eighteen, who was affianced to the daughter of the said Bonaventura Gallichi; the mother of the said Salvador died eight days after giving birth to a male child; a male child of my own died, aged eight months; the wife of Reuben Frosolone miscarried of a male child; and the wife of Clement Pesaro likewise miscarried of a male child; there died also Abraham Pesaro, who was at that time President, who sickened the morning after the night he came out of office, and died eighteen days later. Wherefore shall I pray to God, who has left good life to me and to all Israel, to save us from traitors: Amen, and thus be his will!

Notes

[1] T. B. Sanhedrin 93 b.

[2] Cf. Boswell's *Life of Johnson, ad princ.*

"I am therefore unwilling that any thing, however slight, which my illustrious friend thought it worth his while to express, with any degree of point, should perish. For this almost supreme reverence, I have found very old and venerable authority, quoted by our great modern prelate, Secker, in whose tenth sermon there is the following passage:

Rabbi David Kimchi, a noted Jewish Commentator, who lived about five hundred years ago, explains that passage in the first Psalm, *His leaf also shall not wither*, from Rabbis yet older than himself, thus: That *even the idle talk*, so he expresses it, *of a good man ought to be regarded*; the most superfluous things he saith are always of some worth."

[3] = Jacob b. Moses Molin (c. 1365–1427); cf. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, i, pp. 173–8.

[4] e.g. *Die Memoiren des Ascher Levy aus Reichshofen (1598–1635)*, ed. Ginsburger (Berlin 1913); *Memoiren eines polnischen Juden* (Moses Wasserzug, d. 1808), ed. Loewe, Berlin 1911; *A Seventeenth century Autobiography* (anonymous), ed. Marx (*J. Q. R., N. S.*, viii, pp. 269–304). All of the foregoing works are in a debased Hebrew. To the list may be added the מגלת ספר of Jacob Emden, containing an account of his family, as well as of his own life, and the personal notes of Josselman of Rosheim, the greatest of mediaeval *Štadlanim* (ed. Kracauer, *R. E. J.*, xvi, pp. 85–101). The accounts of the various travellers (cf. Eisenstein, אוצר מסעות, New York 1926) especially David Reubeni and Hayyim Joseph David Azulai similarly contain much autobiographical material. A few interesting fragments have been published by Dr. Max Grünwald under the title *Die Feldzüge Napoleons nach Aufzeichnungen jüdischer Teilnehmer und Augenzeugen* (Vienna-Leipzig 1913). Neglecting the large outcrop of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g. *The Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore*; *Lebenserinnerungen* of A. H. Heymann [1803–1880]; Eine Selbst-Biographie David Arnheims, ed. Grünwald in *Israel-Lewy-Festschrift*) special mention may be

made of Yellin, זכרונות לבן יהושלם תקע ד׳תרס״ה with its graphic account of the development of modern Jewish life in Palestine, and Theodor Herzl's recently published *Tagebücher*. In a class by itself stands Uriel Acosta's *Exemplar Humanae Vitae*, unique in literature. The Memoirs of Glückel von Hameln (1646–1719) are now accessible in modern German (ed. Feilchenfeld, Berlin 1913: illustrated edition, 1925). Those of Solomon Maimon have seen the light in English, Hebrew, Yiddish, and even Italian. Ber of Bolochow's were published by M. Vishnitzer in 1922 simultaneously in Hebrew, English, and Yiddish.

[5] Leon of Modena, חיי יהודה, ed. Kahana (Kiev 1914); Isaac the Levite, מדבר תהסוכות, ed. Blau (הצופה מארץ הגר, ii–iii).

[6] Described by Berliner, Aus den Memoiren eines römischen Ghetto-Jünglings in *Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, vii (1904), pp. 110–32. In the possession of the present writer there is the fragmentary diary of an eighteenth century Italian Jew, in Hebrew and the vernacular, consisting largely of reports of sermons.

[7] Among the persons mentioned are members of the Rieti family—notably Eleazar, grandson of the great Ishmael (see *infra*, note 15).

[8] The passage relating to Solomon Milano, written on a blank leaf of the accounts (fol. 44 a–b) is here replaced in its chronological position *sub anno* 1631. Mention must also be made of (fol. 57–8) an inventory, not here reproduced, of the property in dispute between Joseph and his sister-in-law.

[9] No adequate account of the history of the Jews in Sienna is available at present save that of Cassuto in the Russian Jewish encyclopaedia, *s. v.* Cf. also the partial bibliography in Gabrieli, *Italia Judaica* (Rome 1924), pp. 51–2.

[10] A study in this curious byway of philology is in preparation by Professors D. S. Blondheim and Umberto Cassuto. Cf. also Crescenzo del Monte, *Sonetti Giudaico-Romaneschi* (Florence 1927).

[11] I must here express my invariable thanks to Professor Umberto Cassuto for the extreme kindness and helpfulness which are native to him, as well as to Professor Bigongiari, of the Columbia University, New York, for his assistance in elucidating some points of difficulty, and to Cav. Liberati for painstaking but fruitless enquiries in the State Archives at Sienna.

[12] The royal prerogative of maintenance had not yet been tried out in Italy, any more than it had in contemporary England, and the Jews especially were expected to make contributions in kind for the reception and entertainment of their sovereign. This duty remained incumbent in Venice as late as the close of the eighteenth century; cf. the *Ricondotta degli Ebrei* of 1777, §§ 38–9. For similar duties at Pesaro at an even later period, see the accounts in *R. E. J.*, xvi, p. 249.

[13] " Rabbenu Moshe " was the name popularly given in Italy to Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah*; cf. the preface to Moses Capriles' eighteenth century translation of the *Hilchot Deot* (*s. l. e. a.*).

[14] A place of entertainment for strangers, under conditions carefully regulated by the congregational and civic authorities, was necessarily to be found in any Italian Ghetto of any size.

[15] The Rieti family was established at Sienna as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, when David Reubeni was entertained there by an earlier

Laudadio (= Ishmael) da Rieti, brother-in-law of Jehiel da Pisa; additional details as to this important figure may be found in the present writer's *Gli Ebrei a Firenze sotto l'Ultima Repubblica* (Florence 1924). Ishmael's grandson, Eleazar, is mentioned in the accounts in the volume from which these memoirs are copied. A Joseph b. Sabbetai Elhanan Rieti figures amongst the scholars of Sienna earlier in the seventeenth century in the משבית מלחמות on the vexed question of the ritual bath at Rovigo. Further references to the family may be found in the study of Cassuto המשמר הספרדי בסיינה והיהודים in *Hazofeh* VIII (1924) 36–43.

[16] An Elijah Usigli, Rabbi of Modena, is mentioned in the עקרי הד"ש, p. 90.

[17] Joseph Raphael b. Reuben Frosolone and Solomon Abraham b. Isaac Gallichi (for whom see also the Responsa of Moses Zacuto, § 38) formed with Jehiel David b. Eliakim Ancona the *Beth-Din* of Sienna in 1674; cf. ספקי ריקנאטי האחרונים § v: they were very likely the sons of the two persons here mentioned.

Of the names found in these memoirs, Gallichi, Nissim Borghi (= Del Borgo), and Pesaro figure in the סדר זעירות ולמור on the restoration of the synagogue at Sienna in 1786, and the first two also in the local experiences described in the מעגל טוב of Azulai, pp. 5, 68. These families are still represented in the city. Meniati is a variant form of Da San Miniato for which see Cassuto, *Gli Ebrei a Firenze*, p. 224 and *pāssim*.

[18] Both Pope Sixtus IV (1471–83) and Sixtus V (1585–9) were favourably disposed towards the Jews. The fatal Bull *Hebraeorum Gens* of Pius V, however, expelling those of the minor places of the Papal States, excluding only Rome and Ancona, was dated 26 February 1569—only a few days before Purim, which fell that year on 3 March. It is more than probable that it reached some outlying communities on the eve of the festival, amply explaining Joseph's allusion.

[19] See note 26 as also for other debased Hebrew words.

[20] A חברת פדיון אסורים, or Confraternity for the Release of Prisoners (especially those imprisoned for debt) was to be found in most Italian communities; Joseph's interest in the foundation of one may be readily understood! This association must be carefully distinguished from the חברת פדיון שבויים for the Redemption of Captives—e.g. prisoners of war, or (at this period) the victims of the Mediterranean corsairs. For the orthography, see note 26 *infra*.

[20a] " The Tower " was one of the historic *contrade* of Sienna.

[21] The Hebrew date is manifestly wrong, *Kislev* being written in error for *Heshvan*, and 5393 for 5394: with which alterations the coincidence is exact.

[22] The Jew was forbidden to own real estate, and the only protection he had against the rapacity of his gentile landlord was by an adaptation of the ancient regulations of *Ḥazakah*, or prerogative right, whereby no Jew was permitted to occupy the house of an ejected co-religionist. This tenant-right, Latinised as the *jus gazaga*, became one of the distinctive features of Ghetto life, and was virtually legalised by Pope Clement VIII. Like actual ownership, it could be alienated, bequeathed, or given in dower. Cf. Finzi, Il diritto di hazakà in *Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage A. Berliners*, pp. 93–6; Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, pp. 71–2; and Philipson, *Old European Jewries*, pp. 133–5. For examples of it in practise, see Lampronti's פחד יצחק *ad vocem*:

and, as it appeared to gentile eyes, see the curious legal treatise of Joseph Sessa, *De Judaeis* (Turin 1717), pp. 50–3, 65, 101, &c.

[23] Carnal intercourse between Jews and gentiles, considered almost as an unnatural crime, was punishable by death or mutilation, though later ages were not so severe (cf. Sessa, *op. cit.*, cap. xxiv). In the present case there was apparently no decisive evidence, and the culprits would not confess.

[24] Bargello = Governor of the Gaol.

[25] i.e. the legal compendium of Rabbi Joseph Caro, the famous *Shulḥan Arukh*.

[26] אדרהות represents almost certainly the Hebrew התראות, in conformity with the Italian method of pronouncing Hebrew, which renders the ת by a hard D and leaves the ה quiescent. Thus we get elsewhere מסהרים for מספרים, אסורים for הסורים, קילה for קהילה, and, repeatedly, ועד for ועד, while a few lines below מוניהן is apparently written for מנין—the inevitable quorum of ten males. Phonetically interesting, too, is שיוחר for שוחר. The transliteration preceding this last word indicates that it had fully penetrated already into everyday speech.

מכתב־יד.

מאת יעקב משה טולידאנו—טאנגיר (מארוקו).

מִבֵּין קבוצת כתבי־היד שרכשתי לי מקרוב, פה במארוקו, יש להצין פה איזה דברי־חפץ, מאלה שעדיין לא ידועים כלל וכלל להביבליוגרפים, ושהתוכן שבהם הוא מענין וחשוב.

I

כתר שם טוב מרבי שם טוב בן נמיל מעיר טידילא די נאברה, שהיה אחד המנורשים מספרד. מהספר הזה נמצא רק קטע מהקדמת הספר ועמוד אחר מניף תחלת הספר, בכ"ז בו חשיבות מרובה מפני שבו מספֵּר המחבר את קורותיו ומאורעותיו ביציאתו מספרד, הקטע הזה בהוב בכתב ידו של המחבר בעצמו, וכי ארבעה דפים בפורמאט 4°, שהגני נותן רובו פה:

. . . . . ובעת ובעונה ההיא שלחו לקשטילנוב בשביל בני לשלול שלל ולבזו בו במלאכתי אשר היתה שם[1] וי"י השומר פתאים העיר את רוח בני העיר את ריחם ולא נתנם השם להרע עמם וכל אחד הלך לדרכו א' הנה וא' הנה, וכאשר ראי שלא עלה בידם אות נפשם באו אל הבית וכל המלאכה נמכזה ונמס אותי החרימו ויהי מדי שלש שבועות שהייתי שם בבית הסוהר במקים באלינסיא ביום השבת באתה מניחה ושלחו בשבילי בעלי הטומאה ואמרו לי מה לך פה ומי לך פה כי הצבת לך קבר בבית הסוהר קום קרא בשם טעיתינו ועשינו עמך חסד ואמת ואם לא דע כי מות תמות כי בן דבר המלך ואז אמרתי הנה נא וקנתי ושבתי לא ידעתי יום מותי ואיכבה אוכל להשיב אתכם תשובה ונפשי נבהלה מאד תנו לי זמן ואשיבה שולחי דבר ויאמרו הן יהי כדבריך אבל שוב אל בית הסוהר ואז אמרתי להם למה ידבר מעלתכם כדברים האלה וכי כן היא דרך מקבלי מי המרים לקבלם בצאתם מבית האסורים ואז אמרו טוב הדבר אשר דברת לעשות, ואברך את י"י אשר יעצני אשר הנחני בדרך אמת אף לילות יסרוני כליותי שויתי י"י לנגדי תמיד וכשהשמש נטה לבית מבואו לפנות בצאת השבת לקחתי נער א' ישמעאל ונתתי לו שכר הליכתו והוציאני מן המקום הרע ההוא והביאני אל כפר אחד סמוך מעיר בלינסיא. ויהי בחצי הלילה לקחתי ישמעאל אחד ונתתי לו שכרו והביאני באישון לילה סמוך לקשטילנוב ודרשתי על בני ועל פועל ידי ומצאתי אותם אחד הנה ואחד הנה ואנחנו בעת ובעונה ההיא לא נדע מה לעשות כי עת צרה היא בלתי לי"י עינינו והסכמנו ללכת למקום טורטושא לראות אם נוכל לעבור דרך אניה בלב ים לפי שהוא מחוז הים ולא עלה בידינו וחזרנו מאמצע הדרך לפי שבכל המקום שהיו רואים

[1] נראה מהמשך הדברים שהמחבר גר בעיר טודילא, והיה לו בית מלאכה בעיר קשטילנוב ששם ישבו בניו, והנה לא מצאתי לכתוב לציין שטות הערים הספרדיות הנזכרות פה, בלאטינית, מפני שידועים הם.

איתנו ארץ מתקוממה לנו לאמר אלו היהודים אשר היו מבקשים אבות הטומאה לשרוף אותם באש, ועם כל זה הסכמנו ללכת למקום אלמריאה שהוא ממלכות נרנאדה שאמרו לנו כי שם מחוז הים דרך לעבור גאולים בלילה א' למקום אבהראן[2] והוא מקום סמוך לתלמסן וכאשר הסכמנו כן עשינו אעפ"י שהדרך ארוך יותר ממאה פרסאות, זאת ועוד אחרת שעל כרחנו היה לנו לעבור במקום באלינסיא המקום אשר היו מבקשים אותנו בחקירה ודרישה נדולה, וביום אשר עברנו בה השי"ת ויה' עשה למען רחמיו שקם בהלה נדולה בעיר ועברנו גאולים והשי"ת הצילנו והגיענו לשם בשלום בהשקט ובבטחה אין שטן ואין פגע רע, ויהי היום ושם באלמריאה יצאנו לראות גלי הים ונאונו ויבא השטן ויען ויאמר מאין אתם לראות את ערות הארץ באתם ונאמר אליו לא אדוני ועבדיך באו לראות אם נוכל לעבור דרך אניה בלב ים למקום תלמסן אשר יש שם אנשים קרובים לנו מימים קדמונים, ויאמר לא, כי יהודים אתם והברת פניכם ענתה בכם וישלח ידו ויבא אותנו תפוסים אל שר העיר והשליכו איתנו בבית האסורים בשלשלאות של ברזל ובכבלי עוני והיה שם באותו המקום ישמעאל אחד נכבד ודבריו נשמעים בעיני השרים של נוים כי בן דבר המלכים[3], ובאשר שמע הדבר עלה חמתו באפו ויאמר אליהם מדוע עשיתם הדבר הזה והלא אלו האנשים ישמעאלים הם, ומימי קדם קדמתה ידעתי אותם ואת משפחתם ואותם הרשעים הגוים חזקו פניהם מסלע ויאמרו יהודים הם, והמה בקשו חשבונות רבים ותחבולות ומרמות ולא יאמנו דבריהם, והישמעאל הנכבד הנקרא סאלימא אלבחו חזר לשאול שאלתו ויען ויאמר הוציאו האנשים מבית הסוהר ואם לאו האמת והאמונה שאלך למלכים להוצאתי ואניד להם את צדקתם ואת יושרם ונראה דבר מי יקום ממני או מכם, ואז השיב שר העיר והנלויים אליו אם האמת אתם שהם ישמעאלים יאמרו התְּפִלה שאתם מתפללים ויען הישמעאל ויאמר כדבריכם כן הוא ואז הוציאו אותנו מבית האסורים וכל אחד ואחד ממנו אמרנו תְּפִלַתם בלא טעות ושבוש ואז נסתתמו טענתם. ואז כאשר הראנו השם את ידו ואת נבורתו החזקה והוציאנו מאפלה לאורה הסכמנו ללכת למקום נראנאדה לבקש לנו מנוח אשר ייטב לנו כי לא נוכל לעבור דרך אניה בלב ים ממקום אלמריאה. וישבנו שם ארבעה חדשים ואחר עבור ד' חדשים נראתה שיירא אחת ממאה אנשים איש וביתו שרוצים לעבור לנילות פאס ואמרנו לכו ונלכה באור ה', ולא אאריך בנסיונות הנדולות והנוראות אשר ארעו לנו אבל בכלל העולה ששם במקום נראנאדה נתנו לנו רשות ופרענו שם שלשים הוכאדוש בשביל המכס. ויהי כאשר התעו אותי אלהים ממקום נראנאדה והגענו למקום ויליץ מאלינא ואיש בליעל הלשין אותנו שאנחנו יהודים ולא אוכל להאריך את כל התלאה אשר מצאתנו שם אלא דרך כלל נתנו אותנו אל בית סוהר ותפשו אותנו שבויים ואת חמורינו ואת כל אשר לנו ואת הצרה קשה על כלם וישבנו שם שני ימים ולילה אחד ולאנשים הישמעאלים הבאים בחברתינו הרעו להם עד מאד באומרם אליהם שהם ידעו את הדבר.

[2] היא ווהראן Oran וכמו שמפיים שהוא מקום סמוך לתלמיסן Tlemcen.

[3] ר"ל שהישמעאל ההוא היה לו יפוי כח מהמלכים שיעשה רצונו, ואולי היה הקונסול של ממשלת מאיזוקי, בעיר אלמריאה בכפר־

ויהי בחצי הלילה של יום השלישי ויהי הנשם על הארץ ובאישון לילה ואפלה הוציאו איתנו מבית הסוהר ולא ידענו מה היה לנו, הוציאו אותנו חבושים אסורים כמו שביים מהמלכים ידינו אסירות לאחור ויהי הנשם עלינו כל היום וכל הלילה ועברנו מעברה בנהר גדול, וכמעט המים שטפונו נחלה עבר על נפשנו, כלל העולה שאותו האיש הבליעל הוליך אותנו למקום כרמונה שהוא מהלך מ׳ פרסאות ממקום שתפשו אותנו שבויים, וכרמונא קרוב ממקום שביליא מהלך שש פרסאות, ושם במקום כרמונא ישבנו אסורים ועבר עלינו צרות רבות ורעות, וישבנו תחת יד ורשות השר דון גואן די שישפרש והיה מחסידי אומות העולם ולא אוכל להאריך לכתוב את כל התלאה אשר מצאתנו באומרם אלינו כל היום שנעזוב אלהים חיים וישבנו ד׳ חדשים. ואחר עבור ד׳ חדשים שלחו המלכים שיחזירו אותנו אל המקום אשר תפשו אותנו והוא מקום ויליץ מליגה ושם ישלחו המלכים כדת מה לעשות וישבנו שם שני חדשים וחצי בבית הסוהר. ופה אשית קנצי למלין ולא אאריך בגלגולים והמאורעות אשר אירעו לנו עצמו מספר, ואחר עבור שני חדשים וחצי שלח המלך בשבילנו שיוליכו איתנו למקום נראנדה אל המקום אשר היינו שם בתחלה ונתנו לו׳ את כל אשר לקחו לנו שלשים ליטראש ממשי ו״ד מטבעות מזהב טוב וישבנו שם בבית האסורים חדש אחד, ואחר עבור חדש אחד א׳ לקחו שני בני הקטנים מחמל נפשי ומחמדי יהושע ויעקב המכונים בן גמיל והחזירום גוים על אפם ועל חמתם ודברו עלינו ארבע מיתות ב״ד לאיש אותנו ובאשר ראו שלא עלה בידם מחשבתם נתנו אותנו במתנה לשלשה שרים לעשות כרצון איש ואיש ועם כל זה לא שכחנו שם אלהינו ונפרוש כפינו לאל זר, והאיש אשר נפלתי אני הזקן בגורלו נקרא נואן די שלאש והאיש ההוא היה מחסידי אומות העולם ואם הוא בחור ועבר אותי בסמוך שנפלתי בידו למקום סאפי[5] דרך אניה בלב ים ושם ראיתי מעשה י״י ששלשה פעמים נכנסתי ויצאתי מן הים כי הים הולך וסוער ובפעם הרביעית נכנסנו בשלום ויצאנו בשלום והיהודים הכשרים והצדיקים פדו אותי ונתנו נ׳ אוקיות כסף בתוך ג׳ ימים, ישלם המשלם פעלם ותהי משכורתם שלימה, בפ׳ ואת עשו וחיו את האלהים אני ירא, ואמרתי שם דברי תורה והנושא אשר לקחתי שדי יתן לכם רחמים, וישבתי שם כמשלוש חדשים או יותר לדרוש ולחקור על בני אל חי יצחק ושמואל ן׳ גמיל הנשארים ביד אדוני, ויבוקש הדבר וימצא אשר בני בכורי כחי וראשית איני משכיל וסיפר נפל בגורלו של השר ושופט נקרא שמו פידרו די פוריש והוא היה נ״כ מחסידי אומות העולם, ושם האיש אשר נפל בגורלו בני ידידי בחירי רצתה נפשי הנכון וסופר אחיו הנקרא שמואל בן גמיל נפל בגורלו של איש בליעל נבל שמו ונבלה עמו ומהשם יצא הדבר שמכר אותו לשר ונכבר הנקרא לואיש די קורדובא וגם הוא היה מחסידי אומות העולם, והשי״ת אשר לו נתכנו עלילות גדול העצה ורב העלילה אשר ממכון שבתו השגיח את כל יושבי הארץ לבקשת ותחנת שמואל בני הנז׳ האדון אשר הוא קנאו והנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים גם יחד איש באחיו ידובקו יתלכדו ולא יתפרדו וישבו שם נ׳ שנים בחומר ובלבנים ובכל עבודה בשדה את כל עבודתם אשר עבדו בהם בפרך

[4] אולי צ״ל ונתנו לנו, או אפשר שנתנו לפלך.

[5] היא העיר אספי Safi במארוקו.

ובאותם שלש שנים לא ידעתי מהם כלום והם ג"כ לא ידעו ממני ועמדני בין המתים יבין החיים עד השקיף י"י משמים אל ארץ הביט ובא סוהר א' דרך אניה בלב ים למקום צאלי[6] והיהודים הכשרים היושבים שם נתנו לו אלף מאראבידיש שיוליך שטרות מצדי ומידי לאדון לואיש די קורדובא אשר הם תחת ידו והנה הוא שואל בפדיונם מאתים דוכאדיש על זה אין להוסיף וממנו אין לגריע וישלחו אותם השטרות למקום אלקאצר[7] לפי ששם ישבתי ט' חדשים כלו עיני מיחל לאלהי. ואז כאשר שמעתי השמועה הטובה שמועה טובה תרשן עצם מלאני לבי לבא עם איתם השטרות לקהלות פאם המאושרות כי שם צוה ה' את הברכה חיים עד העולם נוה צדק הר הקדש פרשת ה' אלהיך מתהלך בקרב מחניך להצילך ואז כאשר שמעו חכמי וראשי עם השמועה הטובה נדיבי עמים נאספו עם אלהי אברהם והיתה הסכמת דעתם שאלך למדינת תלמיסן לנגיד עטרת תפארת ישראל איש תם וישר ירא השם וסר מרע ושם ג"כ נדיבי עמים נאספו והנגיד הרמוז נדיב נדיבות יעץ והיא על נדיבות יקום, והשם נתני בדרך אמת ואע"פ שהדרכים מסוכנים ויש לשם קרוב ממאה ועשרים פרסאות יחדלו אורחות והולכי נתיבות, והשם אלהי הצבאות הנהני בדרך אמת והגעתי לשם פ' דרך י"י לעשות צדקה ומשפט ודברתי שם דברי תירה וכזה הפסוק התחלתי ונתנו לי שם עשרים כפולות. . . . . .

[כאן חסר מההקדמה, דף אחד בנראה, ובדף אחר מתחיל].

בעזר השם הטוב אתחיל לכתוב ספר כתר שם טוב. כתיב שם טוב משמן טוב ויום המות מיום הולדו. הודיענו שע"ה בזה הכתוב שאף על פי שכתר שם טוב עילה על כתר תירה ועל כתר מלכות ועל כתר כהונה עכ"ז האיש אשר נקרא שמו בישראל שם טוב לא יפול עליו זה השם אם לא נמצא בו תנאי א' הרמוז בזה הכתוב וזהו אומרו טוב שם משמן טוב ר"ל טוב שם וכיצד השם נופל עליו לומר טיב בשהוא משמן טוב והמם משמש במקום מן שימצאי בו שלימות המדות הן שבליות הן מעשיות, ששלימות אלו המדות נמשלו לשמן טוב בהרבה מקומות אמר דע"ה הנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים גם יחד שבת אחים אלו משה ואהרן שבהם נמצא הטיב האמתי מתורתינו הק' והנעימות והמתיקות לפי שיש דברים יקרים וגכבדים ונחשבים כאבני שוהם ואבני מלואים ואם האדם ישימם בפיו לא ימצא בהם שום מתיקות ויתר מתיקות ימצא במעט צרי ומעט דבש ואם אינן כל כך נחשבים, אבל דברי תורתינו הם יקרים ימעולים ומתוקים מדבש ונופת צופים שכן הכתיב מעיד הנחמדי' מזהב ומפז רב וכו' ולפיכך אמר הנה מה טוב ומה נעים שבת אחים, ואמר גם יחד לפי שאיש באחיו ידובקו יתלכדו ולא יתפרדו בחיים ובמות כמות זה כן מות זה, ואמר על אהרן הכהן כי הוא כביר ממשה לימים והמשילו לשמן הטוב ר"ל שבאמת ובאמונה נופל עליו לומר כשמן הטוב שהנמשל והמשל הנה הם טובים מכל הצדדין וזהו אומרו על הראש לפי שהוא ראש המשוחים ועליו נאמר יורו משפטיך ליעקב שוקן ונשוא פנים הוא הראש מה שאין הפה יכול לדבר ולפיכך אמר שיורד על הזקן ועל השמן אמר כשמן הירוע שהוא המשל ועל הנמשל אמר הזקן הירוע זקן אהרן, ויהטעם שיורד על

[6] היא סאלי Salé במאראקו.

[7] היא Alcasar במאראקו.

פי מדותיו ר״ל שהיה שלם במדותיו בתכלית השלימות הן במעלות שכליות הן במעלות מעשיות המוניות, וע״א התנא הוי מתלמידיו של אהרן אוהב שלום ורודף שלום אוהב[8] את הבריות. בכאן כולל שלימות המדות מעשיות המוניות, וכמה שאמר ומקרבן לתורה כולל שלימות מעלות שכליות, הנה נראה מזה שהשמן הטוב המרוקח כשהוא יורד על איש שלם במדותיו הן שכליות הן מעשיות אנו קורין עליו טוב שם משמן טוב שכל מין יקרב אל דומהו שכשמו כן הוא, וכן אמר באהרן שיורד על פי מדותיו כמו שביארנו. והאיש אשר נקרא שמו בישראל שם טוב ולא נמצאי בו שלימות המדות הן שכליות הן מעשיות עליו הכתוב אומר זבובי מות יבאיש יביע שמן רוקח. יקר מחכמה[9] ומכבוד סכלות ידוע הוא שהשמן הטוב המרוקח אין דרכם של זבובים לנוח ולהתדבק בו אלא על הנבילות המוסרחות או אל אנשים מונעים וכאשר ילבו וינוחו באנשים או בדברים מועילים חשובים הנה הוא הפך טבעם ודרכם ואותו השמן המרוקח ריחו וטעמו נפסד, כן האנשים החשובים והמעולים אשר יש להם שם טוב או נקרא שמם בישראל שם טוב ויעשו אפי׳ סכלות מעט או דבר או דברים שאינם מתוקנים הנה חכמתם וכבודם ושמם הטוב לא יצלה לכל, והמשל בזה הרי שנפל כתם אחד ושחרורית בבגד אחד מעולה מאד מאד ונפל כתם א׳ מאותו ענין בבגד א׳ בלוי שוה דינר. בהיכן יעשה רושם יותר באותו הבגד הפחות והבלוי או בבגד החשוב, ידוע הוא שיותר נראה הכתם ההוא בבגד החשוב מן הבגד הפחות אף הבא נמי, ואל זה רמזו ז״ל במ״ש לכו חזו מפעלות אלהים אשר שם שמות בארץ, האי[8] קרא אוקמוה ואיתמי אבל לא חזו מפעלות אלהים דאלו הוו מפעלות י״ד ה״א וא״ו ה״א שם קיום בארץ, אבל בנין דהוו מפעולות אלהים שם שמות בארץ, א״ל ר׳ חייא השתא דאתערא להאי, לאו הכי אנא אמינא ליה, דבין שמא דא ובין שמא דא בלא שבחא היא, אבל אנא אמינא ליה כמא דאתערו חבריא דשוי שמהן שמות ממש שם בארץ, ואמאי בנין לאשתמשא בהו עלמא ולמהוי קיומא בעלמא, ר׳ יצחק אמר בלא הוא ואפילו מאי דקאמר ר׳ יהודה שפיר קאמר דאלו יהא עלמא בשמא דרחמי יתקיים עלמא אבל בנין דיתברי עלמא בדינא וקיימא על דינא, שם שמות בארץ ושפיר הוא דאלמלא עלמ׳ לא יכיל עלמא לאתקיימא מקמי חובייהו דבני נשא. ת״ח נח בד אתיליד קרון ליה שמא על נחמא דליהוי שמא נרים, אבל גבי קב״ה לאו איהו הכי, נח איהפך אתוון חן כד״א ונח מצא חן בעיני י״י, א״ר יוסי חן היינו נח בצדיקיא שמהן נרים לטב, בחייביא שמהון גרים לביש, בנח כתיב ונח מצא חן, ער בבור יהודה אתהפך אתוון ליה לביש, ער רע בעיני י״י, מה המאמר נראה שהשמות מוכיחים על המעשים הן לטוב הן לרע, א״כ יפה אמר שע״ה טוב שם משמן טוב כמו שפי׳, וסיפא דקרא מוכיח על ראשיתה שאמר ויום המות מיום הולדו, שהאיש אשר אלה לו שכשמו כן הוא יתרון גדול יש לו ביום מותו מיום הולדו כי נמול ידיו יעשה לו, ועיד כי ביום הולדו מי יודע הזה או זה יכשר אבל ביום המיתה הנה שכרו אתו ופעולתו לפניו, וכבר ידעת המשל שאו״ל לספינה שפירשה מן הים ולספינה הנכנסת מבשה לים זו שנכנסת מרננין וזו שפורשת אין עושים כל עיקר ושוטים הם כי הנכנסת מי יודע למה נכנסת אם יהיה סער גדול בים, אבל כשיוצאה בשלום פצחו רננו יחדיו.

[8] [עיין זהר בראשית (דפוס לובלין 1872) דף נח: ל.]

כך כשנולד ויצא לאויר העולם ראוי לפחד עליו כי לא ידעי אביו ואמו עת עתו נפטר מן העולם וקנה שם טוב מה נעים חלקו ומה יפה מאד ירושתו, וכן או"ל כשהצדיקים נולדים אין בריה יודעת בהם וכשמתים הכל מרגישין, נולד מרע"ה לא הרגישו בו וכשמת נסתלק המן והרגישו בו, נולד אהרן כ"ג ולא הרגישו בו, וכשמת נסתלקו עגני כבוד והרגישו, כשנולדה מרים לא הרגישה בה בריה, וכשמתה נסתלקה הבאר והרגישו הכל, הבאר הודיע מיתתה, הוי אומר ויזם המות מיום הולדו[9]. . . לכן בני אל חי אנשי השם הטוב והמעשה אליפי רבותי ומיודעי אחי ורעי המעיינים והמוכירים והמהגים בהקדמת ובענין חבור זה מכתר עם טיב אל תאשימני ולא תשימו עלי תפלה אם תמצאו שיבושים או טעיות או תוספת לשון או ההפך לפי שאני בן שמונים ושתים שנה ואור עיני גם הם אין אתי וכן הרגש שאר החושים לא נשאר בי אלא העצמות היבשות מליאות יגונות ואנחות וצרות רבות כאשר הם בתוכית בהקדמת הספר ועל בלם גם בן ואח אין לי לא נין ולא נכד ולא שום קירוב בשר בארץ הלזו ואפי' אין איש בארץ שיודע אותי ויתן עדות ממני לכן ועל כן תרתי בלבי לב נשבר ונדכה לחבר זה החיבור לקחתי בידי משכיות התמדה מעין הרעת מבוסינא[10] קדישא רשב"י וחביריו הגלוים לנו ולבנינו והנסתרים שלא הבנתי הנחתי להשם אלהינו וברוב הפרשיות אמרתי כוונות המאמרים ולא נשאתי את שמי על שפתי לפי שאפי' השם אין בי כ"ש המעשה, אלא ברוב המקומות נשאתי את שמי בלשון העצמות היבשות ועל עצמי אני קורא לא ימים ידברו ולא רוב שנים יודיעי חכמה, אכן רוח הוא באנוש ונשמת שדי תבינם. תם ונשלם ההקדמה ברוך י"י:

בסייעתא דשמיא אתחיל לכתוב כתר שם טוב שחבר איתו שם טוב בן בבור הנדיב ר' שמואל בן נמיל תנצב"ה המנורש והמטולטל מעיר ואם טודילא די נאברה:

אמר שם טוב בן נמיל, גרסינן במס' אבות רש"א ג' בתרים הם ובו', [כאן נמצא עוד עמוד אחר מנוף הספר, שלא מצאתי צורך להעתיקו פה עוד.].

הערה כללית.

הקטע הזה של רבי שם טוב ב"ר שמואל בן נמיל, חשוב הוא, כמו שכתבתי למעלה, הן מצד תוכנו, בהספיר המענין של יציאתו ומאורעיותיו בדרך לכתו מספרד עד אפריקה, והן מצד שמו של המחבר וספרו, שעדיין לא ידועים כלל בספרות ישראל, המחבר רש"ט אינו מוכיר בקטע הזה את הזמן שבו יצא מספרד היא ובניו, אך לפי הנראה שזה היה בזמן הגרוש הכללי מספרד, זה נראה גם ממה שיזכיר על דבר המאה אנשים איש וביתו שהלך עמהם מגראנאדה ללכת לפאס, שבלי ספק אלה היו נ"כ יהודים, וכל מה שיספר רש"ט על התלאה אשר מצאתם בבואם לעיר ויליין–מאלינה, נגע כנראה לכל איתה השיירא של מאה אנשים איש וביתו שגם הם התענו בכל אותם העגויים שעונה בהם רבי ש"ט בן נמיל אח"כ ושנמכרו סוף סוף בתור שבויים, אלה שלא רצו להמיר דתם, ולפי הנראה שוו היתה שיירא מאיחרת

[9] [עיין מדרש קהלת רבה ז', ד':–ל.]

[10] כך הנירסא פה, במקום מבוצינא.

מפני שמדברי רש"ט בסוף דבריו ניכר שבבואי לפאס כבר היתה שם קהלה גדולה פורחת, וזה היה רק אחרי בוא המגורשים מספרד אליה, ולפי זה, יהיה שנסיעת רש"ט ובניו ומאה איש וביתו, היתה בחורף רנ"ג, כפי שיזכיר, שבעיכרם ירד הגשם עליהם כל היום וכל הלילה.

לא נדע הסבה מדוע לא עשו יהודי פאס לרבי שם טוב, נדבת־בסף, והוצרכו לתלות הדבר בהנגיד שבתלמסן? לפי הנראה לי סבת הדבר היה שהמושל של מארוקו היה או מושל גם על תלמסן, והנגיד שבו תלוי הדבר נמצא או עם המלך בעיר תלמסן, ולכן היו צריכים יהודי פאס לשלוח את רש"ט תחלה לתלמסן, בשביל רשיון לקבץ בסף לפדיון בניו, אך, לא ידענו עוד מי הוא הנגיד הזה שידבר אודותיו רש"ט ויספר בשבחו.

בן לא נדע מה היה הסוף בדבר שני בניו הגדולים יצחק ושמואל שהיו גם משכילים ומופרים, האם יכול אביהם הזקן שהיה בן שמונים ושתים שנה, להשיג הכסף הדרוש לפדיונם, אם לא, ואמנם מסוף ההקדמה שכותב "גם בן ואח אין לי . . בארץ הלוז" ניכר ברור, שבזמן ההוא שגמר רש"ט את ספורו ואת חבורו זה, לא באי בניו עוד אצלו.

מהמשפחה זו "בן גמיל" מצאנו במאה הי"ח בין יהודי טירקיה, שבאו לא"י, מהם היה רבי יצחק בן גמיל מחבר הס' חיים וחסד דרושים שנדפס בקצור בסוף הס' ישרש יעקב לבן בתו ר' חיים אביאלעפיה (אזמיר ת"ק). ונזכר גם בשם הגדולים מהאוולא, ומזה יש לי לשער שבניו של רש"ט זה, יצחק ושמואל, עלה ביחד ללכת אח"כ – אולי אחרי מות אביהם הזקן – לטורקיה, עם גולי ספרד הרבים שמצאו מקלט להם בטורקיה, ומורעם היה ר' יצחק בן גמיל במאה הי"ח, הנזכר, מי יודע גם אם לא השני הבנים הקטנים של רש"ט, יהושע ויעקב, שהתנצרו בעל כרחם ועל כרחו של אביהם האומלל, יכלו אחרי כן גם הם בגורלם, להמלט מידי מְנַצְּרֵיהם, לארצות טורקיה.

לפי המובן מהקדמת המחבר רש"ט, שהעתקנו, הס' כתר שם טוב הוא דרשות כסדר הפרשיות מיוסר על פי דברי ס' הזוהר, ולפי הנראה שחוץ מהקטע הזה שבידינו, לא נשאר עוד מהספר הזה בעולם, ואבד כבר.

II

שתי אגרות מחברון על דבר עלילה בשנת תקל"ה.

אגרת א'.

שרי החילים, אשר פרים קדש הלולים, וקורא להם אילי הצדק שרי גדודים, נאמנים ונחמדים. הם העומדים על הפקודים ושפטו את העם משפט צדק, הנה הנם אחינו אנשי נאולתנו יחידי סגולה אשר בעיר תהלה ק"ק ארטיב אשר במארוק יע"א ועל צבאם הנכבדים הרחמנים פרנסים וגבאים ממונים וקצינים וכל העוסקים עם הצבור לש"ש ועל ראשיהם מלמעלה החכמים השלימים דיינים מצויינים יהי שלום בחילם כיר"א.

מאחר עלות קול רנה ותפלה, לפני מערת המכפלה למען ירים הודם ישבו בניה שלום משכנות מבטחים ומעגלי צדק, אחינו, שלחו וקראו למקוננות ותבאנה יתשאנה עלינו נהי הגה וקינים כי הן בעון הגזרה על ק"ק עדתנו נזרת שמד מעין הנמת השמדות אשר היה בימי קדם בזמן גרוש ספרד, והוא הדבר, כי בן השייך הגדול מלך הארץ נסתר ויבקשוהו ולא נמצא ומזוף שני ימים נמצא טבוע פגר מת באמת השופכים הסמוכים לחומת מחוז היהודים ותהום כל העיר ונאספו עלינו להשמיד להרוג ולאבד את כל היהודים אשר בעיר קדשנו ולבלתי השאיר כל נשמה באומרם אתם הרגתם אותו ומי שלח ידו בבן השיך וגקה הן בהיותנו גיי מגוי האדמה וכ"ש יהודים אומללים ושלח השיך בחימה שפוכה כי יחם לבבו על בנו והסגיר את כל היהודים במקום אחד טף ונשים לנקום נקם והיתה צעקה גדולה ומרה מן הילדים ויונקי שדים כמוה לא נהיתה ונשארנו סגורים כ"ד שעות ושלחנו אל השופטים אשר בארץ למען דעת אם כפי דתם נתחייבו הריגה כל העם מקצה ונשמטו בידי סלע שיפטיהם ובאו אל השיך ויאמרו לו חכמיו לעשות משפט כי לא יאות לאיש כמוהו לנקום נקם אשר לא כדת וסוף דבר נגמר הדין כי השיך יבחר לו עשרה נפשות מישראל ויטביעם במקום אשר נמצא בנו ושאר העם פליטים ותיכף בא השיך ויבחר לו עשרה בחורים מבחר הצאן לעשות בהם משפט כתיב ואמותיהם של אלו היו קורעים בגדיהם ומתגוללים על הארץ בבכי יון ומתחננים לשיך להרוג אותם תחלה ילא יראו בהריגת בניהם ומי שלא ראה צרה זאת לא ראה צרה מימיו ואנחנו לא נדע מה נעשה ועלתה ההסבמה ללבת להתנפל להגלי השרית אשת השיך עם מתן בסתר לבא אל השיך להתחנן לו לקחת כופר העשרה בחורים באשר ישית עלינו ואל ישפוך דם נקי ועצת ה' היא תקום כי זכות אבות עמהם והטתו בריב לקחה ורצה לקחת כופר ופסק עלינו חמשת אלפים גרוש עד שיהיו השלוחים יוצאים לפני אחינו שבגולה והעשרה בחורים שבחר הם ערכון עליהם שאם לא יגיעו לידו החמשת אלפים גרוש הנז' ישלח ידו בהם אשר על זה אנו שולחים לקראת מעלתם החכם השלם והכולל כמה"ר משה חבהן סקלי הי"ו וכפיו ידבר מעין המאירע כי אין בכח הקולמוס להגיד דברים כהוויתן לפני רו"מ בשפל קול התחנה כל השומע צרה בואת יתמלא רחמים על עשרה נפשות מישראל וכל העם מקצה ילבשו קנאה בהתנדב עם יחד עשיר ואביון נדבה לה' וכל הנשים יתנו יקר לה' אלהי ישראל ייריחו את עדים מעליהם לפדיון נפשות כי לא היתה בואת מימות עולם. גם אלה להכמים פני העדה הי"ו להחם בחספדא ולהודיע להמון מקרה בלתי טהור ויתנו רשות לשלוחינו הנז' לחזר על הפתחים מבית לבית ויבואו האנשים על הנשים ימדדו איש לו אשר לכסף ודי וזהב ולית דין צריך בשש כי חיי הבחורים האלה תליים לתשועת אחינו ב"י רחמנים בני רחמנים ובטחנו בחסדי רו"ם כי כה יעשו והיה שכרם אתם יאריכו ימים ושנים כשני אליהו שוים לטובה הזן ועושר בביתם וצדקתם עומדת לעד כנפשם הרמה וכנפש המתפללים בעדם החותמים בעה"ק חברון ת"ו בסדר ושמרו דרך ה' לעשות צדקה שנת התקל"ה ושלם.

הצעיר מרדכי רוביו, הצעיר יהודה פאטו, הצעיר אליהו בכמהה"ר מלמד,
יצחק הבהן, רפאל שבתי הכהן, אברהם רוביו,
שמואל קארינאל ס"ט.

אגרת ב׳.

מלך מהולל בתשבחות, כלול בכל מדות טובות, זורע צדקות מצמיח ישועות לנפשות עצובות, ה״ה הגביר המרומם נשא ורם כהה״ר אהרן נ׳ יוסף נ׳ אלזרע ואחריו יאיר נתיב הגביר המרומם משה אחיו וה״ר אברהם אחיו ואת שלאחרידם נברא דמאריה סייעיה הגביר המרומם כה״ר שלמה נ׳ דוד נ׳ אלישע נר״ו.

לפנים האר״ש תכון תפלתנו לפני מערת המכפלה יטלם וינשאם וכסא כבוד ינחילם בשובע שמחות. האח נפשינו כלנו בני איש אחד נחנו ואח לצרה יולד שא נא עיניך וראה באגרת הכוללת את האש הגדולה אשר בערה בקצה מחנה אלהים זה ובחורי ישראל הכריע לתת אותם בידי אבותי להמיתם במיתה משונה אשר לא היתה כואת מעולם מזמן גרוש ספרד עד היום וידינו אסורות ואין די באר את הצרה על מתכונתה וזלת שלוחנו החכם השלם והכולל כמה״ר משה הכהן סקלי נר״ו ההולך קדמת אשור יביע אומר אחת מאלף כי על כל אלה תשתפכנה אבני קדש בני אל חי לבקש רחמים צדקה וחסד לפני רו״מ יכמרו רחמיו על עשרה בחורי חמד מכחר הצאן אשר הם מסורים להרינה וייקר פדיון נפשם לפני רי״מ ופתיה יפתח את ידו הרחבה להזיל זהב מכיסו לפדיון נפשות ושקולה מצוה זו ומכרעת מכל מצות שבתורה כי אין לך דבר שעומד בפני פקוח נפש ואף גם זאת ידבר על לב אוהביו ורעיו להחזיק במצוה זו כי עת צרת היא לערת ישראל החונים באהלי שם המקום הקדוש הזה וישועתם מהרה תצמח כי חק וזמן נתן לפדיון נפשם או ח״ו גזרת מות והשמד, לואת יחרד כל איש ותסמר שערת בשרו וימהר יחישה מעשהו מעשה הצדקה, המתפללים בעדו החותמים פע״ק הברון ת״ו בסדר ויחשבה לו צדקה שנת התקל״ח ליצירה ושלם.

מרדכי רוביו,	יהודה נומיץ פאטו,	יצחק הכהן,
רפאל שבתי הכהן,	שמואל קארינאלו	אברהם רוביו.

הערה כללית.

המאורע המדובר בשתי האגרות הנ״ל שקרה או בשנה הנ״ל, בשנת התקל״ח, ליהודי חברון, לא נזכר עוד בכל כותבי תולדות א״י, וגם בכותבי תולדות העיר חברון, ראה באוצר ישראל ובאנציקלופדיות אחרות, גם בס׳ „ארץ ישראל ושכנותיה, להר״א הורוויץ ע׳ חברון, שכתב בפרוטרוט תולדות ומאורעות העיר הזאת, לא בא זכר כלל להמאורע הזה.

שתי האגרות הנ״ל נמצאו במארוקו, והן בחתימת הרבנים החתומים הנ״ל בעצם חתימות ידם, ע״ד הרבנים הנ״ל ראה להר״א הורוויץ בס׳ הנ״ל, ובהירושלים של לונץ המצויין שם, אודותם, והראשון ר׳ מרדכי רוביו, הוא מחבר ס׳ שמן המר שו״ת שנדפס בליוורנו תק״מ.

המשפחה סקלי הכהן שאליה התיחס השד״ר מחברון הנזכר, היא משפחה עתיקה יחוסה.

העיר אֶרְפּוּד שאליה נשלחו שתי האגרות הנזכרות, היא עיר קטנה בעת בדרום מארוקו בחלק המדבר סחרא (Sahara), ושלפי הנראה מהאגרות הנ"ל, היתה או בה קהלה יהודית חשובה, כודאי קוראי דברינו יתפלאו איך הגיעו שדרי ארץ ישראל, עוד או בהמצב המקולקל המדיני וסכנות שלפני מאה וחמשים שנה והותר, עד למקומות רחוקות כאלה, למדבר סחרא, ואמנם, לפי מה שידוע לי מתוך אגרות רבות אחרות וגם מידיעות ברורות, ששלוחי א"י הגיעו עוד יותר לפנים המדבר ההיא ויסבנו בנפשם לבוא עד הישובים היותר רחוקים שם, ובב"ז נסבנו בשלום ויצאו בשלום, מפני שהערביאים המרוקואים, גם במקומות שהם כל כך קנאי־הדת ושונאי־ישראל, כִּבדו את שלוחי א"י ולא ננעו בהם לרעה, כי חשבו אותם בתור „אנשים קדושים" כשלידי הארץ הקדושה, ויתנו להם לעביר בלי מעשור גם בדרכים נְשָׂמוֹת ובישובים רחוקים כל כך.

הערה נוספת מאת יעקב בצלאל לוויטערבאך סינסינעטי.

חשודים בעיני דברי שתי האגרות האלו ורואה אני צורך להעיר על איזה דברים שעוררו בלבי ספק גדול באמתת המאורע המסופר באגרות אלו.

א. אמנם אין להתפלא „איך הגיעו שדרי" ארץ ישראל למקומות רחוקות כאלה למדבר סחרא", כאשר יוכיח בצדק הרב טולידאנו. אך מאד נתפלא על הראשים והמנהלים בחברון כי בעת צרה כזאת ששועה קרובה היתה נחוצה מאד „בי חק וזמן ניתן לפדיון נפשם" של הבחורים האסורים, בחרי לבקש עזרה מרחוק ולשלוח את השד"ר דוקא למקום רחוק כזה שזמן הנסיעה לשם בלבד יארך יותר מחדש ימים ובלך ושוב הלא יעברו כשלשה חדשים. מדוע לא פנו למקומות יותר־קרובים לבקש עזרה מהם. ואם נאמר כי שלחו שדרי"ם ומכתבים גם למקומות אחרים הקרובים והרחוקים הלא יפלא כי כל המכתבים שנשלחו למקומות אחרים נאבדו ולא נשארו לפליטה רק שני המכתבים האלו במארוקו. ולא רק המכתבים שנשלחו לשאר מקומות נאבדו גם המאורע עצמו נשכח לגמרי, ולא נזכר בשום מקום. כי כותבי תולדות ארץ ישראל ותולדות עיר חברון לא ידעו ממני. והלא הרב חיד"א היה בחברון קרוב לאותו זמן וכששה שנים אח"כ בשנת תקמ"א יצא עוד הפעם משם לחו"ל בתור שד"ר ונם הוא לא יוכיר המאורע הזה באיזה מספריו.

ב. משמות הרבנים הבאים על החתום נודעו לנו רק שנים שהיו בחברון באותו זמן או קרוב לו, והם הרב ר' מרדכי רוביו ובנו ר' אברהם רוביו שהיה רב בחברון משנת תקמ"ד עד שנת תקס"ו. ואיפשר עוד שלישי אם נאמר כי יהודה פאטו אי יהודה נומיץ פאטו כאשר הוא חתום על המכתב השני, הוא הרב חיים יהודה נומיץ פאטו שהיה בחברון באותו זמן. אך שמות הנותרים לא נודעו לנו ולא נזכרו ברשימות חכמי ורבני עיר חברון.

ג. הרב טולידאנו יחשוב כי המכתבים האלו חתומים „בעצם חתימות ירם של הרבנים בחברון. אך הלא אין מדרך הרבנים לשנות את שמם בחתימתם ולחתום פעם בשם אחד ופעם בשני שמות או בשינוי השם. ובמכתבים האלו הרב יהודה פאטו במכתב הראשון יחתום את שמו רק, יהודה פאטו, ובמכתב השני

יוסף שם אחר על שמו ויחתום יהודה נומין פאטו. והרב שמואל קארינאל במכתב הראשון יוסף תיבות ס"ט (=סופו טוב או, ספרדי טהור?) אחר חתימת שמו. ובמכתב השני ישמיט תיבות אלו ומשנה שמו במקצת ותחת קארינאל יחתום קארינאלו. וגם לזר יחשב לנו שבאותו מכתב עצמו שהרב ר' מרדכי רוביו חתם את שמו, הצעיר מרדכי רוביו, בנו ר' אברהם חיתם את שמו אברהם רוביו בלא סימן הענוה, הצעיר או הקטן. ובמכתב השני שכחו גם ר' מרדכי גם ר' יהודה פאטו את ענותנותם והשמיטו תיבת הצעיר לפני חתימתם.

ד. עוד נראה לי כעין זיוף מתוכן בשני המכתבים. במכתב השני העיד אל הגביר אהרן ן' יוסף ואחיו הכותבים מוכירים את המכתב הראשון שנערך אל נבאי ופרנסי הקהלה בכלל ורומזים אליו בדברים אלו: "שא נא עיניך וראה באגרת הכוללת". ובשעה שנכתבו הדברים האלו, האגרת הכוללת לא היתה כתובה עדיין. כי המכתב אל הגביר נכתב בפרשת לך לך "בסדר והאמין בד' ויחשבה לו לצדקה". והאגרת הכוללת, המכתב אל הפרנסים ואנשי הקהלה בכלל נכתב בשבוע שאחר זה. בפרשת וירא "בסדר ושמרו דרך ד' לעשות צדקה ומשפט".

מכל הנ"ל יוצא לי כי אם לא נאבה לחשוד מנהלי איזו חברה בחברון, מוכרחים אנו לדחליט כי איזה רמאי או שד"ר בלתי נאמן בדה ספור המאורע מלבו. וזיוף המכתבים והתימות איזה רבנים שנודעו לו שהיו באותו זמן בחברון למען יוכל לאסוף נדבות. והלך דוקא למקום רחוק כזה, מקום שאין מכירים אותו וגם לא יוכלו לדעת אם כנים הדברים שהוא מספר להם אם לאו.

תשובה ל"הערה נוספת".

הרה"ח ר"ב ליטרבך נ"י מיהר להטיל חשד בשתי האגרת ההן שלמעלה, ואמנם, במח"ב לא צידק, טעמו השלישי היא העיקרי שיש לשים אליו לב, היינו השינוי שיש בחתימות. וע"ז צריך אני להעיר, כי האגרית נעתקו שלא בפני, מהמקור, והמעתיק לא הבין החתימית הכתיבות בציורים ותליית ברגיל בחתימית הספרדים, ישינה כרצונו, ואמנם כשראיתי בהמקור, אין שם שינוי, הרב פאטו חתום בשתי האגרות, חיים יהודה נומין פאטו, והרב קארינאל, חתום בשתיהן, שמואל קארינאל ס"ט, ויתכן שזה אחיו של רפאל קארינאל שהיה בניויורק ע' איצר יש' ע' קארינאל.

להקושיא ד', יש להשיב בפשיטות, שדרך מנהלי העדה היה להכין מכתבים לעת צאת השד"ר, מלפני זמן מה, ובעת צאתו כותבים הזמן וחותמים, ולכן, נקל הדבר להיות שהאגרת הכוללת נכתבה תחלה קודם, ובזמן החתימה, נחתמו האגרית האחרות קודם ממנה.

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DIE TELEOLOGIE BEI MAIMONIDES

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I.

Die Bedeutung, die dem Problem der Teleologie bei Maimonides zukommen sollte, ist schon rein äußerlich aus der Stellung dieses Problems in der Philosophie gegeben. Es tritt nämlich überall dort zutage, wo sich zwei Gedankengänge schneiden, die wohl eine Zeitlang unabhängig ihres Weges gehen, doch aber konvergieren und sich schließlich treffen müssen, eben im Punkte der Teleologie. Gemeint sind die naturphilosophische Betrachtungsweise, oder wie auch sonst immer das auf das Sein gerichtete Denken bezeichnet werden mag, einerseits und die wertende, normative, hauptsächlich ethische Richtung andererseits. Eine jede dieser Reihen, solange sie für sich ist, kommt ohne den Zweckbegriff aus; er wird nur dann aktuell, wenn sie beide gezwungen werden, sich auseinanderzusetzen oder gar zu vereinigen: wenn ein naturphilosophisch konstruiertes Weltbild einen Sinn oder wenn Postulate der Ethik eine über das empirisch Menschliche hinausgehende Geltung erhalten soll.

Diese Grenzstellung der Teleologie läßt sich leicht historisch belegen. Das Judentum, solange es im rein Ethischen verblieb, bedurfte keiner Teleologie, zumindest nicht für das Weltganze. Ebensowenig aber bedurfte es ihrer die vorsokratische Naturphilosophie. Wenn aber Platon, von der sokratischen Ethik herkommend, auf die Naturphilosophie stößt, so ist seine erste Enttäuschung, und speziell bei Anaxagoras, der doch ein geistiges Prinzip einführte, der Mangel einer teleologischen Deutung.[1] Ähnlich, nur in entgegengesetzter

[1] Die Hauptstelle ist Phaidon 98B, wo der Gegensatz der Teleologie zur mechanistischen Naturerklärung zum ersten Male so prinzipiell klar formuliert wird. Inwiefern speziell die Enttäuschung in bezug auf Anaxagoras berechtigt war — vgl. das Kapitel Anaxagoras bei W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung etc.* 1925 —, mag hier dahingestellt bleiben.

Richtung, war es etwa bei Kant, als er die Kategorien der Erfahrung zu erweitern sich gezwungen sah, wenn auch nicht um eine Kategorie, so doch um die regulative Idee des Zweckes.[2] Nicht anders verhält es sich bis in unsere jüngste Zeit, wenn die Biologie, in ihrer neovitalistischen Richtung, sich gezwungen sieht, die rein mechanisch-energetische Erklärung des organischen Geschehens durch teleologische Faktoren, „Dominanten" oder „Entelechien", zu ergänzen.[3]

Ist nun aber dies der Charakter der Teleologie, daß sie dort aktuell wird, wo sich Ethik und Naturphilosophie schneiden, so wäre sie gerade bei Maimonides zu erwarten, bei dem das Zusammentreffen dieser beiden Gedankenreihen ein wesentliches Motiv seiner ganzen Philosophie ausmacht. Und dies um so mehr, als er jene Gedankenreihen nicht allein aus sich heraus erst zu erzeugen und ihren Widerstreit zu erfahren hatte, sondern beide abgeschlossen und typisiert — in der „Torah" und der „Philosophie" — vorgefunden hatte und seine Aufgabe darin sah, sie nicht allein im Kompromißwege zu „versöhnen", sondern in ein System zu bringen. So hat es wohl auch Hermann Cohen empfunden, als er, bei der Charakteristik der maimunischen Ethik, in der er das Hauptmotiv seiner Philosophie erblickt, auf die Wichtigkeit der Teleologie mit großem Nachdruck hinwies.[4] Zu bedauern ist bloß, daß er sich mit der allgemeinen Bemerkung in der Einleitung begnügt, ohne in der eigentlichen Abhandlung auf die Teleologie Maimonides' näher einzugehen.

In der Tat gehört auch dies zu den schwierigsten Partien der maimunischen Philosophie und beweist von Neuem, wie sehr man fehlgeht, wenn man da nur nach einzelnen Stellen urteilt oder die Darstellung seines wirklichen Gedankenganges durch ein bloßes kapitelweises Referieren zu erreichen glaubt. Die Architektonik des „Moreh" besteht eben darin, daß jeder Abschnitt nur im Zusammenhange mit allem anderen Dazugehörigen und aus dem Geiste des Ganzen heraus richtig verstanden werden kann.

[2] *Kritik der Urteilskraft* II, §. 65 ff.

[3] Vgl. die Partien über den biologischen Zweckbegriff bei R. Eisler, *Der Zweck*.

[4] Cohen, „Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis" in *Moses B. Maimon* I, S. 71 ff.

Da gibt es zunächst jene bekannte Stelle, Moreh III 13, die sich mit der Teleologie befaßt, und die, dem äußeren Anschein nach, als Hauptstelle für unseren Gegenstand gehalten werden kann. Hier lehnt Maimonides jede Teleologie ab, ja bezeichnet alles Suchen nach einem Zweck in diesem Dasein als vergeblich und sogar irreführend.[5] Dies gilt insbesondere in bezug auf die Zentralstellung des Menschen, ist aber auszudehnen auf alles Seiende. Wir müssen uns vielmehr begnügen, dieses Sein in seinem Ursprung, vom göttlichen Willen oder Weisheit, zu erkennen, dürfen uns aber nicht verwirren lassen, außer dem Selbstzweck der einzelnen Geschöpfe noch nach anderen Zwecken zu suchen, die nicht ihre vom Göttlichen ausgehende Existenz an sich enthält.[6] Ja, einen Zweck für das weltliche Dasein zu suchen, wäre nicht minder sinnlos, als den Zweck für die Existenz Gottes finden zu wollen.[7]

Diese Stelle ist nicht nur auffallend an sich im Verhältnis zu dem, was wir von Maimonides erwarten — sondern befindet sich in Widerspruch zu anderen Theorien im Moreh, die auch in die Frage der Teleologie münden. Vor allem Moreh I 69. Hier wird es geradezu als Notwendigkeit hingestellt, bei allen Dingen nach ihrem Zweck zu fragen, und auch im Suchen fortzuschreiten nach einem immer höheren Zweck, so daß man in bezug auf die Welt zu einem letzten Zweck, dem Zweck der Zwecke, gelangt, der Gott ist oder eigentlich sein Wille.[8] Die Notwendigkeit des Zweckes

[5] Gleich am Anfang: הרבה נבוכו מן [רעות] השלטים בבקשת התכלית זה המציאות מה הוא והנני מבאר לך איך תבטל זאת השאלה לכל אחת מן הדעות, dann weiter: ואחר זאת ההצעה. דע שאין דרך לבקש תכלית וכ׳.

[6] *Moreh* III 13 g. E.: ... האדם, כשידע עצמו ... יגוה ולא יתבלבלו מחשבותיו לבקש תכלית למה שאין לו התכלית ההיא או לבקש תכלית למה שאין לו תכלית (Text korrigiert nach Munk, *Guide* III, S. 98 n. 2). Womit also auch ein generelles Ablehnen (Munk: „en général") des Zweckes gemeint ist.

[7] Nachdem schon vorher der göttliche Wille dem Zweck entgegengestellt worden war — הנה בארנו שאין שם תכלית אלא רצון לבד —, heißt es dann g. E. ונשקוד להאמין שזה המציאות כלו מכוון מאתו יתע׳ לפי רצונו ולא נבקש לו עלה ולא תכלית אחרת כללי, כמו שלא נבקש תכלית מציאותו יתי, כן לא נבקש תכלית רצונו.

[8] *Moreh* I 69 g. E.: וכן עוד הענין בכל תכלית, כי הדבר אשר לו תכלית יש לך לבקש לתכלית ההוא תכלית, um dann, nach einer Exemplifizierung, zum Schlusse zu gelangen: ואם כן הוא יתי תכלית כל דבר האחרון ... והוא ענין רצונו אשר הוא עצמו ... בזה הצד נאמר בו שהוא תכלית התכליות.

als solchen ist hier, im Formalen zumindest ganz aristotelisch, von nicht geringerer Bedeutung als die der anderen drei Ursachen, an deren Gültigkeit doch wohl nicht gezweifelt werden kann. Den Widerspruch zwischen diesen beiden Auffassungen bei Maimonides hat nun Narboni sehr lebhaft empfunden[9] und er versucht es, in einer längeren Interpretation die beiden Stellen in Einklang zu bringen.

Während aber Narboni auf jeden Fall den Ausgleich im Sinne einer positiven Stellung Maimonides' zur Teleologie durchführt und die Ablehnung alles Zwecksuchens in III 13 als einen besonders erklärungsbedürftigen Spezialfall in die proteleologische Ansicht von I 69, die ihm als die maßgebende gilt, einfügt, finden wir bei den neueren Darstellern die entgegengesetzte Neigung. Für Kaufmann[10] z. B. gilt es als ausgemacht, daß nach Maimonides' Behauptung „bei der Schöpfung nach einem Zwecke nicht gefragt werden dürfe", dies unter Berufung auf Moreh III 13, dabei aber die Stelle I 69 geradezu als Beleg anführend, insbesondere da am Schlusse des ersteren Kapitels auch Wille und Weisheit Gottes erwähnt werden. Dies wohl auch im Sinne Munks, der auch die Unergründlichkeit des göttlichen Willens, für die er auf I 69 hinweist, als Erklärung für die Zwecklosigkeit der Schöpfung anführt.[11] Für beide also ist die maßgebende Lehre Maimonides' durchaus antiteleologisch.

Daß aber diese Auffassung unhaltbar ist, wird klar aus verschiedenen Gründen. Zunächst ist das Heranziehen von I 69 für III 13 als Beleg unmöglich. Formulieren wir die Frage einmal prinzipiell, was die Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt betrifft, so lautet die Antwort in I 69, man müsse bei jedem Ding nach einem Zweck suchen, während es in III 13 heißt, man dürfe keinen suchen, da jedes Geschöpf an sich Selbstzweck ist. Und gerade der Schluß von III 13, auf den sich Kaufmann beruft, den er aber nicht wortgetreu wiedergibt, besagt eben, es gebe keinen anderen Zweck als die

[9] Kommentar ed. Goldenthal zu *Moreh* III 13, S. 51b: אני נבוכותי הרבה על הרב ז"ל איך רב ואמר שהוא יבאר איך תכשל ואת השאלה ... ואני רואה כי זה סתירת כל החכמות, כי תכלית כל החכמות לדעת התכלית האחרונה. Dann, S. 52, wird, unter Hinweis auf I 69, zu erklären versucht: ... אמנם דבר זה ברטוים ועל דרך סתר כפי מנהגו באלה הענינים האלהיים.

[10] *Attributenlehre*, S. 320 Anm. 180. [11] So *Guide* III, S. 91 n. 1.

Eigenexistenz;[12] das ist doch nicht identisch mit der Behauptung, es gebe einen Zweck und dies ist der Wille Gottes. Daß uns aber auch die Unergründlichkeit des göttlichen Willens hier nicht helfen kann, beweist klar eine andere Stelle, wo Maimonides die Meinung der Aschariten bezüglich der Providenz vorträgt, ihre Gottes-Willens-Theorie bis zu ihren letzten Konsequenzen durchführt und als eine der Absurditäten, die sich aus dieser einseitigen Lehre der Unergründlichkeit des göttlichen Willens ergeben, die anführt, daß nach ihr alle Zweckmäßigkeit des göttlichen Handelns aufgehoben wird.[13] Wobei also die Teleologie als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt und von einer extremen „Willens"theorie als bedroht bezeichnet wird.

Sollte aber noch ein Zweifel über die Grundtendenz Maimonides', wie in den zwei erwähnten Stellen dargestellt, zurückbleiben, so dürfte er vollkommen behoben werden durch eine dritte, die wir wohl auch als Hauptstelle für unsere Frage ansehen dürfen, nämlich Moreh III 25. Hier werden unter den Handlungen, mit Beziehung auf ihren Zweck, vier Gruppen unterschieden: die sinnlosen, die spielerischen, die verfehlten und schließlich die zweckmäßigen. Maimonides führt diese Vierteilung an, um jede Annahme, Gott könnte eine andere Handlungsart als die vierte, die zweckmäßige, ausüben, strenge zurückzuweisen.[14] Wobei noch zwei Momente hervorzuheben

[12] Den Schlußsatz von *Moreh* III 13, כ״ו b: או כטלב גאיה לטא לא גאיה לה א ל א ... וגודה אלמתעלק באלמשיה אלאלאהיה ואן שית קל באלרכבה אלאלאהיה gibt Kaufmann wieder: „das keines oder nur ein in Gottes Willen oder Wissen begründetes Ziel hat". Dadurch ist ihm auch die Verbindung mit I 69 erleichtert. Hier ist aber nicht von Gottes Willen oder Wissen als Ziel, sondern von der von jenem Willen etc. abhängigen Eigenexistenz als Selbstzweck die Rede.

[13] *Moreh* III 17 (הדעת הג׳), wird als letzte und schwerste הרחקה die genannt: ויתחייב לפי זה הדעת ג״כ שלא תהיה תכלית כונה לפעולותיו יתע׳.

[14] Die Einteilung wird gemacht unter dem Gesichtspunkt: לפי בחינת תכליתם. Die Behauptung, es könnte in der Schöpfung auch eine der drei ersten Handlungen möglich sein, wird bezeichnet als שקריתו גלויה בתחלת המחשבה und, nach einer Auseinandersetzung mit Gedankengängen, die darauf führen könnten, abgelehnt mit den Worten: וזה כלו לברוח מטה שצריך לברוח מטנו והוא שיעשה הפועל פעולה ולא יכוין בה תכלית כלל. Dann wird diese Auffassung auch als Absurdität bezeichnet: ודע שאשר סבלו זאת ה ה ר ח ק ה עד שיהיו פעולת השם ית׳ אצלם כפעולות ההכל אשר לא יכוין בהם תכלית כלל.

sind. Erstens wird hier Zweckmäßigkeit nur im absoluten Sinne verstanden; denn Handlungen, die nur in relativem Sinne zweckmäßig sind — sei es, daß ihr Zweck an sich ein geringerer ist oder daß er nur für einen Teil von Subjekten, wenn es auch die Weisen sind, Bedeutung hat — gehören noch nicht ganz in die Gruppe des Zweckmäßigen.[15] Die zweckmäßige Handlung, die sich auf den notwendigen und bedeutenden Zweck bezieht, ist eben die gute Handlung an sich. Zweitens wird hier, und dies in der entgegengesetzten Richtung zu III 13, nachgewiesen, daß das Leugnen eines Zweckes in den Teilen aus der irrtümlich aufgefaßten Zwecklosigkeit des Ganzen, die als solche noch irgendwie begreiflich wäre, hervorging.[16] Während also früher, bei der Ablehnung der Teleologie, die Selbstzwecklichkeit der Einzeldinge gleichsam konkurrierend zur Annahme eines Gesamtzweckes des ganzen Daseins auftritt, soll hier das gerade Gegenteil erfolgen: Die zweckmäßige Einrichtung des Einzeldings, deren Leugnen eben eine absurde Konsequenz wäre, soll auf die allgemeine Teleologie zurückführen, soll Annahmen, die im Bereiche des Allgemeinen noch manche Berechtigung haben, korrigieren und also, im Analogiewege, die Setzung dieser allgemeinen Teleologie ermöglichen.

Ganz auffallend aber ist die Benützung der auf jeden Fall abgelehnten Auffassung von der kosmischen Zentralstellung des Menschen zu zwei entgegengesetzten Argumentationen.

[15] Die פעולת השחוק (פעל אלעבת) wird eigentlich nur als eine, gemessen an der höchsten Art, quantitativ geringere Handlung: הפעולה אשר יכון בו תכלית פחות bezeichnet. Und als Übergang zwischen ihr und der vollkommen zweckmäßigen Handlung, aber offenbar noch als zur spielerischen Gruppe gehörig, werden diejenigen Handlungen eingereiht, deren Nutzen nicht evident ist: ... כהתעטלות הגוף אשר הוא הכרחי להתמיד הבריאות ... וככתיבה שתועלתה גדולה אצל אנשי החכמה usw.; und zwar nur aus dem Grunde, da sie von den Unwissenden als spielerisch angesehen, obwohl sie subjektiv אצל החכמים אינו פעולת שחוק (Munk, III, S. 197: „mais qui n'est pas frivole" etc.). Erst dann wird die reine פעולה טובה, die also auf eine evidente תכלית נכבדת gerichtet ist, behandelt.

[16] Bei der Ablehnung der ascharitischen extremen Willenstheorie (III 25, Mitte): אמנם אלו האומרים שפעולות השם כלם לא כון בהם תכלית כלל, הביאם לזה הכרח ... שהם אומרים מה תכלית מציאות העולם בכללו ... וימשיכו זה בחלקי העולם כלם. Vgl. dagegen, oben Anm. 12, den Schlußsatz von III 13, der mit der dort im ganzen Kapitel entwickelten Lehre durchaus im Einklang ist.

In dem einen Falle wird diese überhebliche Meinung vom Menschen als falsch bezeichnet, im Anschluß daran gleichsam als dessen psychologische Konsequenz auch die Ablehnung einer jeden Zweckmäßigkeit gelehrt.[17] Während im anderen Falle eben diese falsche Vorstellung vom kosmischen Zentrismus des Menschen geradezu als Grund dafür angeführt wird, daß in bezug auf die Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt Zweifel auftauchen konnten.[18] Stellt man die beiden Darstellungen gegenüber, so ergibt sich, daß jene Überwertung des Menschen das eine Mal zur Teleologie führt — die aber ebenso wie ihr Ursprung abzulehnen ist— das andere Mal aber von der Teleologie, die bejaht wird, abhält, woraus allein eben die Falschheit dieser Überwertung sich erweisen soll.

Es scheint, als wollte das Kapitel III 25 in allem und jedem — in der Argumentierung nicht weniger als im Grundgedanken — die genaue Umkehrung des Kapitels III 13 sein.[19] Das eine gleichsam ein Gegenstück zum anderen.

[17] In III 13 werden die beiden Fragen als eins, das eben zu verneinen ist, behandelt: אמנם ... יש הושבים שואת השאלה מחויבת, ר״ל בקשת התכלית לכל זה המציאות, וכן יחשבו, שתכלית המציאות כלו מציאות מין האדם לבדו. Das וכדלך ישׁ übersetzt Munk (*Guide* III, S. 89): En conséquence, on croit usw. Wodurch die Überwertung des Menschen als Folgerung aus der Annahme eines Weltzweckes erscheint. Dies entspricht nicht dem Gedankengang des ganzen Kapitels, wo doch die Stellung des Menschen psychologisch als primär behandelt wird. Der Widerspruch aber mit III 25, der uns hier beschäftigt, kommt nach der Auffassung Munks noch drastischer heraus. Scheyer in seiner Übersetzung (S. 64) schwächt sogar das Tibbonsche וכן noch mehr ab und schreibt „und sind der Meinung", wonach die zweite Hälfte, die Stellung des Menschen, sich explikativ an die erste, die Idee der gesamten Zweckmäßigkeit, anschließt.

[18] III 25 g. E.: ודע שרוב הספקות המביאות למבוכה בבקשת תכלית מציאות העולם בכללו או תכלית כל חלק מחלקיו, אמנם שרשם מעות האדם בעצמו ודמותו שהמציאות פלו בגללו לבד. (Munk, III, S. 201, übersetzt das אמנא noch stärker: n'ont d'autre source que.) Dann weiter: ומפני המעות ההוא יתחדשו הספקות והמבוכה, עד שידמו שקצת פעולות השם יתי שחוק וקצתם הבל וקצתם ריק.

[19] Dies erscheint notwendig so, wenn man nur referierend diese Kapitel behandelt, ohne den Versuch zu machen, sie durch Interpretation in Einklang zu bringen; eine so gemachte Darstellung muß auch zu Widersprüchen führen. Als Beispiel sei hier Joel angeführt. In seiner *Religionsphil. d. M. b. Maimon* (Ausgabe des Jahresberichtes), da heißt es einmal, S. 19, „daß die Frage nach dem Zweck der Schöpfung unzulässig sei" — also folgend *Moreh* III 13. Später aber, bei Behandlung der Gebote, also unter Berufung auf *Moreh* III 25, wird, S. 40,

Nur in einem Punkte sind die beiden Darstellungen einig: im Verhältnisse des Teleologieproblems zum Kreationsproblem; in beiden nämlich wird ein direktes Verhältnis zwischen Kreation und Teleologie gelehrt, so daß die Bejahung der ersteren auch die Annahme der letzteren zur Folge hat. Aber auch in dieser Frage ist die Auffassung Maimonides' durchaus nicht einheitlich — vergleicht man diese soeben erwähnte Stellungnahme mit anderen. Daß das Problem einer Zweckmäßigkeit in der Welt mit der Annahme einer vernünftigen Weltordnung und in weiterer Folge mit der Annahme eines der Welt zugrunde gelegten Vernunftplans zusammenhängt, dies war schon in der antiken Philosophie klar, als sich das Teleologieproblem noch in seinen ersten Regungen befunden hatte.[20] Bei Maimonides aber, bei dem das Planmäßige des Weltgeschehens notwendigerweise mit der Idee eines weltschaffenden Lenkers verbunden ist und somit zur Annahme eines Schöpfungsaktes ex nihilo führt — da wäre es zu erwarten, daß das Problem der Teleologie eindeutig mit dem der Kreation so verbunden wird, daß aus diesem, für Maimonides feststehenden Grundsatz sichere Ergebnisse auch für die Teleologie zu erreichen wären. Dem ist aber nicht so. Die Verbindung dieser beiden Fragen variiert zwischen einem Extrem und dem anderen.

Das eine Mal wird die Unabhängigkeit zwischen Teleologie und Kreation behauptet — ja, die Vermischung der beiden Fragen scheint als überflüssige Komplikation angesehen zu werden.[21] In den weiteren Erörterungen hingegen des Teleologieproblems wird der Zusammenhang als solcher mit Kreation wohl betont und eingehend behandelt, in den Folgen aber, die

jene „die Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in Abrede stellende Ansicht", die sich auch in der Ansicht der Zwecklosigkeit der Gebote fortsetzt, als falsch zurückgewiesen.

[20] Wenn man, mit Theiler *loc. cit.*, S. 13 ff., schon Diogenes von Apollonia als „Begründer" der Teleologie betrachten will, so hängt dies schon bei ihm mit der Annahme eines einheitlichen Weltprinzips, des ἀήρ, zusammen, woraus dann, dualistisch gestaltet, „das Walten der Luft im Kosmos ... wie das des anaxagoreischen νοῦς" folgt.

[21] *Moreh* I 69, wo von Gott als Weltzweck gesprochen wird, heißt es: ולא תטריד שכלך הנה בענין חדושו לעולם או התחייבו ממנו על דעתם.

aus dem einen für das andere sich ergeben, zeigt sich eine große Diskrepanz. Als von der Teleologie noch im Sinne eines Anthropozentrismus im Kosmos gesprochen und daher abgelehnt wird, da werden die Schwierigkeiten, die sich den Philosophen, die an die Weltewigkeit glauben, aus dieser Ablehnung ergeben, behandelt und eher unsere Auffassung von der Schöpfung als mit dieser Ablehnung der Teleologie übereinstimmend hingestellt.[22] Demnach würde die Kreationstheorie und die Ablehnung einer Teleologie sich gegenseitig unterstützen; zumindest eher, als es die Ewigkeitstheorie kann, die sich in schwer zu lösende Schwierigkeiten verwickelt.

Hingegen sind, wie gesagt, die zwei Stellen, von denen die eine (III 13) die Teleologie durchaus ablehnt und die andere (III 25) durchaus bejaht, gerade darin einig, daß Kreation und Teleologie sich gegenseitig begünstigen. In der ersten wird wohl auch, wie in I 69, einleitend behauptet, daß die Ablehnung der Teleologie sowohl für die Ewigkeit als auch für die Kreation in gleichem Maße gilt.[23] Doch wird wiederholt betont, daß die Annahme eines Zweckes für die Lehre der Schöpfung geradezu als Beweis dient, und auch später wird die Leugnung der Zweckmäßigkeit als trotz der Schöpfungslehre notwendig bezeichnet.[24] Ebenso wird in III 25 die Notwendigkeit einer Zweckmäßigkeit in der Welt von der Vollkommenheit und Unfehlbarkeit ihres Schöpfers abgeleitet. Allerdings in beiden Stellen verschieden; in der einen wird die Planmäßigkeit besonders auf die Absichtlichkeit, also auf das

[22] *Moreh* III 14: סוף דבר שואת השאלה (womit die Ablehnung der anthropozentrischen Teleologie gemeint ist) יעיר בה בבה שנאמינהו בחדוש העולם. Auf diese Stelle und ihre Bedeutung werden wir noch später zurückkommen.

[23] Am Anfang von *Moreh* III 13: איך תכטל ואת השאלה לכל אחת מן הדעות: dann weiter: דע שאין דרך לבקש תכלית לכלל הבציאות, לא לפי דעתנו האוטרים בחדוש העולם ולא לפי דעת אריסטו בקדמות.

[24] III 13: ודע כי מן הגדולה שבריאות על חדוש העולם... הוא טה שיעמוד עליו המופת בנמצאות השבעיות, כי לכל דבר טהם תכלית אחר (worüber weiter unten). Dann später: אטנם לפי דעתנו בחדוש העולם... יש חושבים שואת השאלה טחויבת, ר״ל בקשת התכלית לכל זה הבציאות. Und schließlich nach der Ablehnung: ותבטל נ״כ שאלת התכלית בכל מיני הנמצאות ואפילו לפי דעתנו בחדוש העולם. (Über den im Anfang betonten Unterschied zwischen תכלית ראשונה und תכלית אחרונה wird noch später ausführlich zu sprechen sein.)

Willensattribut zurückgeführt,[25] während sie in der anderen mehr mit der Weisheit Gottes begründet wird, wobei das Willensmoment allein als irreführend abgelehnt wird.[26] Doch ist hier wieder eine noch zu lösende Verwicklung berührt, auf die wir vorläufig nicht näher eingehen können.

Was wir bisher gesehen haben, ist eine durchaus widerspruchsvolle Behandlung des Teleologieproblems. Sowohl die Frage einer Teleologie überhaupt als auch eine Reihe wichtiger Einzelfragen, wie der Anthropozentrismus in seinem Verhältnis zur Teleologie und das Verhältnis zwischen Kreation und Zweckmäßigkeit — alle weisen an den verschiedenen Stellen eine verschiedene und auch entgegengesetzte Behandlung auf. Dies müßte genügen, um uns zu veranlassen, einen ernsten Versuch zu unternehmen, der wirklichen Ansicht Maimonides' über die Teleologie auf den Grund zu gehen und sie darzustellen. Mit der einfachen Formel, „es gibt" eine Teleologie oder „es gibt keine", können wir hier nicht auskommen — sie führt eben zu den Widersprüchen innerhalb des Moreh, ja sogar insbesondere innerhalb des dritten Teiles, der doch sicherlich einheitlich auf einmal vom Verfasser herausgegeben worden war.

Dieser Versuch kann nur darin bestehen, daß alle betreffenden Stellen zusammengehalten und die in ihnen auftauchenden scheinbaren Widersprüche als verschiedene Seiten einer und derselben Grundanschauung gesehen werden. Die extremen positiven sowohl als negativen Formulierungen dürfen nur als antinomistisches, also bewußtes Verfahren aufgefaßt werden, um das sich aus ihnen ergebende Dritte, beiden Formulierungen gerecht und doch von keiner erschöpft,

[25] In III 13 wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Kreation-Zweckmäßigkeit auf die כונת מכון zurückgeführt ולא יצויר כונה רק עם התחדשות מחדש. Dies ähnlich wie II 19 Einl., wo auch das Willensmotiv wesentlich ist.

[26] *Moreh* III 25 wird für die Ansicht שפעלות השם כלם לא כוון בהם תכלית כלל wohl die ascharitische Theorie verantwortlich gemacht, aber etwas generalisiert: כמאמר כל מי שיאמר בחדוש העולם שכן רצה השם לא לעלה אחרת. Die Teleologie wird erst später möglich gemacht dadurch שעם מה שנאמינהו שהעולם מחודש רוב הכמינו ויודעינו לא יאמינו שזה ברצון לבד לא זולתו, אבל יאמרו שחכמתו ית'... חייבה מציאות זה העולם בכללי und bekräftigt durch das Argument, daß die Naturdinge סעילת הכמה גדולה sind, und mit Bibelstellen, die הכמה enthalten, wird dann weiteroperiert.

gleichsam von selbst hervortreten zu lassen. Diese Methode, durchaus dialektischen Charakters, schien von Maimonides als besonders fruchtbar bevorzugt zu sein — wie es sich auch in anderen Teilen der Lehre zeigt[27] — allerdings unter der Voraussetzung, daß nicht jede Seite, die ihren Wert nur als Komponente im Ganzen hat, für sich als abgeschlossene „Meinung" gewertet wird.

II.

Maimonides behandelt nirgends die Teleologie an sich, isoliert, er spricht von ihr nur im Zusammenhange mit anderen, die Hauptsache seiner Untersuchung ausmachenden Fragen, und zwar als eine aus ihnen folgende Konklusion oder als notwendige Einleitung. So sehen wir unsere drei wichtigsten Stellen in folgenden Zusammenhängen behandelt: I 69, proteleologisch, in Verbindung mit dem Attributenproblem, hauptsächlich um für Gott den Vorzug der Bezeichnung סבה gegenüber פועל zu begründen; dann III 13 als Abschluß der Theodizee (8—12), wo eigentlich, dem ganzen Gedankengange entsprechend, eher eine Bejahung einer Planmäßigkeit des Geschehens und somit einer Teleologie zu erwarten wäre; und schließlich als Einleitung zur Lehre von den Geboten und ihres Sinnes in III 25. Beweist nun das wiederholte Zurückkommen auf dasselbe Problem, wie sehr dieses dem Autor wichtig war, so darf die Anordnung, d. h. die unterlassene selbständige Untersuchung dieser Frage nicht diesen Eindruck abschwächen. Wir werden sehen, daß gerade diese Verquickung der Teleologie mit den anderen Teilen seiner Philosophie es Maimonides möglich gemacht hat, seine wirkliche Lehre in ihren verschiedenen Seiten klarer hervortreten zu lassen. Darum wird auch für uns die Betrachtung in diesen Zusammenhängen eine Erleichterung des Verständnisses herbeiführen.

Beginnen wir nun mit III 13, so wissen wir bereits, daß hier zwei Ansichten vereinigt sind, um in einem abgelehnt zu werden: Der Mensch als Weltzweck und die Zweckmäßigkeit

[27] Vgl. meine Abhandlung: „Maimonides' Lehre von der Prophetie" in *Jewish Studies* (Abraham's Memorial Volume), S. 74 ff. Diese Abhandlung wird im folgenden unter „Proph." zitiert werden.

überhaupt oder eigentlich der Mensch als einzige Möglichkeit einer angenommenen Weltzweckmäßigkeit. Im Zusammenhange aber näher besehen, beinhaltet diese Stelle nur die Ablehnung der Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt, der Mensch wird nur als Ausgangspunkt verwendet. Denn die Ablehnung der anthropozentrischen Anschauung ist bereits früher und ausgiebig erfolgt. Den Standpunkt im Mischnah-Kommentar, wo noch der Mensch als einziger Zweck in der sublunaren Welt (und eigentlich in der Welt überhaupt) angenommen wird,[28] diesen Standpunkt hat Maimonides in Moreh ganz aufgegeben. Er wiederlegt ihn wiederholt, insbesondere aber in der Theodizee, da er in dieser Überheblichkeit des Menschen den Ursprung des Pessimismus Alrasi's erblickt.[29] Die Ablehnung geschieht zunächst aus der Betrachtung der geringen Bedeutung des Menschen, verglichen mit den anderen kosmischen Existenzen.[30] Während also im Mischnah-Kommentar Maimonides noch ganz dem Gedankengange S a a d j a s folgte, finden wir im Moreh eine Revision und eine T e i l u n g der früheren Ansicht.

Bei Saadja war die Zentralstellung des Menschen dadurch gegeben, daß er zur höchsten sittlichen Leistung befähigt ist — er ist also der „Kern" der Welt, d. h. ihr Zweck.[31] Den Ein-

[28] In der Einleitung zu Seder Zeraim. Da wird zunächst unter Berufung auf die Alten — דע כי הקדמונים הקרו הקירה עצומה — auf die Bedeutung des Zweckproblems hingewiesen. Dann wird die Ansicht vertreten, daß על דרך כלל יש לדעת שכל הנמצאים שתחת גלגל הירח נמצאו בשביל האדם לכדו, dies allerdings, um vom Menschen als Zweck auf den Zweck des Menschen zu sprechen zu kommen: וכאשר מצאו שתכלית כל אלו העניינים הוא למציאות האדם, הוצרכנו להקור כמו כן למה נמצא האדם וכי. Doch scheint die erste Hälfte dieses Satzes wesentliche Voraussetzung zu sein.

[29] *Moreh* III 12 (Anf.): וסבת זה המעות כלה היות זה הסכל וחבריו מן ההמון לא יבחינו המציאות וכו'... וידמה כל סכל, כי המציאות כלו היה בעבורו. Dann weiter: שלא ישעה, ויחשוב שהמציאות היה בעבורו לבד, und dies, obwohl er noch immer daran festhält, daß האדם הוא נכבד מכל מה שבעולמנו זה התחתון; wobei allerdings, wenn man unter Berücksichtigung des תכלית übersetzt: נכבד מכל מה שנתהוה (vgl. Munk, *Guide* III, S. 70 n. 2), die Wichtigkeit noch mehr eingeschränkt erscheint.

[30] *Ibid.*: ואלו בחן האדם המציאות וציוויו וידע מעוט חלקו ממנו; dann: שכל בני האדם הנמצאים... oder: הוא דבר שאין לו שעור כלל בערך אל המציאות כלו הנמשך אשר מן האדם. בערך אל המציאות העליון... איך יהיה ערך... בינו ובינם (sc. המציאות) הקטן שבו.

[31] *Emunoth* IV wird mit der Frage eingeleitet: מי הוא המכוון בכל הברואים und gleich beantwortet: המכוון הוא האדם. Dies wird durch die konzentrische Anlage der Welt begründet, wie es schon aus der Analogie mit der Frucht ersichtlich ist.

wand, daß doch der Mensch physisch relativ so gering ist, weiß Saadja zu entkräften mit dem Hinweis auf die Bedeutung seines Geistes.[32] Dieser Gedankengang ist auch ganz der des Mischnah-Komentars; auch hier folgt Anthropozentrismus aus oder zumindest im engen Zusammenhange mit der Bedeutung der menschlichen Leistungsfähigkeit im Sittlich-Geistigen. Im Moreh wird dies auseinandergerissen. An der überragenden Bedeutung des Menschen, in seiner Leistung, wird weiter festgehalten und auch in ihrer kosmischen Relevanz[33] — hingegen wird der Anthropozentrismus, der aus dieser Bedeutung zu folgen schien, durchaus abgelehnt.[34] Und die Ablehnung geschieht erstens, wie gesagt, aus quantitativen Gründen, zweitens aber — und dies bedeutet eine Polemik gegen Saadja und auch gegen den eigenen früheren Standpunkt —, da man die

[32] *Ibid.*: שאף על פי שגופו קטן נפשו רחבה מהשמים והארץ usw.

[33] Vgl. oben Anm. 29 über *Moreh* III 12. Hierher gehören auch I 54 g. E. und III 54 g. E. (über den Charakter der menschlichen Leistung in Beziehung zu Gott), und II 30, worauf wir noch später zurückkommen werden.

[34] In *Moreh* III 13 wird die relative Bedeutung des Menschen unter den anderen irdischen Geschöpfen hypothetisch zugegeben: ומבואר הוא שהשלם שאפשר עד אם יאמר כי כל המציאות מתחת גלגל מציאותו מזה החומר הוא האדם und als Fortsetzung: הזרח הם בעבורו, יהיה אמת מזה הצד, ר"ל להיות תנועות המשתנה מפני ההויה להגיע השלם שאפשר להיות. Diese Bezeichnung des Menschen als etwaiges Entwicklungsziel dient bloß der hier beabsichtigten Hauptsache: seiner Ablehnung als Zweck. Aber auch das wird dann weiter eingeschränkt: ויתדע שהאדם הוא יותר שלם ונכבד מכל מה שיהיה מזה החומר לא זולת זה. Heinemann, *Die Lehre von der Zweckbestimmung des Menschen*, Breslau 1926, sieht den Sachverhalt nicht richtig, wenn er, S. 62 ff., als die maßgebende Ansicht Maimonides' die im Mischnah-Kommentar dargelegte (s. oben Anm. 28) ausführlich zitiert, die doch im *Moreh* durchaus zurückgewiesen wird. Wohl empfindet Heinemann (*ibid.*, S. 72), daß im *Moreh* III 13 sich „ein gewisser Wechsel" zu vollziehen „scheint", doch versucht er dies mit dem Standpunkt im M.-Kommentar in der Weise in Einklang zu bringen, daß er im *Moreh* den Schwerpunkt nicht in der Ablehnung des Menschen als Zweck sehen will (darin bestärkt ihn auch die oben angeführte Stelle), sondern in der Ablehnung eines möglichen Sinnes der Welt überhaupt. Er kann aber dann einen Widerspruch nicht vermeiden, wenn er, in einem anderen Zusammenhang, S. 77 erklärt: „Der Nachdruck liegt an der Stelle *Moreh* III 13 unzweifelhaft auf der Abwehr der naiven anthropozentrischen Beschränktheit — nicht auf der Bestreitung eines Weltzweckes überhaupt." — In Wirklichkeit hat Maimonides an dieser Stelle beides — sowohl die anthropozentrische Anschauung als auch den analog gearteten Zweck der Welt — in gleichem Maße abgelehnt, im vollsten Gegensatz zum Mischnah-Kommentar.

Leistung des Menschen, seine sittliche Vollkommenheit, nicht als Ziel der Schöpfung ansehen kann, denn Gott bedarf nicht dieser Verehrung;[35] die „Größe des Geistes" vermag also nicht die „Kleinheit des Körpers" aufzuwiegen.

Dieses aber, die Ablehnung des Anthropozentrismus, war nicht mehr Aufgabe des Kap. III 13. Hier war ein Schritt weiter getan. Die Ablehnung des Menschen als Weltzweck sollte ausgedehnt werden auf die Ablehnung eines Weltzwecks überhaupt, soweit dieser dem Mensch-Zweck in seiner inneren Struktur analog ist.

Aus diesem Grunde läßt Maimonides seine frühere Argumentation für einen Moment fallen. Wenn der Anthropozentrismus nur wegen der relativen Bedeutungslosigkeit des Menschen gegenüber den Sphären abzulehnen wäre, so bestünde noch immer die Möglichkeit, die höchsten unter den Geschöpfen, also die Sphären z. B., als solchen Weltzweck zu betrachten.[36] Maimonides will aber die Zweckmäßigkeit dieser Art überhaupt widerlegen. Darum nimmt er wieder das Saadjahsche Argument, die überragende Bedeutung des Menschen könnte davon herrühren, daß er „Gott diene", also sittlich vollkommen ist, wieder auf. Dann aber wären alle anderen Dinge der Welt zwecklos, da doch prinzipiell die Existenz des Menschen denkbar ist ohne die Existenz anderer Kreaturen.[37] Will man daher die Zweckmäßigkeit dieser Kreaturen aufrechterhalten, so muß eben der Mensch als Zweck wieder fallen gelassen werden. Die beiden Ansichten — Zweckmäßigkeit der Welt überhaupt und Mensch als Zweck — die zu Beginn miteinander verbunden waren, sie treten nun auseinander und

[35] *Moreh* III 13: וכן יחשבו שתכלית המציאות כלו מציאות מין האדם לבדו לעבוד את השם, dann: ואסילו אם היה הכל מפני האדם ותכלית יתכאר מה שבו מן הטעות... וזה הדעת... האדם לעבוד השם... השאלה קשת והיא מה התכלית בהיותו עובד והוא יתע' לא יוסיף שלמות אם יעבדוהו.

[36] Auch Saadja berührt die Frage des Verhältnisses zu den Sphären, doch ist ihm der Mensch, wegen seines Gottesdienstes, immer höher. So *Emunoth* IV Anf., wo auch die גלגלים in den Dienst des Menschen gestellt werden. Ferner *Emunoth* I g. E., wo vom Zweck der Weltschöpfung gesprochen wird: ומשלישית רצה בזה תועלת הברואים, בטה שמנהיגם בו ויעבדוהו. Vgl. auch *Emunoth* II g. E.

[37] *Moreh* III 13: ואם יאמר אומר שאפשר ושהשם יכול להמציא אדם מבלתי שמים ע"ד: מ ש ל, יש לשאול א"כ מה תועלתו באלה הדברים כלם אחר שאינם התכלית. (Das תועלתו korrigiert nach Munk.)

heben sich gegenseitig auf. Nehmen wir einen Zweck der Welt und in der Form eines bestimmten Geschöpfes an, so werden eben dadurch alle anderen Geschöpfe zwecklos und wir haben eben die Zweckmäßigkeit als solche zerstört. Dies aber gilt ebenso für jedes andere Geschaffene in der Welt. Jedes Ding, und sei es die höchste Sphäre, die als Zweck angesehen werden möchte, würde, da noch andere Dinge existieren, eben als Argument gegen die Zweckmäßigkeit dienen. Mit einem Worte: Der Mensch dient hier als Beispiel, um jede verdinglichte Teleologie zu widerlegen. Welches Argument nun wieder auf den Menschen zurückwirkt, um ihn als Zweck abzulehnen. Denn kein Ding der Welt kann ihr Zweck sein.

Das ist das Neue in III 13, und dazu reichte die frühere Argumentation gegen den Anthropozentrismus — von der Quantität her — nicht aus; denn jene hätte nur den Menschen als Zweck abgewiesen — so aber ist jede Dinglichkeit des Weltzweckes überhaupt ad absurdum geführt. In der Welt der Dinge gibt es nur Selbstzwecke; alles ist auf sich bezogen[38] und selbst auch dort, wo es den Anschein hat, daß das eine des anderen wegen existiert.[39] Denn ebenso wie es keinen einzigen Ding-Zweck für die Welt gibt — so gibt es auch kein System der Zwecke unter den Dingen, und wo es diesen Anschein hat, daß das eine Ding für das andere, dessen Zweck, ist, da ist es in Wirklichkeit nur die eigene Natur, die aber irrtümlicherweise auf ein anderes Ding bezogen wird.[40] Wohl gibt es

[38] *Ibid.:* אבל יהיו ג״כ שאר הנמצאות כלם מכוונות לעצמן, לא מפני דבר אחר; ebenso g. E. d. Kap., vgl. oben Anm. 12.

[39] *Ibid.:* ואפילו לפי דעתנו... שאנחנו נאמר כל חלקי העולם... מהם מכוונים לעצמן ומהם מפני דבר אחר — האחר ההוא מכוון לעצמו. Den Widerspruch, der sich zu der unmittelbar vorhergegangenen Behauptung der unbedingten Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge zu ergeben scheint, will Maimonides offenbar so gelöst wissen, daß er die beiden zueinander gehörigen Dinge in diesem Sinne als eine Einheit ansieht, und der Zweck des אחר bedeutet dann eo ipso Selbstzweck für das ihm untergeordnete Ding. Das wird wohl auch beabsichtigt sein in der Formulierung, die gleich darauf folgt: וכל נמצא מהם אטנם כיון בו עצם (לאת) הנמצא ההוא.

[40] Dies wird an zwei Beispielen veranschaulicht: an den Sternen, bei denen es heißt להאיר על הארץ ולמשול וכי, und bei den Fischen des Meeres, bei denen es heißt ורדו בדגת הים, also Geschöpfe, die über dem Menschen sind, und solche, die unter ihm stehen. Doch wird bei beiden der Grund in der Natur der Sache

— im kausalen Sinne — ein Früher und Später in der Natur; manches ist Voraussetzung fürs andere.[41] Aber

(אינו רק להניד טבעם) oder des Menschen in seiner Beziehung zu ihnen — רק להניד טבעו אשר הטביעו השם יתּ עליו — und nicht in einer besonderen Zweckbestimmung gesucht. Allerdings wird bei den Pflanzen zugegeben, daß sie für die Lebewesen geschaffen sind — demnach ist der früher behauptete Selbstzweck alles Geschaffenen wieder eingeschränkt.

[41] Es handelt sich hier, III 13, um eine speziellere Form der Abhängigkeit der Dinge voneinander, des מצני דבר אחר existierenden Dinges. Hier ist das vorangehende notwendiges Antezedens für die Möglichkeit der Existenz des Darauffolgenden. Als Beispiele werden angeführt Sinnlichkeit und Verstand — כהקדים ההרגשה לשכל — und dann auch die Materie: לכל בעל חטר... כחטר. In beiden Fällen handelt es sich um נמצאות אי אפשר מציאותם אלא אחר מציאות דבר אחר. Hier wird der Vers (Jes. XLIII 7) herangezogen: כל הנקרא בשמי ולכבודי בריאתיו, יצרתיו אף עשיתיו: wobei in בריאתיו das Gesamte dieser Schöpfung, bezogen auf den göttlichen Willen, ausgedrückt wird; יצרתיו bezieht sich auf das Antezedens und עשיתיו auf das eigentlich beabsichtigte Ding. Diese Auslegung wird in ihrem ganzen Sinn verstanden, wenn man die an anderen Stellen streng durchgeführte terminologische Auseinanderhaltung der Verba für Schöpfung heranzieht. *Moreh* II 30 g. E. wird den Verben ברא und עשה (neben קנה und אל) das Wort יצר entgegengestellt; die ersteren vier besagen das Schaffen von Substantiellem, während יצר nur Akzidentielles oder künstliche Form (תאר) ausdrückt. An einer anderen Stelle, III 10, wird zur Erklärung des Verses יוצר אור ובורא חושך עושה שלום ובורא רע die Gruppierung anders durchgeführt. Hier wiederum haben עשה und יצר ein Gemeinsames, und von ihnen verschieden ist ברא; die ersteren beziehen sich auf die Setzung des Geschaffenen, während ברא auf die Hervorbringung der Steresis anwendbar ist oder auf die Hervorbringung aus dem Nichtsein. Läßt man nun diese beiden Stellen sich kreuzen, so ergibt sich für unseren Fall, daß im בריאתיו das allgemeine Erschaffen aus dem Nichts, und zwar beider zusammengehöriger Dinge, ausgedrückt wird. In יצרתיו אף עשיתיו sind die beiden Schattierungen der bereits gesetzten Gegenstände angedeutet: das Antezedens hat nur יצר, da es nicht Endzweck, sondern vorbereitenden Charakters, also, offenbar, akzidentiell ist; nur das eigentlich Beabsichtigte hat עשה. Aus dieser terminologischen Erwägung ergibt sich klar, daß die Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge eben so zu verstehen ist, daß im Falle einer Zusammengehörigkeit das Antezedens nicht etwa zwecklos ist, sondern in dem Zweck des Darauffolgenden aufgeht. Und dies ist nicht allein der Fall, wo das Antezedens nur zu verarbeitendes Material ist; es kann dies auch bei sonst selbständig erscheinenden Dingen eintreten. Beide Nuancen werden klar auseinandergehalten: אחר זה עשיתי בדבר ההוא הקודם או אחריו (סי׳ דלך אלשי אלמתקדם או בעדה) מה שהיה כונתי להכציאו. Munk, III, S. 93: dans cette chose antérieure, ou après elle. Hingegen vernachlässigt die Übersetzung Scheyers (S. 68: „und dann habe ich auch das andere, von mir Bezweckte gemacht") diese Unterscheidung vollkommen. (Weiß berücksichtigt sie wohl, aber falsch.) Sie ist aber wesentlich, denn da wird eben auch das zeitlich vorangehende und selbständige Ding dem unentbehrlichen Antezedens, d. h. etwa dem Instrument oder Material, gleichgesetzt. Vgl. oben Anm. 39.

das ist mit einer finalen Verbundenheit nicht zu verwechseln.

Für diese Beweisführung aber war die Hypothese der Weltschöpfung unerläßlich. Nach der Annahme der Weltewigkeit, wonach alles Geschaffene notwendig da ist, wäre nur jene frühere Argumentation von der quantitativen Minderwertigkeit des Menschen zulässig, woraus höchstens das eine Objekt, der Mensch, als Zweck abgelehnt wäre; woraus aber nicht die aus dieser Annahme folgende Absurdität des dinglichen Zweckes überhaupt erwiesen wäre. Nur wenn wir eine bewußte planmäßige Schöpfung annehmen, kann man bei jedem dinglichen Zweck fragen, wozu denn dann die anderen Dinge geschaffen worden seien und somit jene reziproke Aufhebung von Zweck und Ding-Zweck durchführen. Dies hat Maimonides in III 13 noch nicht so klar herausgearbeitet. Hier wird das mit der Schöpfungstheorie zusammenhängende neue Argument zum ersten Male geltend gemacht, ohne seinen besonderen Vorzug deutlich hervorzuheben. Diese Hervorhebung geschieht erst in der Fortsetzung. Nachdem Maimonides das Quantitätsargument wiederholt variiert hatte, nimmt er es dann mit großer Ausführlichkeit wieder auf,[42] um die Notwendigkeit seines neuen Arguments erst zwingender vor Augen zu führen.

Während er bisher die Ablehnung der Teleologie für beide Ansichten — für die „philosophische" sowohl der Weltewigkeit als auch für unsere der Weltkreation — betont hatte, kommt er jetzt auf eine Divergenz in der Argumentation der beiden Ansichten zu sprechen. Wiederum wird ausführlich die dimensionale Überlegenheit der Sphären über den Menschen dargestellt — worauf hauptsächlich das Quantitätsargument beruht.[43] Nun aber ergibt sich für die Philo-

[42] *Moreh* III 14.

[43] *Ibid.*, gleich der Anfang: מטה שצריך ג"כ שיתבונן בו האדם עד שידע מעלת נפשו ולא ישיגה הוא מה שהתבאר משער הגלגלים והכוכבים ושער דרהקים אשר בינינו ובינם. Dann werden die großen astronomischen Entfernungen detailliert aufgezählt, um zum Schluß zu gelangen: והשתכל אלו הכמצאות הגשמיות מה עצום שעורם ומה רב מספרם ... מה ערך האדם לכל אלו הנבראות. Denselben Gedankengang finden wir II 11, auch in bezug auf den Zweck.

sophen[44] eine neue Schwierigkeit. Dieses Argument wäre nur dann stichhältig, wenn wir das menschliche Individuum als Zweck der Welt betrachten würden; dann wäre seine relative Geringfügigkeit Grund genug, dies abzulehnen. Da wir aber das Genus des Menschen, dessen Individuen ins Unendliche gehen, als solchen Zweck bezeichnen, da ließe sich schon der große Apparat der Sphären für ihn als Zweck glaubhaft machen — nach dem Beispiel des Meisters, der große Maschinen zur Erzeugung unendlich vieler Nadeln herstellt.[45] Der Philosoph nun muß sich zu einem anderen Argument flüchten — zum qualitativen, daß nämlich die Sphären nicht bloß größer, sondern auch in ihrem Wesen höher sind als der Mensch.[46] Also wiederum ein Graduntersched — der gegenüber dem Quantitätsunterschied, infolge seiner Relativität, als Argument nicht wesentlich besser ist. „Mit einem Worte — schließt Maimonides — bei dieser Frage ist eine Hilfe im Sinne unseres Glaubens an die Schöpfung der Welt gegeben, und dies ist die Hauptsache, die ich

[44] Daß die Schwierigkeit sich nur vom philosophischen Standpunkte aus ergibt, wird wiederholt hervorgehoben: ויש לשאול לפי דעת הפילוסופים, dann היה זה שקר לפי העיון הפילוסופי und והפילוסוף מתרץ.

[45] Dieses Gleichnis bewegt sich noch ganz im Quantitativen, nur wird die unendliche Anzahl des Erzeugten — etwa das Fortschreiten in der Zeit — der überwiegenden Masse im Raume entgegengesetzt. Den גלגלים, die הגרמים העצומים sind, werden die אישי מינים entgegengestellt (sc. של הפילוסופים) אשר לפי דעתם האישיים; ebenso den nadelerzeugenden כלים שמשקלם ככר ברזל das Erzeugen von מחט אחר מחט, das dann כבירים רבים מהמחטים ausmacht. Daß Maimonides diese Beweisführung nicht akzeptiert, ist nicht allein aus dem לפי דעתם ersichtlich, sondern aus noch später zu erörternden tieferen Gründen, die auch hier angedeutet sind. Aber auch schon in III 12 (vgl. oben Anm. 30), wo, gemessen am המציאות העליון oder המציאות הנמשך, auch alle Menschen — כל בני האדם הנמצאים — verschwindend wenig bedeuten. Die Unendlichkeit der Zahl der Individuen wäre also für Maimonides nicht entscheidend.

[46] *Ibid.*: אלו לא היה ההלוק... אלא בגדלות ובקטנות היה אפשר שיאמר זה, אמנם מאשר ההפרש ביניהם מעלת העצם הוא רחוק מאד. Dieser Graduntersched, der hier als ein dem Philosophen eigentümliches Argument angeführt wird, wurde oben, als noch die Argumentation allgemein gehalten war, ebenso erwähnt: זרו עין הקש הנשבים כל שכן בשתיעין מציאות השכלים הנפרדים. Früher sollte es eben nur eine Steigerung des Quantitätsarguments darstellen — hier aber soll es als ein neues ausschlaggebendes Moment hinzukommen.

in diesem Kapitel beabsichtigt habe."[47] Hier also gehen die Wege auseinander. Die „Philosophen" können nicht

[47] Die Stelle, III 14, lautet: סוף דבר שואת השאלה יעוד בה בטה שנאטינהו טהדוש העולם — וכאלנטלה אן הדא אלשך יסתעאן בה סי מא נעתקדה טן החדוש אלעאלם — ורוב מה שכותתי בזה דברק היה זה הענין. Diese unklare Stelle hat verschiedene Deutungen erfahren. Narboni, *Kommentar*, S. 52b, sieht in diesem Schlußsatz nur eine ergänzende Fortsetzung der Argumentation der Philosophen; er ist aber etwas unsicher dabei: זהו המובן אצלי בזה הטקום ולא נראה לי לפרשו על חלוף זה כסי תכלית הדושו. Nach Munk (*Guide* III, S. 102) sei dies so zu verstehen, daß der gegen die Philosophen vorgebrachte Einwand die Theorie der Welterschaffung unterstützt (cette objection peut offrir un secours à notre croyance de la nouveauté de monde). Munk erklärt dies (n. 2) so, daß die Schwierigkeit, die jenen Einwand ausmacht, behoben wird durch die Annahme einer Schöpfung aus freiem göttlichen Willen „dont les mystères nous sont inaccessible", ebenso wie die Schwierigkeiten in II 19 und 22 gelöst wurden. Diese Auffassung Munks wäre aber in unserem Zusammenhang zunächst nur dann gerechtfertigt, wenn die Philosophen keine Erklärung hätten finden können und der Einwand bestehen bliebe. Demnach könnte man sich auf den Standpunkt des Einwandes stellen und sagen, die Sphären seien doch für den Menschen da und das Unbegreifliche daran sei auf den unergründlichen Willen zurückzuführen und dies sei ein neuer Beleg für die Notwendigkeit der Kreation. Dies ist aber nicht der Fall: weder bleibt der Philosoph die Antwort schuldig noch identifiziert sich — sachlich — Maimonides mit dem Einwand; denn im Ergebnis ist ja sein eigener Standpunkt derselbe wie der des Philosophen. — Ganz entgegengesetzt ist die Auffassung von Ephodi und Schem Tob. Ephodi: ר"ל זאת השאלה אשר עשינו על הראיה שהביאו הפילוסופים, הנה השאלה בנויה על אטונת החדוש, שאו טן הקל שנאטר שהגלגלים בעבור טין האדם. Dies noch teilweise im Sinne Munks. Dann aber, als Erklärung von ורוב מה שכותתי, heißt es: שאפילו עם אטונת החדוש עדין אין ראוי שיהיו הגלגלים בעבור טין האדם. Demnach beruht der Einwand wohl auf der Kreationstheorie, wird durch sie ermöglicht, d. h. nach der אטונת הדדיש könnten wir uns hypothetisch auf den anthropozentrischen Standpunkt stellen. Dieser Einwand jedoch, und somit der Anthropozentrismus, wird nur durch die Antwort des Philosophen behoben, der wir uns anschließen und zum Ergebnis gelangen, daß trotz der אטונת החדוש doch die Anschauung des Philosophen recht behält. Das wäre nun auf jeden Fall eine Schwächung der Kreationstheorie. Dies aber kann sicher nicht der Gedankengang des Autors gewesen sein, daß er dreimal die Schwierigkeiten, die sich für den Philosophen ergeben, unterstreicht, um dann als „Hauptabsicht" des Kapitels das Ergebnis zu bezeichnen, daß wir mit unserer Kreationstheorie von seinen Lösungen abhängig sind. — Stellen wir die drei Auffassungen übersichtlich zusammen, so sehen wir: 1. Nach Narboni erhält die Lösung (der Philosophen) eine Unterstützung durch den חדוש (was aber nicht zu begründen ist). 2. Nach Munk erhält der חדוש eine Unterstützung durch den Einwand, indem die Lösung der Philosophen abgelehnt wird — und dies offenbar auch sachlich, denn nur dann braucht man das Argument des Willens (wobei aber Maimonides sich auf den Standpunkt des Einwandes stellen und die von den Philosophen gegebene

weiter kommen, als bis zu einem Gradunterschied, der die Zweckmäßigkeit als solche in ihrem Prinzip nicht erfaßt. Dazu ist nötig die Kreationstheorie und deren Argumentation. Die Kreationstheorie also, und die mit ihr verbundene Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung, die, auf den ersten Blick doch die Zweckmäßigkeit der Schöpfung eher bestärkt als die Ewigkeitstheorie, sie selbst liefert am Ende einen prinzipielleren Beweis gegen die Zweckmäßigkeit, soweit sie dinglich aufgefaßt wird.

In drei Variationen also sehen wir den Anthropozentrismus widerlegt, verschieden in der Betonung des Individuellen und Generellen im Menschen — immer weiter zum Prinzipiellen vordringend. In der Ablehnung des anthropozentrisch orientierten Pessimismus, III 12, da wird noch das reine Quantitätsargument angewandt unter besonderer Betonung des Individuellen im Gegensatze zum Geschlecht; hier reicht es auch vollkommen aus. In der Ablehnung des Menschen

Lösung widerlegen müßte). 3. Nach Ephodi wird der Einwand vom חדוש unterstützt, aber nur hypothetisch, denn nach der philosophischen Lösung, die angenommen wird, wird sowohl der Einwand unhaltbar als auch der חדוש zu einer Konzession gezwungen. Gegenüber diesen Auffassungen scheint doch unsere die einleuchtendste zu sein, daß hier wohl חדוש im Gegensatz zur Lösung der Philosophen angeführt wird, nicht aber da sich der חדוש mit dem Einwand identifiziert, sondern da er ihn von sich aus widerlegt, aber im Sinne des Philosophen. Sachlich also mit den Philosophen übereinstimmend, polemisiert Maimonides nur gegen deren Argumentation. Der חדוש wird hier angeführt nicht wegen des „unergründlichen Willens", um etwa auch eine den Philosophen entgegengesetzte anthropozentrische Theorie möglich zu machen — sondern wegen des aus dem חדוש und nur aus ihm folgenden Argumentes gegen den Anthropozentrismus. Es ist also nur ein neuer, verstärkter Hinweis auf die Argumentation in III 13. Also nicht ist hier eine Übereinstimmung mit der Argumentation der Philosophen (Narboni, Ephodi), noch verlangt der חדוש auch sachlich auf dem Standpunkt des Einwandes zu beharren (Munk und hypothetisch auch Ephodi) — sondern der חדוש bringt ein neues Argument gegen den Einwand. Gegen die Schwierigkeit des Einwandes wird geholfen durch den חדוש — und dadurch wird natürlich auch der חדוש gestärkt. Die Argumentation der Philosophen muß dann nicht widerlegt werden, da ja Maimonides mit ihrem Ergebnis einverstanden ist und sie nur als schwächer (und also überflüssig) bezeichnet, verglichen mit dem Argument aus חדוש. Daß dies die Hauptabsicht eines besonderen Kapitels bilden kann, ist begreiflich. Allerdings können wir das בה in unserer Stelle nicht instrumental auffassen, und das סי מא נעתקדה muß, wie vielleicht nicht ganz üblich, als „im Sinne unseres Glaubens" verstanden werden.

als Weltzweck und dadurch des dinglichen Weltzweckes überhaupt, III 13, da wird schon das neue Argument — vom Widerstreit des Dinges als Zweck mit der dinglichen Zweckmäßigkeit — eingeführt; daneben aber wird noch das frühere Argument in einer negativen Form zu einem Schluß a minori ad maius umgestaltet:[48] Selbst die Sphären, da sie materiegebunden sind, sind nicht vollkommen vor Gott, geschweige denn der tiefer stehende Mensch — wobei Mensch als Gattung[49] betont wird. Hier wären noch beide Anschauungen, sowohl die von der Ewigkeit als auch die von der Erschaffung der Welt, gleich in dieser Beweisführung. Erst dann, III 14, wird das Quantitätsargument in seiner ersten positiven Fassung wieder aufgenommen — wird als nur den Philosophen eigen bezeichnet und auch in seiner letzten Konsequenz — wenn man auch die Gattung nimmt — nur als Gradunterschied dargestellt, der uns nicht genügen kann, da wir, vom Grundsatze der Schöpfung ausgehend, eben die Zweckmäßigkeit als solche widerlegen.

Diese Variationen desselben Arguments wären nichtssagende überflüssige Wiederholungen — führten sie nicht immer weiter, immer zwingender zur Verneinung der Zweckmäßigkeit im Bereiche des Dinglichen. Von der Bestimmung eines Geschöpfes — sei es des Menschen oder auch eines anderen — in der Welt könne nicht auch darauf geschlossen werden, daß dieses Geschöpf für die Welt Bestimmung wird. Im Bereiche des mechanischen, dinglichen Geschehens da gibt es keinen anderen Zweck als den der Eigenexistenz; alles andere ist Täuschung oder Selbstüberhebung.

Aber die Welt ist nicht bloß ein Mechanismus, der die Teleologie grundsätzlich ausschließt, sie ist gleichzeitig auch noch etwas anderes; sie bildet auch eine höhere Einheit, einen Organismus. Mit großem Nachdruck schärft Maimonides ein, daß man die Welt als ein einziges großes Individuum,

[48] Dies durch Deutung des Verses: הן בעבדיו לא יאמין אף שוכני בתי חמר oder הן בקדושיו לא יאמין ... אף כי נתעב ונאלח איש ..., wobei עבדיו und קדושיו als Sphären zu verstehen sind.

[49] Zur letzteren Gegenüberstellung — הן בקדושיו וכי — wird hinzugefügt: ואמרו איש כאמרו אדם, כי פעמים יקרא הטין האנושי איש, טכה איש ומת.

vergleichbar dem individuellen Lebewesen, ansehen muß.[50] Zunächst wird der Vergleich durchgeführt im äußeren Aufbau des kosmischen, auch die Sphären umfassenden Globus — worauf wir hier nicht näher einzugehen brauchen. Ohne daß wir zunächst auch auf die Herkunft dieses Gleichnisses eingehen, wollen wir hier betrachten, welche Bedeutung dies für Maimonides hatte. Und die bedeutenden Konsequenzen sind in zwei Punkten zu finden.

Erstens in der Beziehung der Welt zu Gott. Diese Vorstellung — nämlich der Welt als Organismus — hält Maimonides für unerläßlich, um die Einheit Gottes zu erkennen, um es zu erklären, daß der Eine das Eine der Welt erschaffen hat.[51] Bedenkt man, wie sehr Maimonides immer wieder davor warnte, die Attribute Gottes zu materialisieren, wie er auch bei der Einheit hervorhob, daß sie nichts gemein

[50] *Moreh* I 72 Anf.: דע כי זה הנמצא בכללו הוא איש אחד לא זולת זה, ר״ל כי כדור הגלגל הקיצון בכל מה שבו הוא איש אחד בלא ספק und mit diesem Nachdruck wiederholt im selben Kapitel. Die Anschauung Cassirers, *Erkenntnisproblem* I², S. 207, daß die Betrachtung der Welt als Organismus, bzw. die philosophischen Konsequenzen dieser Betrachtung erst ein Produkt der neueren oder genauer „der deutschen Naturphilosophie des 16. Jahrhunderts" ist, wird durch die bei Maimonides erfolgte Behandlung dieser Grundansicht wesentlich korrigiert.

[51] *Ibid.*: כי זה המין מן הציור הכרחי באד, כלומר (או n. Munk) כוונתי באד בבוסת על היות השם אחד... ובזה הציור יתבאר ג״כ שהאחד אמנם ברא אחד. Die Einheit, die hier gemeint ist, kann wohl nicht im aristotelischen Sinne (*Phys.* VIII 6; *Metaph.* XII 8: ἓν ἄρα ... τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα ... ἓν μόνον· εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος) verstanden werden. Auf diese aristotelische Anschauung, allerdings wie er sie durch Ibn-Sina modifiziert kannte (vgl. Munk, *Melanges*, S. 360), und auf die sich daraus ergebenden Schwierigkeiten für die Vielheit in der Welt geht Maimonides ausfürlich in II 22 ein. Aber gerade der Umstand, daß er dort den göttlichen Willen als Lösung für die Schwierigkeiten der Vielheit anführt, zeigt, daß er selbst sich nicht auf eine eigene „Einheits"-Theorie in diesem Sinne berufen kann, was ja der Fall wäre, wenn die Stelle hier, I 72, auch so zu verstehen wäre. Man kann daher Munk, *Guide* I, S. 363 n. 3, nicht zustimmen, daß die Stelle hier eine Anspielung auf II 22 enthielte. Denn nicht bloß die Einheit der Welt, sondern auch die Einheit Gottes muß im II 22 anders als die von Maimonides wirklich gelehrte aufgefaßt werden. Wodurch allein sich der auffallende Widerspruch im Vergleich mit dem Feuer zwischen II 22 und I 53 — wie ihn Schem Tob und Munk, *Guide* II, S. 173 n. 1, empfinden — sich erklären läßt. Es ist eben nur der Standpunkt Aristoteles'-Ibn Sinas, in bezug auf Gott und Welt, den Maimonides in II 22 behandelt, um von ihm aus zu seiner Willenslehre zu gelangen.

haben kann mit unserer, uns faßbaren Einheit[52] — so muß diese Stelle, wo die sichtbare eine Welt mit der Einheit Gottes in einem Atem genannt wird, befremdend anmuten. Da aber an der absoluten Immaterialität der Einheit Gottes sicher nicht zu rütteln ist, so müssen wir eben die hier gelehrte Einheit der Welt als Organismus der göttlichen näherbringen und auch diese immateriell und r e i n a l s I d e e verstehen. Also nicht allein wegen der dem organischen Individuum vergleichbaren inneren Zusammenhänge und Wechselwirkungen wird dieses Bild als so wesentlich eingeschärft, sondern vielmehr wegen der ü b e r jenen Teilzusammenhängen das Ganze ausmachenden idealen Einheit. Der Einheit des Schöpfers steht das Geschaffene als Einheit zur Seite — das eine das andere beweisend und beide ein drittes Existierendes ausschließend, wie es schon Maimonides vorwegnehmend früher behauptete.[53] Die Einheit der Welt als lebendiger Makrorganismus, obwohl er ja auch viel „Totes" in sich einschließt,[54] die Einheit als Idee, der Gottes korrespondierend, ist die eine Folgerung dieser Vorstellung.

Die zweite Folgerung betrifft die Ordnung innerhalb der Welt. Die organische Einheit der Welt, die als beseelt zu denken ist, bedingt auch eine führende Kraft in ihr, eine Vernunftbegabtheit, die, verschieden von der sonstigen in der Welt erscheinenden Vernunft, die ihren Weg durch die Vermittlung der Sphäre nehmen[55] muß — direkt von Gott herstammen

[52] Besonders *Moreh* I 57, wo eben zwischen der Einheit des Geschaffenen und Gottes strenge unterschieden wird, da die Einheit beim Geschaffenen immer akzidentiell ist — כי האחדות והרבוי מקרים קרו לנמצא באשר הוא רב או אחד, — während bei Gott אין האחדות ענין נוסף על עצמו אבל הוא אחד לא באחדות und weiter die Fortsetzung des Einheits-Attributes als eines negativen.

[53] *Moreh* I 71: וכבר הודעתיך שאין זולת השם יתע׳ וזה הנמצא ואין ראיה עליו יתעלה כי אלו העניינים נקשרים קצתם בקצתם והוא שאין אלא מזה הנמצא מכללו ומסדריו. Ähnlich I 34: בנמציאה זולתי השי״ת ומעשיו כלם והם כל מה שכללה אותו המציאה בלעדיו ואין דרך להשיגו אלא מפעשיו.

[54] *Moreh* I 72: כן זה הנמציאות כלו הוא איש אחד חי... ואע״פ שבו גופים רבים נחים ומתים. Als Gegenstück im Organismus des Lebewesens werden Knochen und Knorpel als נחים angeführt, die allerdings nicht tot, sondern empfindungslos sind; das מתים also im Makrorganismus ist wohl ebenso zu verstehen, daß sich die betreffenden Teile der Zugehörigkeit zum Ganzen unbewußt sind.

[55] Vgl. *Moreh* II 10 und 12.

mag und somit eine Sonderstellung einnimmt.[56] Von dieser der Welt innewohnenden Vernunft gehen jene Schöpfungen aus, die als zweckbestimmt zu bezeichnen sind, die nach festen Regeln entstehen und existieren, im Gegensatze zu den zufällig und absichts- und zwecklos entstehenden Lebewesen.[57] Diese Vernunft, die das zweckbestimmte Dasein erzeugt, scheint für Maimonides allein aus dem organischen Charakter der Welt hervorzugehen. Zwar werden die Vergleiche abwechselnd mit einem lebendigen Organismus überhaupt — auch dem nichtmenschlichen — und dann wieder mit dem ausgesprochen menschlichen durchgeführt, und zwar so, daß, wo von der vernünftigen Planmäßigkeit gesprochen wird, eben der Mensch zum Vergleich herangezogen wird.[58] Doch wird gerade im Zusammenhange mit der Einheit Gottes das Individuum im allgemeinen angeführt,[59] und auch sonst scheint man berechtigt zu sein, wegen der Vernünftigkeit der Weltordnung nicht die Bezeichnung Makrorganismus in die eines Makranthropos etwa vertauschen zu müssen. Der Unterschied betrifft nicht allein die Nomenklatur und ist daher nicht

[56] Entsprechend dem ἡγεμονικόν im Lebewesen wird I 72 in der Welt eine Kraft genannt, die verbindend und konservierend wirkt und von deren Stellung gesagt wird: זה הכח יש בו עיון אם הוא במצוע הגלגל אם לא (הדה אלקוה סיהא נשר הל הי בואסטה אלפלך אם לא). Die Frage also, ob diese Kraft die normale weltordnende ist oder eine besonders geartete, wird offen gelassen.

[57] Es sind dies I 72 die מינים מכוונים (אנואע מקצודה מן אלתכוין) und מינים בלתי מכוונים (אנואע גיר מקצודה) — nach Munk (*Guide* I, S. 365 und 366): des espèces dont la génération a un but déterminé und des espèces qui n'ont pas de but. Sie unterscheiden sich dadurch, daß die ersteren קיומים נמשכים על סדר, während die letzteren nur eine Folge des allgemeinen Gesetzes vom Entstehen und Vergehen sind.

[58] Am Anfang wird allgemein איש אחד gesagt, dann wird es gleich am Menschen, als Spezialfall, exemplifiziert: וכמו שראובן על דרך משל הוא איש אחד. Dann allerdings heißt es wiederholt וכמו שבנוף האדם, wo Maimonides auf die vier Kräfte zu sprechen kommen will, deren höchste der כח הדברי ist; dann bei der Vernunftordnung וכמו שבאדם oder bei den מינים מכוונים, wo es heißt וכמו שבנוף אישי האדם; dann bei Hervorhebung der Unterschiede wird rekapituliert: וידע כי הדמיון אשר דמינו העולם בכללו באיש מבני אדם, dies auch nur wegen des dritten Unterschiedes, der sich auf den כח מדבר bezieht.

[59] An dieser Stelle wird deutlich vom Lebewesen im allgemeinen gesprochen וכמו שהחי אמנם הוא חי כלו בתנועות לבו... כן זה המציאות כלו הוא איש אחד חי; dann: הנה כן צריך שתצייר כל זה הכדור איש אחד חי מתנועע בעל נפש.

irrelevant: wenn man nur den Menschen anführt, so ist es eine Analogie, ein Bild, und hat nur etwa metaphorischen Wert; sagt man aber Organismus, so ist das nicht etwas, dem die Welt bildlich gleicht, sondern etwas, das die Welt ist. Sieht man näher zu, so wird man unterscheiden, daß, wo der Mensch herangezogen wird, dies nur in der Form eines Vergleiches geschieht, „wie der Mensch" usw., dort aber, wo der Organismus generell angeführt ist, dies in Form einer Prädikation geschieht; die Welt ist ein lebendes Individuum.[60]

Dies wird noch klarer durch die Erörterung des Begriffes Mikrokosmos, die Maimonides in diesen Zusammenhang einschaltet. Er betont, daß wenn wir den Menschen Mikrokosmos nennen, wir dies nicht etwa als Umkehrung des Vergleiches der Welt mit dem Menschen nehmen dürfen; denn dieser Vergleich — oder wie wir sahen, die Aussage — läßt sich durchwegs bei jedem Lebewesen durchführen.[61] Warum aber wird nur der Mensch so bezeichnet und nicht etwa der Esel oder das Pferd? Wegen seiner ihn besonders auszeichnenden Eigenschaft der Vernunft.[62]

[60] Vgl. die Beispiele vom Menschen oben Anm. 58. Beim allgemeinen Individuum heißt es: הדא אלמוגוד בגמלתה הו שכץ ואחד, ebenso später כולך הדא אלמוגוד כלה הו שכץ ואחד. Diese Stelle übersetzt Munk (I 362): „de même tout cet univers est un seul individu"; hingegen die gleich darauffolgende Stelle אן תתצור גמלה הדה אלכרה שכצא ואחדא חיא usw. (Tibbon: שתצייר כל זה הכדור איש שהוא אחד חי) übersetzt Munk (I 363): représenter l'ensemble de cette sphère comme un seul individu, vivant, etc. Also nicht eindeutig identifiziertend, etwa mit doppeltem Akkusativ, sondern vergleichend, wie wir es beim Menschen finden. Dies entspricht nicht dem Original. Gemeint ist eben als (engl. *as*), nicht wie (engl. *like*). Darauf kommt es uns hier an.

[61] *Ibid.:* ודע כי זה שאמרנוהו כלו מדמות העולם בכללו באיש מבני אדם, לא כמבני זה נאמר באדם שהוא עולם קטן, כי זה הדמיון כלו נמשך בכל איש מאישי בעלי חיים השלם באבריו (Munk, I 369: d'un organisme complet).

[62] *Ibid.:* ואמנם נאמר באדם זה מבני הדבר שיווחד בו האדם והוא הכח המדבר... אשר זה הענין לא ימצא באחד מבעלי חיים זולתו. Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 53, bemerkt zu dieser Stelle: ודבריו מובים ונכוחים אבל אפשר להבין מלשון אריסטו כי יש לומר שהשעם שנקרא האדם עולם קטן בעבור שהאברים נוצרים ומונחים ביצירת זה העולם וקומתו ישרה. Was nun die Ursprünge dieser Vorstellungen Mensch als Mikrokosmos und Welt als Makranthropos betrifft, so kann vorderhand darauf nicht näher eingegangen werden; Mikrokosmos wird von Aristoteles, de respir. 4, schon Demokritos zugeschrieben, und der Makranthropos wird als philosophischer Vergleich bekanntlich bei Plato durchgeführt, hängt aber mit viel älteren Vorstellungen zusammen.

Also: um die Vernünftigkeit der Welt zu beweisen, müsse sie nicht gerade mit dem Menschen verglichen werden, hingegen könne nur der Mensch, wegen seiner Vernunft, mit der Welt verglichen werden. Soll hier nicht ein grober Denkfehler an dieser so pointierten Stelle vorliegen, so muß sie eben so verstanden werden, daß hier drei Wege zurückgelegt werden. 1. Die Welt ist ein Organismus wie jeder andere, auch nicht vernunftbegabte. 2. Die Welt als Organismus — wie wir bereits sahen: als Idee — ist vernüftig; was nicht bei jedem organischen Individuum zutreffen muß. 3. Der Mensch, da ein vernunftbegabter Organismus, wird zur Welt rückverglichen. Bezüglich der Vernunft also ist nicht die Welt dem Menschen ähnlich — dazu reicht ihr organischer Charakter aus —, sondern er ihr. Wenn die Welt mit dem Menschen verglichen wird, so ist es eben bloß bildliche Veranschaulichung. Zusammenfassend sehen wir nun zunächst, daß die Welt als Organismus: 1. eine absolute Einheit als Idee darstellt; 2. als organisch auch vernünftig ist; 3. als solche eine Zwecks-Rich-

Für unseren Zweck vgl. Munk, *Guide* I, S. 354 n. 1. Auch die Verbindung beider Vorstellungen zu einer Art Korrelation war gegeben, vgl. Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber*, S. 162 ff. und weitere Belege bei Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, S. 210 Anm. 188. Worauf es uns hier ankommt ist, daß Maimonides eben diese Korrelation Mikrokosmos-Makranthropos durchbricht, um an Stelle des Makranthropos den Makrorganismus zu setzen. Klarer wird uns dies durch einen Vergleich etwa mit Jehudah Halevi. Auch Halevi (Kusari IV 3) führt an: וכבר דמו הפלוסופים העולם באדם גדול והאדם בעולם קטן, dies geschieht aber nur als eingeschaltete Bemerkung im Zusammenhange mit dem Versuch einer Rechtfertigung der anthropomorphen Bezeichnungen für Gott (ואל יקשה בעיניך דמות אדם לבורא) und dem Bestreben, dies auch von philosophischer Seite zu belegen. Darum muß Halevi den Vergleich so auffassen, daß er mit dem vollkommensten der Menschen gedacht ist, der für die anderen führend ist: ועל שני הדמיונים (d. h. sowohl der prophetischen als auch der philosophischen) לא יתכן שיהיה דמותו אצל הדמיון אלא צורת הגדול שבבני אדם, שמטנו יצא התוכן והסדר לשאר בני אדם. Da eben der Vergleich in Wirklichkeit nicht für die Welt, sondern für ihren Gott gelten soll. Das genaue Gegenteil sehen wir bei Maimonides: selbst der gewöhnliche Mensch ist ihm für den Vergleich zu viel — es genügt vollkommen jeder fehlerlose Organismus. Und es ist eben kein Vergleich, sondern eine Aussage Denn nicht der bewußte Führer ist hier gemeint, sondern die durch den organischen Charakter der Welt implicite enthaltene vernünftige Plan- und Zweckmäßigkeit. Also mehr als in der Anwendung des landläufigen Vergleichspaares Mikrokosmos-Makranthropos liegt die Bedeutung unserer Stelle in der korrigierenden Umdeutung dieser Vergleiche.

tung hat in ihrem Erzeugen. So ist die Welt der idealen organischen Einheit — zum Unterschiede von der Welt als Mechanismus der vielfältigen Wirklichkeit.

Daß diese Auffassung der Welt als einheitlichen Organismus nicht allein bildlich und als Analogie zu nehmen ist, beweist die Tatsache, daß Maimonides diese Anschauung auch der Beweisführung für die Einheit Gottes zugrundelegt. Was in I 72 nur angedeutet wird, ist später, unter den Beweisen für die Einheit Gottes durchgeführt: aus der Einheit der Welt folgt die Einheit Gottes.[63]

Und in diesen Zusammenhang gehört auch die Darstellung in I 69, wo Gott als Zweck bezeichnet wird. Hier wird zunächst die Frage behandelt, welche Bezeichnung adäquater ist, Agens oder Causa. Gegenüber Agens, das wohl deutlicher den Kreator ausdrückt, zieht Maimonides Causa vor, da dieses eben den Zweck inbegreift, als causa finalis, obwohl es das kreatorische Moment nur nach einer Überlegung, also schwächer, mit zum Ausdruck bringt. Causa in ihrer vierfachen Bedeutung — enthaltend auch Agens, Form und Zweck —, die bei Gott eins sind, drückt das Gesamte der göttlichen Stellung aus. Daß diese Darstellung mit der Auffassung der Welt als Makrorganismus innerlich zusammenhängt, werden wir später, bis wir den Charakter des Organismus bei Maimonides besprechen, noch näher sehen. Hier sei nur auf folgendes hingewiesen. Bei allen vier Arten der Causa sind zu unterscheiden nahe und weitere Ursachen. So auch Form und Zweck. Gott ist also letzter Zweck, ebenso wie letzte Form.[64] In dieser Bezeichnung als Letzter liegt aber nicht bloß das Moment der Progression bis zu einem letzten, mit den vorangehenden gleichartigen Gliede, sondern das eines Bedeutungswandels. Der Ausgangspunkt sind zwar die vier physikali-

[63] *Moreh* II 1, der Abschnitt beginnend דרך אחר ביחוד, der ganz auf dem in I 72 dargelegten Gedankengang basiert. Wiederum wird von der Einheit des Geschaffenen auf die des Schöpfers geschlossen: הנה כבר התבאר לך ג"כ בזה הדרך שהיות הנמצא כלו אחד הורנו על שמצציאו אחד. Auch hier wird nur vom allgemeinen Individuum, nicht vom Makranthropos, geschlossen (כי הנמצא כלו כאיש אחד).

[64] *Moreh* I 69: יהצורה האחרונה ההיא בכל המציאות הוא הש"י ובזה הצד נאמר בו שהוא הצורה האחרונה ושהוא צורת הצורות. Ebenso beim Zweck: ואם כן הוא יתי תכלית כל דבר האחרון... בזה הצד נאמר בו שהוא תכלית התכליות.

schen Formen der Ursachen, dann werden auch Zwecke in einer Reihe aufgezählt, als wären alle vom selben Charakter,[65] in Wirklichkeit aber ist der letzte Zweck ein Sprung in eine andere Sphäre.

Dies wird uns klarer durch eine Betrachtung von III 13. Hier wird ausdrücklich zwischen einem letzten Zweck und dem Zweck im physikalischen Sinne ein Unterschied gemacht.[66] Der physikalische Zweck wird ohne weiteres zugegeben; was bestritten wird, ist nur der letzte Zweck für das gesamte Dasein. Soweit der Zweck causa finalis bedeutet — soweit ist er bloß nächster Zweck, nicht letzter.[67] Zumindest nicht letzter in unserem Sinne. Denn während wir bezüglich der ersten Zwecke mit Aristoteles zusammengehen, sie nämlich als causae finales bezeichnen, wird auf eine Divergenz zwischen unserer Auffassung und der aristotelischen in bezug auf den letzten Zweck klar hingedeutet. Auch bei ihm mag es einen letzten Zweck geben; er ist aber wesentlich nicht verschieden vom ersten. Während der erste die Vollkommenheit des Individuums, bezogen auf sein Genus, bedeutet, ist der letzte Zweck eben nichts anderes als die Vollkommenheit des Genus, wieder bezogen auf sein Nächsthöheres, auf die Kontinuität seiner Form, und ist schließlich erfüllt in der Kontinuität des Entstehens und Vergehens.[68] Auch der letzte Zweck also bleibt bei Aristoteles im Bereiche des Physischen und unterscheidet sich vom ersten nur quantitativ oder graduell — denn beim natürlichen Prozeß des Entstehens und Vergehens macht er Halt. Nach einem letzten Zweck in unserem Sinne be-

[65] *Ibid.:* וכן עוד הענין בכל תכליות, כי הדבר אשר לו תכלית יש לך לבקש לתכלית ההיא תכלית, dazu wird das Beispiel vom Stuhl angeführt, dessen Zweck das Sitzen ist, der Zweck des Sitzens ist die Erhebung des Sitzenden usw.

[66] *Moreh* III 13: ואע"פ שההכמה הטבעית תחקור על תכלית כל נמצא טבעי, אבל אינה תכלית האחרונה אשר דברנו בזה דפרק בה.

[67] Nach der Anführung der Identität der causa efficiens, formalis und finalis bei den natürlichen Dingen wird hinzugefügt: וזה כלו התכלית הראשונה.

[68] *Ibid.:* ואשר יראה לי מדברי אריסטו, שהתכלית האחרונה אצלו לאלו הטיעים הוא התמדת ההויה וההפסד; dann, nach Aufzählung der Zweckabstufung: והתכלית האחרונה לבין התמדת ואת הצורה בהמשך ההויה וההפסד. Wir sahen in I 72 (vgl. oben Anm. 57), daß auch die טיעים בלתי מכוונים, d. h. die nicht aus dem organischen Charakter der Welt hervorgehenden und daher nicht zweckbestimmten Geschöpfe ihren Ursprung haben im טבע ההויה וההפסד הכולל.

steht für ihn nicht einmal eine Frage. Diese Frage nach einem letzten Zweck, der nicht nur graduell, sondern essentiell vom ersten Zweck verschieden ist, besteht nur für uns, d. h. für die Anhänger der Kreation.[69] Allerdings wird sie hier, innerhalb des natürlich-dinglichen Daseins, negativ beantwortet.

Nun wird uns auch der Gedankengang in I 69 verständlicher. Gott wird hier als letzter Zweck, Zweck der Zwecke, genannt — als eben derjenige Zweck, der später abgelehnt wird. Und zwar wird er auch hier als causa finalis bezeichnet — dies aber in einem spezifischen Sinne. Denn nicht allein deswegen ist Causa vor Agens als Attribut vorzuziehen, weil Causa bei Gott auch alle anderen causae — also auch die causa formalis und finalis — mit inbegreift.[70] Dies, die Vereinigung aller drei causae in Eins, finden wir bei allen natürlichen Dingen und dennoch bleibt die causa finalis nur im Bereiche der ersten Zwecke. Das Spezifische ist, daß eben hier Gott zugleich causa finalis und doch Endzweck

[69] *Ibid.*; als Schluß der Zweckabstufung: ובאלו הענין מבואר כי לפי דעת הקדמות הבטל שאלת התכלית האחרונה למציאות בכללו... אמנם לפי דעתנו בחדוש העולם בכללו... יש חושבים שואת השאלה מחוייבת. Die Ausdrücke למציאות בכללו (ללונוד באסרה) und העולם בכללו (אלעאלם באס־ה) sind nicht zufällig, da es sich beim ersteren nur um ein Fortschreiten in der Reihe Individuum — Genus handelt, während beim Begriff der Kreation der Begriff Welt eine neue, mehr als bloß quantitative Bedeutung hat. Allerdings ist es fehlerhaft, von der Erschaffung der Welt ausgehend einen Zweck für מציאות zu suchen, darum heißt es auch gleich darauf (לכל הדא אלונוד) בקשת התכלית לכל זה המציאות. Über diese terminologische Frage wird noch später ausführlicher zu sprechen sein.

[70] Es möchte so den Anschein haben an der Stelle I 69: ולזה אמרו שהוא יתי עלה וסבה שיכלול אלו השלש סבות והוא שיהיה פועל העולם וצורתו ותכליתו. Diese Identität wird aber auch von allen Naturdingen behauptet in III 13, wo es sich dennoch nur um den nächsten Zweck handelt; vgl. oben Anm. 67. Sal. Maimon, *Gibeat Hamoreh* z. St., betrachtet diese Identifikation als solche für entscheidend in unserem Zusammenhange, weshalb es ihn wundert, daß Gott nicht auch als letzte Materie bezeichnet wird — und dies durchaus vom Standpunkte Maimonides', nämlich der Kreation *ex nihilo*, ausgehend (obwohl er einleitet יש להפלא על הפילוסופים), indem er argumentiert: כי אם נניח היותו יתעלה הפועל הצורה והתכלית לבד מעלת היותו גם כן הסבה החמרית, נצטרך ברכחה להניח מציאות חומר קדמון... וזה סותר ציור השם יתעלה. Daß nicht diese Identifikation an sich für Maimonides die Hauptsache hier war, sondern ihre Interpretation in seinem eigenen Sinne, sagt er ja selber: וכוונתי בזה הסרק שאבאר לך על איזה צד נאמר בו יתב' שהוא הפועל וכ', während die Identifikation selbst von Maimonides nur geduldet wird: יכ־עיתם אשר לא אחלוק אני עליהם. S. Neumark: *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie* I, S. 395.

ist. Hier wiederum wird die Bedeutung der „Letztheit" an der causa formalis ausführlich erörtert, das aber ebenso für die causa finalis gilt. Gott wird auch als letzte Form bezeichnet. Dabei aber hält es Maimonides für nötig, eindringlich zu betonen, daß er unter letzter Form nicht die aristotelische meint, d. h. nicht diejenige, die im Regressus der natürlichen Formen als letzte, ungeworden und unvergänglich, gilt. Denn jene Form ist natürlich und der Materie inhärent — während unsere letzte Form separat ist und transzendent.[71] Was hier unter der letzten Form bei Aristoteles verstanden werden soll, können wir dahingestellt lassen;[72] eines ist sicher, daß auch sie beim Entstehen und Vergehen Halt macht und auch sie im Naturhaften bleibt. Also nicht anders als der aristotelische letzte Zweck, wie er III 13 beschrieben wurde. Es ergänzen sich also beide Darstellungen in der Weise, daß wir die Trennung zwischen erstem und letztem Zweck und die Charakteristik des letzteren III 13 entnehmen können, diesen aber analog der Darstellung der letzten Form in I 69 behandeln dürfen — schon gestützt auf die gleiche Charakterisierung der aristotelischen Auffassung sowohl vom letzten Zweck als auch von der letzten Form, die beide in beiden Kapiteln abgelehnt werden.

Der Zweck also, als welcher Gott bezeichnet wird, ist ebenso jenseits des Naturhaften und Materiellen, ebenso separat, wie dies von der Bezeichnung Gottes als letzte Form gilt. Der Begriff der Zweckursache, der für die natürlichen Dinge nur den ersten Zweck bedeutet, bekommt für Gott einen anderen Sinn, ebenso wie die Formursache. In beiden ist er nicht allein letztes Glied einer wesensgleichen Kette — sondern ein Neues, Wesensverschiedenes. Und dieses Neue, der separate Zweck, der in der dinglichen Welt wohl gesucht werden mag,

[71] *Moreh* I 69: ולא תחשב שאמרנו בו שהוא הצורה האחרונה לכל העולם הוא רמז לצורה האחרונה אשר יאמר אריסטו עליה . . . שהיא בלתי הווה ולא נפסדת כי הצורה ההיא הנזכרת שם טבעית לא שכל נפרד, was dann weiter als צורה לחומר erklärt wird.

[72] Auf das Schwierige hier hat zuerst Narboni, *Kommentar*, S. 14, hingewiesen. Vgl. auch Munk, *Guide* I, S. 319 n. 1. Besonders aber hat Neumark diese Stelle zum Ausgangspunkt seiner weitgehenden Untersuchungen genommen; vgl. *loc. cit.*, S. 284 ff. (bes. S. 285 Anm. 3) und S. 398. Es würde von unserem Thema weit abführen, wollten wir auf diese Gedankengänge näher eingehen.

aber vergebens, da eben dort nur die natürliche causa finalis anzutreffen ist, d. h. der erste Zweck — besteht für die Welt, sofern sie als ideale Einheit, als Organismus angesehen wird. Und ebenso wie es von Gott als letzter Form gilt, daß er nicht der Welt als Form hinzukommt, sondern die Welt in ihm als Form enthalten ist,[73] so gilt es auch vom Zweck, nicht daß die Welt Gott zum Zweck h a t, sondern daß sie in ihm, als Zweck, enthalten ist.

Es ist somit nicht allein ein und derselbe Zweck, der in einem Falle abgelehnt, im anderen aber zugegeben wird, sondern es sind zwei im Grunde v e r s c h i e d e n e Z w e c k b e g r i f f e. Der eine mußte aus dem dinglichen Dasein hervorgehen, und da kann er nicht ein letzter sein in unserem Sinne — der andere, dem Makrorganismus entsprechend, ihn ausmachend, kann ein letzter, separater Zweck sein. Aus der Verschiedenheit der zwei Welten, der mechanischen und der organischen, gehen die Zweckbegriffe hervor. Es ist daher begreiflich und unsere Darstellung nur bekräftigend, daß Maimonides in beiden Zusammenhängen von zwei verschiedenen „Welten" spricht. Von einer W e l t, als Einheit, ist nur dort die Rede, wo vom letzten-separaten Zweck gesprochen wird. Die Terminologie ist konsequent eingehalten: In I 69 wird fast durchwegs „Welt" gebraucht, in I 72 wird vom Dasein als Gesamtheit, als Einheit gesprochen; ja man könnte sprachlich auch das Wort K o s m o s verwenden. Hingegen wird in III 13 nur diese „Existenz", oder das Daseiende, ohne jeden Hinweis auf die Einheitlichkeit dieses Daseins, gebraucht. Es handelt sich eben nur um das empirische, in einer V i e l h e i t erscheinende Dasein — das Wort W e l t dafür kommt nicht vor.[74]

[73] *Moreh* I 69: Abgelehnt wird שיהיה הוא יתי צורה לגשם, sondern das Verhältnis zur Welt ist: הוא לו כדמות הצורה (כמנזלה אלצורה) לדבר אשר יש לו צורה אשר בה הוא מה שהוא, ובצורה תתקיים אמתתו ומהותו, כן יחס הבורא לעולם. Dies macht den Eindruck, daß צורה hier im übertragenen Sinne gebraucht wird, als Bild. Die Übersetzung Munks (*Guide* I, S. 320): „Dieu est à l'univers ce qu'est la forme à la chose qui a formé" trägt dieser Nuance, die in כדמות (כמנזלה) sich ausdrückt, nicht ganz Rechnung. — Weiter heißt es als Erklärung „für Form der Formen": כלומר שהוא אשר מציאות כל צורה בעולם וקומה נמצאת באדרוגה אליו ובו קומה, כמו (כמא) שהדברים בעלי הצורות מתקיים בצורתם.

[74] In I 69 ist durchwegs, mit Ausnahme der einen in der nächsten Anmerkung zu besprechenden Stelle, die Rede von פאעל אלעאלם וצורתה, so

Diese terminologischen Unterschiede müssen genau berücksichtigt werden, um das Ganze richtig zu beurteilen. Charakte-

וגאיתה, dann והו צורה אלעאלם והו גאיתה (*Guide* I, פ״ט), dann אלצורה אלאכירה לגמיע אלעאלם oder צורה אלעאלם אלאכירה (I, פ״ט b). In I 72 wechselt אלעאלם, das in der Regel gebraucht wird, mit einem ihm gleichkommenden Ausdruck ab: אלמגמוד בגמלתה oder אלכירה בגמלתהא (I, צ״ח b), גמלה הדה אלכרה (I, ק b), אלמגמוד בגמלתה (I, ק״א b). Dieses so konsequent im ganzen Kapitel verwendete جملة hat seinen wohl begründeten Sinn. Das vieldeutige Wort جمل, das gleichzeitig Summe und verschmelzen und schmücken heißt, ist wohl am besten geeignet, das geordnete, zu einer Einheit verschmolzene Dasein unter besonderer Hervorhebung seiner Einheitlichkeit zum Ausdruck zu bringen und kommt daher dem Worte עאלם, das eine Einheit bedeutet, gleich; ja durch die Nebenbedeutung von „schmücken" enthält es noch eine Nuance mehr: die von κόσμος, das von κοσμεῖν herkommt. Oft aber wird das جمل noch mit עאלם verbunden, und wir haben in I 72 wiederholt den Ausdruck אלעאלם בגמלתה (*Guide* I, ק׳, ק b, ק״ב b, ק״ג b, ק״ד b), worin die Verbindung beider Worte die erwünschte einheitliche Geordnetheit noch klarer betont. Und bei diesem so überwiegenden Gebrauch ist wohl auch so zu verstehen der vereinzelt vorkommende, etwas schwächere Ausdruck הדא אלמגמוד כלה (I, ק׳ b), das aber weiter unten ersetzt wird durch das noch prägnantere הדא אלמגמוד אלמסתקר אלדי כלאמנא פיה (Tibbon: זה המציאות המיושב אשר דברנו בו, Munk, I, S. 363: cet être bien constitué dont nous parlons). Hingegen wird III 13 gleich eingeleitet mit der Frage nach dem Zweck in הדא אלמגמוד (*Guide* III, כ״ב; Tib.: זה המציאות) ohne jeden Hinweis auf die einheitliche Gesamtheit des Daseins, und auch weiter לכל הדא אלמגמוד (III, כ״ג b u. v. a.) oft unter Betonung des הדא, also des empirisch gegebenen; nirgends, mit Ausnahme von einem Male für Aristoteles, wird das Wort עאלם verwendet. Nur einmal kommt das Wort גמלה vor — III, כ״ב b: לשלב גאיה לגמלה אלמגמוד —, aber auch nicht in der stärkeren Form אלמגמוד בגמלתה, wie es in I 72 vorkommt, und auch dies nur in der einleitenden Bemerkung im Zusammenhang mit dem etwas schwächeren אין דרך לבקש. Sicher ist Folgendes: In den Kapiteln, in denen die Teleologie bejaht wird, liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Einheitlichkeit der Welt — auf עאלם oder גמלה, das die Verbindung zu einer Einheit ausdrückt — während bei der Ablehnung des Zweckes nur das empirische Dasein — גוד oder הדא אלמגמוד — vorwiegt. Dazu ist zu erwägen, daß גוד (בציאות) für Maimonides immer etwas Akzidentielles war, im Gegensatz zum אמתת מהותו einer Sache, wie es im I 46 ausgeführt, aber an mehreren anderen Stellen (I, 33, 36, 57 u. a.) behandelt wird. Darum wird ja auch in I 69, wo von Gott als der letzten separaten Form die Rede ist, gesagt, daß das Dasein, das durch ihn verliehen wird, eben nicht akzidentieller Natur ist, sondern אמתתו ועצמותו — תחקיק מאהיתה וגודתה der Sache ausmacht. (Vgl. Neumark, *loc. cit.*, S. 399.) Demnach kann sich הדא אלמגמוד nur auf das empirische, nicht das in seinem wahren Wesen sich repräsentierende Dasein beziehen. Darum war es auch nötig, sowohl in I 69 als auch in I 72, wenn vom Dasein gesprochen wird, hinzuzufügen, erklärend oder aussagend, daß es sich um das einheitliche, als Welt geordnetes Ganze handelt; so I 69: הדא אלשי אלדי אוגדה אלבארי יעני אלעאלם (*Guide* I, צ b) und I 72: ויעלם אן הדא הי צורה הדא אלמגמוד אלמסתקר וגודה בלא שך — וידע שואת היא צורת

ristisch für den Sprachgebrauch ist die Stelle, wo die letzte Form zuerst als Regression, die von den empirischen Formen ausgeht, behandelt wird — und wo von der „gesamten Existenz" die Rede ist; hingegen gleich darauf, wo die Reservation in bezug auf den wahren Sinn der letzten Form hier — daß sie eben nicht mehr Fortsetzung des Empirischen ist — gemacht wird, da wird gleich das Ganze der Welt eingeführt.[75]

זה הנמצא הציושב המציאות בלא ספק — (I, ק״ד b). Es darf also als erwiesen betrachtet werden, daß der Sprachgebrauch an der antiteleologischen Stelle (III 13) und den proteleologischen (I 69, 72) eben auf zwei verschiedene Gesichtspunkte der Betrachtung des weltlichen Daseins hinweist; über III 25 weiter unten. Wenn daher Munk (*Guide* III, S. 82, 84, 89 u. a.) das Wort וגוד mit „univers" übersetzt, es also terminologisch gleichsetzt sogar dem עאלם besonders in I 72 (vgl. z. B. mehrere Male *Guide* I, S. 361, 362 u. v. a.), das er auch mit „univers" übersetzt — so trägt das sicherlich bei, den, wie wir sehen, wesentlichen Unterschied im Sprachgebrauch zu verwischen. Vgl. *Guide* III, S. 78, n. 1, wo Munk über die Grundbedeutung des Wortes אלוגוד, als trouver = finden, spricht und die Stelle dort wörtlich so deutet und nicht in seinem philosophisch-technischen Sinne „d'être ou d'univers". Wenn man „être" und „univers" eben nicht gleichsetzt, so kommt וגוד dem ersteren näher, gerade von trouver ausgehend, als dem letzteren. Munk verfährt auch ganz frei und nicht einheitlich in der Terminologie; während er z. B., wie gesehen, in der Regel וגוד und ebenso I 71 אלמוגוד (נמצא) (*Guide* I, צ״ח) wiederholt mit „univers" (*Guide* I, S. 353) übersetzt — lautet die oben erwähnte Stelle I 72 g. E.: הוא הי צורה הוא אלמוגוד אלמסתקל וגודה bei Munk (I 374): que telle est la forme de cet être dont l'existence est... constituée. Also eben מוגוד nicht mit dem die Einheitlichkeit der Welt enthaltenden univers, sondern mit dem schwächeren Sein und Existieren ausgedrückt. (Auch Scheyer übersetzt III 13 im Anfang „Zweck des Universums"; nur Weiß, III, S. 62, hat zwar richtig: „Zweck des Seienden", spricht aber gleich in Anm. 1 zum Kap. vom „letzten Zweck des Universums"...)

[75] *Moreh* I 69, in der Regression, heißt es (*Guide* I, ס״ט b): ותלך אלצורה אלאכירה סי גמיע אלוגוד — והצורה האחרונה ההיא בכל המציאות, während es dann, als der spezifische Charakter Gottes als letzter Form betont werden soll, heißt: אלצורה אלאכירה לגמיע אלעאלם — צורת העולם האחרונה (wobei Tibbon hier das גמיע nicht berücksichtigt, wie im vorigen). Hier hat Munk die Nuancierung genau durchgeführt (*Guide* I, S. 318), das erstemal übersetzt er: „cette forme dernière de tout l'être"; dann aber „la forme dernière de tout l'univers". Ähnlich, wenn auch nicht so charakteristisch, ist es in III 13. Wenn von der Ablehnung des Zweckes vom Standpunkte der Ewigkeit der Welt gesprochen wird, heißt es (*Guide* III, כ b) התכלית האחרונה לנמצאות בכללו — אלגאיה אלאכירה ללוגוד באסרה, während die sich aufwerfende Frage vom Standpunkte der Kreation gleich im Sinne dieses Kapitels formuliert wird für כל הדא אלוגוד. Munk (*Guide* III, S. 89) übersetzt dies „tout cet univers" ebenso, wie er zwei Zeilen vorher für הדות אלעאלם auch „univers" gebraucht. Hingegen ist Scheyer (S. 64) hier genauer: im ersten Falle,

Und so hat jedes Geschaffene seine Stellung sowohl als Ding als auch als Teil der Welt. In seiner ersteren Stellung kann wohl auch von einer Art letzten Zweck gesprochen werden — aber so kann es nur der Selbstzweck des Dinges sein. In seiner letzteren Stellung aber da ist Gott der letzte Zweck. Und daß beide Zweckmäßigkeiten zugleich und nebeneinander bestehen, hat Maimonides in der Möglichkeit der Doppeldeutung des Bibelverses, Prov. XVI 4, Gott hat alles für sich geschaffen, erklärt. Für „sich" heißt beides: für das Ding, also Selbstzweck, und für Gott.[76] Es ist hier keine Umdeutung, wie oft bei Maimonides, sondern der Hinweis auf die Duplizität des Zwecks.

Diese Doppelstellung aber, die von allen Dingen behauptet wird, gilt nicht weniger vom Menschen. Daß er als Zweck der Welt, auch der sublunaren, abgelehnt wurde, haben wir bereits gesehen. Er war ja auch der Ausgangspunkt für die Ablehnung aller Zwecklichkeit in der Welt der Dinge. Jene zweite Zwecklichkeit aber, die in der Welt als Organismus, bekommt für ihn eine noch gesteigerte, neue Bedeutung. Denn sie ist ihrer Natur nach, um in neuerer Terminologie zu sprechen, nicht explikativ, sondern normativ.[77] Wo die Erklärung Gottes als letzten Zweck der Welt gegeben wird, da wird in einem Atem auch die normative Bedeutung dieser Zwecklichkeit betont. Gott ist der letzte Zweck, und Zweck alles Existierenden ist es auch, sich ihm in seiner Vollkommenheit anzugleichen.[78] Wobei die zweite Hälfte des Satzes nur als explikative Ergänzung der ersten zu verstehen ist. Hier aber, wo der Zweck als Sollen zum Vorschein kommt, ist es der Mensch, dem er in erster Reihe aufgegeben ist. Als Objekt ist er geringfügig, gleich allen anderen Dingen,

im Zusammenhange mit der Ewigkeit der Welt, übersetzt er: „nach dem letzten Zweck des Universums", dann aber für הוא אלוהי „Daseyn" oder „Schöpfung". Vgl. vorige Anmerkung.

[76] *Moreh* III 13: אמר כל פעל ד' לתעניהו — אם שר שיהיה זה הכנוי שב אל הפעול; ואם יהיה שב אל הפועל, יהיה פרושו לתכן עצמו יתע'. Also gleichzeitig deutet לתעניהו auf beides hin, auf das Ding und auf Gott.

[77] Vgl. Eisler, *loc. cit.*, S. 68 f.

[78] *Moreh* I 69 g.E.: ואם כן הוא יתי תכלית כל דבר האדרון ותכלית הכל ג"כ ההדמות בשלמותו כפי היכולת.

als Subjekt aber steht er zur Zweckhaftigkeit der Welt in einem besonderen Verhältnis.

Denn auch die Doppelstellung des Menschen tritt bei Maimonides klar zutage. Sie drückt sich am besten aus im Verhältnis Individuum — Genus, das wir bereits früher, bei Behandlung des Anthropozentrismus, gestreift haben und nun näher besehen wollen. In der Widerlegung des Pessimismus Alrasi's wird zunächst als Argument angeführt die irreführende Betrachtung nur des menschlichen Individuums (und die damit verbundene Ansicht von seiner zentralen Wichtigkeit).[79] Der Mensch müsse als Geschlecht betrachtet werden, dann erweisen sich die Leiden des Individuums als irrelevant, im Verhältnisse zum Geschlecht. Ja, die Voraussetzung dieser Leiden, die Körperlichkeit des Menschen, gibt uns erst die Möglichkeit, überhaupt die Menschen als Genus zu betrachten.[80] Es ist also nicht nur akziden-

[79] *Moreh* III 12 Anf.: היות זה הכלל וחבריו... לא יבחינו המציאות רק באיש מבני אדם לא זולת זה וידמה כל מכל כי המציאות כולו היה בעבורו. Tibbon gibt das Moment des Individuellen in der zweiten Hälfte, im בעבורו, nicht so genau wieder; denn im Original wird es betont: כון הדא אלנאהל ואמתלה... לא יעתבר אלנוע אלא בשכץ אנסאן לא גיר ויתכיל כל נאהל אן אלנוע כלה טן אגל שכצה (*Guide* III, י״ח; Munk: pour sa personne). Dies wird wiederholt betont: ואמנם תלך מחשבתם כלם לקצת אישי טין האדם — (לבעין אשכאץ נוע אלאנסאן; III י״ח b). Dann weiter: כל אשכאץ נוע אלאנסאן אלמוגודין (Tibbon wieder nicht prägnant genug: שכל בני האדם הנמצאים; Munk: tous les individus de l'espèce humaine). Dann: ולא ינלט ויטן אלוגוד טן אגל שכצה סקט (*ibid.*), Tibbon nur allgemein: ושלא ישעה ויחשוב שהמציאות היה בעבורו לבד; dann: ורוב הרעות הנופלות באישיו הם מעצמם ר״ל מאישי בני אדם ההפרים.

[80] *Ibid.* (המין הא׳) heißt es: ולולא זה ההפסד האישי לא תהיה הווה נמשכת ההויה המינית, weiter wird die Körperlichkeit und die mit ihr verbundene Rezeptivität, oder Impressivität, als der Grund, im Genus zusammengefaßt zu werden, bezeichnet: שאלו היה בלתי מקבל למעשה לא נתהוה והיה הנמצא מנו איש לא אישי מין. Wenn Scheyer übersetzt: „und das aus ihm Gewordene konnte wohl etwas, aber nicht das Einzelwesen einer Gattung sein", so gibt er das שכצא לא אשכאץ נוע nicht genau wieder. Die Erklärung der hier angeführten Kontradiktion scheint durch Ephodi prägnanter gegeben zu sein als durch die „Vereinfachung" Munks (*Guide* III, S. 72 n. 1). Daß nun das Übel mit der Körperlichkeit verbunden und durch sie bedingt ist, als die ihr notwendigerweise anhaftende Steresis (vgl. I 17), und daß alles Übel eben nur die Materie trifft und nicht die Form, jede Form aber, mit Ausnahme der separaten Intelligenzen, Materie voraussetzt — dies war bereits früher III 10 g. E. und III 8 g. Anf. dargelegt. Hier wird dies nicht bloß wiederholt, sondern es tritt die Rezeptivität als neues Moment hinzu, und zwar besonders mit Rücksicht auf die Genusbildung.

tiell und erklärbar, wenn das menschliche Individuum leidet, sondern diese Beschaffenheit ist geradezu eine Notwendigkeit für sein Genus. Als in ein Genus zusammenfaßbar also ist der Mensch ein Ding wie alle anderen, an die Materie gebunden. Daher ist er auch als Genus nichts anderes als die anderen. Die Einheit von Agens, Form und Zweck, die wir etwa bei ihm antreffen, bleibt eine Einheit im Genus[81] und nicht

[81] *Moreh* III 13: כבר באר אריסטו, שבענינים הטבעיים יהיה הפועל הצורה והתכלית אחד, ר"ל אדם בנין. Als Beispiel wird die Zeugung eines Menschen angeführt, wie es auch in der bezüglichen Stelle der aristotelischen Physik II 7 geschieht: ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Maimonides fügt nur erläuternd hinzu: ר"ל אחד בנין — אעני ואחדא באלעין. Was soll damit gesagt sein? Die allgemeine Auffassung geht dahin, daß sich dies auf den Charakter der Einheit der Ursachen bezieht: sie, die Ursachen, seien gleich in der Art; so Scheyer und Munk in ihren Übersetzungen. Was aber durch diese Gleichheit in der Art ausgeschlossen werden soll, ist doch nicht zu ersehen. Munk (*Guide* III, S. 86 n. 3) führt die Stelle aus dem Kommentar Ibn-Roschds an, der auch einschränkend interpretiert: unum secundum subjectum et plures secundum definitionem; also unterschieden zwischen dem realen Subjekt und der logischen Stellung. Dies aber auch als die Absicht Maimonides' aufzufassen, wie Neumark, *loc. cit.*, S. 395 Anm. 1, will, ist doch nicht gut möglich. Wie soll die Einheit der Ursachen, „die Einheit in der Art" gerade besagen: „die einzelnen Momente sind trotzdem logisch auseinanderzuhalten"? Ist doch die Art gerade die Grundlage der Definition, und durch Betonung der Art kann unmöglich die Ausschließung der Definition beabsichtigt sein. Wohl konnte es Ibn-Roschd, der auch gleichzeitig und folgerichtig zwischen generatio und generabilia unterscheidet, also zwischen tatsächlicher Zeugung (wo die Einheit stattfindet) und potentieller Zeugbarkeit, wo die drei noch getrennt sind. Doch diesen Unterschied macht Maimonides, wie Neumark richtig bemerkt, nicht. Mit dem Wegfall aber von dieser Unterscheidung wird auch die andere haltlos. — Dieses אחד בנין bekommt aber einen Sinn, wenn man es nicht als Charakteristik der Einheit und auf die Ursachen bezogen auffaßt, sondern das בנין als auf die Naturdinge, auf die ענינים טבעיים bezieht. Das heißt dann so, daß die Einheit der Ursachen nur vom Gesichtspunkte des betreffenden Genus aus gesehen stattfindet; nicht aber etwa vom Gesichtspunkte des individuellen Trägers aus. Auch Ibn-Roschd hat eine leise Andeutung dafür, wenn er hinzufügt et generatio est ab aquali in specie. Dies hat aber nichts mit seiner früheren Unterscheidung zwischen Subjekt und Definition zu tun. Wenn daher Neumark dieses „ab aquali in specie" als Vergleich zum אחד בנין heranzieht, hätte ihn gerade dieses — und insbesondere die Fortsetzung „verbi gratia: quum homo generatur ex homine" — belehren sollen, daß auch das אחד בנין sich eben auf die Naturdinge bezieht. Und in dem Sinne ist auch weiter von den Individuen gesagt, daß es für alle, soweit sie Arten angehören, gilt: כי השלש סבות בהם מבנין אדר — מאן אלתלאתה אסבאב מיחא מן נוע ואחד (Scheyer: Dieselbe Gleichartigkeit der

anders als bei allen anderen Naturdingen. Und die Grenze aller Teleologie ist das Entstehen und Vergehen wie bei allem Naturhaften. Einen letzten Zweck in unserem Sinne kann er so, sei es als Individuum, sei es auch als Genus — und nicht allein wegen der quantitativen oder qualitativen Minderwertigkeit[82] — nicht bilden.

Der Mensch hat aber auch eine andere Seite, die dem genusbildenden Materiellen entgegengesetzt ist und so seine Genushaftigkeit durchbricht: es ist sein intellektuelles Vermögen, das sich besonders in der Providenz auswirkt. Hier wird das vernunftrealisierende Individuum dem Genus gleichgesetzt. Wenn Maimonides hier die Unwirklichkeit des Genus im Vergleich mit dem Individuellen betont, so ist dieser Nominalismus nicht so allgemein zu nehmen, wie es Munk auffassen will.[83] Wäre es so, dann müßte es ja für

wirkenden Ursache etc.; Munk vernachlässigt das מין נוע ganz und hat: „ne forme qu'une seule"). Das heißt: auch beim Individuum sind die drei Ursachen eins, vom einheitlichen Genus ausgehend. Daß dieses מין sich auf die Naturdinge bezieht, geht ja auch aus dem ganzen Zusammenhange hervor. So wird bei der causa formalis betont, היא נתינת צורה מיוחדת, dann wird von אנשי המינים gesprochen, während einleitend nur allgemein von הענינים המבעיים die Rede war, die eben dann durch das אחד מין präzisiert wurden. Besonders wird dies aber geklärt durch die Fortsetzung: וזה כלו הוא התכלית הראשונה, ואמנם מציאות תכלית אחרונה לכל מין (אמא וגוד נאיה אפירה לכל נוע). Aus dieser Gegenüberstellung ist ja klar, daß ebenso wie die תכלית אחרונה auch die im Vordersatz erwähnte und mit וזה כלו aufs Frühere bezogene תכלית ראשונה sich auf das מין bezieht. Denn daß das מין hier terminologisch von Wichtigkeit ist (obwohl Scheyer allgemein „bei allen Naturgegenständen" übersetzt), ist ja aus dem weiteren Gedankengange — wo von der Stufenfolge Individuum — Genus usw. die Rede ist — außer jedem Zweifel. Das מין also im ganzen Abschnitt bezieht sich auf ein und dasselbe: auf die Naturdinge. Und die von Aristoteles zitierte Einheit der Ursachen wird eben nur insoferne zugegeben, als man die Dinge und auch die Menschen von ihrer Zusammenfaßbarkeit in Genera aus betrachtet.

[82] Die im *Moreh* III 14 durchgeführte Beweisführung gegen den Anthropozentrismus ist ja ausdrücklich auch gegen das Genus gerichtet, wofür — für die אישי מינים — die Philosophen den qualitativen Graduntersched einführen müssen, während vom Standpunkte der Weltschöpfung die Argumentation eine andere ist. Vgl. oben Anm. 44—47.

[83] Im Gegensatze zur „aristotelischen" Ansicht von der Providenz, daß sie sich in der sublunaren Welt nur auf Genera erstreckt, lehrt Maimonides bekanntlich, *Moreh* III 17, daß beim Menschen eine Ausnahme stattfindet: שאני מאמין שההשגחה האלהית אמנם היא בזה העולם התחתון... באישי מין האדם לבד וזה המין לבדו הוא אשר כל עניני אישיו וכ; also beim Menschen gibt es eine individuelle Differen-

alle Genera gelten und eine Providenz müßte nur beim individuellen Menschen stattfinden. Daß Maimonides so nicht denkt, beweist die Tatsache, daß er sich bezüglich aller anderen Geschöpfe der „aristotelischen" Ansicht anschließt, wonach für ihre Genera eine Providenz besteht.[84] Es ist also nicht allein

zierung. Wenn es auch später begründet wird damit daß, הטין אשר נדבק בו השפע ההוא השכלי... הוא אשר התחברה אליו ההשגחה האלהית, so darf es nicht so verstanden werden, daß dadurch die Menschen untereinander, da sie demselben טין angehören, gleichgestellt sind. Das wird wiederholt betont und insbesondere III 18 begründet, und zwar durch eine zweifache Einleitung: 1. daß die Universalia nur intellektueller Natur sind, nicht wirklich, und 2. daß השכל האנושי אמנם הוא מה שנמצא מן השכלים האישיים. Diese beiden Momente verbunden — nämlich die Realität des Individuellen und die Individualität des menschlichen Intellektes, beide zusammen geben erst die Basis ab für die maimunische Anschauung, daß sich innerhalb des menschlichen Genus eine Abstufung der Providenz je nach der intellektuellen Vollkommenheit ergibt. Entscheidend ist eben das zweite Moment, wodurch der menschliche Intellekt dem den Sphären innewohnenden Einzelintellekt gleichgesetzt wird. Weshalb eben der Einzelmensch, wenn intellektuell vollkommen, ebenso wie die Sphäre, gleich den Genera der Providenz teilhaftig ist. Das erste, nominalistische, Argument zum Hauptmotiv zu machen, wie Munk, *Guide* III, S. 137 n. 1, ist daher, selbst für den Menschen, nicht richtig: denn dies allein würde für die Sonderstellung des Menschen unter den anderen Genera in bezug auf seine Individuen gar nichts beweisen. Es ist auch noch fraglich, ob der hier so kategorisch vorgetragene Nominalismus, „sans réserve" (Munk), nicht auch nur in diesem Zusammenhange begründet ist, denn I 51 wird die nominalistische Anschauung mit כמאמר אחרים angeführt. Im *Miloth-Hahigajon* X, das Munk (*Guide* I, S. 185 n. 2) anführt, ist von Nominalismus nichts zu lesen. Auch Scheyer, III, S. 111 Anm. 1, der ursprünglich diese Stelle als ein nominalistisches, antiplatonisches Bekenntnis auffaßt, bemerkt dann, daß „sich ihm Zweifel erhoben" haben. Dies insbesondere mit Rücksicht auf II 6, wo die platonische Ideenlehre im positiven Sinne angeführt wird. Wie konnte übrigens eine Stelle, deren Schwerpunkt in der völligen Ausschaltung des Genus-Begriffs liegen soll, eingeleitet werden mit: ואחר מה שהקדמתיו מהיות ההשגחה מיוחדת בטין האדם לבדו משאר טיני בע"ח?

[84] *Moreh* III 17, als Maimonides seine eigene Theorie vorträgt, fügt er hinzu: אבל שאר בעלי חיים... דעתי בהן דעת אריסטו, das heißt ja nur die Providenz für die Genera. Dasselbe geht klarer hervor später g. E., wo die Bibelstellen, in denen von der göttlichen Fürsorge für die Tiere gesprochen wird, erklärt werden: ואין בהם דבר סותר דעתי זה, כי אלו כלם השגחה טינית לא אישית... ולולא זה היה הטין אבד. Dies wieder unter Berufung auf Aristoteles. Ja selbst der Mensch, von seiner materiellen Seite gesehen, darf nur, auch in Fragen der Providenz, als Gattung betrachtet werden. In der allgemeinen Einleitung zum Providenz-Problem III 16 wird geradezu auf III 12 rückverwiesen, wo die Beurteilung des Menschen nach seinen Individuen als schwerer Fehler bezeichnet war: ואמנם סכלותם... הוא בהיותם בוחנים המציאות בעניני אישים טבעי אדם אשר רעותיהם מהם או מהכרח טבע החומר... וכבר

nominalistische Argumentation — sondern, selbst die Bedeutung der Genera zugegeben, wird der Mensch, soweit er sich durch seine Vernunft dem Göttlichen anschließt, aus dem Genus herausgehoben und im Individuum dem Genus gleich. Dieselbe Anschauung also, die bei der Abwehr des Pessimismus so tadelnd zurückgewiesen wird, die Betrachtung des menschlichen Individuums als Kriterium, sie wird hier aufgenommen und mit besonderem Nachdruck gelehrt. Dort wird vom Einzelmenschen auf den Genus verwiesen, und, in bezug auf die Zweckhaftigkeit, selbst vom Genus auf die Sphären — hier aber wird das Genus zugunsten des Individuums zurückgestellt und dieses dem Genus gleichgestellte Individuum wird den Sphären gleichgesetzt.[85] Dies wäre nicht möglich, wenn

בארנו מזה מה שצריך. Also in der Providenz selbst und selbst in bezug auf den Menschen ist der Nominalismus nicht so eindeutig — sondern abhängig vom Gesichtspunkt.

[85] Da doch dies die Sphären charakterisiert und sie nach Aristoteles der Providenz teilhaftig macht, daß sie in ihrer individuellen Existenz fortdauern. Diese Begründung, der Maimonides durchaus nicht widerspricht, führt er in zweifacher Form vor, *Moreh* III 17, (הדעת הב׳), heißt es: ומסני זה שהש״י משגיח בגלגלים... שההשגחה היא כפי טבע המציאות, אם כן אלו ההתמידו אישיהם על מה שהם עליו, und etwas später: הגלגלים ומה שבהם, אשר אישיהם מתמידים, ענין ההשגחה בהם הוא התמדתם... Nach der ersten Formulierung erscheint die Providenz primär und die individuelle Fortdauer die Folge; nach der zweiten ist die Fortdauer das Primäre, weswegen dann die Providenz, da sie sich nach dem טבע המציאות richtet, eben in dieser Fortdauer besteht. Diese zweifache Formulierung soll nur die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit von beiden zeigen. Beim Menschen, soll er in der Providenz den Sphären gleichgesetzt werden, mußte eben III 18 dieses Moment, daß sein Verstand מן השכלים האישיים ist, hervorgehoben werden (vgl. oben Anm. 83). Wozu aber noch ergänzend bemerkt werden muß, daß diese Stelle, III 18 Anf., verschiedentlich unrichtig aufgefaßt wurde. Sie lautet: ...יהיה נודע ג״כ, שהשפע האלהי הנמצא מדובק בטין האדם, ר״ל השכל האנושי, אמנם הוא מה שנמצא מן השכלים האישיים, והוא מה ששפע על ראובן ושמעון וכו׳ (אמנא הו מא וגוד מן אלעקול אלשכציה והו מא פאץ עלי זיד ועמר) erscheint wörtlich korrekt. Aber schon Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh* S. 130, verwandelt die im Original gegebene Koordination (הו... והו) in eine relative Abhängigkeit: אמנם הוא זה שנמצא מהשכלים האישיים מה ששפע על ראובן ושמעון. Schon diese kleine Abweichung ermöglichte den Anfang eines Mißverständnisses. Narboni nun, *Kommentar* S. 55, betritt, wenn auch nicht ganz sicher, den Weg einer Interpretation, wonach die שכלים אישיים als die Intellekte der menschlichen Individuen zu verstehen sind: אמנם הוא שנמצא מן השכלים האישיים, כי הם הנמצאים באישים, והוא מה ששפע על האישים. Diese Interpretation ist dann durch Schem-Tob fortgeführt und eindeutiger ausgedrückt: ר״ל לשכל האנושי, אחר שהטין לא נמצא, אמנם הכוונה בו הוא מה שנמצא מהשכלים האישיים

nicht von zwei Gesichtspunkten aus gesehen. Der Mensch als

והוא ראובן ושמעון... ושאר האישים. Das Motiv ist klar: es soll diese zweite Behauptung als Fortsetzung der ersten, der nominalistischen, verstanden werden oder eigentlich nur jene nominalistische Theorie auf den Spezialfall des menschlichen Intellektes angewendet oder an ihm exemplifiziert. Auch Scheyer will über diese „so ganz dunkle" Ausdrucksweise dieser Stelle so hinwegkommen und übersetzt III S. 114: „die göttliche Gabe... nämlich die menschliche Vernunft keine andere ist als die, welche bei den einzelnen vernünftigen Wesen vorhanden ist, bei Ruben, Simon" etc. Also מן wird mit „bei" übersetzt, שכלים אישיים wird verstanden als אישים שכליים, und der koordinierte, selbständige Satz: והוא מי ששפע ומי wird zu einem Komma verflüchtigt: „bei Ruben..." Da ist nun Munk (III, S. 137) genauer, indem er die שכלים אישיים als das auffaßt, was sie bei Maimonides und insbesondere in diesem Zusammenhang, nach III 17, einzig bedeuten können, als „Intelligences individuelles", nämlich die sphärischen Intelligenzen. Womit er also die Richtung Narbonis zwar verläßt — ohne jedoch für die so wichtige Stelle eine einleuchtendere Lösung zu finden. Er übersetzt: „que l'épanchement divin... je veux dire l'intellect humain est une chose qui n'a son existence que par les Intelligences individuelles à savoir par ce qui s'est épanché (de l'intelligence divine) sur Zeid, sur 'Amr" etc. Dies erscheint jedoch unhaltbar. Durch welche Intelligenzen (im Plural) bekommt der menschliche Intellekt seine Existenz? Wir wissen nur, daß es einen Aktiven Intellekt gibt, der die menschliche Erkenntnis ermöglicht. Dann ist ja der Aktive Intellekt eine separate Intelligenz, während doch unter den שכלים אישיים die Eigenintellekte der Sphären zu verstehen sind, die auch erst von den ihnen zugeordneten separaten Intellekten geleitet werden. (So ist es in III 17 zu verstehen; vgl. II 4 und 6.) Ferner wurde schon im vorigen Kapitel, 17, die Bedeutung des שפע אלהי deutlich genug hervorgehoben — welches neue Moment tritt hier hinzu, daß es als Grundlegung an die Spitze gestellt wird? Aber abgesehen vom Sachlichen mußte Munk eben dem Text Gewalt antun. Das من übersetzt er durch par, also instrumental, den folgenden koordinierten Satz והו מא פאץ setzt er ganz unbegründet um in „à savoir par ce qui s'est épanché", wohl um das erste „par" zu halten. In Wirklichkeit ist das من nicht anders als partitiv zu verstehen, und die Stelle besagt nichts anderes als daß die dem Menschengeschlechte verliehene göttliche Influenz, d. h. der menschliche Intellekt, eben eine der individuellen Intelligenzen ist (d. h. eine Art Sphärenintelligenz) und daß dieser menschliche Intellekt wieder auf die Individuen Ruben etc. influiert. Somit sollte hier nur die Stellung des menschlichen Intellektes, nach der er den Sphären gleich ist, hervorgehoben werden; was auch der Lehre Maimonides vollkommen entspricht (s. meine Abhandlung *Proph.* S. 96). Und nach der ersten Vorbemerkung, vom Nominalismus, ist diese zweite, von jener unabhängige, eine wichtige Ergänzung. — Bemerkenswert ist diese Stelle noch von einer anderen Seite. In der Regel wird in der Erkenntnislehre nur vom „Menschen" und dem „Aktiven Intellekt" gesprochen, der letztere als Mittler zwischen Gott und Menschen (s. bes. III 51) — im Bereiche des Menschlichen aber wird keine Differenzierung gemacht. Die Formulierung hingegen an unserer Stelle läßt eine Abstufung auch innerhalb des Menschlichen

empirisches, passives Wesen,[86] in der Welt der Dinge, ihnen gleich und ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeit unterworfen, und der intelligible Mensch, der im Individuum das Genus ausmacht. Man darf zweifellos diese Terminologie anwenden, ohne sich einer Modernisierung schuldig zu machen, und man ist ebenso berechtigt, diese zweite Ansicht des Menschen auch auf die Teleologie zu übertragen.

Denn auf diese zweite Ansicht des Menschen hat seine Benennung „Mikrokosmos" Anwendung. Da diese keine Umkehrung des Vergleiches von der Welt als Makrorganismus ist, wie bereits gesehen,[87] bedeutet der Vergleich des Menschen mit dem Kosmos eben, daß er Organismus ist plus jener vernünftigen Zielstrebigkeit, die sich uns bei der Welt aus ihrem organischen Charakter ergeben hat. Er ist somit nicht bloß ein höheres oder höchstes Lebewesen, sondern dadurch ein Geschöpf sui generis. Und die Beweisführung dafür ist: daß, während die anderen Lebewesen kraft ihrer Genusnatur leben und für das Genus leben, der Mensch eben sich individuell seinen Lebensweg erst bahnen muß und auch dann nicht im Genus aufgeht.[88] Diese so hochwichtige Beschaffen-

durchblicken: es wird vom „Menschlichen Intellekt" (השכל — אלעקל אלאנסאני) gesprochen, der mit der göttlichen Influenz identifiziert wird, und von dem erst eine Influenz auf das menschliche Individuum ausgeht. Da darunter doch sicher nicht der Aktive Intellekt verstanden werden kann, so ist hier eine neue Zwischeninstanz eingeschaltet — zwischen der Influenz des Aktiven Intellektes und dem erkennenden Individuum: es ist der übergeordnete, etwa dem Menschengeschlecht angehörende Intellekt. Diese Theorie vom Intellekt, der aller empirischen Einzelerkenntnis vorangeht und sie ermöglicht (der übrigens lebhaft an die Kantsche Tranzendentale Apperzeption erinnert), ist von Maim. weiter nicht entwickelt worden. Daß dies aber keine zufällige Stilisierung, sondern eine in die Philosophie Maimonides' sehr gut hineinpassende Formulierung ist, ist außer Zweifel. — Die Verbindung hier פאלא עלם הוא סקד עלם, die bei Tibbon (יהיה נודע גם כן) als eine Art Folgerung des zweiten aus dem ersten verstanden werden kann, ist in der Übersetzung Falaqueras (כבר נודע) sinnentsprechender.

[86] Vgl. oben Anm. 80 über seine Bezeichnung als מקבל בעשה.

[87] Siehe oben Anm. 61.

[88] *Moreh* I 72. Während כל איש מאישי בעלי חיים... ילך ויעשה לפי טבעו ohne individuelle Vernunft, dafür auch יתמיד בזה אישו המדה אשר יתמיד ויעשך מציאות, muß der Mensch individuell von anderen Individuen angeleitet werden, wozu aber der individuelle Intellekt Voraussetzung ist. Darum wird hier am

heit, die Maimonides geradezu als Mysterium ansieht,[89] ist es, die dem Menschen, also nicht seinem Genus, sondern dem menschlichen Individuum, soweit es vernunftentwickelnd ist, die kosmische Bedeutung gibt — die vernünftige Zweckmäßigkeit.

Während nun der Mensch in seinem empirischen Dasein als Weltzweck abgelehnt werden muß, ebenso wie alles andere Dingliche, und als Genus noch um so mehr abzulehnen ist, da seine Genushaftigkeit eben erst durch seine Körperlichkeit ermöglicht wird — so ist, von der anderen Seite gesehen, doch eine besondere Teleologie für ihn vorhanden. Von der Seite aus, wo er vernünftig ist, wo er auch als Individuum den Sphären und Genera, in der Providenz, und dem Kosmos, in der Zweckmäßigkeit, gleichgestellt wird, dort ist auch für ihn eine Zweckmäßigkeit gegeben. Es ist dies die im selben Satz, in dem Gott als letzter Zweck genannt wird, angeführte „Angleichung" — es ist die moralische Zweckmäßigkeit. Nicht der Mensch ist ein Zweck, sondern dem Menschen ist ein Zweck gegeben, aufgegeben.

Und dies ist der Sinn der Teleologie, die in III 25 so emphatisch bejaht wird. Es ist die Teleologie des moralischen Gebotes, wie es im darauffolgenden Kapitel ausführlicher behandelt wird. Hier ist zunächst bemerkenswert, daß das Agensmotiv stärker betont wird,[90] während es doch in I 69

Individuum exemplifiziert: אנוש האדם לבד אלו ישועך איש מטמנו לבדו, dann wäre er verloren, da ihm die Hilfe der Gesellschaft abgehen würde; dann aber wird diese Hilfe eben auf das individuell-intellektuelle Vermögen zurückgeführt: מונח (sc. הדברי) ובעבור זה אילו דמית בנפשך אחד מבני אדם (שכצא מן אלנאס) נשלל זה הכח עם הכח החיוני לבד, היה אובד לשעתו. Also beide, Lebewesen und Mensch, hängen von ihrem Genus ab; nur ist die Abhängigkeit beim Lebewesen eine instinktiv-natürliche und also bezogen auf das Genus als solches, während der Mensch als Individuum auf die individuellen Erfahrungen seiner Geschlechtsgenossen angewiesen ist — wobei bei allen die Erfahrung durch die individuelle Vernunft zustande kommt.

[89] *Ibid.:* לא תובן (Munk: très occulte) וזה הכח נכבד מאד.. והוא ג"כ נעלם מאד אטתתו בתחלת הדעת המשתתף כהבנת שאר הכחות השבעיות.

[90] *Moreh* III 25 wird wiederholt von הפעולה שיכוין בה פועלה תכלית von בונת הפועלים oder הפעולה אשר עשאה הפועל gesprochen. Auch die spätere Alternative bezieht sich auf כל פועל פעולה אחת. In der Terminologie ist noch zu bemerken, daß auch hier durchwegs von der Welt, als Einheitsbegriff, nicht bloß vom empirischen Dasein die Rede ist; so אלעאלם באסר (*Guide* III ג"כ); ונור אלעאלם בכללה

vor Causa zurückgestellt worden war. Beides war zugunsten der Teleologie — nur zeigt sich uns durch die Nuancierung der Motive auch eine Nuancierung im Zweckbegriff. Für die organische Welt bedeutet er, wie bereits erörtert, das Prinzip der teleologischen Ordnung, im Bereiche des Moralischen aber das Prinzip des teleologischen Gebotes. Daher war dort Causa vorgezogen, da es auch Agens, Form und Zweck mitenthält und so die identische Einheitlichkeit zum Ausdruck bringt; hier aber ist Agens allein mehrsagend, da es dem normativen Charakter gerechter wird. Natürlich aber sind es wiederum nur Nuancen eines und desselben Zweckes.

Und so ist es auch verständlich, daß, während vorher[91] der Anthropozentrismus als Ausgangspunkt der Zwecksetzung bezeichnet wurde, die aber abzulehnen ist, hier derselbe Anthropozentrismus als Hindernis für die wahre Erkenntnis des Zweckes, der zu bejahen ist, hingestellt wird. Vorher hat es sich eben um den Menschen als Geschöpf, als Ding unter den Dingen, gehandelt, der selbst Zweck sein sollte; hier handelt es sich um den normativen Zweck für den Menschen. Darum werden hier als Fehlerquelle drei Irrtümer, als zusammenhängend, aufgezählt: die Überschätzung des Menschen, die Unkenntnis der Natur der Materie und die Unkenntnis der ersten Absicht.[92] Diese drei Irrtümer, die Eins bilden, werden vom Autor nicht näher erklärt; sie bedeuten aber nichts anderes als die Ablehnung des Menschen als dinglichen Zweck, soweit er infolge seiner Materialität — und nur durch sie — zu einem Genus zusammengeschlossen werden kann — um die Setzung eines normativen Zweckes für ihn, soweit er über sein materiebedingtes Genus hinausragt, zu ermöglichen. Nur so kann die Einführung des Irrtums in der Natur der Materie hier einen Sinn haben.

(*ibid.* יג b). Hier übersetzt Munk (III, S. 199) das נעלה אלוהי, bei der Anschauung der Ascharia, durch l'ensemble de l'être. Vgl. oben Anm. 74.

[91] *Moreh* III 13, siehe oben Anm. 17 und 29.

[92] *Moreh* III 25: ודע שרוב הספקות ... אמנם שרשם טעות האדם בעצמו ודמותו שהמציאות כלו בגללו לבד, והסכלות בטבע זה החומר השפל, וסכלות המכוון הראשון ומפני הטעיות הזאת וסכלות שני העניינים ראלה יתחדשו הספקות. Daß diese drei in ihrem Zusammenhange hier maßgebend sind, beweist die Wiederholung:

Sicher beziehen sich die Gebote auf beides: auf die Vervollkommnung des Körpers und die der Seele; und die erstere ist nur in seiner kollektiven Erscheinung möglich, etwa im Staate, nicht aber im einzelnen.[93] Dies aber darf uns nicht irreführen, denn nicht worauf sich das teleologische Gebot richtet, ist ausschlaggebend, sondern die Stellung des Menschen, die es ermöglicht. Und die Vollkommenheit des Körpers — beziehungsweise aller gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Tugenden, die mehr das Genus Mensch betreffen — sind ja auch nur propädeutische Vorarbeit zu jener letzten Vollkommenheit (denken wir an den letzten Zweck), die im Geistigen liegt und den Zweck des dauernden Lebens (also nicht bloß des Entstehens und Vergehens der Genera) bildet.[94] Die Torah ist eben nicht Normenwissenschaft, sondern eine normative Wissenschaft.[95]

Auf einem Mißverständnis dieser Doppelstellung des Menschen — und des Unterschiedes zwischen seiner Wertung als Zweck und als Erfüller eines Zweckes — beruht die Polemik Crescas' gegen Maimonides. In zwei Punkten setzt Crescas seine Polemik an:[96] daß Maimonides der Torah meh-

[93] *Moreh* III 27: תקון הגוף והוא הנחנת המדינה לתקון ענייני אנשיה. Dies ist die notwendige Voraussetzung für תקון הנפש. Wir haben etwas Ähnliches auch in I 72 gesehen. Auch dort wird bei Besprechung des spezifisch-menschlichen intellektuellen Vermögens zunächst die soziale Abhängigkeit des Einzelnen hervorgehoben — aber auch diese letzten Endes auf die individuell-intellektuale zurückgeführt (vgl. oben Anm. 88). Dort ist keine Abstufung erwähnt; die Stelle hier, wenn auch in einem anderen Zusammenhang, kann beitragen zum Verständnis dort. Auch hier wird in bezug auf תקון הגוף gesagt: וזה לא ישלם לאיש אחד לבדו כלל, א"א להגיע כל אדם אל זה השער אלא בקבץ המדיני.

[94] *Ibid.*: Der תקון הגוף bringt nur השלמות הראשון. Und als zweite Stute אפשר להגיע אל השלמות האחרון אשר הוא הנכבד בלא ספק והוא סבת החיים המתמידים לא זולתו. Die Identifizierung von letzter Vollkommenheit und letztem Zweck wird auch gleich durchgeführt: והקדים הגה השלמות האחרון לפי מעלתו כמו שבארנו שהוא התכלית האחרון.

[95] Vgl. Eisler, *loc. cit.*, S. 75. Der Begriff „normativ" wird hier nicht im Sinne Simmels, *Einleit. in die Moralwissenschaft* I, S. 321, gebraucht, wonach eine normative Wissenschaft „nur kausal, nicht teleologisch" ist. Vgl. dagegen Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900, I, S. 27.

[96] Im ersten Punkt liegt keine ausgesprochene Polemik gegen Maimonides vor, bezieht sich aber auf seine Lehre, *Or-Adonai* II, 6, 1. Vgl. Heinemann, *loc. cit.*, S. 75f. Hingegen ist er im zweiten Punkt sehr deutlich. Schon die

rere Zwecke statt einem zuschreibt und daß er den Menschen, der doch Träger und Verwirklicher der Torah ist, als Zweck ablehnt. Sein Gefühl sagt ihm wohl, daß Maimonides den Weltzweck nicht ganz ablehnt,[97] doch scheint ihm seine Polemik am Platze. Nach der obigen Darstellung erledigen sich beide Einwände von selbst. Die scheinbare Vielheit der Zwecke der Torah läuft letzten Endes auf eine Einheit im Prinzip hinaus. Und die Annahme einer Zweckhaftigkeit der Torah für den Menschen als Träger und einer Zweckhaftigkeit der Welt stehen mit der Ablehnung des Menschen als Zweckes und somit alles dinglichen Zweckes nicht in Widerspruch, sondern ergänzen und beleuchten sich gegenseitig.

So nun gelangen wir zum Ergebnis, daß die Welt als Organismus und die Welt der ethischen Aufgaben durch das Gemeinsame der Teleologie gleichgesetzt werden, dies hat

Einleitung von II 6 geht von der Annahme aus, Maimonides lehne jeden Weltzweck ab, in offenbarer Anlehnung an *Moreh* III 13 (ebenso III Einl.). Dann wird II 6, 3 erklärt, daß der Zweck der niederen Welt und der Torah אחד באיש sind und זה יתבאר בקלות לטה שהתכלית בעולם השפל הוא המין האנושי ... שהתכלית שלמות האנושי בואת התורה. Also ähnlich wie bei Saadja, nur eingeschränkt auf den כלל המציאות השפל. Bei beiden folgt aus dem Range der Torah der Mensch als Zweck. (Darum glaubte auch Crescas weiter, III 6, 5, die von Maimonides angeführten Zitate für die Minderwertigkeit des Menschen durch eine gezwungene Interpretation entkräften zu müssen.) In bezug auf die Stellung des Menschen also bedeutet die Lehre Crescas' keinen Fortschritt gegen Maimonides, sondern eher das Gegenteil. Als Analogie möge hier erwähnt werden die Entwicklung, die die Teleologie genommen hat in der Stoa. Auch dort war der Ausgangspunkt anthropozentrisch — so bei Seneca und Epictet. Die römische Stoa hingegen gelangte zur Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge; dies unter Berücksichtigung der „schaffenden Kraft des Ganzen" (Marc-Aurel). Vgl. P. Barth, *Die Stoa*, S. 43 f.

[97] *Or-Adonai* III Einl.: הנה יראה שדעת הרב אמנם הוא בבקשת התכלית, כי עם שנניח מציאותו בקשתו כבדה. Er spricht auch weiter im Sinne Maimonides' nur von קושי מציאותו. Bemerkenswert ist, daß auch Crescas II 6, 4 zum Ausgangspunkt seiner Lehre von der Einheit des Zweckes (nicht von der Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt) die Anschauung von der Welt als Organismus nimmt — mit Berufung auf *Moreh* I 72. Hätte er diesen Gedanken in seiner ganzen Weite durchgeführt, so hätte er es nicht nötig gehabt, die oben angeführten proteleologischen Momente gerade in *Moreh* III 13 hineinzudeuten. — Auf andere Auswirkungen der maimunischen Teleologie, in positiver und negativer Beziehung, insbesondere etwa bei Spinoza, einzugehen, würde, wenn dies nicht flüchtig geschehen soll, den Rahmen dieser Arbeit ganz sprengen.

Maimonides klar durchgeführt.[98] In beiden wird die Teleologie bejaht — im Gegensatz zur Welt der Vielheit der empirischen Dinge, und dazu gehört auch der Mensch in seinem empirischen Dasein, in dem es nur Selbstzwecke der Dinge gibt, aber keinen übergeordneten gemeinsamen Zweck.

Sehen wir nun ab von der causa finalis, die innerhalb der Weltmechanik für das einzelne kausale Geschehen angenommen wird, und fragen wir nach einem Gesamtzweck, so können wir aus dem Gesagten folgendes übersichtlich ersehen:

1. Biologisch, d. h. im System des mechanischen Daseins, in der Welt der Dinge, wird ein Zweck abgelehnt. Da gilt nur Kausalität und Selbstzweck des Geschaffenen.
2. Kosmologisch, in der Welt als organischer Einheit, wird der letzte, separate Zweck, in Gott, bejaht.
3. Ethisch, in der Welt der intelligiblen, handelnden Person wird der göttliche Zweck bejaht.

Es gibt also keinen dinglichen letzten Zweck; es gibt bloß Zweck als Sinn im Kosmos, gesehen als Makrorganismus, als Idee, und als Aufgabe im Bereiche des Sittlichen.

Das heißt, wie bereits angedeutet, nicht, daß es zwei Zwecke gibt, und der früher erwähnte Parallelismus ist nicht als wirklicher zu denken. Vielmehr wurzeln die sich im Organischen und Ethischen offenbarenden Zweckmäßigkeiten in einem einheitlichen Prinzip und sind eins in ihrem Wesen. Bevor wir zur Klarstellung dieses Punktes gelangen, müssen wir noch den Charakter der Teleologie — im Organischen sowohl als auch im Ethischen — etwas näher untersuchen.

III.

Um zur genaueren Kenntnis des Charakters der maimunischen Teleologie zu gelangen, wollen wir nun anknüpfen an

[98] *Moreh* III 26; deutlicher aber III 32 Anf.: כשתתבונן בפעולות האלהיות, ר"ל הפעולות השבעיות, יתבאר לך מהם ערמת השם וחכמתו בבריאת בע"ח והדרגת תנועות האבריים ושכונתם קצתם אל קצתם וכן יתבאר לך חכמתו ותחבולתו בהדרגת ענייני כלל האיש ענין אחר ענין. Also werden die organisierten Lebewesen und der Charakter des Gebotes parallel auf ein Grundprinzip zurückgeführt. Diese Parallele wird dann in ihren Einzelheiten durchgeführt.

den bereits erörterten Zusammenhang zwischen der Zweckmäßigkeit und der Auffassung der Welt als Organismus. Die Ordnung der Welt, die Zuordnung ihrer Teile, sahen wir, spricht für die Annahme einer vernünftigen Planmäßigkeit und ergo einer innewohnenden Zweckmäßigkeit. Maimonides spricht auch vom Problem des Zweckes als von einem aus dieser Zuordnung resultierenden.[99]

Wenn aber diese Zuordnung eine organische sein soll, dann genügt das Charakteristikum des Zusammenhanges allein nicht. Die Welt als einheitlicher Organismus besagt mehr als bloß das Zusammenstimmen seiner Teile. Es muß sich da auch ein besonderes Verhältnis zwischen Teil und Ganzem darstellen. Zunächst ist es nun die Unterordnung der Teile unter das Ganze; da das einheitliche Ganze gleichsam der Zweck ist und die Teile nur zu ihm führende Mittel. Ihre Existenz richtet sich also nach der sie umfassenden Einheit. Dies ist ja schon in der Vorstellung des organischen Individuums enthalten und, in Anwendung auf die Welt, in der Darstellung ihrer konzentrischen Struktur, der durchgängigen Systematik ihrer Existenzen, gebunden an zentrale Kräfte, zur Genüge zum Ausdruck gebracht. Maimonides aber scheint diese eine Seite des Verhältnisses im Organischen nicht zu genügen; er hebt wiederholt und gerade im Zusammenhang mit der Teleologie die Bedeutung des Teiles hervor. Es macht den Eindruck, als ob es ihm um die Hervorhebung dieses Punktes besonders zu tun wäre.

Das Einzelding hat nicht bloß seine Existenz durch das Ganze und für es, was ja die Zweckmäßigkeit zunächst bedingt, sondern der Teil, und gerade als Teil einer Welt, hat Eigenbedeutung. Und dies nicht allein im Wissen Gottes, worauf besonderes Gewicht gelegt wird,[100] sondern auch in seinem

[99] *Moreh* I 34 (dritte Ursache); bei Aufzählung der letzten Dinge, die jedem wissenswert erscheinen müssen: ואיך נברא העולם כלו (אלעאלם באסרה) ומה תכליתו לפי סדורו קצתו עם קצתו. Munk I, S. 120: à la disposition réciproque de ses parties. Daß in demselben Zusammenhang mit Schöpfung und Zweck auch nach der Natur des Himmels und der Engel gefragt wird, wird uns später noch verständlich werden.

[100] Dies im Zusammenhang mit der Providenz, *Moreh* III 16 g. E., der für Maimonides ein wesentlich notwendiger ist. Den Vertretern der Anschauung,

schöpferischen Tun. Zweimal wird dies im Zusammenhang mit der Teleologie betont: das eine Mal bei der Ablehnung der dinglichen Zweckmäßigkeit, wo in Verbindung mit der Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge auch hervorgehoben wird, daß jeder einzelne Teil der Welt erschaffen ist.[101] Das zweite Mal, im stärksten proteleologischen Kapitel, wo Gott als Zweck der Zwecke bezeichnet wird, wo aber als Hauptabsicht des ganzen Kapitels die angegeben wird, daß Gott alle in der Welt vorkommenden Einzelwirkungen ebenso bewirkt, wie er die Welt als Ganzes in dieser ihrer Form schafft.[102] An dieser zweiten Stelle scheint die Hervorhebung der Schöpfung im einzelnen, gleichgestellt der, als Voraussetzung angenommenen, Schöpfung des Ganzen als besonders wesentlich in der Lehre der göttlichen Zweckmäßigkeit. Ebenso wird bei Behandlung der Irrtümer der Menschen bezüglich der Zweckmäßigkeit in einem Atem gesprochen vom „Zweck der Existenz des gesamten Universums oder vom Zweck einer jeden seiner Teile".[103] Maimonides geht aber noch weiter. Als Abschluß des Kapitels I 72, wo er die Lehre vom Weltorganismus darstellt, kommt der Satz, daß die göttliche Leitung und Providenz sich auf jeden einzelnen Teil der Welt bezieht und

Gott kenne und berücksichtige nicht die Teile, da sie nur sinnlich erfaßbar seien etc., wirft Maimonides Inkonsequenz vor — סכלותם בזה שהיו מעירים אותנו עליו תמיד —, indem gerade sie beim Menschen, in Fragen der Theodizee, vom Einzelnen ausgingen. Er bezeichnet auch die Anschauung von den Teilen als Verlegenheitsgriff, um die Auffassung vom Menschen gutzumachen: וכאשר יסדו הסנה הזאת הסותרת לכל סנה טובה ... התחילו אחר כן להסיר נגותה.

[101] *Moreh* III 13: כל חלק מחלקי העולם וכר שהוא המציאו ושמציאותו היה נאות לכונה. Zu bemerken ist, daß an dieser Stelle im Kapitel, wo durchwegs von הדא וגוד die Rede ist, doch der Terminus עאלם gebraucht wird (כל גו וגו מן אלוא אלעאלם). Ein Beweis mehr, daß die Terminologie nicht zufällig ist. Vgl. oben Anm. 74 und 75.

[102] *Moreh* I 69: ואמנם הכונה הנה היותו יתי סועל לפרטי הפעולות הבאות בעולם, כמו שהוא עושה העולם כלו כמות שהוא. Munks (I, S. 317) Ici on a seulement pour but ... drückt das אנמא des Originals in der Hervorhebung der Wichtigkeit dieses Satzes noch besser aus. Ephodi z. St. hebt hier die Kontinuität hervor — מתמיד העולם כלו — was uns weiter unten klarer werden wird.

[103] *Moreh* III 25: שרוב הספקות המביאות למבוכה בבקשת תכלית מציאות העולם בכללו (וגוד אלעאלם בגמלתה) או תכלית כל חלק מחלקיו. Munks (III, S. 201) „soit ... soit" ist abschwächend und nicht begründet.

selbst auf den geringsten und minderwertigsten.[104] Dies heißt noch viel mehr als das früher erwähnte noetische und kreatorische Verhalten Gottes zum einzelnen Weltteil. Es steht ja auch in offenbarem Widerspruch zur späteren, eigentlichen Providenzlehre.[105] Welcher Widerspruch uns hier aber weiter nicht aufhalten soll, da der Ausspruch hier ja doch nur zur besonders eindeutigen Hervorhebung der Weltteile in ihrem Zusammenhang mit Gott dienen soll.

Der organische Charakter der Welt im Lichte der Teleologie bedeutet daher viel mehr als die bloße Unterordnung des Teiles, als Mittel, unter das Ganze, als Zweck; er besagt gleichzeitig die Unmittelbarkeit der Beziehung zwischen Teil und Gott als Zweck, wodurch also auch der Teil etwas vom Zweck an sich hat. Alles in der organischen Welt ist Mittel und Zweck zugleich.[106] Wodurch eben die Zweckmäßigkeit eine organische ist, zum Unterschiede von der mechanischen, wo der Teil mit dem Zweck nur mittelbar, durch das Ganze, als dessen Mittel, in Verbindung ist. In gewissem Sinne haben wir hier ein Analogon zu jenem Hervortreten des Menschen aus seiner Genusexistenz, die wir im vorigen Kapitel besprochen haben. Dort hat die intellektuell-ethische Stellung den Menschen, das menschliche Individuum, den Genera gleichgestellt; auch hier tritt das Einzelding, im Lichte der Gesamtzweckmäßigkeit, aus seiner Subordination zum Ganzen hervor, tritt in direkte Beziehung zum einheitlichen Weltzweck (der in Gott enthalten ist),

[104] Dies wird als bewiesen betrachtet; והטוסת יעמוד על מציאות מעשה הנהגתו והשגחתו בכל חלק מחלקיו ואפילו הדק הפחות, dies entsprechend dem vorhergehenden והנהגתו יתע׳ והשגחתו מחוברת לעולם בכללו. Vgl. Tibbons Erklärung der Fremdwörter unter השגחה, da wird das Moment der wertenden Beachtung (Beispiel: לא משגחינן ביה) hervorgehoben.

[105] *Moreh* III 17, (הדעת הה׳), wird in bezug auf alle Geschöpfe, mit Ausnahme des Menschen, die philosophische Lehrmeinung akzeptiert אבל ישאר בע״ח וכ״ש הצמחים וזולתם, דעתי בהן דעת אריסטו, לא אאמין כלל שזה העלה נפל בהשגחה בו ולא שזה העכביש וכו׳ und mehrere andere Beispiele. Wie Munk, I, S. 373 n. 2, gerade von jenen in der vorigen Anmerkung zitierten והטוסת יעמוד auf III 17, wo das Gegenteil gelehrt wird, offenbar belegend verweisen konnte, ist unverständlich.

[106] Diese Kantsche (*Kr. d. Urt.* II § 66) Formulierung der Zweckmäßigkeit im organischen Wesen darf hier verwendet werden, obwohl es sich hier keineswegs um eine Naturzweckmäßigkeit handelt.

ohne daß diese Vielheit der Einzelbeziehungen etwa eine Zersplitterung der göttlichen Zwecktätigkeit nach sich ziehen würde.[107]

Nun bewegt sich dieser ganze Gedankengang auf aristotelischem Boden; da ja eine durchgebildete und bis ins einzelne seiner Philosophie eindringende teleologische Lehre bei Aristoteles gegeben ist, während, wie bereits bemerkt, in der jüdisch-traditionellen Gedankenwelt eine teleologische Philosophie so gut wie gar keinen Platz hatte. Darum ist auch dies eine jener Partien in der Philosophie Maimonides', in denen er ausschließlich aristotelische Philosophie zum Ausgangspunkt nehmen mußte und in denen er auch immer wieder sich auf Aristoteles ausdrücklich beruft. Es erscheint daher unerläßlich, in einigen wesentlichen Punkten auf die eigentliche teleologische Lehre Aristoteles' einzugehen und ihnen die Ergebnisse Maimonides' vergleichend entgegenzuhalten. Dadurch allein können wir zur klareren Erkenntnis dessen gelangen, worin sich Maimonides von seiner aristotelischen Grundlage abhebt, d. h. wozu er die ihm gegebenen Elemente der Teleologie umgestaltet hat. Wobei bei der Fülle der Ausstrahlungen dieser Frage in alle philosophischen Gebiete darauf zu achten ist, daß der Rahmen, der durch unsere systematische Absicht hier gegeben ist, nicht allzusehr überschritten wird.[108] Der Vergleich soll nur so weit gehen, als er uns zur deutlichen Erkenntnis des Spezifischen bei Maimonides zu verhelfen vermag.

Es zeigt sich nun gleich in der hier behandelten Frage des Verhältnisses Teil-Ganzes eine wesentliche Verschiedenheit.

[107] Diese Anschauung des Kalam weist ja Maimonides ausführlich, und für sein System grundlegend, zurück. So *Moreh* I 73, VI Präm. ff., dann I 74 bes. V Methode u. v. a.

[108] Die Einschränkung muß in zweifacher Richtung stattfinden. Es kann, erstens, nicht quellenkritisch auf den arabischen Aristotelismus, besonders Alfarabi und Ibn Sina, eingegangen werden, da bei ihnen für unser Problem wenig Eigenes anzutreffen ist; sie waren hauptsächlich logisch oder psychologisch orientiert und die Teleologie nahm keinen zentralen Platz ein, vgl. de Boer, *Gesch. d. Phil. im Islam*, S. 125. Anderseits aber kann hier bei Berührung Aristoteles' das entwicklungsgeschichtliche Moment der aristotelischen Philosophie — das W. Jäger, *Aristoteles*, großzügig ins Licht gerückt hat — nicht berücksichtigt werden, da wir uns ja mit dem der Nachwelt vorliegenden, als einheitlich angesehenen Aristoteles, wie ihn Maimonides kannte, auseinanderzusetzen haben.

Wohl hat Aristoteles die Bedeutung des Zweckes mit dem organischen Charakter des Weltgeschehens, im Gegensatze zu den materialistisch-mechanistischen Lehren der Vorsokratiker, begründet.[109] Aber der Begriff des Organischen erschöpft sich bei ihm nur in dem früher erwähnten ersten Moment: in der Subordination der Teile unter das Ganze. Das ist auch der eigentliche Sinn der aristotelischen Teleologie, daß der Zweck mit dem jeweiligen Ganzen identisch ist und die Teile nur Organe, Mittel sind, die zu ihm führen.[110] Von dem zweiten Moment, wonach durch die Zweckmäßigkeit die Teile eben aufhören, bloß Mittel zu sein, und zwischen ihnen und dem Ganzen ein teleologisch reziprokes Verhältnis besteht, davon ist bei Aristoteles nichts zu finden. Diese grundlegend vorausgesetzte Notwendigkeit der Unter- und Überordnung im Teleologischen führte ihn auch zur Annahme, daß auch dort, wo ein Ganzes, das als Zweck gelten könnte, nicht zu sehen war, ein Teil, wenn er als besser betrachtet wird, von den anderen herausgehoben wird, diesen gegenüber die Stelle des Ganzen einnimmt und somit ihr Zweck wird.[111] Wohl

[109] *Phys.*, 198 b 14 ff. wo der Begriff der Zweckursache für die Natur begründet wird, schickt eine Kritik der vorsokratischen Lehren, besonders der des Empedokles, voraus. Ebenso *de part. anim.* 640 a 22, bezüglich des Werdeprozesses im Organischen. Obwohl anderseits ein gewisses „Streifen" des Form- und Wesenbegriffes bei Empedokles und Demokritos zugegeben wird. (*Phys.* 194 a 20: ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι μέρος.) Ähnlich *Met.* 993 a 17 f. Vgl. Hans Mayr, *Natur und Kunst bei Arist.*, S. 34.

[110] *de part. animal.* 641 a 7—32; 645 a 30 f. (Vergleich mit dem Holz, Stein etc. im Verhältnis zum Ganzen des Hauses); ebenso *Met.* 1035 b 22: τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνόλου πρότερα ταῦτ' (sc. μορία) ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δύναται χωριζόμενα. Vgl. weitere Belege bei Siebeck, „Die Lehre des Aristoteles von dem Leben etc. des Universums", *Zeitschr. f. Phil. u. phil. Kritik*, Bd. 60, S. 4; er gelangt auch zum Schluß: „Es ist augenfällig, daß dieses Erfordernis (nämlich, daß „Teile ... doch nur als Glieder des aus ihnen bestehenden Ganzen wahre Existenz haben und somit ... nicht früher sind, als das Ganze") mit den Bestimmungen übereinkommt, worin Aristoteles das Wesen des Organismus setzt." Das gilt auch im Staate; *Pol.* 1253 a 20: τὸ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. Vgl. Mayr, *Der Entwicklungsgedanke bei Aristoteles*, S. 96 und 99.

[111] *de gener. anim.* 732 a 5: βέλτιον τὸ κεχωρίσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον τοῦ χείρονος. Ähnlich *de part. anim.* 672 b 20; bes. *Pol.* 1333 a 21: ἀεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. Vgl. Eucken, *Die Methode der aristotelischen Forschung*, S. 85.

spielt das Besondere einmal eine bevorzugte Rolle gegenüber dem Allgemeinen — dies gilt aber nur für die Herausbildung des Gattungstypus,[112] was aber wieder nichts anderes bedeutet als das Allgemeine gegenüber dem Individuellen. In der aristotelischen Teleologie gibt es eben nur diesen einen festen Punkt: das Genus; ihm gegenüber verschwindet das Einzeldasein, von ihm aber führt auch kein richtiger Weg zu einer alle Genera umfassenden Zweckmäßigkeit.[113] Während wir also bei Maimonides einen einzigen Zweck sahen, der alles umfaßt, und somit auch die geringsten Teile, sind es bei Aristoteles viele, relative Zwecke, hauptsächlich die Genera, denen die Teile, also alles Individuelle, nur dienen, aber keinerlei unmittelbare Beziehung zu einem, auch dem Ganzen übergeordneten Zwecke behaupten können.

Dies hängt aber mit einer zweiten Divergenz zusammen. Wir sahen bei Maimonides die Zulässigkeit des Zweckbegriffes immer in zwei Formen: erstens als Selbstzweck der Einzelexistenzen, was als nächster Zweck bezeichnet werden mag; dies in der Welt der Dinge der Vielheit; zweitens aber als letzter, alles umfassender Zweck, in der Welt, die einen einheitlichen Organismus bildet. Charakteristisch hierfür ist der eine Satz in dem beides hervorgehoben wird: sowohl die Ablehnung der Fremdzwecklichkeit unter den Dingen als auch die Entstehung der kleinsten Teile aus einer einheitlichen Zweckabsicht.[114] Das genaue Gegenteil haben wir bei Aristo-

[112] *de gener. anim.* 736b 2: οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γίνεται ζῷον καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲ ζῷον καὶ ἵππος ... ὕστερον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τέλος, τὸ δ'ἴδιον ἐστι τὸ ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως τέλος. Ähnlich *de part. anim.* 685b 15; *de inc. anim.* 704b 15 (ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ'ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχωμένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζῴου τὸ ἄριστον); dann 708a 9. Allerdings ist bei den verstümmelten Arten auch dieses Prinzip durchbrochen, darüber Eucken, *loc. cit.*, S. 82.

[113] Die Zweckmäßigkeit zeigt sich nur im Bau einzelner Gattungen im Verhältnis zu anderen (so *de part. anim.* 696b 24f.) oder im Bau der Individuen mit Rücksicht auf ihre Gattung, ohne individuellen Nutzen. Von den vielen Beispielen seien erwähnt: *hist. anim.* 502b 21; *de part. anim.* 689b 2; ferner 669b 28 (über die Milz); *de gener. anim.* 750b 6. Daß aber eine Reihe individueller Züge, wie etwa Augen und Haarfarbe, nichts mit Zweckmäßigkeit zu tun haben, wird ausdrücklich erklärt *de gener. anim.* 778a 30f.; b. 13.

[114] *Moreh* III 13; aus der Torah ist zu ersehen שלא באר כלל בדבר מהם שיהיה בעבור דבר אחר אלא כל חלק וחלק בחלקי העולם וכר שהוא המציאו ושבציאותו היה נאות לכונה. Die

teles. Die Teile haben nichts vom Zweck an sich, sie sind nur für ihn da. Hingegen muß Aristoteles, um die vielen in der Welt vorkommenden Zwecke zu einer Einheit zusammenzuschließen, sich eben desselben Mittels bedienen, das wir oben in bezug auf die Beziehung Teil-Ganzes sahen. Wo es kein Ganzes gibt, da wurde ein Teil, infolge seiner relativen Wichtigkeit, zum Range des Ganzen erhoben. Auch in der Welt muß diese pars-pro-toto-Methode angewendet werden. Als Ersatz des einzigen Weltzweckes werden die Genera in ein System einer Zweckabstufung gebracht, wonach das eine Genus, das höhere, dem niederen als Zweck dient. Bei Aristoteles geschieht diese Subordination innerhalb der Genera in zweierlei Form: einmal als Norm, da ist das Höhere dem Niederen Zweck im Sinne eines zur Nachahmung hinanziehenden höheren Wesens; danach ist in der sublunaren Welt der Mensch der Normgebende, im Universum aber tritt er vor den Sphären zurück.[115] Denn selbst die Möglichkeit, seinen eigenen Zweck zum Ausdruck zu bringen, ist auch nur den höheren Genera verliehen und steht in direktem Verhältnis zur Höhe des betreffenden Genus.[116] Aber nicht allein in diesem, mehr formalen

Verbindung mit אלא drückt deutlich aus, daß sich die beiden Ansichten ausschließen. Bei Schem-Tob z. St. noch prägnanter: והוא שכל נמצא כיון בו הנמצא ההוא טבלתי שיטצא דבר בעבור דבר אחר.

115 Die Tiere sind nur zwergartige Geschöpfe gegenüber dem Menschen *de part. anim.* 686 b 2. Sowohl sein Körperbau, der allein der naturgemäß richtige ist — *ibid.* 656 a 10 —, ist ein Maßstab für alles Tierische als auch besonders das Psychische, indem alles im Tier vorkommende Seelenleben nur als Spur des menschlichen anzusehen ist; *hist. anim.* 588 a 18: ἔνεστι ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἴχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων; ebenso 608 b 4; auch in der Lebensart πολλὰ ἂν θεωρηθείη μιμήματα τῶν ἀλλων ζώων τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς, 612 b 18. Daß es allerdings im Kosmos ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν gibt, wird *Eth. Nic.* 1141 a 34 hervorgehoben, ebenso bezüglich der Höherstellung der Gestirne *de caelo* 290 a 32.

116 Dies wird *Meteor.* 389 b 29 f. an Beispielen genau ausgeführt, (35: τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκιστα ἐνταῦθα δῆλον ὅπου πλεῖστον τῆς ὕλης). Ebenso *Phys.* 199 b 9: καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, ἧττον δὲ διήρθρωται. Ist dies nun ausgesprochene aristotelische Lehrmeinung, so konnte Maimonides, *Moreh* III 13, gut als טבואר מאד בהכמה השבעית auch anführen daß: (sc. הסבה התכליית) הנכבדת שבסבות האדבע תעלם ברוב רשינים, da ja die meisten Genera eben die tieferstehenden sind. Munk, III, S. 85 n. 1, der diese Ansicht bei Aristoteles nicht vorzufinden glaubte, will an Stelle von יאן הוא, wodurch dies als Ansicht Aristoteles' gedacht ist, והוא lesen,

Sinne, auch in einer niedereren, praktischen Beziehung will Aristoteles manchmal die niederen Arten für die höheren existieren lassen, für deren Nutzen; demnach die Pflanzen für das Tier, das Tier aber für den Menschen, wobei natürlich der Mensch die höchste Stufe bedeutet.[117] Die Zusammenschließung der vielen Zwecke zu einer Einheit wird also hier nur durch die Fremdzwecklichkeit erreicht. Was aber gleichbedeutend ist mit der Verdinglichung des Zweckes.

Bei Maimonides wissen wir, daß er, um eben die Reinheit des Zweckbegriffes zu erhalten, weder die Sphären als höchsten Zweck noch auch den Menschen in der sublunaren Welt gelten lassen will — selbst im Sinne einer Norm.[118] Schon gar nicht aber möchte er dies zulassen im Sinne des Nutzens.[119] Die Verschiedenheit der Auffassungen bezüglich der Teile greift also hinüber auch auf die Auffassung bezüglich der Dinglichkeit des Zweckes und der Fremdzwecklichkeit.

Dazu kommt noch ein Drittes. Wir haben gesehen, daß Maimonides wohl die Welt mit einem Menschen vergleicht, von ihr aber die Einheit als Makrorganismus aussagt. Sie als Makranthropos zu betrachten, hält er nicht für nötig.

womit eine eigene Hinzufügung Maimonides' gegeben wäre. Diese Korrektur ist, wie gesehen, überflüssig, aber auch aus dem Grunde unmöglich, da doch Maimonides, wäre es seine eigene Behauptung, dies auch begründen müßte. Daß alle Genera im Entstehen und Vergehen ihren Zweck haben, spricht nichts gegen die Behauptung, der Zweck sei in den meisten nicht genug sichtbar (יכמי — העלם). Das Tibbonsche וזאת הסכה התכליית etc. muß daher, dem ואין הדא entsprechend, richtig heißen ושזאת oder את וכי.

117 Schon unter den Elementen wird die Stufenfolge, verbunden mit Zweckzuordnung, durchgeführt, *Meteor.* 389 b 26. Bei den organischen Wesen τὰ ὁμοιμερῆ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν ἕνεκέν ἐστιν, *de part. anim.* 646 b 11. Dann aber *Pol.* 1256 b 15: ... οἰητέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τἄλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, worauf sich offenbar *Moreh* III 13 (s. *Guide* III, S. 85 n. 3) bezieht, und bezeichnend als Schluß: εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν, womit dies mit der eigentlichen Teleologie enge verknüpft erscheint. In dem Sinne schließt auch *Phys.* 194 a 35: ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος.

118 Dies wäre die III 13 als irrig zurückgewiesene Meinung שהכלית המציאות בלו מציאות מין האדם לברו לעבוד את השם, wie Saadja es begründet. Vgl. oben Anm. 35, 36.

119 Wiederholt in III 13, s. oben Anm. 17, 29 und weiter unten Anm. 235—236.

Anderseits wiederum will er den Ausdruck Mikrokosmos nur für den Menschen, nicht aber für jedes Lebewesen zulassen.[120] Das Gegenteil bei Aristoteles. Die organische Einheit der Welt selbst wird bei ihm nur insofern zum Ausdruck gebracht, als er ihren zweckmäßigen Aufbau mit dem Kunstwerk vergleicht, sie als Werk eines guten Wirtschafters oder vernünftigen Menschen ansieht.[121] Nicht ausgesagt wird ihre Einheit, sondern verglichen ihre rationelle Organisation. Hingegen wird die Bezeichnung Mikrokosmos unbedenklich auch auf jedes andere Lebewesen angewendet,[122] wodurch also die innewohnende Vernunft, die das Zweckmäßige in der Welt ausmachen soll, nicht mehr als für dessen Charakter wesentlich angesehen wird. Während also bei Maimonides allein aus der organischen Beschaffenheit der Weltzusammenhänge das sie durchwaltende Vernunftprinzip hervorging und dadurch eben nur das vernunftbegabte Wesen, der Mensch, als seine Miniatur bezeichnet zu werden verdient, wird bei Aristoteles die Welt nur als ein vernünftiges Werk angesehen, was ja auch für jedes Lebewesen zutreffen mag.

Es ist dies aber nicht bloß ein Unterschied in Metaphern, sondern in der Grundvorstellung. Aus ihr resultieren die drei angeführten Züge in der Teleologie des Aristoteles: die einseitige Subordination des Teiles zum Ganzen, die dingliche Fremdzwecklichkeit innerhalb der Genera, die bloß zweckmäßige, einem Kunstwerk gleiche, aber nicht zweckdurchdrungene und von einem einheitlichen Zweck getragene Ordnung der Welt; all dies ist Ausdruck für die technistische

120 Beleg s. oben Anm. 62.

121 *de gener. anim.* 744 b 16 ff.: ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαί τι χρηστόν. (Ähnlich *de part. anim.* 675 b 20 ff.) *de part. anim.* 687 a 10—12: ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι. Dann *ibid.* 694 a 20 f., 661 b 28 f. Bezeichnend ist bei beiden angeführten Stellen, daß sich die Vernünftigkeit der Natur mit der richtigen Ausnützung und nützlichen Verteilung begründet wird. Vgl. Hardy, *Der Begriff d. Physis etc.* I, S. 195 ff. Daß aber die Welt, obwohl sie belebt ist, doch nicht ein einheitliches ζῷον im Sinne Platons darstellt, weist nach Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* II³, 2, S. 423 Anm. 1.

122 Von mehreren allgemein gehaltenen Vergleichen sei als besonders bezeichnend angeführt *Phys.* 252 b 26: εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ (bezogen auf das vorhergehende: εἰ δ' ἐν ζῴῳ) γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ.

Grundauffassung bei Aristoteles. Technistisch als Überwindung der mechanistischen; technistisch als Grundvorstellung auch dann, wenn einzelne aristotelische Aussprüche versichern, daß die Kunst die Natur, nicht die Natur die Kunst nachahme.[123] Denn nicht vom Rang ist hier die Rede, sondern von der ursprünglichen Konzeption. Und diese technistische Konzeption ist es eben, in allen Teilen, der Maimonides entgegentritt.

Bei Maimonides war es die Einheit des Kosmos, entsprechend der Einheit Gottes, die die Einheit des Weltzweckes gewährleistete. Für Aristoteles konnte es eine solche Einheit, zumindest für die Teleologie, nicht geben. Die architektonische Einheit, der konzentrische Aufbau, bedingt dies noch lange nicht notwendig. Abgesehen von der Vielheit der Zwecke, die die technistische Grundanschauung mit sich brachte, waren es in in der aristotelischen Welt zwei voneinander notwendigerweise wesentlich verschiedene Zweckarten: die in der Sphärenwelt und die im sublunarischen Entstehen und Vergehen. Da sich die Notwendigkeit des Zweckes zunächst aus dem Begriff der Kinesis ergeben hat — da die Einzelbewegung zu irgendeinem Ende, Telos, führt[124] —, so war der eigentliche Platz des

[123] *Phys.* 194 a 21: ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν. Bald darauf aber, an der Hauptstelle, 199 a 15 f., wird derselbe Ausspruch — ἡ τέχνη τὰ μέν ἐπιτελεῖ... τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται — ganz klar als Ausgangspunkt benützt, um von der Technik auf den Zweck in der Natur zu schließen: εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἕνεκα του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν; woran sich dann mehrere Gedanken dieser Art anschließen. Ebenso *de anima* 415 b 16: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις, καὶ τουτ' ἔστιν αὐτῇ τέλος. Allerdings schließt der ähnliche Gedankengang *de part. anim.* 639 b 19 ff. damit ab, daß μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα... ἐν τοῖ τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ εν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. (Vgl. Meyer, *Natur und Kunst*, S. 62 f., 85 f.) Wenn Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 75 Anm. 2, nach der (als aristotelisch agnoszierten) Proteptikos-Stelle μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φύσις etc., die faktische Priorität der Natur gegenüber der Kunst hervorhebt, so ist damit noch immer die vielfach belegte logische Priorität der Kunstzweckmäßigkeit gegenüber der der Natur nicht aus der Welt geschafft — und darauf kommt es ja bei der Grundvorstellung des Philosophen an.

[124] Beispiele für das Schreiten zum Ziele gibt es mehrere, so *Phys.* 193 b 13, wird vom ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν gesprochen, dann 16: τὸ φυόμενον ἐκ τινὸς εἰς τὶ ἔρχεται; 257 b 7 f.: τὸ δὲ δυνάμει εἰς ἐντελέχειαν βαδίζει, ἔστι δ' ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής. *Met.* 1048 b 28: πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής (Beispiel: βάδισις); 1050 a 7: ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος. *De coelo* 310 a 34 f. (εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος φέρεσθαι). Klar ist die Bezeichnung des τέλος als ἔσχατον in *Met.* 1055 a 14. Über den Zweck als Grenze, vgl. Eucken, *loc. cit.*, S. 110 f.

Telos, in seiner Zwitterbedeutung Ende-Zweck, ursprünglich nur in derjenigen Bewegung, die geradlinig verläuft, also in der sublunaren Welt.[125] Es war nur gleichsam im Wege des Schlusses, daß auch in der superlunarischen Welt, wo die Sphärenbewegung die vollkommenste, die kreisförmige, die unendliche ist, daß auch da ein Telos angenommen wurde — das aber nichts mehr vom Ende an sich haben konnte und nur reiner Zweck war, der ὡς ἐρώμενον, ὡς ὀρεκτόν wirkt.[126] Es ist dies der erste unbewegte Beweger. Und wenn innerhalb des einzelnen Geschehens eine Art Synonymie[127] unter den Ursachen besteht, so mag hier bei der Anwendung desselben Terminus für beide grundverschiedene Bewegungsarten eine Homonymie vorliegen.

Denn die beiden Hälften der Welt, die sphärische und die irdische, dürfen in keinem Punkte verglichen, noch auch nach denselben Prinzipien behandelt werden.[128] Wie sollen sie nun in der wichtigsten der Ursachen, in der Zweckursache, ein Gemeinsames haben? Die Welt hängt wohl zusammen. Aber die Einwirkung der Sphären auf die sublunare Welt ist uns bei Aristoteles nur in zweierlei Beziehung bekannt: in der mechanischen, indem die Drehungen der Gestirne auf das

[125] *De coelo* 288 b 29 f.: ἅπασαν δὲ (sc. κίνησιν) φάμεν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι εἶναι καὶ ὡρισμένην. *Phys.* 241 a 26: μεταβολὴ... ἅπασα γὰρ ἦν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι, καὶ ἡ ἐν ἀντιφάσει καὶ ἡ ἐναντίοις; 261 a 32. *Met.* 1069 b 13: εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἄν εἶεν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί; auch 1012 b 28. Vgl. *de gener. et corr.* 331 a 14 ff. Die Bewegung von Punkt zu Punkt, die als Gegensätze anzusehen sind, war also die Grundvorstellung. Das konnte für die Sphäre nicht gelten; *Phys.* 241 b 2: ἡ δὲ φορὰ ὕστερον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πεπερασμένη· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσα ἐν ἐναντίοις.

[126] *Met.* 1072 b 3, 1074 a 23. Weiters vgl. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 375 Anm. 2 und 3.

[127] Die darin besteht, daß „das neu entstehende dieselbe Form an sich trägt wie das den Werdeprozeß einleitende Prinzip". Meyer, *Natur und Kunst* S. 60; Belege s. *ibid.* Anm. 4 („eine Ausnahme findet nur statt beim ersten Beweger").

[128] *Met.* 1075 b 13: διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ' ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. *De coelo* 306 a 9: δεῖ ἴσως... τῶν δ' ἀϊδίων ἀϊδίους, τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν φθαρτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅλως δ' ὁμογενεῖς τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις; auch 279 a 18 (daß das Überirdische über Raum und Zeit erhaben ist). Gegenüber dem Sublunaren aber ist das Superlunare als das Normale maßgebend, was ausführlich *Met.* 1010 a 25, 1063 a 11 behandelt wird. Dieser Mangel an Einheitlichkeit innerhalb der Welt wird nicht gutgemacht durch die verschiedenen Beweise, daß es nur eine Welt gibt, nicht viele, worüber Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 446 f.

Werden in der irdischen Welt Einfluß haben,[129] und in der μίμησις der letzteren. Die μίμησις ist es eigentlich, die im irdischen Entstehen und Vergehen, die in jedem Sonderfalle doch geradlinig verlaufen, eine Art von Kreislauf, also der Bewegung der Sphären gleich, erblicken läßt.[130] Dies steht dem Teleologischen etwas näher — doch reicht ja sicher das Verhältnis der μίμησις, das Aristoteles in verschiedenen Beziehungen verwendet,[131] nicht aus, um eine teleologische Verbundenheit darzustellen, die doch in der Vorstellung des Organs wurzelt. Wie könnte, im teleologischen Sinne Aristoteles', auch nur die entfernteste Möglichkeit einer Konstruktion bestehen, wonach etwa das Entstehen und Vergehen, selbst als kyklische Bewegung gesehen, M i t t e l ist, die zum Kreislauf der Sphären irgendwie führt? Anderseits ist μιμούμενος doch keinesfalls gleichwertig mit ἐρώμενος.

Demnach ist weder die Möglichkeit gegeben, aus dem sublunarischen Entstehen und Vergehen auf den unbewegten Beweger zu schließen,[132] noch auch diesen, wenn auch erwiesen,

[129] Belege s. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 468f., bes. S. 471 Anm. 1 und 2. Diese feste Beziehung zwischen der Ekliptik und der irdischen γένεσις ist der Grundzug der Schrift *de gen. et corr.* Hinzuzufügen wäre noch *Phys.* 194 b 13: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος..., dazu ergänzend *Met.* 1071 a 13, worin bei der Entstehung des Menschen gleichgestellt sind πατήρ mit ἥλιος und λοξὸς κύκλος. Weitere Stellen, wo als πρῶτον κινοῦν für das Werden die Kreisbewegung der Planeten zu verstehen ist, *Met.* 1070 b 27, b 34 u. a.

[130] *Meteor.* 346 b 36, wo der Kreislauf des Wassers μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον. Allgemeiner *Met.* 1050 b 28: μιμεῖται τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα; *de gener. et corr.* 337 a 2: καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα... μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν (veranschaulicht am Kreislauf der Elemente) ...ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχής ἐστιν. Auch *Phys.* 223 b 23 ff.

[131] So z. B. *hist. anim.* 612 b 18, wo im Leben der Tiere πολλὰ μιμήματα zum Leben des Menschen gefunden werden, oder *Poet.* 1449 b 9, wo vom Epos ausgesagt wird, es sei eine μίμησις der Tragödie. In beiden Fällen wird wohl eine Wertung damit ausgedrückt, doch auf keinen Fall eine wirklich teleologische Beziehung.

[132] In der Jugendschrift περὶ φιλοσοφίας hat Aristoteles wohl einen Gottesbeweis auf ontologisch-teleologischer Basis unternommen: Auf Grund der Stufenfolge im Seienden wird auf ein Höchstes, Vollkommenstes geschlossen. Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 161. Doch hat dieser Gedankengang, wie auch Jäger S. 162 andeutet, nichts Gemeinsames mit seinen aus den Lehrschriften bekannten Gottesbeweisen aus der Ewigkeit der Bewegung etc. Den „teleologischen" Gottesbeweis, den Elser, *Die Lehre des Aristoteles über das Wirken Gottes*, S. 9f.,

in irgendeine wirksame Beziehung zur sublunaren Welt zu bringen. Er bleibt Gott und Zweck der Sphären — und selbst da nicht der einzige, wie in der ursprünglichen Konzeption.[133] Er mußte auch da vieles von seiner Existenznotwendigkeit an die sich später ergebenen[134] 55 Sonderbeweger der einzelnen Sphären abgeben, die aber wiederum nicht mehr ganz „unbewegt" bleiben konnten, wodurch sich Aristoteles in Schwierigkeiten begeben mußte, die ihm später von Theophrast und Plotin[135] vorgeworfen wurden, die er aber auch selbst empfunden zu haben schien.[136] Ist nun die Vielheit selbst in die Region der unendlichen Kreisbewegung eingedrungen, welche Wirksamkeit soll da noch dem einzigen unbewegten Beweger in der Welt des endlichen, geradlinigen Entstehens und Vergehens vorbehalten sein? Es handelt sich hier nicht allein um die Schwierigkeit Immanenz-Transzendenz, die sich aus dieser Dualität der Bewegung und der Zwecke er-

anführt, bezeichnet er selbst, wegen seiner „populären Haltung", als für die eigentliche Gotteslehre Aristoteles' nicht maßgebend. Vgl. auch A. Boehm, *Die Gottesidee bei Aristoteles*, S. 86.

[133] Die ursprüngliche reine Fassung des πρῶτον κινοῦν im Jugenddialoge περὶ φιλοσοφίας stand noch ganz im Zeichen des platonischen Einflusses. Er hat bloß an Stelle der sich selbstbewegenden Weltseele für den πρῶτος οὐρανός den unbewegten Beweger angenommen. Reste dieser ursprünglichen Anschauung sind noch im Buche Λ der Metaph. erhalten. Darüber ausführlich Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 143, 231, 373 f.

[134] Dies geschieht *Met.* Λ 8, wo die Frage der Sphärenbeweger enge mit der fachlichen Astronomie, insbesondere mit der des Kalippos, verbunden wird. Durch diese Verbindung ergab sich die Annahme einer Mehrzahl von Sphärenbewegern als Konsequenz des πρῶτον κινοῦν. Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 366 ff., bes. S. 379. (Über die Bewegtheit dieser Sphärenbeweger S. 386.)

[135] Die Kritik Theophrasts, *Metaph.* p. 310 f. Br., gipfelt darin, daß sich aus der aristotelischen Annahme die Konsequenz ergibt, daß der erste Beweger keinerlei Wirkung auf die sublunare Welt ausüben kann. Plotin, *Enn.* V, I, 9., hält durch die Annahme der vielen Beweger — deren Verhältnis zum ersten Beweger nicht geklärt werden kann — die Einheitlichkeit des Kosmos gefährdet.

[136] Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 377, weist auf *Met.* 1074 a 31 ff. hin, wo die Einheit des Himmels, mitten im Kap. 8, bewiesen wird — welche Stelle als von Aristoteles selbst empfundener Einwand zu erklären ist. Dann *Phys.* 258 b 10: ... ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ὃ πρῶτον κινεῖ, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πλείω. Welche Ausdrucksweise, s. Jäger, S. 383, auf eine Unsicherheit bei Aristoteles selbst — im Kap. 6 des Buches VIII, wo die Notwendigkeit der Annahme eines ersten Bewegers bewiesen wird — schließen läßt.

gibt.[137] Denn selbst als transzendenter Zweck ist der einzige Beweger in der sublunaren Welt ganz unbegründet und unhaltbar. Das aristotelische Bild, daß die Welt an Gott „hängt" (ἤρτηται), entspricht gut diesem unbestimmten Verhältnis zwischen dem ersten Beweger der Sphärenwelt und einem hypothetisch einheitlichen Kosmos.[138] Zumindest ist dadurch ausgedrückt, daß er weder die Welt durchdringt, noch aus sich emaniert.[139] Soll aber die Zweckmäßigkeit nicht bloß homonymer Natur oder Metapher sein, sondern ein wirklicher Faktor, eine causa finalis, so mußte der teleologische Zusammenhang zwischen der super- und sublunaren Welt hergestellt sein, und es mußte in Gott oder von ihm aus der Zweck des Ganzen, ein Zweck, gefunden werden können. Bei Aristoteles aber gibt es weder einen Zweck, noch eine teleologisch geeinigte Welt.

Für Maimonides war die Einheit der Welt, und somit ihre einheitliche Zweckmäßigkeit, gesichert durch zwei wesentliche Grundlehren: die Kreation ex nihilo und die Stellung des Aktiven Intellektes; oder, bei einer allgemeinen Fassung des zweiten Punktes, durch die neue Deutung der Funktion

[137] So z. B. Cassirer, *loc. cit.*, I[2], S. 216, der als inneren Widerstreit bei Aristoteles den zwischen seiner Naturansicht und der Metaphysik empfindet: „Der Weltbegriff hat seine Selbständigkeit an den Gottesbegriff verloren." Ähnlich Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, I[7], S. 64, der die teleologische Immanenz als Pantheismus ansieht und ihr die „transzendente Gottesidee", die dem „echt aristotelischen Gedanken" vom unbewegten Beweger entspricht, gegenüberstellt.

[138] Siebeck, *loc. cit.*, S. 29, will zunächst den Schluß vom αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν auf die Annahme eines aus der sublunaren Welt, dem Himmelsgebäude und dem unbewegten Beweger bestehenden, „einen lebenden und beseelten Organismus" als berechtigt erklären, muß aber selbst, S. 36 u. bes. S. 38, die Unhaltbarkeit dieser Anschauung, infolge der unüberwindbaren Schwierigkeiten im System, zugeben. „Wenn es nur mit der Einheit dieses ζῷον besser bestellt wäre!" Die „Beseeltheit" der irdischen Welt kann nur als ἀνάλογον zur eigentlich beseelten Sphärenwelt angesehen werden. (S. 37.) In seinem späteren *Aristoteles*, S. 53, sieht Siebeck „bei näherer Betrachtung" diese Auffassung der Einheit der Welt (mit Einbeziehung des πρῶτον κινοῦν) als eine „Vereinigung von Gegensätzen", die „mehr behauptet als bewiesen" ist.

[139] Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 411. „Die Einheit Gottes mit der Welt" — „er ist ihre Einheit, obgleich er nicht in ihr ist" — ist in diesem Bilde, aus dem wohl nur die zweite Hälfte des Satzes hervorgeht, schwerlich zu finden.

der Sphären im kosmischen Geschehen. Wir werden sehen, daß gerade dieser Punkt der aristotelischen Lehre, wo, im Lichte der Teleologie, die Welt für ihn auseinanderfiel und nur, schwer vereinbar, an seinem unbewegten Beweger „hängen" blieb — daß es dieser Punkt war, wo Maimonides ansetzte, um das erschütterte aristotelische Gebäude durch sein eigenes zu ersetzen. Und es wird sich auch zeigen, daß die vielzitierte Konzession, die Maimonides der aristotelischen Lehre in der sublunaren Welt einräumt,[140] und sogar die Verbindung dieser Konzession mit einer scheinbaren Teilung zwischen dem himmlischen und irdischen Bereich[141] nicht wörtlich zu nehmen sind. Für beide ist, durch den einschränkenden und betonten Zusatz der Unrichtigkeit der aristotelischen Lehren, insbesondere bezüglich der separaten Intelligenzen,[142] in der Gültigkeit dieser Lehren, auch im sublunaren Geschehen, eine wesentliche Restriktion gegeben, die, prinzipiell gesehen, einer Aufhebung gleichkommt.

Ist dies doch schon der Fall in der Frage der Kreation. Kreation aber und Stellung und Funktion der separaten Intelligenzen hängen enge zusammen und sind gleichsam gegenseitig bedingt. Die Kreationslehre glaubt Maimonides nicht anders stützen zu können als durch die präzisierte Lehre von

[140] *Moreh* II 22: שכל מה שאמרו אריכטו בכל הנמצא אשר מתחת גלגל הירח עד מרכז הארץ הוא אמת בלא ספק.

[141] *Moreh* II 24, wo auf die Stelle II 22 bezug genommen wird und nur noch unsere Unwissenheit in den superlunaren Dingen hervorgehoben: ואמנם כל מה שבשמים לא ידע האדם דבר ממנו אלא בזה השעור הלמודי המעט. Dann unter Heranziehung des Verses Ps. CXV 6: השמים לה׳ אמנם מה שתחת השמים נתן ליבולת לאדם לדעתו. Und als abschließende Mahnung: אבל נעמוד אצל היכולת ונניח הענין במה שלא יושג בהיקש לטי שבאהו השפע האלהי העצום.

[142] *Moreh* II 22 als Fortsetzung des oben Zitierten: כל שכן בטה שיאמרהו בסדר השכלים לקצת אלו הדעות האלהיות אשר יאמינם ובהם ההרחקות העצומות וההפכדים הנראים הטבוריים. Daß schon darin, entsprechend der maimunischen Lehre über den Zusammenhang zwischen der sphärischen und der sublunaren Welt, eine eingestandene wesentliche Abschwächung des Vorherigen enthalten ist, ist klar. Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 106, findet den Widerspruch schon im Vordersatz allein — וכטעט אומר שדבר לשון הבאי —, da doch die aristotelische Lehre von der Ewigkeit der ersten Materie sich auf die sublunare Welt bezieht und Maimonides I 74, Methode IV, die Kreation davon abhängig macht, שיתבאר בסופת היות ההומר הראשון והצורה הראשונה הוות נספדות.

den Sphären,[143] da ja der Haupteinwand gegen die Kreation, der vom Verhältnis Potentialität — Aktualität und ihrer Stellung im Zeitlichen, durch das Heranziehen der Wirksamkeit des Aktiven Intellektes entkräftet wird.[144] Anderseits aber ist auch zur richtigen Auffassung der separaten Intelligenzen, schon in ihrer Wirksamkeit auf die Sphären, die Kreationstheorie als Grundlage nötig.[145] Wie nun beide zu-

[143] *Moreh* II 2: כי החוקות שבראיות עליו (sc. על חדוש העולם) לא יתאמתו ולא יתבארו אלא אחר ידיעת מציאות השכלים הנפרדים ואיך אביא ראיה על מציאותם. Entgegen dem Einwande Munks, II, S. 48 n. 4, scheint die Lesung und Übersetzung Tibbons richtig zu sein, wenn es das אסתדל als I. Pers. futur. act. (أَسْتَدِلُّ) und nicht als perf. pass. (أُسْتُدِلَّ) auffaßt und also אביא (nicht הביאו wie Charisi) übersetzt. Denn nur so hat et einen Sinn; da ja aus der hergebrachten philosophischen Lehre von den separaten Intelligenzen sich für die Kreation nichts ergibt, sondern erst aus der maimunischen eigenen Interpretation und Ableitung derselben. Es entspricht auch der im Kapitel vorhergegangenen Bemerkung, daß er die Theorien der Philosophen ergänzen (שאשלים דעת הפילוסופים, Munk: achever) will, indem er ihre Beweise mit dem יסוד תורתנו, der Engellehre, in Einklang bringt. Auch die darauffolgende, mit besonderer Feierlichkeit eingeführte הקדמה spricht dafür: der Autor verwahrt sich dagegen, daß seine Absicht eine naturwissenschaftliche sei, auch soweit dies mit der Weisheit Gottes zusammenhängt, oder die Frage etwa von der Natur oder Anzahl der Sphären oder der Anzahl der separaten Intelligenzen etc. Diese hauptsächlich physikalischen Fragen überläßt er anderen — er verfolgt einen ganz anderen Zweck. Damit ist deutlich genug gesagt, daß er wohl nicht bloß eine Wiederholung der philosophischen Beweise für die separaten Intelligenzen vorhat. Über die Stellung des ואיך אביא ראיה על מציאותם gibt Ephodi (auch Schemb-Tob) zwei Möglichkeiten zur Wahl: entweder verbunden mit dem Vorhergehenden, wie hier zitiert, oder in Verbindung mit dem Darauffolgenden ואיך מבלתי הקדים לפני זה. Im ersteren Falle sieht auch er den Sinn des ואיך אביא ראיה in der spezifischen Beweisführung Maimonides': ולהעמיד ג' איכות הבאת הראיה על מציאותם. Doch ist dies als סדוש אחר nicht notwendig; beide möglichen Auffassungen sind sehr gut vereinbar. Wie wir sahen, bilden alle drei: die Existenz der separaten Intelligenzen, die spezifisch maimunische Ableitung und die verwahrende הקדמה — eine gedankliche Einheit. Das ואיך אביא ראיה bildet das Verbindungsglied.

[144] *Moreh* II 18, Methode I. Wichtig ist, daß Maimonides das Heranziehen des Aktiven Intellektes nicht etwa als Vergleich mit Gott verstanden wissen will — ואילו עשינו זה היתה הטעאה — sondern es ihm auf die prinzipielle Möglichkeit einer Tätigkeitsaufnahme beim Separaten ankommt, ohne daß dies eine zeitliche Aktualisierung bedeuten müßte. Doch wäre dies ohne das gemeinsame Charakteristikum der Separatheit nicht möglich.

[145] *Moreh* II 19 g. E., wo abschließend über die Frage der Verschiedenheit der Sphärenbewegungen (worüber noch später) gesagt wird: אמנם החלוקים הנבצאים בגלגלים ובכוכבים מי הוא מיחדם כי אם השם, ואם יאמר אומר השכלים הנפרדים לא הרויח כזה הטאמר

sammen, Theorie der Kreation und der separaten Intelligenzen, die Komponenten darstellen zur Bildung des einheitlichen Weltbildes bei Maimonides — auf teleologischer Basis —, dies soll näher besehen werden.

Der Aktive Intellekt ist es zunächst, der Sphären- und Elementewelt verbindet, indem er nicht bloß menschliche Erkenntnis ermöglicht, sondern überhaupt alle Formen hervorbringt, also die Aktuierung in der sublunaren Welt herbeiführt.[146] Maimonides glaubte wohl damit eine echt aristotelische Lehre zu vertreten[147] — dabei aber die Metamorphose des aristoteli-

מאומה. Dies entsprechend der früheren Behauptung: ידע כי לפי דעתנו אנחנו קהל האומרים בחדוש העולם יקל זה כלו, und den am Schluß als Konsequenz sich ergebenden zwei Fragen: über die Planmäßigkeit, die sich darin zeigt, und die Schöpfung ex nihilo.

146 *Moreh* II 4: והשכל העשירי הוא השכל הפועל אשר הורה עליו צאת שכלנו מן הכח אל הפועל והיות הצורות הנמצאות ההוות נספדות אחר שלא היו בחמרים שלהם אלא בכח. Die von Alfarabi herstammende Bezeichnung für den Aktiven Intellekt יאהב אלצור (vgl. Steinschneider, *Alfarabi*, S. 245) nimmt auch Maimonides, II 12 — נותן הצורה — an.

147 *Moreh* II 18, Methode I: והראיה על זה השכל הפועל על דעת ארים טו והנמשכים אחריו — אשר הוא נפרד — והנה יעשה עת אחת ולא יעשה עת אחרת, כמו שבאר אבונצר וכי. Demnach hält Maimonides die allgemeine Lehre vom Aktiven Intellekt als echt aristotelisch (allerdings durch והנמשכים אחריו etwas abgeschwächt) und nur das Aussetzen seiner Tätigkeit als eine Behauptung Farabis. Munk, II, S. 138, übersetzt: „Nous en avons une preuve dans l'intellect actif, qui, selon l'opinion d'Aristote et de ses sectateurs, est séparé et qui" etc. Demnach würde sich die Berufung auf Aristoteles nur auf die Separatheit des Aktiven Intellektes beziehen und es würde auch der wirklichen Lehrmeinung Aristoteles' *de anima* III 5, wo der sogen. νοῦς ποιητικός als χώριστος bezeichnet wird, entsprechen. Dies war offenbar das Motiv Munks bei der Heraushebung des „qui" und die Einschaltung Aristoteles' in Parenthese. Doch ist dieser Auslegungsversuch im Text nicht begründet: דליל דלך אלעקל אלפעאל עלי ראי ארסטו ותבאעה אלדי הו בסארק וקד יסעל וקדא ולא יסעל וקתא, wonach, ganz wie die Tibbonsche Übersetzung, die Berufung auf Aristoteles allgemein gehalten ist und erst dann der Relativsatz der Separatheit beginnt. Es ist schon gut anzunehmen, daß Maimonides die von ihm akzeptierte und allgemein geltende Lehre vom kosmischen Aktiven Intellekt als echten Aristoteles ansah, ohne sich vorsichtigerweise nur im Punkte der Separatheit auf ihn berufen zu wollen. Denn, sollte Maimonides jene Stelle *de anima* III 5 vor Augen gehabt haben, so ist unsere *Moreh*-Stelle die schärfste Polemik gerade gegen sie. Denn nur zwei Zeilen nach der Erklärung, daß dieser νοῦς ein χώριστος ist, heißt es: ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Das heißt, daß aus der Tatsache, daß hier ὅλως keine Aktualisierung in der Zeit stattfindet, folgt, daß der νοῦς seine Tätigkeit niemals aussetzt. Vgl. übrigens Zeller, *loc. cit.*,

schen sogenannten νοῦς ποιητικός bei Alexander-Farabi, bewußt oder unbewußt, übersehend. Auf jeden Fall aber hat Maimonides, sogar gegenüber Farabi, die Stellung des Aktiven Intellekts noch mehr heraugestrichen. Charakteristisch hiefür ist vor allem der Versuch, von unten aus die Existenz, ja die logische Notwendigkeit des Aktiven Intellekts zu beweisen.[148] Betrachtet man diesen Beweis näher, so ist es nicht bloß eine neue Zutat zu dem bereits von Aristoteles-Farabi rezipierten Weltbild, wonach der Aktive Intellekt der zehnte der separaten Intelligenzen ist und seine Wirksamkeit sich auf die Erde erstreckt. Es soll eben gezeigt werden, daß alles formbildende Geschehen in der sublunaren Welt ohne diesen separaten Intellekt (der ihr zugeordnet ist wie die anderen separaten Intelligenzen ihren Sphären) logisch gar nicht denkbar wäre. Der Vergleich mit dem Tischler und der Idee des Schrankes, die dem wirklichen Schrank vorausgehen muß,[149] berührt aber gerade diese Art von Zusammenhang des Realen

S. 571 Anm. 2. Die Hauptabsicht unseres *Moreh*-Abschnittes ist die Beweisführung für das genaue Gegenteil: daß trotzdem der Aktive Intellekt keine zeitliche Aktualisierung erfährt, er dennoch seine Tätigkeit aussetzt. Darum auch wird diese Ansicht Farabis durch ein wörtliches Zitat belegt. Während also Maimonides die allgemeine Lehre vom Aktiven Intellekt als aristotelische Ansicht ansieht, führt er diese zusätzliche Lehre Farabis, vom Aussetzen der Tätigkeit, ins Treffen gegen Aristoteles. In der Mitte steht das אשר הוא נפרד, das sowohl für Aristoteles gilt, aber auch gleichzeitig den Stützpunkt bildet für die Lehre Farabis. Eine Übersetzung daher, wie die Weiß', II 118: „Dies beweist nach Ansicht Aristoteles' die aktive Vernunft" etc. die, der extremste Gegensatz zu Munk, gar die ganze Beweisführung auf Aristoteles gründen will, ist nicht nur dem Original nicht treu, sondern auch sachlich ganz irrig.

[148] *Moreh* II 4; vgl. meine Abhandlung *Proph.*, S. 97.

[149] *Ibid.*: וצריך שיהיה המוציא ממין המוצא, כי הנגר לא יעשה האוצר באשר הוא אומן אבל מאשר בשכלו צורת האוצר וצורת האוצר אשר בשכל הנגר היא אשר הוציאה צורת האוצר לפועל. Wird nun hier die Idee geradezu als die erzeugende Ursache bezeichnet, so ist es scheinbar anders in III 19, wo auch ein technisches Gleichnis angeführt wird: מבואר הוא שכל פועל כלי מן הכלים לולא שהפועל הנעשה בכלי החוא כצויר אצלו לא היה יכול לעשות לו הכלי, und als Beispiel wird der Nadelerzeuger angeführt, der auch vom Nähen eine richtige Vorstellung besitzen muß, um die Nadel richtig zu machen. Doch muß diese Variation keine Änderung des im ersten Gleichnis Ausgedrückten bedeuten. Form und Leistung fallen eben zusammen; die Erzeugung, um richtig, d. h. der Idee entsprechend, zu sein, setzt also auch die richtige Vorstellung der Benützung voraus. Die Idee ist, anders ausgedrückt, der Zweck.

mit dem Idealen, den Aristoteles gewöhnlich, im Gleichnis des Hausbaues, für die Charakteristik des Zweckbegriffes verwendet.[150] Diese logische Ableitung bekommt also von Haus aus teleologische Färbung. Die aristotelische Entelechie, die ein Zweck-Innehaben bedeutet,[151] und deren Verwirklichung nur durch die Steresis stimuliert wird, sie wird hier gebunden an einen Akt der Leitung, von oben her erfolgt, durch den Mittler zwischen Gott und Welt.[152] Die Entwicklung des Organismus aus dem Keim, die für Aristoteles das Urbeispiel für seine Teleologie war, sie wird hier noch einen dazukommenden oberen Faktor, dem Engel, zugeschrieben, der, wie Maimonides durch eine Parallelisierung deutlich zum Ausdruck bringt, mit der immanenten Tendenz des Keimes als solchen nicht identisch ist.[153]

[150] So z. B. *Phys.* 199 a 7f., *Eth. Nic.* 1097 a 14f., *de part. anim.* 639 b 14f. u. v. a.

[151] Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 409: „Das Eidos mit Bezug auf die Bewegung heißt ἐν-τελ-έχεια, insofern jedes Ding im Eidos das verwirklichte τέλος der Bewegung innehat."

[152] *Moreh* III 51 wird der Aktive Intellekt als Band zwischen Gott und uns bezeichnet אשר בינו ובינינו (אלוצלא) הדבוק (Munk: le lieu). Ebenso III 52: והמלך ההוא הדבק המחופף הוא השכל השופע עלינו, שהוא הדבוק אשר בינינו ובין השי"ת.

[153] *Moreh* II 6 wird von allen Naturkräften als von מלאכים gesprochen; gegen die mißverstandene Ideenlehre wird betont שאפילו הלקי המציאות עד בריאת האברים מבעלי חיים כפי מה שהם עליו כל זה באמצעות מלאכים. Dann bei Ablehnung der grob-materialisierenden Auffassung vom Engel werden dieser folgende zwei Auffassungen entgegengestellt: שהשי"ת שם בזרע כח מציר יעשה תכונת אלו האברים ויתארם והוא המלאך אך שהצורות כולם מפעולת השכל הפועל והוא המלאך והוא שרו של עולם. Von diesen zwei voneinander unterschiedenen Anschauungen entspricht die erste der echt aristotelischen, immer noch der materialistischen vorzuziehen, die zweite aber ist die eigentliche maimunische, wie überall gelehrt. Munk, II, S. 71, betont die zweite Hälfte des Satzes durch die Übersetzung des או mit ou bien. Ephodi z. St. erklärt zu שם בזרע וכ' — וזה הכח הוא המביע dann zu — או שהצורות כלם וכ' ר"ל שיהיו השכל הפועל מקנה הצורה ונותנה בחומר, כאשר הוא אמת. Dagegen Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 88, will beide Auffassungen zugleich gelten lassen: וכלל שתי הדעות בדבריו, דעת האומרים כי הטציר החמרים כח מבעי ודעת האומרים שכל נגדל. Diese Interpretation, beträchtlich übertrieben, vertritt Schem-Tob z. St. Auch er will beide vereinigen: אם שיהיה המהוה כח נפשי הנמצא בזרע... והוא האמת... כמו שבאר אריסטו בו' מהשמע, או יהיה המלאך והוא השכל הפועל, ובכאן כלל הדעת השנית שהוא דעת ב"ס. Um nun diese Vereinigung — והאמת כי הרב סובר שתי הדעות בחוית העוברים — möglich zu machen, muß er, aus eigenem, eine Rollenverteilung zwischen הכח המציר und השכל הפועל vornehmen, die nichtssagend ist. Daß hier Ephodi, in der Aus-

Diese Einwirkung des letzten sphärischen separaten Intellektes auf das Irdische, die auch aus diesem als notwendig erwiesen werden kann, hat wenig Ähnlichkeit mit der losen Beziehung der aristotelischen μίμησις — sie ist eben ein festes Band — noch auch mit der Lehre von der Einwirkung der Gestirndrehungen auf das Entstehen und Vergehen in der sublunaren Welt. Letzteres lehnt Maimonides wiederholt ausdrücklich ab. Er läßt es wohl in einem gewissen Maße gelten,[154]

einanderhaltung der beiden Ansichten und Anerkennung der zweiten, richtig gesehen hat, ist klar.

[154] *Moreh* II 11 wird als Einfluß dritter Ordnung im Kosmischen der auf das Materielle gerichtete bezeichnet וישפעו מן הגלגלים כחות ושובות על זה הגוף ההוה והנפסד oder וכל גלגל יגיע מאתו כחות אל היסודות. Daß diese mechanischen Prozesse in der Elementenwelt mit der Formgebung des Aktiven Intellektes nicht identisch sind, ist aus II 12 klar ersichtlich. Vgl. ausführlich in meiner Abhandlung *Proph.*, S. 94 Anm. 78. Auffallend ist die Stelle I 72, wo von den vier Naturkräften — der mineralischen, vegetativen, vitalen und auch intellektuellen — וכח יתן הכח הדברי לכל מדבר — als von der Sphäre herkommend gesprochen und hinzugefügt wird: וכל זה במצוע האור והחושך הנמשכים אחר יושרם (sc. של הגלגלים) והקסם סביב הארץ (zur Lesung, יושרם statt אורם, vgl. Munk, I, S. 362 n. 2). Daß auch der Intellekt von den Drehungen der Sphäre, die rein mechanisch sind, abhängen soll, kann unmöglich Lehrmeinung Maimonides sein. (Vgl. folgende Anmerkung.) Ähnliches wurde ja auch schon II 10 gesagt — aber doch ganz anders. Dort werden zwei Parallelierungen durchgeführt: die erste zwischen den vier Arten der Sphären und den ihnen entsprechenden vier Elementen; die andere zwischen den vier Ursachen der sphärischen Bewegung — סבות תנועת הגלגל — und den daraus folgenden vier כחות כוללות. Bei der ersteren spielt die Drehung der Sonne eine Rolle. Die letztere Parallele dagegen ist bei der Sphärenbewegung: כדוריתו, הויה המחצבים, נפשו, שכלו (אשר בו יציר), השכל הנבדל; und anderseits bei den Kräften: נפש המדברת, הנפש הצומחת, הנפש החיה, הנפש הטבעית; daraus ergibt sich klar, daß die dem שכל נבדל entspricht und von ihm abzuleiten ist. (Warum Munk, II, S. 89, die, im Text durch ein einfaches Binde-Waw verbundenen, zwei Vierergruppen durch das Dazwischensetzen eines Semikolons und die Hinzufügung, in Klammern, „il y a aussi" auseinanderreißt, ist nicht einzusehen.) Dabei beruft sich Maimonides — כמו שבארנו — offenbar auf I 72 (Ephodi). Und selbst in I 72, kurz vor der zitierten Stelle, wird von der Bewegung der Sphären lediglich ההשתנות בעיקור abgeleitet, wovon wohl die Mineralien, die Pflanzen und auch בעלי חיים מינים רבים abhängen, כפי מה שנזכר מזג הטעורב, aber nicht der Mensch mit seinem Intellekt. Am nächsten würde unserer Stelle noch die Darstellung II 30 kommen, wo auch von den durch die sphärischen Bewegungen verursachten Licht und Finsternis das Werden der Elementenwelt abhängig gemacht wird — ובתנועת הגלגל יתעיבו היסודות ובאור ובחושך ישתנו מזגיהם —, und hier ist schon auch der Mensch genannt: ואחר הצמחים הבע"ח, וההרכבה האחרונה היא האדם. Aber doch immer nicht der Intellekt! Nun hat Ephodi schon am unmittelbar vorhergehenden Ausspruch: כל נפש שתצא

schränkt aber ihre Bedeutung ein, als nur „nahe Ursache des Entstehens und Vergehens“ — im Gegensatze zu jener leitenden Tätigkeit der Sphärenintellekte, die eben eine andere, hinzukommende Funktion ist.[155] Zwischen den Einwirkungen der Gestirne, die auf Nähe und Ferne beruhen, und dem Wirken der Sphären-Intellekte auf die irdische Welt ist strenge zu scheiden, da dieses mit dem Wirken Gottes ein Gemeinsames hat.[156] Die Wirkung der Sphärenintellekte wird nicht so gedacht, daß sie in einer selbstgenügsamen Passivität als ὀρεκτά angestrebt werden, sondern als Folge einer über die Bedürfnisse der eigenen Sphäre hinausgehenden Aktivität. Die Ausströmung kommt von einer Über-

לבעל נפש בעולם התחלתה נפש הגלגל Anstoß genommen und müht sich, etwa durch Identifizierung von נפש הגלגל mit שכל הפועל, ab, die Stelle im Sinne der maimunischen Gesamtlehre zu erklären. Seine andere Lösung: שרוצה לומר הגלגל הוא המכין החמרים כלם להקביל הצורות, לא שיהיה לומר שהגלגל יקנה הצורות, כי המקנה הוא השכל הפועל — die wird wohl die einzig mögliche auch für unsere sonst unerklärbare Stelle sein. Im selben Kapitel wird ja auch vom intellektuellen Vermögen erklärt: הכח המדבר הוא כח בגוף ובלתי נפרד מטנו.

155 *Moreh* II 5 g. E. wird als Meinung der Philosophen angeführt, daß הנהגת זה העולם התחתון נשלמות בכחות שופעות עליו מן הגלגל, was aber dann erklärt wird: וענין הממשלה השלטון בהנהגה והוא ענין מוסף על האור והחושך, אשר הוא עלת ההויה וההפסד הקרובה. (Über den Unterschied zwischen סבה קרובה und רחוקה oder אחרונה, welch letztere von einer wesentlich größeren Bedeutung ist, wird I 69 gesprochen.) Diese Stelle, wo von der אמתת ההנהגה gesprochen wird, beleuchtet die anderen Stellen, wo die Veränderung von Licht und Finsternis auch die Bedeutung einer Leitung scheinbar zugeschrieben wird, wie I 72 und II 30; vgl. Anm. 154. Wenn also auch I 72 in diesem Zusammenhang gesagt wird: הגלגל הוא המנהיג שאר חלקי העולם בתנועתו, so wird aus unserer Stelle, II 5, die Bedeutung der eigentlichen הנהגה klargestellt.

156 *Moreh* II 12 wird der Unterschied zwischen der mechanischen Mischung, מזג, die von der Bewegung der Sphäre herrührt, und der eigentlichen Formgebung in zwei Punkten hervorgehoben: im Räumlichen und im Zeitlichen. Die erstere ist materieller Natur und wirkt im Nebeneinander oder, mit anderen Worten, durch Berührung — בנגיעה oder קריבת גוף אל גוף או רוחק גוף מגוף — und außerdem in einem Nacheinander — והוא יתחדש ראשון ראשון — also in der Zeit, in der Bewegung. Das Gegenteil bei den Formen: והם כל מתחדש בלתי מתחדש מגוף המזג. לבד. Das Räumliche ist ausgeschaltet — זה הפועל לא יעשה בנגיעה ולא על רוחק מיוחד — und auch das Zeitliche, auch beim Entstehen und Vergehen: ואמנם יתחדשו או יפסדו בלא זמן. Die Funktion des מזג bleibt eine bloß vorbereitende, in der Materie: המזג מכין החומר לקבל הצורה לבד. Hingegen die Tätigkeit der separaten Intellekte ist in ihrer Art der Tätigkeit Gottes gleich und wie diese in unserer Sprache nicht wiederzugeben: שלא נוכל על אמתת שם וכו׳.

strömung.[157] Und das Wesentliche, das das Merkmal dieser letzteren Tätigkeit ausmacht, ist vor allem die Tatsache der bewußten Tätigkeit. Die Tätigkeit geschieht nicht automatisch und nur als Folge der Bewegungen, sondern ist ein bewußtes leitendes Einwirken.[158] Also gerade dieses teleologische Moment ist es, daß Maimonides gegenüber Aristoteles der Einwirkung der Sphären hinzufügt, und zwar als ihre wesentliche Aufgabe — wodurch eben das Einbeziehen der ganzen Welt, auch der sublunaren durch den Aktiven Intellekt, in die große vernünftig-bewußte Zielstrebigkeit und somit die Einheit der Welt im Lichte dieser Teleologie gesichert ist.

Denn nicht allein für die sublunare Welt, auch für die Sphärenwelt findet Maimonides die aristotelische Konzeption der Sphären-Beweger als unzureichend. Schon beim ersten Erwähnen der aristotelischen Sphären und ihrer Intellekte findet sich bei Maimonides eine sonst nicht übliche Ungenauigkeit in der Zahlangabe der Sphären; er spricht wiederholt von 50,[159] während doch Aristoteles nach einer langen Auseinandersetzung[160] zu 55 gelangt. Dieses pauschalierende Verfahren,

[157] *Moreh* II 11; die Tätigkeit der Sphäre beruht auf der Tatsache שיהיה שלמותו בענין שיוותר כאנו שלטות לזולתו. Wenn nun auch hier die mit Gott beginnende Reihe beim Aktiven Intellekt endet, bezw. bei den Sphären bis zum Monde, worauf dann הגוף ההוה והנפסד folgt, so finden wir doch, II 37, eine ähnliche Erscheinung bei der Prophetie, die auch auf eine überströmende Vollkommenheit שיהיה הדבר (sc. השפע האלהי) הנגיע אל האיש שיעור שישפע על שלטותו להשלים זולתו zurückgeführt wird. Ganz hört also dieser Vorgang auch in der sublunaren Welt nicht auf; ebenso wie die Kreation.

[158] *Moreh* II 7 wird betont, daß die Sphären nicht als materielle Kräfte aufzufassen sind — אשר הם טבע —, sondern הגלגלים והשכלים כשיגים פעולותיהם ובוחרים ומנהיגים. Ähnlich II 5 g. E. und dann: ומן השקר ושהגלגלים משיגים למה שינהיגוהו יודעים בו שיהיה המנהיג דבר אחד לא ידע הדבר הזה אשר ינהיגהו, כשתודע אמתת ההנהגה על מה זה הפעל.

[159] *Moreh* II 4 zuerst allgemein עד שהיו חושבים בזמנו (של אריסטו sc. שהגלגלים): ואמר אריסטו, אם הענין כן השכלים הנפרדים גם כן חמשים; dann in Form eines Zitats: חמשים. Bemerkenswert auch die Ausdruckweise ולא נזר (ולם יקטע) אריסטו וכו׳. Auch in der reservierenden הקדמה von II 2 wird gerade dieser Punkt, die Zahl, als sekundär mehrmals wiederholt: ולא היתה כונתי בו שאבאר ואגזור תכונות הגלגלים ולא כשתראני מדבר בהעתיד השכלים הנפרדים ובמספרם או במספר שאגיד מספרם, dann wieder: הגלגלים וכו׳.

[160] *Met.* XII 8. Auch Ibn-Sina in seiner Methaphysik (IX, 3) spricht, allerdings vorsichtiger, von „circiter quinquaginta et amplius". Vgl. Munk, II 56 n. 3. Doch der Annahme Munks, daß Maimonides in der Zahlangabe lediglich Ibn-Sina folgt, widerspricht das mit יאמר אריסטו eingeführte Zitat Aristoteles'

wie auch sonst der Ton dort, entbehren sicherlich nicht einer leisen Ironie über die astronomische Akribie bei Aristoteles gerade in diesem Zusammenhange.[161] Viel eingehender aber wird diese Frage behandelt in der großen Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles, in deren Zusammenhang Maimonides insbesondere die Komplikationen, in die sich Aristoteles durch seine Sphären-Motoren-Theorie begeben hat, indem er sie allein aus der natürlichen Bewegung ableiten will, nachweist und insbesondere betont, daß Aristoteles nicht einmal seine eigenen, aus der Verschiedenheit der Sphärenbewegung sich ergebenden Schwierigkeiten befriedigend zu lösen imstande ist.[162] Es war nicht die Vielheit, die Maimonides hier anfocht, wie es die früheren Angreifer dieser Lehre taten[163] — eine Mehrzahl von separaten Intelligenzen nimmt ja auch er an —, sondern es ist der Punkt, wo sich bei Aristoteles die klaffende Diskrepanz ergibt zwischen der teleologischen Absicht, die doch auf das Dasein der Sphärenbeweger führt, und dem Mangel

(s. vorige Anmerkung), wo das einleitende אם הענין כן dem aristotelischen: τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε... wörtlich entspricht; wie ja auch Munk sogar den ganzen Ausspruch unter Anführungszeichen bringt. Eher wäre die maimunische Zahl 50 zu erklären durch die von Aristoteles selbst unmittelbar vorher offengelassene Möglichkeit an Stelle der 55 Sphären, nach Ausschluß von Sonne und Mond und ihrem Anhang, 49 anzunehmen. Genau ist es aber auch so nicht.

161 Dieses Kap. 8 hat allen Aristoteles-Kommentatoren, vom Simplicius bis Lasson, Schwierigkeiten bereitet, weshalb es manche in *de coelo*, manche auch in die Physik verlegen wollten. Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 369 ff., hat klar dargelegt, daß dieses, den Zusammenhang zwischen Kap. 7 und 9 zerreißende Kap. 8 ein späteres „astronomisches Einschiebsel" in das Buch Λ der *Met.* ist.

162 *Moreh* II 19 ist dies das Kernstück des Angriffes auf Aristoteles. Maimonides ist es besonders darum zu tun, daß auch Aristoteles die Unlösbarkeit empfunden hat: ואיך להצדהו זאת הקושיא בלא ספק והשתדל לצאת מהנה כדברים לא עזרוהו הטציאות עליהם; dennoch aber: לא נשלם לו זה ולא ישלם לעולם. Dann wiederholt: שאריסטו בלא ספק ידע חולשת מאמריו. Die Theorie der Sonder-Beweger wird als Auskunftversuch infolge dieser selbstempfundenen Schwäche bezeichnet: יראה לי כי אשר אמרו בספר מה שאחר השבע בהניח שכל נפרד לכל גלגל אמנם הוא מפני זה הענין ע"כ, עד שיהיה דבר יחד כל גלגל בתנועה אחת, והנה אבאר שהוא לא הרויח בזה מאומה. (Vgl. oben Anm. 136 über die von Jäger nachgewiesene Unsicherheit.) Der Wiederspruch richtet sich natürlich nur gegen diese Ableitung, denn zur Sache wurde ja II 4 u. 6, die Zuordnung von separater Intelligenz und Sphäre und die Gleichheit der Zahl beider vollkommen akzeptiert.

163 Siehe oben Anm. 135.

einer zugrundegelegten Planmäßigkeit des Ganzen, woraus sich erst ihr Sosein begründen ließe. Und dies ist gerade für Maimonides der sicherste Punkt, von dem aus er zur Kreation ex nihilo, die aber in ihrem Wesenskern die zweckwollende Planmäßigkeit, die כונת מכוּן bedeutet, vordringt.[164] Dieser Frage ist auch das ganze Kapitel gewidmet. Gerade die Vielheit und Verschiedenheit im Betriebe der Sphäre führt zur Einheit der Grundabsicht. Und nur so ist auch der wahre Charakter der separaten Intelligenz gesichert — in Korrelation zur Stützung der Kreationstheorie durch den Vergleich mit dem Aktiven Intellekt.[165] Denn daß all diese Probleme eine Einheit bilden, hat Maimonides auch programmatisch deutlich hervorgehoben. All die drei Punkte in einem Atem genannt: daß alles erschaffen ist, daß auch die separaten Intelligenzen erschaffen sind, daß, drittens, die Sphärenintellekte bewußt leitend wirken — das ist es, „worin wir Aristoteles bekämpfen."[166]

[164] *Moreh* II 19; Aristoteles mißlang seine Lösung, da er sie versuchte שיחן לנו שיהיה הכל על צד החיוב המבעי לא על צד כונת מכוּן (wenn es ihm gelungen wäre לפי דעתנו... בהדוש העולם יקל זה כלו .(עלת התחלף תנועת הגלגלים... היה זה נפלא. Aber Alle die Fragen wie הנחות אלו הכוכבים ושעורם מציאות התיחדות הגלגל und überhaupt אין ספק כי כל דבר מהם הכרחי לפי כונת מכוּן ותנועת גלגליהם המתחלפות ומספרם, sie alle. Während in der sublunaren Welt die Bewegungen natürlich zu erklären sind, sind anderseits ההלוסים הנמצאים בגלגלים ובכוכבים מי הוא מיחדם כי אם השם ואם יאמר אומר שכלים נפרדים השכלים הנפרדים לא הרויח בזה המאמר מאומה, nämlich wenn die lediglich als richtunggebende Sphärenbeweger angesehen werden. Und der Grund dafür (ובאור זה) ist die Immaterialität der Intelligenzen, die es nicht zulassen, daß zwischen ihnen und den Sphären eine Relation der Lage — שיהיה להם הנחה מן הגלגל — bestünde und so eine Bewegung gegen Osten oder Westen verursachte. Diese Funktion der separaten Intelligenz würde ihre Definition aufheben. Munk II 162, übersetzt dieses logisch verbindende ובאור זה (וביאן דלך) mit „en effet" und leitet darauf einen neuen Satz ein, vom vorigen getrennt. Dies ist nicht nur in bezug auf den Text nicht genau, sondern zerreißt auch diesen einheitlichen Gedanken.

[165] Siehe oben Anm. 147.

[166] *Moreh* II 6 g. E. Entgegen den zwei, uns widersprechenden Anschauungen des Aristoteles, von der Ewigkeit und der Naturnotwendigkeit der Dinge, werden es bei uns drei: ואנחנו נאמין שכל זה נברא ושהשם ברא השכלים הנפרדים והגלגלים ושם בהם אלו הכחות המנהיגות; ושם בגלגל כח התשוקה להם, והוא אשר ברא השכלים בזה נהלוק עליו. Rein stilistisch ist diese Steigerung bemerkenswert; Schöpfung, Schöpfung auch der separaten Intelligenzen, Schöpfung plus Leitungsfunktion dieser Intelligenzen.

So ist es nun die vermittelnde-leitende Funktion der separaten Intelligenzen — für die sublunare Welt der Aktive Intellekt —, die die Einheit der Welt in ihrem Geschehen, und der Akt der Kreation, der sie in ihrem Entstehen gewährleistet; denn dieser gilt für Sphäre und Erde zugleich. Beide aber sind nur Ausdruck eines und desselben Prinzips, das im Teleologischen wurzelt. Wohl hat auch Farabi die leitende Funktion des Aktiven Intellekten gelehrt,[167] und Gazali lehrte auch die Bedeutung des Teiles und das Einzelwissen Gottes,[168] aber erst mit Hinzutreten des Kreations-Moments hat das Ganze seine Grundlegung erhalten. Die aristotelische Steresis hat Maimonides zu einer „speziellen" Steresis umgedeutet,[169] der er die „absolute" Steresis,[170] nämlich die der Kreation vorangegangene, hinzufügt oder entgegenstellt. Aber durch dieses Hinzutreten der absoluten Steresis, und also der zweckstrebigen Kreation, hat auch die „spezielle" eine Wandlung erfahren, indem ihre Form-Realisierung auch erst mit dem leitenden Einwirken des Sphären-Intellekts ermöglicht wurde.[171] Denn letzten Endes war ja auch jene Beweisführung für die בוגת מבנן von der Verschieden-

[167] Siehe Alfarabi, *Hatchalath-Hanimzaim ed Philipowski* S. 2 f., 43.

[168] Vgl. de Boer, *loc. cit.*, S. 145.

[169] *Moreh* II 17 wo, nach Aristoteles, die drei Prinzipien des Seienden החומר והצורה והתעדר המיוחד (אלעדם אלמכצוץ) genannt werden. Im selben Sinne auch I 55, als notwendig für die Aktualisierung: וכל כח יחובר אליו התעדר בהכרח.

[170] *Moreh* II 13 (הרעת השני) wird als Meinung der Philosophen das Leugnen an einem התעדר גמור (עדם מחץ) angegeben, während wir auch vom Himmel annehmen, daß er entstanden ist (אלעדם אלמטלק) לא מדבר אלא אחר התעדר המוחלט. Auch III 17 wird von הידיעה בהתעדר הגמור (אלעלם באלעדם אלמחץ) gesprochen. Anderseits aber konnte Maimonides dem Kalam nicht zustimmen, daß es nur einen התעדר גמור gebe und daß diesem Realität zukomme, III 10 auch I 73, Präm. 7. Maimonides wollte nicht die aristotelische Steresis verabsolutieren, sondern sie für das Werden nach der Schöpfung als spezielle erhalten. Und wenn auch III 22 das negative Prinzip, der שמן = Steresis — vgl. Ephodi z. St. und Munk III S. 165, n. 1 — tiefer steht als die anderen בני האלהים, weswegen auch von ihm nicht להתיצב, d. h. die beabsichtigte Dauer ausgesagt wird, so ist er doch in der sublunaren Welt, wenn auch בלתי מבוין, nicht erläßlich. Indem Munk das eine Mal, im aristotelischen Sinne, „privation" übersetzt, bei der Schöpfung aber „neant", kommt der terminologische Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Formen des (עדם) התעדר nicht ganz klar zur Geltung.

[171] Siehe oben Anm. 153.

heit der sphärischen Bewegungen nur hypothetischen Charakters — indem sich Maimonides auf den Boden Aristoteles' stellte, um ihn von hier aus zu widerlegen. In Wirklichkeit war ja der Sinn der Kreation — wir können es hier nur andeutungsweise berühren — ein ganz anderer. Maimonides hat die Kreation nicht nur nicht beweisen können, sondern auch nicht beweisen wollen, er hat sie postuliert.

Gegen alle Einwände, die sich aus den Begriffen der Zeit und der Naturwissenschaft gegen die Kreation ergeben,[172] verteidigt sie Maimonides mit der prinzipiellen Ablehnung aller Induktion. Nicht vom System der Natur, nicht vom empirischen Dasein aus soll die Schöpfung bewiesen werden, das wäre eben unmöglich.[173] Aber eine Widerlegung wäre nur dann gültig, wenn sie von der Gottesidee deduziert werden könnte.[174] Die Möglichkeit einer Beweisführung wird also dadurch in eine ganz andere Sphäre gehoben. Wiederum tritt uns hier entgegen die strenge Auseinanderhaltung von empirischem Dasein, aus dem sich kein strikter Gegenbeweis ergeben kann, und der Idee der Welt, als Einheit — es ist dieselbe terminologische Auseinanderhaltung, die wir früher bezüglich der Teleologie gesehen haben.[175] Fürs Dasein

[172] *Moreh* II 14; im דרך ראשון wird die Beweisführung für die Weltewigkeit auf Grund der Bewegung und der Zeit besprochen; im letzten דרך (VII) die Argumentation mit der in der Natur vorhandenen Ordnung und Ökonomie, woraus, auf der Basis einer Identifikation הכמה = עצמו, die Ewigkeit des Naturdaseins, gleich der Ewigkeit der הכמה, abzuleiten ist.

[173] *Moreh* II 17, wo die Hauptwiderlegung gegen Aristoteles sich gegen seine ראיות מטבע המציאות הנה השלם ההוה בסועל richtet, was, wie für die anderen Argumente, auch für die Bewegung gilt, daß ein Beweis מטבע התנועה, d. h. אחר המצא התנועה על זה הטבע שהיא נהה עליו nichts besagen kann. Maimonides selbst verwahrt sich dagegen, daß er beweisen wolle שטבע זה המציאות הנה יורה על היותו מחודש.

[174] *Ibid.* g. E. Wenn nur die Möglichkeit gegeben ist, נבריע דעת החדוש. Die Beweisführung hierfür kann vom Erschaffenen nicht ausgehen. Eine Unmöglichkeit könnte erwiesen werden לא מטבע המציאות אבל מטה שיחיבהו השכל בחוק השם. Beim מבע המציאות gibt es nämlich auch keinen Weg שיחיבהו השכל, er müßte denn der der Induktion sein und die gilt nicht.

[175] Siehe oben Anm. 74. Auch hier wird bei der, unzulässigen, Beweisführung Aristoteles' מבינה אלונוד (Guide II, ל״ה b, ל״ו a) oder מבינה הדא אלונוד (ל״ו a) gebraucht; während im Zusammenhange mit der Kreation ausschließlich von עאלם (II ל״ה b, ל״ו a) oder אלעאלם בנטלקה (ל״ו a) die Rede ist. Charakteristisch

läßt sie sich nicht beweisen; in der Welt als Einheit muß sie gesetzt werden.

Und da die Kreation postuliert und ihre Beweisführung nur die Deduktion von Gott zur Basis haben kann, steht sie auch in unlösbarer Verknüpfung mit der normativ formulierten Zweckmäßigkeit, mit der Torah. Charakteristisch für dieses Verhältnis ist der Gedankengang, wo zunächst von einer Übereinstimmung zwischen dem Berichte der Torah und der Kreationslehre die Rede ist, was nicht wesentlich entscheidend [176] ist, dann zur Erklärung der Beschaffenheit der Torah im Sinne der Kreation übergeht, am Schlusse aber darin gipfelt, daß die Torah als solche ihre M ö g l i c h k e i t durch die Grundlegung der Kreationslehre erhält; die Torah steht und fällt mit der Kreation.[177] Oder jenes eigentümlich anmutende Kapitelchen über den Sabbat und seinen Zusammenhang mit der Befreiung aus Ägypten, die zum Symbol der allgemeinen sittlich-

ist die Entgegenstellung des bereits zitierten מבע זה המציאות הנה, von dem eine Kreation nicht ausgesagt werden kann, und מענתנו שהעולם בכללו המציאהו השם אחר ההעדר. Munk ist auch hier in der Übersetzung nicht konsequent; während er wiederholt (II S. 133) das מציעות אלוהי mit „nature de l'être" übersetzt, heißt es ein anderes Mal (S. 137), für denselben Ausdruck, „nature de l'univers".

[176] *Moreh* II 25 wird mit der vielzitierten Reservation eingeleitet, daß der Kreationsglaube nicht infolge des Haftens am Wortlaut der Torah statuiert wird, denn לא שעיקר הפרוש סתומים בפנימו ולא נמנעים לנו בענין חדוש העולם אבל היה אפשר לנו לפרשם ואולי זה היה יותר קל הרבה (sc. את הכתובים). Doch wird hier (הכפה השנית) die allegorische Auslegung vermieden, da die Ewigkeit der Welt prinzipiell unzulässig ist: אבל אמונת הקדמות... הנה היא פותרת הדת מעיקרה... ומבטלת כל מה שתחל בו התורה וכי. Während es aber hier noch mit dem אות enge verbunden erscheint, wird es später erweitert: ודע כי עם האמנת חדוש העולם יהיו האותות כלם אפשריות ותהיה התורה אפשרית ותסול כל שאלה... למה צווה באלה המצוות... ומה כוונת השם באלו התורות... Munk II 198 übersetzt den Anfang dieses Zitats: tous les miracles devenant possibles, la (révelation de la) Loi devient possible aussi" etc. Durch diese eigene Hinzufügung in der Klammer wird auch die Frage der Torah auf die des אות reduziert — was aber aus den nachher aufgezählten Gesichtspunkten, wo Torah und Wunder getrennt erscheinen, widerlegt ist. Vgl. unten Anm. 270.

[177] *Ibid.* g. E.: וכן אלו התאמת להם מופת (על הקדמות) על דעת אריסטו תסול התורה בכללה ויעתק הענין לדעות אחרות. Auf den inneren Zusammenhang zwischen Torah und Kreation wird noch später zurückgekommen. Aber schon diese Stelle erscheint ausreichend, um die Auffassung Cohens, *Charakteristik etc.* S. 134, daß „auch die Weltschöpfung als ein metaphysisches Problem in der Ethik Maimunis zurücktritt", zu widerlegen.

intellektuellen Freiheit erhoben und dieses Symbol mit dem vollendeten Werk der Kreation zu einer Einheit verbunden wird.[178] Am entscheidensten für unsere Auffassung ist aber jene Auslegung des biblischen Wortlautes, die mit viel Reservationen auf ihren mystischen Charakter eingeleitet wird,[179] jene Unterscheidung zwischen תחלה und ראשית, zwischen dem Ersten in der Zeit und dem Ersten als Grund. Die Schöpfung, die mit בראשית berichtet wird, bedeutet den Anfang ohne Zeit, den Anfang als umfassenden Grund — „das ist die richtige mit der Weltkreation übereinstimmende Interpretation."[180] Was aber anders kann dieser mit der Torah eng verknüpfte, auf die Vervollkommnung hinweisende, dieser zeitlose Anfang, das Gefäß der Welt, bedeuten — als ihre teleologische Grundlegung? Das Sein ist enthalten in seinem Sinn.

Greifen wir nun auf einen früheren Gedankengang zurück, so zeigt es sich jetzt, daß dieselbe Kreationslehre, die als

[178] *Moreh* II 31 g. E.: וצונו בתורת השביתה... לקבץ שני הענינים, האמנת דעת אמתי והוא חדוש העולם... וזכור חסדי השם עלינו... וכאלו הוא חסד כולל בדעת האמתי העיוני. Vgl. Munk II 259 n. 1. Heranzuziehen ist noch I 67, wo der Sabath, vom verbum ונח ausgehend, die Vollendung der Naturordnung„ הנחה והמשך המציאות כפי מה שהוא, bedeutet, dies aber ergänzt durch ויפש, unter Hinweis auf I 41, das dieser Vollendung ihren Sinn gibt: בענין הכונה והרצון שהוא (sc. נפש) והיה עינו נשלם רצונו והוית כל חפצו.

[179] *Moreh* II 29 g. E., wo von diesen Erörterungen des מעשה בראשית als הסודות הנבואיות, אלו הסודות, gesprochen wird.

[180] Gleich *Moreh* II 13 הדעת הראשון wird die Zeitlosigkeit der Schöpfung betont: ולזה לא תהיה המצאת הבורא לעולם בהתחלה זמנית, כי הזמן מכלל הנבראים. Wichtiger ist aber II 30, wo zugleich mit der Ablehnung der Zeitlosigkeit doch die besondere Bedeutung des Prinzips — ראשית — als wesentlich hervorgehoben wird. Die einleitend gemachte Distinktion in bezug auf die Zeitlichkeit zwischen אלאול (ראשון) und אלמבדא (התחלה), die dem hebr. Gebrauch des תחלה und ראשית entsprechen, ist nicht streng durchgeführt, wie es Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh* S. 155, für אלאול und Narboni z. St. für אלמבדא begründen. Vgl. Munk II 230 n. 2, 231 n. 1. Doch sicher gilt für die Schöpfung אלמבדא als zeitloses Prinzip: והעולם לא נברא בהתחלה זמנית... ולזה אמר בראשית ו"ב"ת כלי ופיוש זה הפכיק האמתי כן, בהתחלה ברא השם העליונים והתחתונים, זהו הפרוש המסכים לחדוש העולם. Die Auffassung des ב' von בראשית als lokales Enthaltensein (Crescas: באשר דבר אחר נמצא תוך דבר כאמרנו היין בחבית; das ist der Sinn des Tibbonschen כלי, nicht, wie Schem-Tob und auch Weiß II 20, instrumental) — Charisi führt auch in der Übersetzung das arabische في an — dieses Umfaßtsein der Welt durch sein Schöpfungsprinzip, das ist noch ein ganz neues Moment, das zur Zeitlosigkeit hinzugefügt wird.

Argument gegen die Teleologie im Bereich des dinglichen Daseins angeführt wurde[181] — dieselbe bedeutet die Grundlegung der teleologischen Auffassung in der idealen Einheit der Welt. Und auch die Sphäre, da ihr Wirken nicht allein ein natürliches sein kann, von der Bewegung abhängig und sich ausschließlich auf Entstehen und Vergehen beziehend, sondern auch ein zweckbewußtes, leitendes ist, muß darum auch in diesem Wirken nur teleologisch gerichtet sein: auf das Gute und nur auf das Gute.[182]

Der erste Beweger Aristoteles', obwohl nur νόησις νοήσεως, ist doch nur das Höchste im System der Natur, ist, da ihm Leben zukommt, ein ζῷον, ein Lebewesen, wenn auch das vollkommenste.[183] Maimonides hingegen hebt wiederholt hervor das Verhältnis Gottes zur Welt als ihr Lebensprinzip, als חֵי העולם, unter besonderer Betonung des status constructus; er wiederholt es in zwei Zusammenhängen: einmal als Abschluß der Betrachtung über die organische Einheit der Welt und das andere Mal im Zusammenhang mit der Bezeichnung Gottes als Form-Zweck der Welt.[184] Diese Wiederholung und die ausdrückliche Bezugnahme einer Stelle auf die andere[185] genügt wohl, um auf das innere Zusammengehören beider Gedankengänge hinzuweisen. Bedenkt man, daß unmittelbar vorher Leben als Attribut zurückgewiesen und der status constructus in Verbindung mit Gott, חֵי ד׳, gegen חַי ד׳

[181] Siehe oben Anm. 47.

[182] *Moreh* II 7: אבל השכלים והגלגלים... יעשו השוב לעולם ואין אצלם כי אם השוב. II 11: ויישעו טן הגלגלים כחות ושובות.

[183] *Met.* 1072b 28f.: φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. Ebenso *de coelo* 286a 9f.: θεοῦ δ' ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ζωὴ ἀΐδιος.

[184] Einmal *Moreh* I 72; der Mensch wird Mikrokosmos genannt, da er ein leitendes Vernunftprinzip in sich hat, ומשני זה הענין נקרא השם יתי בלשוננו חֵי העולם, wobei עולם Welt bedeutet, nicht Ewigkeit wie Dan. XII 7, auf den sich die Deutung bezieht. Dann I 69: ובזה הצד נאמר בו שהוא הצורה האחרונה ושהוא צורת הצורות... ומשני זה הענין נקרא בלשוננו חֵי העולמים, ענייני שהוא חיי העולם. Es müßte schon diese Verschiedenheit allein genügen, um einen Satz wie Schmiedls, *Studien* S. 269, Maimonides hätte „die aristotelische Anschauung (sc. bezüglich der Definition Gottes und seiner Stellung zur Welt) ganz zu der seinigen gemacht" zu widerlegen.

[185] I 69 ist hinzugefügt כמו שיתבאר, bezugnehmend auf I 72.

zurückgestellt wurde,[186] so wird erst der Sinn klar: nicht Lebewesen ist Gott, sondern Lebensprinzip. Gott lebt, nicht indem er Leben h a t, sondern indem er Leben i s t: für die Welt, als ihr Zweck.[187]

IV.

Wir sind nun der Wesensbestimmung des Zweckes näher gekommen und wollen sie zunächst bei Aristoteles betrachten. Bei ihm, vom Bewegungsbegriff ausgegangen und von diesem unabtrennbar, war der Zweck in der Grundvorstellung vor allem das Ende der Bewegung, da jede Bewegung ihren Endpunkt haben muß.[188] Die Vorstellung war daher eine räumlich-zeitliche. Aristoteles spricht von einem Schreiten zum Telos hin, von einem Weg zu ihm,[189] da sich der Zweck als der „natürliche Ort" (οἰκεῖος τόπος) darstellt, wie etwa für das Feuer und das Wasser das Oben und das Unten.[190] Auch die Sphären haben ihren Endzweck; nur erreichen sie, in ihrer unendlichen

[186] *Moreh* I 68, mit der Begründung: מפני שאין חייו דבר זולת עצמו, vorher bei der Begründung der negativen Attribute I 57: וכן חי לא בחיים. Ebenso Acht Kap. VIII; *Jesode Hatorah* II 10. Vgl. Munk I S. 232 n. 2.

[187] Diese Formulierung will zeigen, daß die Unterscheidung des Seins Gottes vom Leben noch nicht bedeuten muß, daß „Maimonides die Verbindung zwischen Gott und Natur im Sein entzweischneidet", wie Cohen, *Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie* S. 46, darstellt. Gott als Lebensprinzip der Welt heißt für Maimonides noch immer nicht Pantheismus; die absolute Separatheit Gottes und die Durchdrungenheit der Welt von ihm, beides gleich bejaht, bildet eben jenes Mysterium, worauf er Ende I 72 hinweist.

[188] Die Auffassung vom τέλος als G r e n z e hat Belege in den verschiedensten Formen; so *de gen. anim.* 715 b 14: ἡ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀτελές, ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος; *de anima* 416 a 17: ... πέρας καὶ λόγος; *Met.* 999 b 8 f.; 1055 a 14: [τὸ τέλος] ἔσχατον ἐν παντί; *de coelo* 277 a 26; 288 b 29 f.; *de part. anim.* 646 b 8: τὸ τέλος ἔχει καὶ τὸ πέρας. *Meteor.* 353 a 17; *Pol.* 1257 b 28 (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις).

[189] Vgl. oben Anm. 124.

[190] *De coelo* 279 b 1: πάντα παύεται κινούμενα, ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον; 310 a 31 ff.: ... τὸ δ' εἰς τὸν αὑτοῦ τόπον φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τὸ εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος ἐστι φέρεσθαι; 312 a 15. *Phys.* 255 a 2: ταῦτα γὰρ εἰς μὲν τοὺς ἀντικειμένους τόπους βίᾳ κινεῖται, εἰς δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους ... φύσει. *De gen. et corr.* 335 a 20: ἕκαστον δὲ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν φέρεσθαι· ἡ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἁπάντων ἐν τοῖς ὅροις.

Bewegung, ihr Ziel niemals.[191] Mit der räumlichen hängt auch die zeitliche Vorstellung zusammen, und das Natürliche wäre hier, daß eben der Zweck zeitlich das Spätere ist, da es das Zuerreichende darstellt, was auch von Aristoteles gelehrt wird.[192] Hier aber greift schon hinüber die erweiterte oder gar übertragene Bedeutung des Telos, nämlich seine Auffassung als Substanz oder Form (οὐσία, εἶδος), und erfordert neben dem Vorangehen des Zweckes an Bedeutung auch ein Vorangehen in der Zeit.[193] Woraus sich ein Widerspruch ergibt; nicht der einzige in der aristotelischen Teleologie. Diese primäre Zweckauffassung ist zu verstehen als ein Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Anfang und Ende der Bewegung; sie wurzelt, soweit dies die geradlinige, sublunarische Bewegung betrifft, im Gegensätzlichen der beiden Endpunkte.[194] Die Gegensätze aber dürfen nicht als etwas Separates gesehen werden, sondern haben ihre Existenz nur in der Verbindung mit einem Substrat.[195] Daraus ergibt sich die notwendige Verbundenheit des Zweckes mit einer Materie, wobei der Zweck diese sich unterwirft. Und zur Veranschaulichung dessen wird die Übertragung vom Individuum gebraucht, das in sich die Materie bereits mit dem Zweck verbunden hatte, wie der

[191] *De coelo* 279 b 2.: τοῦ δὲ κύκλῳ σώματος ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅθεν ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃν τελευτᾷ; *de gen. et corr.* 320 a 22 f.: τὰ μὲν γὰρ (μόρια) ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τόπῳ μεταβάλλει τοῦ ὅλου μένοντος. (Vgl. Bergson, *Quid Arist. de loco senserit* S. 63, 65.) Über die Notwendigkeit der ewigen Bewegung vgl. *Phys.* 151 a 16 ff. b 9 f. bes. 267 a 24 ff. Vgl. oben Anm. 125.

[192] *Met.* 1077 a 14 f., wo die Wesenhaftigkeit des Körpers verglichen mit Fläche und Linie auch aus ihrer Entstehungsweise abgeleitet wird, 26: εἰ οὖν τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον, τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἐπιπέδου καὶ μήκους. *de part. anim.* 646 b 5 f. (das Verhältnis der Elemente zu den Homoiomerien). *de coelo* 310 b 33: ἡ φορὰ — γενέσει ὑστάτη τῶν κινήσεων, ὥστε πρώτη ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὕτη κίνησις. Besonders *de gen. anim.* 736 b 3: ὕστερον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τέλος.

[193] *Met.* 999 a 13: ὅπου τὸ μὲν βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον πρότερον; *de coelo* 286 a 18: ὕστερον τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. Besonders *Phys.* 265 a 22 (auch auf die zeitliche Reihenfolge der Bewegungsarten angewendet, im diametralen Gegensatz zur in der vorigen Anmerkung zitierten Stelle *de coelo*) — πρότερον δὲ καὶ φύσει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ χρόνῳ τὸ τέλειον τοῦ ἀτελοῦς.

[194] Siehe oben Anm. 125.

[195] *Met.* 1087 a 36 ff.: ἀλλὰ μὴν γίγνεται πάντα ἐξ ἐναντίων ὡς ὑποκειμένου τινός ... ἀεὶ ἄρα πάντα τἀναντία καθ' ὑποκειμένου, καὶ οὐθὲν χωριστόν.

Mensch, der den Menschen erzeugt.[196] Aber auch „das Verhältnis des Zweckes und der Form zur Materie ist kein ganz klares und festes“ [197] — da manchmal eben auch die Materie gegenüber dem Zweck bestimmend wird, wie der Körper z. B. bezüglich der Seele.[198]

Nun ist es diese physikalische Grundvorstellung (die sich aus der Bewegung und ihrem Spannungsverhältnis ergeben hat und in der noch immer Telos mehr Endpunkt bedeutet), verbunden mit der Reflexion über den Vergleich mit der Kunsttätigkeit (aus dem die Beziehung des Teiles zum Ganzen hervorging und in dem Telos eher Endabsicht bedeutet), die beide zusammen zum biologischen Telos-Begriff Aristoteles' führten, der als der eigentliche, seine gesamte Lehre beherrschende zu bezeichnen ist. (Wobei natürlich nicht an eine chronologische Reihenfolge bei Aristoteles gedacht ist.) Hier ist der Punkt, wo sich die Verschmelzung von Zweck mit Wesen und Form endgültig vollzieht,[199] und auf dieser Basis ist der vielzitierte Satz geprägt: Das Wesen ist Zweck für das Werden und nicht das Werden Zweck des Wesens.[200] Das Wesen also einer jeden Sache ist Ende und Zweck, alles andere ist nur Mittel und Weg zu ihm. Als Paradigma dient der Keim, aus dem nicht alles Mögliche entstehen kann [201] sondern nur ein bestimmter,

196 Vgl. *Phys.* 200a 13; *de somno* 455b 26; *de part. anim.* 646a 30: πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔκ τινος καὶ εἴς τι ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν ... ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον καὶ φυτὸν γεννᾷ φυτὸν ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον ὑποκειμένης ὕλης; *de anima* 413a 4: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος.

197 Eucken, *loc. cit.*, S. 73.

198 Beispiele hierfür: *de part. anim.* 651a 12, 667a 11 — daß der Körper auf das ἦθος der Lebewesen bestimmend wirkt. Siehe *de gen. anim.* 762a 24. Über die notwendige Abhängigkeit vom Körperlichen s. ausführlich Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 483, bes. Anm. 4.

199 Siehe Belege bei Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 328, Anm. 1. Über die Konkurrenz zwischen φύσις, dem Grundbegriff der Teleologie, als Bewegungsprinzip, ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως und als εἶδος = τέλος s. Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 91.

200 *de part. anim.* 640a 18: ἡ γὰρ γένεσις ἕνεκα τῆς οὐσίας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἕνεκα τῆς γενέσεως. Ähnlich *de gen. anim.* 778b 2f. *Met.* 1034a 31f. Diese Formulierung ist gut platonisch; *Phileb.* 54B.

201 Belege dafür vielfach in *de gen. anim.* (bes. 736a 27ff., auch 737b 17 u. a.) und *de anima.* Vgl. ausführlich Meyer, *Entwicklungsgedanke* S. 52f. 98. Gegenüber Empedokles macht Aristoteles geltend, daß der Keim οὐ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ vorhanden ist, *de part. anim.* 640a 24. Den Wider-

von vornherein in seiner Wesensidee feststehender Organismus. Diese Zweckauffassung ist in ihrem Charakter biologisch, ob sie nun auf bereits durchgeführte biologische Theorien fußt oder nicht.[202]

Dieses Zweck-Wesen aber — und hier wirken wiederum Bewegungsmoment und Technikvergleich zusammen — besteht in nichts anderem als in einer spezifischen Tätigkeit, in einer Funktion. Die Form im Organismus und also sein Zweck ist seine Spezialleistung, sein ἔργον.[203] Hier erst verliert τέλος seine Bedeutung als räumlich-zeitliches Ende und wird zum reinen ἕνεκα του, nicht wovor, sondern wofür etwas geschieht. Das Vermögen ist der Zweck des Organs, das Sehvermögen der des Auges.[204] Es bleibt aber nicht beim

spruch zwischen dieser auch zeitlichen Voranstellung des Zweckes zu den später (646 a 24 ff.) entwickelten Gedanken, daß τὰ ὕστερα τῇ γενέσει πρότερα τὴν φύσιν ἐστί, καὶ πρῶτον τὸ τῇ γενέσει τελευταῖον, will Meyer, *Natur etc.*, S. 99, Anm. 1, als von zwei Gesichtspunkten gesehen erklären, wobei die letztere Behauptung „ohne Berücksichtigung der synonymen, den Werdeprozeß einleitenden Ursache" zu verstehen sei. Vom Gesichtspunkte des „Gesetzes der Synonymie" fielen πρῶτον τῇ φύσει und πρῶτον τῷ χρόνῳ zusammen. Daß diese Schwierigkeit bei Aristoteles durch diese Erklärung allein nicht behoben ist, beweisen die oben, Anm. 192 und 193, angeführten Stellen, bei denen die Erklärung durch die „Synonymie" keine Lösung herbeizuführen vermag.

[202] Über Aristoteles' Stärke in der Biologie in bezug auf seine Zwecklehre vgl. Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, 2. Aufl., S. 354. Dennoch kann Jäger recht behalten, daß Aristoteles nicht eine bewußte Nachbildung spezialbiologischer Ergebnisse vorgenommen hat.

[203] Schon in Protreptikos bei Jamblich nimmt der ἔργον-Begriff eine hervorragende Stellung ein. Siehe Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 66 f. Das ist das von den anderen als eigentümliche Leistung sich abhebende ἔργον. Hier ist auch schon die Abstufung durchgeführt und die Hervorhebung jenes ἔργον, das mit der ἐνέργεια zusammenfällt, also nicht ein von der ἐνέργεια verschiedenes Objekt darstellt, wie dies im Seelischen der Fall ist. Dies wird vielfach später wiederholt. *Met.* 1050 a 21: τὸ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον; b 2; *de coelo* 286 a 8: ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὃς ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου; *de part. anim.* 655 b 20: ἐκ τῶν ἔργων γνωρίζειν; *Pol.* 1253 a 23: πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται; *Meteor.* 390 a 10: ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ; ebenso *Met.* 1035 b 16; u. v. a.

[204] *de part. anim.* 694 b 13: τὰ ὄργανα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἔργον πρὸς τὰ ὄργανα. Das Verhältnis des ἔργον zum Organ entspricht dem der Seele zum Körper; 645 b 19: καὶ τὸ σῶμα πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον; *de anima* 415 b 18: πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα. Darum unterscheidet sich das mit dem Sehvermögen begabte Auge vom bloß homonym mit ihm so benannten toten; *Meteor.* 390 a 10; *de*

Vermögen, sondern dies löst sich noch weiter auf in die Aktivität des Vermögens; das Sehvermögen hat seinen Zweck im Sehen.[205] Das ἔργον, die Spezialleistung mit dem Vermögen eng verbunden, wird als πρᾶξις, als Ausüben verstanden und vielfach wird eben πρᾶξις, als eigentlicher Zweck erklärt.[206] Dies wird manchmal auch im Sinne von Gebrauch, Nutzanwendung (χρῆσις) verstanden, wie etwa das Sägen von der Säge.[207]

Auf jeden Fall zeigt es sich, wie der Begriff des Ganzen oder des Wesens als Zweck sich in ein Dynamisches immer mehr auflöst und so vom „Ganzen" des Vermögens wieder bis zu seiner jeweiligen Teilausübung zurückgeht, so daß wiederum der Einzelakt das eigentlich Teleologisch-Reale zu sein scheint. In diesem Sinne der funktionellen Bestimmung ist auch die vielfach gebrauchte Wendung zu verstehen, die Natur, oder Gott, mache nichts umsonst,[208] welcher Satz, wie Aristoteles an einer Stelle angibt, sich ihm auf induktivem Wege, aus der Beobachtung empirischen Geschehens, ergeben hat.[209] Dies alles aber läuft auf Eines hinaus: auf die Immanenz der Teleologie. Im Funktionellen war die Immanenz, dieser Hauptzug der aristotelischen Teleologie, am

part. anim. 641 a 1; *Pol.* 1253 a 20 u. a.; *de anima* 412 b 18: εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις.

205 So *Met.* 1050 a 9: τέλος ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῷα, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν. Diese Relation zwischen ὄψις und ὁρᾶν ist ebenso formuliert, wie die zwischen ὄργανον und ἔργον; ; s. vorige Anm.

206 Manchmal mit ἔργον zusammen, so *de part. anim.* 646 b 11: τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν ἕνεκέν ἐστι· ἐκείνων γὰρ ἔργα καὶ πράξεις εἰσίν; vorher 645 b 15: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα πρᾶξίς τις; auch 662 a 23 (ἐργασία); *Meteor.* 390 a 18.

207 Als Fortsetzung der früher zitierten Stelle *de part. anim.* 645 b heißt es 17: οὐ γὰρ ἡ πρίσις τοῦ πρίονος χάριν γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ὁ πρίων τῆς πρίσεως· χρῆσις γάρ τις ἡ πρίσις ἐστίν. Ähnlich auch im Werte des Reichtums für den Menschen, *Rhet.* 1361 a 23: ὅλως τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος.

208 Belege für diesen so bekannten, sehr häufig vorkommenden Ausspruch s. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 424 Anm. 3.

209 *de incessu anim.* 704 b 12: ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως ὑποθμένοις οἷς εἰώθαμεν χρῆσθαι πολλάκις πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον τὴν φυσικήν, λαβόντες τὰ τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον ἐκ πᾶσι, τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις· τούτων δ' ἓν μέν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην. Ähnlich *de gen. anim.* 788 b 20 f.

besten geborgen. Mit ihr aber war zugleich die Relativität und Vielheit der Zwecke gegeben und, wie bereits gesehen, führte die Vielheit zu Unterordnungen und Fremdzwecklichkeit, welches gerade der Tendenz der immanenten, also eigenen Zwecklichkeit zuwiderläuft. Aber abgesehen davon führt diese funktionelle Immanenz, an sich selbst besehen, zu Unklarheiten und unlösbaren Schwierigkeiten.

Die erste ist schon im Begriffe der πρᾶξις enthalten. Von ihr ausgehend und sie als Formzweck betrachtend, gelangt man leicht zur Anschauung, daß etwa im Verhältnis zwischen einer Kunst und ihrem Gegenstand die erstere die Form (Zweck) des letzteren ist. Was auch Aristoteles wiederholt behauptet; die Heilkunst ist die Form der Gesundheit.[210] Es wäre dies so zu deuten, daß sich die Gesundheit erst durch die Heilkunst auswirkt und daher in ihr ihre πρᾶξις hat. Nun aber unterscheidet Aristoteles sehr scharf zwischen πρᾶξις und ποίησις, und zwar in deren Beziehung zum Zweck. Die ποίησις hat den Zweck außerhalb sich selbst, die πρᾶξις schließt den Zweck in sich ein, ist Selbstzweck.[211] Eine Kunst aber ist als ποίησις anzusehen.[212] Sie ist ihrer Natur nach auf ein zu erreichendes Ziel, auf ihren Gegenstand, gerichtet. Im Falle der Heilkunst etwa geht die ποίησις auf die Gesundheit, die als Idee-Zweck ihr voransteht.[213] Es ergibt sich also im teleologischen Verhältnis zwischen Kunst und Gegenstand ein Zirkel:

210 *de gen. anim.* 740 b 28: ἡ δὲ τέχνη μορφὴ τῶν γιγνομένων ἐν ἄλλῳ; *de part. anim.* 640 a 31 (bezugnehmend auf die ἀνδριαντοποιητική): ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ὁ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἔστιν; *de gen. et corr.* 335 b 33; *Met.* 1032 b 13: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ἐστι καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς οἰκίας.

211 *Eth. Nic.* 1139 b 2 f.; 1140 b 6 f.: τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστιν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. *Met.* 1025 b 22: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις. Auch diese Unterscheidung ist gut platonisch. (So *Charm.* 163 B f.)

212 *Eth. Nic.* 1140 a 16: ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τήχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. Darin liegt auch der dort erörterte Unterschied zwischen τέχνη (als ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική) und φρόνησις. Weiters vgl Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 199 Anm. 2; S. 764 Anm. 2.

213 Der oben, Anm. 210 zitierten Stelle *Met.* 1032 b geht voran a 32: ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; dann: ἡ δ' ὑγίεια ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ; schließlich: εἶτα ἤδη ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται, ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.

das eine ist Form des anderen; und dies nicht etwa an verschiedenen Stellen, sondern beide Bestimmungen stehen dicht nebeneinander in Met. VII, Kap. 7. Es sei denn, man gibt der Heilkunst eine Doppelstellung: zur Gesundheit als Idee und zur bereits verwirklichten Gesundheit. Das würde durch die Betonung der Immaterialität im Anschluß an die Bezeichnung der Heilkunst als Zweck[214] eine gewisse Möglichkeit finden. Auf jeden Fall ist zumindest eine und dieselbe Heilkunst einmal πρᾶξις, somit selbst Zweck, das andere Mal ποίησις und erst auf einen außenliegenden Zweck gerichtet.

Eine zweite Schwierigkeit aus der Relativisierung des Zweckes ergibt sich in der Frage des Einfachen und Differenzierten. Dies greift schon beträchtlich ins Gebiet des Ethischen hinüber. Vom Funktionellen ausgehend ist die Tätigkeit je höher im Werte, je differenzierter und verfeinerter sie ist. Darum ist das nicht unmittelbar Existenznotwendige, das Überschüssige, höher als das Notwendige[215] — eigentlich sei dieses über das Notwendige Hinausgehende das, wo das Gute und Schöne anfängt.[216] Darum ist auch der Mensch gegenüber den anderen Lebewesen höher, da bei ihm die Differenziation die höchste Stufe erreichte, körperlich sowohl[217] — wobei wiederum die größere Geschiedenheit in den räumlichen Gegensätzen, wie rechts und links usw., von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung sind — als auch im Seelischen.[218] Andererseits aber wird wiederum das Einfache und Unveränderliche dem Diffe-

[214] So in der angeführten Stelle *Met.* wenn gesagt wird, die Gesundheit entstehe aus Gesundheit: τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην. So auch *de part. anim.* 640a 31.

[215] *Pol.* 1252b 29; 1278b 20f.

[216] *Top.* 118a 6: τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίω, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ αἱρετώτερα· βέλτιον γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον. Vgl. *de anima* 434b 20f.

[217] *de inc. anim.* 705a 26ff.; 706a 18f.; *hist. anim.* 497b 21; 494a 26; *de part. anim.* 672b 20.

[218] *Hist. anim.* 588a 18; 608b 4: (ἴχνη τῶν ἠθῶν) μᾶλλον δὲ φανερώτερα ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι μᾶλλον ἦθος καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτετελεσμένην, ὥστε καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις εἶναι φανερωτέρας ἐν αὐτοῖς. Über das schärfere Wahrnehmungsvermögen *de gen. anim.* 781b 17ff.; *de part. anim.* 655b 37f.; *de coelo* 292b 2f.: ἐνταῦθα αἱ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πλεῖσται πράξεις· πολλῶν γὰρ τῶν εὖ δύναται τυχεῖν, ὥστε πολλὰ πράττει, καὶ ἄλλων ἕνεκα.

renzierten gegenüber viel höher gestellt — mit Rücksicht auf dessen Abgegrenztheit und Bestimmtheit.[219] Die Sphären sind deshalb höher, weil einfacher, das höchste Wesen ist das Einfachste.[220] Alle Veränderung und Differenziertheit bedeutet Verfall.[221] Der Mensch also, der wegen seiner Differenziertheit den anderen Lebewesen gegenüber höher steht, ist infolge derselben Differenziertheit den sphärischen Wesen gegenüber tiefer. In einem Falle ist die Feinheit der Funktion das Kriterium, im anderen das Moment der πέρας[222] — beide aber als Gesichtspunkte der teleologischen Qualifikation.

Schließlich wird diese Relativität des Zweckmäßigen auch im Ethischen maßgebend. Ein allgemeines, das platonische ἀγαθόν, wird grundsätzlich abgelehnt.[223] Da das Gute mit

219 *Eth. Nic.* 1170a 19, das Leben gehöre zu den Gütern, ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς ταὐαθοῦ φύσεως. *Phys.* 201b 25: αἱ ἀρχαὶ διὰ τὸ στερητικαὶ εἶναι ἀόριστοι. Über die Veränderung *Eth. Nic.* 1154b 28; μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. *Meteor.* 361b 34.

220 *Eth. Nic.* 1154b 20: οὐκ ἀεὶ οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν... ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται· διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ηδονήν. *de part. anim.* 641b 18: τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλλον. *de coelo* 270b 13.

221 Siehe oben Anm. 219. *Eth. Nic.* 1106b 28: τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν... τὸ δὲ καθορθοῦν μοναχῶς. *de coelo* 286b 16: πρότερον τῇ φύσει ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει τὸ ἓν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν τῶν συνθέτων. *de part. anim.* 665b 14: ἀρχὴν τούτων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μίαν· ὅπου γὰρ ἐνδέχεται, μίαν βέλτιον ἢ πολλάς. In dem Sinne auch *Anal. post.* 86a 4, *Rhet.* 1356b 31.

222 Siehe oben Anm. 188.

223 Die Hauptstelle gegen das platonische ἀγαθόν ist *Eth. Nic.* I 4. Das Objekt auf das der menschliche Wille (oder Begierde) gerichtet ist, ist wohl ein ἀγαθόν, aber kein absolutes, sondern das erreichbare, das πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν; *Eth. Nic.* 1095a 16, 1139a 13f.; *de anima* 433a 27f.: διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν·...πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. (Vgl. Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 609, 3.) Anders verhält es sich wohl im Kosmos, der sein ὀρεκτόν in sich selbst behält und somit sein ἀγαθόν eher als absolutes erscheint. Vgl. Siebeck, *Die Lehre des Aristoteles* S. 33. Doch gibt es auch hier Belege genug, daß „Gott und das Gute doch bei Aristoteles nicht gleichbedeutende Begriffe sind", Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 371 Anm. 1. In der Ablehnung des Guten, als Wurzelpunkt für Natur und Sittlichkeit zugleich, liegt jener für Aristoteles wesentliche „Unterschied zwischen Metaphysik und Ethik" mit all seinen Folgen, insbesondere in der Teleologie, s. Cohen, *Charakteristik*, S. 72.

dem Zwecke gleichzusetzen ist, gibt es eben so viele Arten des Guten, als es Zwecke gibt.[224] Wie in der Natur, so im menschlichen Handeln, ist das jeweilige zum Endzweck Führende das jeweilig Gute.[225] Darum gibt es auch terminologisch ein „gut" und ein „besser"; so gehört einmal das Sein zu dem an sich Guten, ein andermal ist es „besser" als das Nichtsein.[226] (Es gibt auch ein „Bestes", was dasselbe wie das Gute bedeutet.)[227]

Wenn daher Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 85 Anm. 1 diese verlorengegangene Einheit von Sein und Wert im Gottesbegriff wieder vereint findet: „das höchste Sein ist zugleich das höchste Gut" — so muß er doch die „völlig verschobene Perspektive" und auch die Tatsache zugeben, daß „der Zusammenhang dieser Metaphysik mit der einzelnen πρᾶξις zu locker" ist.

[224] *Rhet.* 1393 a 13: ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι' ἐκείνων λεκτέων τὰς αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν; *de anima* 414 b 21. Der Zweck als Gut, *Phys.* 194 a 32 f. 195 a 23 f.; doch: ἑκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα, *Top.* 149 b 37 f. *Anal. post.* 95 a 6 f. *Eth. Nic.* 1170 a 21: τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. *Rhet.* 1362 a 24: ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη ... τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν. *Eth. Eud.* 1218 a 30: τὸ φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἑνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται, ὀφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγιείας, οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου. *de part. anim.* 645 a 21, *de gen. anim.* 742 a 20 f. In dem Sinne auch *de anima* 415 b 1, *Pol.* 1288 b 37.

[225] *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 34: ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον; 1176 a 3: δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν; 1173 a 4: ἴσως καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ; *Phys.* 246 a 13: ὅταν λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον. Über den „Zirkelbeweis", der sich auch hier ergibt, vgl. Eucken, *Meth.* S. 90. Entscheidend ist die Wandlung in der Anschauung über das Verhältnis der βίοι zu den ἀγαθά. Während im Protreptikos und besonders in der *Eud. Eth.* die drei typischen Lebensformen auf drei Grundwerte im Menschen — φρόνησις, ἀρετή, ἡδονή — zurückgeführt werden, ist es in der Nikomachischen Ethik umgekehrt: die βίοι bleiben; aber erst „aus den βίοι soll erkannt werden, was die Menschen als ἀγαθόν ansehen", Jäger, *loc. cit.*, 245 f.

[226] *Eth. Nic.* 1170 a 19: τὸ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων; b 1: φύσει ἀγαθὸν ζωή (auch *Pol.* 1278 b 24). Hingegen heißt es *de gen. et corr.* 336 b 27: ἐν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὀρέγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν — βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναι; *de gener. anim.* 731 b 30: βέλτιον ... τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοῦ μὴ ζῆν; *Pol.* 1333 a 21. *Phys.* 260 b 22: τὸ βέλτιον ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν.

[227] Siehe die oben, Anm. 224, zitierten Stellen *Top.* u. *Anal. post.* (ἑκάστου τὸ βέλτιστον); *de coelo* 288 a 2: ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον; ebenso *de part. anim.* 687 a 15; *de vita et m.* 469 a 28: τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ... ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον; *de inc. anim.* 704 b 17: τὸ ἄριστον; *Eth. Nic.* 1099 b 20: εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ... εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν.

Dabei wird wiederum die Nuance von Ende bei Telos unterdrückt — polemisierend gegen Euripides will Aristoteles den Endzweck des Lebens nicht im Tod erblicken, obwohl dieser sein Ende ist.[228] Daneben gibt es allerdings eine vereinzelte Stelle, wo vom Guten als ewigem Unveränderlichen ganz im platonischen Sinne die Rede ist.[229] Diese Wendung hat sich aber nirgends als grundlegende Ansicht in der Philosophie Aristoteles' ausgewirkt. Auch das oft angeführte Gleichnis vom Heer und Feldherrn, wonach die Ordnung des Heeres sowohl in einem immanenten Prinzip als auch in einem transzendenten „Feldherrn" zu suchen sei[230] — auch dies sollte in seiner Bedeutung für die Lehre Aristoteles' nicht überschätzt werden, obwohl sicherlich darin, wie in vielen anderen, bewußt gewordene Regungen, die Immanenz der Teleologie überschreiten zu müssen, sich zum Ausdruck durchringen.

Das Hauptgewicht der Teleologie bleibt ja doch in der Immanenz, d. h. in ihrer physikalisch-biologischen Orientierung. Und wir haben nun gesehen, welche Folgen sich aus ihr ergeben haben für das zeitliche Verhältnis zwischen Mittel und Zweck, für das Verhältnis des Zweckes zu seinem notwendigen Substrat, zur Materie, für die erweiterte Anwendung des Funktionsbegriffs, für das Wertverhältnis zwischen dem Einfachen und Differenzierten; und schließlich auch in der Relativisierung des ethischen Begriffes des Guten.

Die wesentliche Abweichung Maimonides' von dieser Theorie ist die, daß bei ihm die eigentliche Teleologie im Transzendenten anfängt. Da er aber auch auf die aristotelische immanente Naturzweckmäßigkeit nicht verzichtet, müssen wir diese seine Gedankengänge und Andeutungen bis ins Detail untersuchen, um auf den wahren Sinn zu kommen. Diese doppelte Teleologie, die natürliche und die „letzte", die bereits oben ausführlich besprochen wurde, soll hier auf ihren tieferen Grund geprüft werden.

[228] *Phys.* 194 a 27 f.

[229] *de met. anim.* 700 b 32: τὸ δὲ αἴδιον καλόν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς καὶ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ μὴ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δὲ μή, θειότερον καὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὥστ' εἶναι πρός ἕτερον. Daß aber dieses „oberste Prinzip praktisch in der Naturbetrachtung keine Rolle spielt", vgl. Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 95.

[230] *Met.* XII 10. 1075 a 1 f. (Vgl. Siebeck, *Arist.*, S. 45.)

Das Verhältnis dieser beiden zueinander wird klar, wenn man sieht, daß Maimonides ein typisch aristotelisches Beispiel — vom zweckmäßigen Bau des Auges für seine Funktion — als Argument gegen eine aus der Kreationstheorie sich ergebende antiteleologische Lehre anführt.[231] Dies ist gerichtet gegen die ascharitische Verquickung von Kreation mit der zur Atomisierung führenden göttlichen Willenslehre. Ebenso war die „Natur des Unmöglichen" unbedingt aufrechtzuerhalten, um die Lehre von der göttlichen Absicht bei der Kreation nicht in ihr Gegenteil umschlagen zu lassen.[232] Denn in diesem Falle wäre die Teleologie, als ein einheitliches, der Weltordnung zugrundeliegendes Prinzip, nicht weniger bedroht als durch die materialistischen Lehren. Kreation und Schöpfungsabsicht konnten nur dann ihren richtigen Sinn bekommen, wenn mit ihnen eine feste Naturordnung in Verbindung war. Darum ist es auch verständlich, daß die natürliche Zweckmäßigkeit, ganz im aristotelischen Sinne, als „stärkster" Be-

231 *Moreh* III 25. Der Fehler der ascharitischen extremen Willenslehre besteht darin, daß sie nicht bei der Kreation als solcher bleibt ויכשיכו זה בחלקי רעולם כלם, und der zweckmäßige Bau des Auges gilt für sie auch als spezieller Willensakt, כן רצה השם אע"ם שהיה הראית אפשר בחלוף זה. Dem widerspricht nun Maimonides. Ziehen wir aber heran III 19, wo ebenso vom Bau des Auges gesprochen wird, als von einer zweckmäßigen Organisation, so bleibt es hier nicht allein bei der immanenten כונה כן הטבע, sondern wird auf die פעולת בעל שכל zurückgeführt und das Ganze bezweckt die Erklärung von Gottes Wissen der sinnlichen Einzeldinge. Gott sieht und hört die Einzeldinge, indem er beim Schaffen des Auges und des Ohres ihr Sehen und Hören mitbegreift und dies wissend weiß er ergo auch alles durch diese Erfaßte. Diese beiden Stellen, an derselben Tatsache illustriert, ergänzen sich: während III 25 mehr zur natürlichen Immanenz neigt (die allerdings abhängt von מה שגזרה הכמתו), ist der Ausgangspunkt in III 19 die natürliche Intention, die notwendigerweise zur schöpferischen und mit der Providenz enge verbundenen הנהגה zurückführt. Während also III 25 die Organisation des Teiles gleichsam gegen die Argumentation vom Ganzen aus geltend macht, wird in III 19 die letzte Verbundenheit des Teiles mit dem Ganzen betont.

232 *Moreh* II 19 Anf., wo die כונה bei der Weltschöpfung eingeschränkt wird: לא כל כונה בסחם, כי יש שם טבע הנמנעות קים א"א בטולו; dann weiter als Absicht, die Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung darzulegen מבלרי שאעמים עלי מה שדתגברי עליו הביבים מבטול לנמנע טבע קים עומד, אינו מפעולת פועל ובפני זה טבע המציאות. In diesem Sinne III 15: לא יכואר דשם ביכולת עליו. Dies als Axiom angenommen, läßt nur noch eine Diskussion zu, was zum נמנע oder zum אפשר gehört.

weis für die Kreation angeführt werden konnte,[233] ohne daß da ein Widerspruch zu III 25 erblickt werden muß. Es ist eben dieses von der Naturwissenschaft herstammende Gegenmoment gegen die extreme Willens-Kreationstheorie gemeint. Der Schlüssel, beide Stellen in Einklang zu bringen, ist jene Einleitung von II 19, wo wohl die כונת מכין Schwerpunkt ist, wie hier, III 13, aber a priori durch die Natur des Unmöglichen reguliert, im Sinne von III 25.

Es ist eben nicht so, daß Maimonides die immanente Naturteleologie akzeptiert und sie dann durch einen Überbau seines letzten Zweckes e r g ä n z t hat, sondern beide Teleologien stützen sich gegenseitig, und die eigentliche transzendente b e d a r f der nichteigentlichen immanenten. Aus der natürlich-immanenten resultiert die Vielheit der Zwecke, aus einer b l o ß transzendenten „Absicht" resultiert die Vielheit der göttlichen Willensakte — beide bedrohen die Einheit der kosmischen Teleologie. Bemerkt sei noch vorläufig — ohne daß auf die weiteren Konsequenzen eingegangen wird — daß für die immanente Naturteleologie immer das Weisheitsattribut Gottes herangezogen wird, für die Transzendenz der Teleologie, verbunden mit Kreation, gewöhnlich das Willensattribut.[234]

Wenn aber die immanente Zweckmäßigkeit unerläßlich war — die eigentliche blieb doch die transzendente. Wir kommen wieder auf die letzterwähnte Stelle III 13 zurück. Hier ist der Gedankengang folgender: Es wird unterschieden zwischen „natürlichem" und „letztem" Zweck; dann wird die

[233] *Moreh* III 13: ודע כי מן הגדולה שבראיות על חדוש העולם... הוא מה שיעמוד עליו המוסח בנמצאות השבעיות, כי לכל דבר מהם איזו תכלית. Daß dies nicht wörtlich zu nehmen ist, ergibt sich ja klar aus II 17, wo die Beweisführung aus den נמצאות שבעיות prinzipiell abgelehnt wird; ואמנם יתחייבו הטענות דאלה על כי שיאמר שטבע זה המציאות הנה יורה על היותו מחודש וכבר הודעתיך שאני לא אומר זה. Dies beeinflußt auch limitierend den Gedankengang von II 19, der vom Satz ausgeht שמציאותנו וזאת תורתנו על שהיא בכונת מכין בהכרח, dies als Gegensatz zu קדמות־חיוב. Denn auch die Schwierigkeiten, die sich aus den Sphären-Bewegungen ergeben, wollte Maimonides weniger als positives Beweismaterial für sich ausnützen denn als negatives, um die Unzulänglichkeit der aristotelischen Lösungen darzutun. Dieses Kapitel schließt mit der Stellung der zwei Probleme der Kreation, die erst einer Lösung bedürfen.

[234] So ist III 25 חכמה ausschlaggebend, hingegen I 69 ist für uns רצון maßgebender.

aristotelische Auffassung des natürlichen Zwecks dargestellt, aus der hervorgeht, daß die Dinge „eines für das andere" existieren; hier wird die Darstellung durch zwei Bemerkungen unterbrochen: erstens, daß aus dieser natürlichen Ordnung auch seitens Aristoteles' ein göttliches Prinzip abgeleitet wird, und zweitens, daß von den natürlichen Existenzen aus die Kreation bewiesen werden kann, da ein jedes einen Zweck hat „und das eine für das andere existiert".[235] Dies von der Kreation ist nun sicherlich nicht mehr als referierten Aristoteles anzusehen — und doch wiederholt sich derselbe Wortlaut bezüglich der zweckhaften Zuordnung der Dinge zueinander. Als Meinung Maimonides' aber steht es im krassesten Widerspruch zur eine Seite später im selben Kapitel einsetzenden Beweisführung, daß die Dinge nicht Zwecke sind das eine fürs andere. Und in beiden Fällen dieselben Beispiele, insbesondere das der Pflanzen.[236] Der Sinn kann nur der sein, daß hier, bei Besprechung der natürlichen zweckmäßigen Zuordnung, dies „eine für das andere" nicht als eigentliche Zweckmäßigkeit anzusehen ist. Auch der Zusammenhang bestätigt dies: vorher, als Maimonides in seinem eigenen Sinne spricht,

235 *Moreh* III 13. Von den beiden parenthetischen Sätzen, zwischen וכ״ש באבני בעלי חיים und der Wiederaufnahme des Hauptgedankens, ist ein jeder mit ודע besonders eingeleitet. Bei der התהלה שבלית des Aristoteles wird hinzugefügt ואשר יעשה זה מפני זה, ebenso auch bei der Kreationsansicht: ושזה מפני זה. וזה והיא ראיה על כונת מכון.

236 *Ibid.*: zuerst: וכבר באר אריסטו שהצמחים נבראו בעבור ב״ח וכן באר במקצת הנמצאות שזה מפני זה; unter den מקצת הנמצאות sind wohl die Tiere, die für den Menschen sind, zu verstehen, dies im Sinne des vorangegangenen ולא מה תכלית זה המין מבעלי חיים או הצמחים, vor allem aber im Sinne der aristotelischen Stelle — *Pol.* I 8 — die hier vorgeschwebt haben muß und wo nach der Aussage über die Pflanzen folgt: καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν. Dann bei Darstellung unserer Meinung, im Sinne der Kreation, wird als irrig in Einem bezeichnet: אם הגלגלים היו בעבור האדם כל שכן שאר [כל] מיני בעלי חיים והצמחים. Erst gegen Schluß des Kapitels führt Maimonides eine Scheidung zwischen Tier und Pflanze durch: das Tier ist nicht für den Menschen — wie zu ודרו בדנת חים erklärt — die Pflanzen dagegen הנה באור אריסטו וזולתו וכן נראה שהצמח אינם נמצא בעבור בעלי חיים. Auf jeden Fall aber ist die in der ersten Argumentation gemachte Erwähnung der Pflanze sicherlich gegen die vorher zitierte Meinung Aristoteles' über die Pflanze gerichtet gewesen, um zunächst auch für diese zu beweisen, daß sie nicht für den Menschen geschaffen sein muß. Im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles verbleibt Maimonides nur in bezug auf die Tiere.

ist nur von einem „gewissen Zweck“ [237] der Dinge die Rede; dann aber folgt die bezeichnende Wendung: „ich komme auf das Thema des Kapitels zurück, das ist die Frage des Zwecks“ [238] — dies unmittelbar nach der Erwähnung der Zuordnung des einen für das andere. Daraus ist klar ersichtlich, daß diese Zuordnung wohl für Aristoteles in seiner natürlichen Teleologie bereits Zweck bedeuten mochte, sein „letzter Zweck“ ist ja auch der Kreislauf des Entstehens und Vergehens — nicht aber für uns, die wir auf dem Standpunkt der Kreation stehen. Da wird unter dem letzten und für uns eigentlichen Zweck eben der verstanden, der eine solche Zuordnung ausschließt. Innerhalb dieser Teleologie sind auch die Teile Selbstzweck.

Nun haben wir bereits gesehen, worin sich der letzte Zweck vom natürlichen unterscheidet — in Anlehnung an die Erörterung der letzten Form als Gegensatz zur natürlichen in I 69.[239] Der letzte Zweck ist charakterisiert durch seine Separatheit. Dieses Moment der Transzendenz betont auch Maimonides im Anschluß an den Vergleich des Kosmos mit dem Menschen. Daß die Welt ein Makrorganismus ist, wird in keinem Punkt eingeschränkt; nur soweit sie mit dem vernunftbegabten Menschen verglichen wird, da bedarf es einer Einschränkung in drei Punkten, deren dritter darin besteht, daß die hier waltende Vernunft nicht, wie im Menschen, an eine Materie gebunden ist, sondern als absolut separat gedacht werden muß.[240] Hier allerdings erwächst eine Schwie-

[237] *Guide* III, כ״ג a: אין לכל שי מנהא נאיה מא (Munk: une certaine fin), das Tibbon'sche תכלית אחד ist unrichtig (es sei denn, wenn man אחד lesen wollte).

[238] *Ibid.*: ואשוב אל כוונת הסרק והוא הדברים בתכליח. Munk, III S. 86, übersetzt hier das והו אלכלאם סי אלגאיה mit „qui traite de la cause finale“, wodurch wohl eine Nuancierung gegen das in der vorigen Anmerkung erwähnte „fin“ gegeben ist. Doch fehlt diese beabsichtigte Nuance im Text (wo es heißen müßte אלכלאם אלגאיי), אלגאיה allein, gegen das frühere נאיה מא, läßt die Hauptabsicht besser hervortreten.

[239] Siehe oben Anm. 71, 73.

[240] *Moreh* I 72: יהשם יתי אינו כח בגוף העולם אבל נסדר מכל חלקי העולם והנהגתו יתע׳ והשגחתו מחוברת לעולם בכללו. Während die ersten zwei Unterschiede — über das Verhältnis des אבר הראש zu den anderen und über die Lage des לב im kosmischen Organismus — noch gut aristotelisch sein konnten, ist dieser dritte Unterschied eine Betonung der wesentlichen Abweichung. Charakteristisch ist dies durch die

rigkeit aus dem organischen Charakter des Kosmos, welcher allein zweckmäßige Gleichstellung der Teile begründet. Der Organismus verträgt nur eine immanente Zweckmäßigkeit. Das aber hat Maimonides empfunden und als unbegreiflich, aber doch unleugbar, hingestellt. Separatheit der leitenden Vernunft und zugleich Zweckbedeutung der Teile — das ist das Mysterium.[241] Es erinnert an die Schwierigkeit, die sich bei Aristoteles im Gleichnis des Heeres offenbart[242] — dort aber ist die immanente Heeresordnung entscheidend und nur der hinzutretende Heeresführer problematisch.

Hervorhebung der Abgesondertheit von allen Teilen der Welt — מצאיק לנטיע אנזא אלעאלם — und anderseits die Durchdringung der Welt als Gesamtheit — ללעאלם בגמלתה. Wir wissen bereits, daß die Durchdringung der Gesamtheit auch auf die Teile zurückwirkt — doch soll diese Gegenüberstellung den primären Charakter der Beziehung Gottes zur Welt hervorheben. Es gibt keinen Teil der Welt, auch nicht die höchste Sphäre, der in einer näheren Lage zu Gott sich befände als ein anderer; die Frage einer etwaigen „Lokalisierung" oder der, bei Aristoteles so problematischen, ἅπτη fällt von vornherein weg. Munk, I S. 373 trennt auch hier die mit einem Binde-waw verbundenen Teile (והדביקה) und beginnt mit dem zweiten Teil einen neuen selbständigen Satz. Dadurch geht der Charakter der Gegenüberstellung verloren. Falaquera, *Moreh Hamoreh* S. 54, zitiert מהובית לעולם ohne בכללו, wodurch auch das Wesentliche weggelassen erscheint.

241 *Ibid.*: der חבור נעלם מטנו תכליתו besteht in der Antinomie: כי הטופת יעטוד על הבדלו מן העולם והנקותו מטנו והטופת יעטוד על מציאות מעשה הנהגתו והשגחתו בכל חלק מחלקיו ואפילו הדק הפחות. Der erste Teil des Satzes weist zurück auf I 70, wo die Frage der Separatheit auch gegenüber der ersten Sphäre — ערבות — behandelt wird; dort werden als Konsequenzen der Separatheit, die im Bilde רוכב ערבות gesehen wird, nicht bloß שאין הרוכב מבין הנרכב, sondern auch die zwei Lehren angesehen: 1. das Gott nicht in der Welt ist, ein Teil von ihr — והסתכל אמרם שוכן עליו ולא שוכן בו שאלו אמרו שוכן בו, היה מחייב לשם מקום — oder später unter Anführung von Ber. Rab.: הוא מעון עולמו ואין עולמו מעונו; 2. daß die Separatheit nicht Passivität bedingt, sondern die Welt als Instrument bedeutet והיא כלי לו שישתמש בה כרצונו. All dies wird als ein, im Innern sich bedingender, Gedankenkomplex betrachtet; nur so sei Gott als מניע הגלגל zu verstehen. Ephodi z. St., I 72, sieht die Antinomie so, daß aus der Separatheit — והנקותו מטנו — folgt שאינו מניע גלגל ערבות, während aus der השגחה לעולם בכל חלקיו, also aus dem zweiten Satz, sich erst ergibt, daß Gott den גלגל ערבות bewegt. Dies, offenbar doch auf I 70 bezogen, stimmt jedoch mit den Darlegungen dort nicht überein, wie gezeigt. Die Antinomie hier besteht in der Beziehung Gottes zum Ganzen des Kosmos und zu den Teilen, zu allen auch den geringsten.

242 Siehe oben Anm. 230.

Die Separatheit bedeutet aber nicht bloß ein Negatives. Wohl ist dadurch die Zweckidee, da losgelöst von allem Materiellen, von vielen Komplikationen, die sich bei Aristoteles aus der Materiegebundenheit ergeben, frei. Dazu aber kommt noch ein Positives. Schon bei jener dritten Einschränkung im Menschenvergleich, worin die Weltvernunft von der Menschenvernunft sich durch ihre völlige Beziehungslosigkeit zur Materie charakteristisch unterscheidet, schon da wird noch ein Hinweis auf ein Neues gegeben. Es wird dennoch die Möglichkeit eines Vergleiches nahegelegt mit dem menschlichen aquirierten Intellekt.[243] Dieser aber ist zwar auch als separat gedacht, jedoch ist nicht die Separatheit sein wesentliches Merkmal — sondern der Realisierungsakt, der in ihm impliziert ist. Auf diese Weise kommt zur Separatheit auch in der Weltvernunft noch dieses neue, aktive Moment hinzu. Bei Aristoteles sehen wir als die letzte Stufe in der teleologischen Reihe die ποίησις; als nächste, d. h. die eigentliche bei jeder immanenten Zweckmäßigkeit, war die πρᾶξις; für Gott aber konnten beide Arten nicht gelten, er kann bloß νόησις sein.[244] Irgendwie mußte das πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον als separat gedacht werden[245] — nirgends aber hatte diese Separatheit eine positive Auswirkung im System, am wenigsten in der Teleologie, wo sie ja die aristotelische Immanenz von Grund aus umgestürzt hätte. Bei Maimonides hingegen war es gerade die Separatheit, die die Teleologie, d. h. die Lehre vom letzten Zweck ganz auf den Boden der ποίησις gestellt hat. Die funktionelle πρᾶξις hatte im letzten Zweck

[243] *Moreh* I 72: וידע שראוי היה שנדמה יחס האלוה יתי לעולם יחס השכל הנקנה הנאצל לאדם אשר אינו כח בגוף והוא נבדל מן הגוף... ושופע עליו. Umgekehrt wird wieder, I 1, im דמות die nur dem Menschen eigentümliche — יישרד האדם בעניין שהוא זה בו מאד — reine Erkenntnis mit der göttlichen — אשר אינה בכלי — verglichen.

[244] Die Hauptstelle ist *Met.* XII, 7. „Daß der Gottheit weder eine ποίησις noch eine πρᾶξις beigelegt werden könne, sagt Aristoteles öfters mit aller Bestimmtheit," Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 368, Anm. 1 (wo auch Belege); bes. S. 374, Anm. 2.

[245] Schon *Met.* 1060 a 7 ff. wird die Frage des Gegenstandes der Metaphysik behandelt, und ganz im platonischen Sinne, als ἀΐδιος οὐσία χωριστή καὶ καθ' αὑτήν bezeichnet. Vgl. ausführlich Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 219 f. Dann *Met.* 1073 a 4 wird vom ersten Beweger als οὐσία κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν gesprochen; (ähnl. wie *Phys.* 198 a 36: ὧν (αἰτίων) ἡ ἑτέρα οὐ φυσική).

keinerlei Berechtigung; es mußte daher, mit Hilfe der absoluten Immaterialität, das Pojetische ermöglicht werden.

Diese für Maimonides wesentliche Grundlegung seiner Teleologie wird an allen bezüglichen Stellen nachdrücklich hervorgehoben. Von III 25 haben wir bereits gesehen, daß dort der ganze Gedankengang auf das Agensmotiv eingestellt ist. Auch III 13 beginnt mit der Vorbemerkung, daß das planmäßige Handeln mit der Zweckfrage verbunden ist, daß es daher für Gott, der nicht geschaffen ist, keine Zweckfrage geben kann.[246] Damit ist die Basis gegeben; dann erst, „nach dieser Vorerörterung", beginnt die eigentliche Abhandlung über den Zweck des Daseins. Man sieht gleich, die spätere Ablehnung des Daseinszwecks hat doch noch anderen Charakter als die in der Vorbemerkung ausgesprochene grundsätzliche Unmöglichkeit einer Zweckfrage beim Nichtgeschaffenen. Aber auch in I 69, wo ja Agens gegen Causa zurückgestellt wird, geschieht es nur aus zwei Gründen: erstens, wie bereits gesehen, da Causa auch den Zweck mitinbegreift, zweitens aber, und dies wird ausdrücklich vom ersten Grund unterschieden, da das Attribut Agens die Möglichkeit gibt zu einer mißverständlichen z e i t l i c h e n Beziehung zwischen dem Wirkenden und dem Werk[247] — dessen Ausschaltung für Maimonides wesentlich war. Hier wird es zwar nur mit der notwendigen Kontinuität der E r h a l t u n g der Welt begründet, wir haben aber bereits gesehen, daß auch für die S c h ö p f u n g das zeitliche Moment ausgeschaltet wurde — eben wegen der Reinheit des Zweckprinzips. Aber auf den pojetischen Charakter des Weltzweckes wird hier keineswegs verzichtet; ausdrücklich

[246] *Moreh* III 13 Anfangs: כל פועל שיעשה בכונה אי אפשר לדבר ההוא אשר עשה מבלתי תכלית אחת בגללה עשה und gleichsam als Stütze für diese erste Prämisse wird die dritte unbezweifelbare angeführt: שהמחויב המציאות... לא יצטרך לפועל... ולהיותו בלתי פועל, denn diese Prämisse an sich spielt im weiteren Gedankengang keine Rolle. Der Hauptzweck, der Prämissen ist die Herstellung der Verbindung zwischen מחודש — כונה — תכלית.

[247] *Moreh* I 69 g. E. wird resumierend wiederholt: ולזה קראוהו סבה ולא קראוהו פועל לבד; dann erst kommt das Argument gegen die Anschauung des Kalam, daß die Welt auch bestehen bleiben könnte, wenn ihr Schöpfer aufhörte zu existieren: ואשר זכרוהו הוא אמת אלו היה פועל לבד ולא היה לדבר ההוא הפעל צורך אליו בהמשך עבורתו.

wird ja betont, daß Causa durchaus nicht mit Ewigkeit der Welt verbunden sein muß.[248]

Nun war Maimonides die Schwierigkeit, die mit der ποίησις für Gott verbunden ist, gut bekannt. Die aristotelische Auffassung, daß alle ποίησις auf einen außenliegenden Zweck gerichtet ist,[249] mußte berücksichtigt werden. Wir sehen auch z. B. Ibn Zaddik das Vorhandensein eines Planes bei der Weltschöpfung ablehnen, und dies nicht allein deswegen, da man dann einen neben Gott existierenden Behelf annehmen müßte,[250] sondern auch, da man daraus notwendigerweise auf eine Zweckursache schließen würde,[251] was nicht anders zu verstehen ist als auf einen außenliegenden Zweck. Dieser Gedankengang, wesentlich entnommen der die Zeit so vielfach beeinflussenden neoplatonischen Theologie des Aristoteles,[252] konnte auch von Maimonides nicht vernachlässigt werden. Während also die Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung ein so wichtiger Stützpunkt der Teleologie war, drohte es nun, daß gerade aus den teleologischen Konsequenzen die Schöpfung selbst bedroht würde.

Aus diesem Grunde fixiert Maimonides den Terminus des „transeunten Zwecks" und erklärt ihn nur möglich bei Willensakten materieller Subjekte.[253] Nur bei diesem ist der Zweck

[248] Selbst nicht für die Philosphen, *ibid.*: ואשר הביאו הפילוסופים לקראו יתי עלה וסבה ולא יקראוהו פועל אינו מפני דעתם הכפורסם בקדמות העולם.

[249] Siehe oben Anm. 211.

[250] *Mikrokosmos*, ed. Horovitz S. 56; nachdem alles abgelehnt wird, was נופל תחת כלי האומנות, wird fortgesetzt: וכן ניכ אין לומר שברא במחשבה ועיון, und dann אבל הבורא יתע׳ ברא ברואיו בלי עיון ומחשבה וכלי (das וכלי fehlt wohl im Ms. Parma, doch kann der Sinn nach dem Zusammenhang nicht anders sein).

[251] *Ibid.*: ועוד שאין לומר שברא לדבר שהדברים הנבראים היו אז עלה מתמטת לאותו דבר הואיל ונבראו בגלל אותו דבר. Über עלה מתמטת als Zweckursache vgl. Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 315 Anm. 166; dieser Stelle will Kaufmann, S. 320 Anm. 180, so einen Sinn geben, indem er שלדברים und dann באותו דבר liest, was jedoch für unseren Zweck weniger wichtig ist, da die Ablehnung einer Zweckursache (in dem שברא לדבר) gleichgestellt mit der Ablehnung eines Instruments, auf jeden Fall gesichert ist.

[252] Siehe Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 319 und 320 Anm. 178, 179. Vgl. auch Horovitz, *Einl. zum Mikrokosmos*, S. IX, Anm. 36.

[253] *Moreh* II 18, Methode II: Der Begriff des תכלית יוצאת — נאיתי מא כאנה wird genau bestimmt dadurch בשיהיו הפעולות מפני דבר אחר הוץ לנוף הרצון. Dies erscheint beim materiebedingten Subjekt sogar eine notwendige Folge: ואם היה הרצון הזה לבעל הומר עד שיבוקש בו (חתי ישלב בה) תכלית אחת יוצאת.

vom Subjekt räumlich getrennt, äußerlich, und infolgedessen ist auch der auf den Zweck gehende Willensakt eine Veränderung, also in der Zeit. Das alles gilt nicht für den separaten Willen, der nur Namensgemeinschaft hat mit unserem materiegebundenen Willen.[254] Durch die Separatheit also konnte gleichsam die Immanenz des Zweckes im Göttlichen erklärt und dadurch die ποίησις ermöglicht werden. Durch die Immaterialität des göttlichen Willens ist sein zweckmäßiges — und dennoch von Raum und Zeit unabhängiges — Wirken möglich. Diese Stelle im Moreh ist von grundlegender Bedeutung, denn sie bildet den Schlüssel zu all den ineinandergreifenden Fragen. Die Fixierung des transeunten Zweckes und seines Bereiches ermöglichte die Lehre vom letzten Zweck. Dadurch ist die Zulässigkeit des Willensattributes in seiner teleologischen Bedeutung gerettet.[255] Auf

[254] *Ibid.* als Gegensatz zum רצון בעל חומר wird der רצון נפרד genannt אשר אינו רצוננו ורצון הנפרד אנחנם יאמר עליהם: משני דברי אחר. Die beiden sind im Wesen verschieden: רצון בשתוף ואין דמיון בין שני הרצונים. Das Gemeinsame besteht darin, daß beide ein Eintreten des Aktes darstellen, denn dies macht das wahre Wesen des Willens aus שאמתת הרצון ומהותו זה עניינה, שיוציא ולא יוצא; in diesem Punkte ist wohl die Gemeinsamkeit nicht bloß homonymer Natur, בשתוף. Nur während beim materiegebundenen Willen, die Spannung zwischen Passivität und Aktivität von den מניעים ומתחדשים bedingt wird, ist sie beim separaten Willen im Inneren begründet. Veränderlichkeit und transeunter Zweck bedingen sich gegenseitig; Veränderung ist aber nicht identisch mit Entscheidungsakt. Ephodi z. St. scheint dieses Moment des transeunten Zweckes zu übersehen und spricht wiederholt vom תכלית allein (כי אין לשאלותיו תכלית etc.), darum ist es begreiflich, daß ihn diese Lösung nicht befriedigen kann: ואלו השני תירוצים צריכים עיון לפי דעתי. Denn nähme man es in dieser allgemeinen Fassung und verstünde man die Stelle כי הפעל הנה נמשך לרצון לבד, an die Ephodi anknüpft, wörtlich, so wäre es ja der krasseste Widerspruch zu dem III 25 durchgeführten Gedankengang. Die Unterscheidung hier entspricht wohl dem in I 69 betonten Gegensatz מבעית לא שכל נפרד in bezug auf die letzte Form.

[255] Dadurch sind auch die Gefahren beseitigt, die sich aus dem Willensattribut für Cohen, *Charakteristik* S. 97, ergeben und die er so formuliert: „Die Schöpfung macht das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Mensch transeunt, während es immanent sein muß. Die Erkenntnis begründet diese Immanenz; der Wille bedroht sie; und die Schöpfung scheint die Drohung auszuführen." Wir sehen, daß gerade der Wille in seiner Immanenz — Maimonides empfindet wohl, daß התית זה הספק כבדה והיא דקה מאד — verbunden mit der Schöpfung, als sittliche Grundlegung für die Begründung der maimunischen Teleologie unerläßlich sind.

dieser Basis aber bedeutet es dasselbe, ob wir sagen, Gott ist der Zweck, wie I 69, oder Gott will einen Zweck, wie III 25; es ist dies kein Widerspruch, da in beiden Fällen der Zweck in Gott immanent bleibt, indem er den Zweck bildet.

Ist nun aber der teleologische Weltgrund, als weltschöpferisches Prinzip, gesichert, so greifen die Konsequenzen auch in den Bereich der Naturteleologie hinüber. Da die Lehre vom letzten Zweck, wie gesagt, nicht bloß ein transzendenter Überbau über die immanente Naturzweckmäßigkeit ist, sondern, durch das kreatorische Moment, ihre Grundlegung bildet, müssen auch die natürlichen Zwecke im Lichte des einen letzten Zweckes ihre richtige Deutung erhalten. Führt nun die Naturteleologie zu einer Vielheit und Relativität und Vergleichbarkeit der einzelnen Zwecke, so wird diese Vielheit durch die sie konsumierende Einheit des letzten Zweckes aufgehoben. Das οὗ ἕνεκα bei Aristoteles hat ja die Relativität bis ins Innere des einzelnen Zwecks hineingetragen — es kann auch der eine Zweck eine doppelte Beziehung haben;[256] von der Vergleichbarkeit und verschiedenen Bewertung der einzelnen Zwecke wurde bereits oben gesprochen. Durch die Aufhebung des ὑ ἕνεκα als letzter Frage war für Maimonides die Relativität der Zwecke beseitigt.

Die Kreaturen sind Selbstzwecke und sie sind es, weil sie vom letzten Weltzweck, Gott-Wille oder Gott-Weisheit abhängen.[257] Denn ihre Zwecke, vom letzten Zweck getragen,

[256] So *de anima* 415b 2: τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα, δύττὸν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ; ebenso *Phys.* 194 a 35 (*Met.* 1075b 2, wozu vgl. Bernays, *Dialoge des Aristoteles* 169). Das οὗ bezieht sich etwa auf die Herstellung der Gesundheit, das ᾧ auf die Heilung des Kranken — je nach dem Gesichtspunkt.

[257] *Moreh* III 13 g. E. wird das irrige Zwecksuchen zwiefach ausgedrückt: לבקש תכלית למה שאין לו התכלית ח ח י א (למא ליס לה תלך אלנאיה) או לבקש תכלית למה שאין מציאותו התלית ברצון האלהי וכי (אלא למא לא נאיה לה אלא...) לו תכלית (Text ergänzt nach Munk III S. 98 n. 2). Jetzt ist uns klar, daß der zweite mit או verbundene Satz nicht nur eine allgemeinere Fassung des ersten — wie Munk: ou (en général) — ist, sondern auch explikativ zum ersten steht, denn das irrige Suchen eines speziellen, außenliegenden Zweckes eines Dinges ist begründet im Irrtum der dinglichen Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt und beide, in Einem, werden behoben durch das Verlegen des Zweckes in Gott. Das או wäre vielleicht besser zu übersetzen: oder eigentlich. (Scheyer zieht beide ganz zusammen, was der Sache

sind untereinander nicht meßbar. Und eben dieselbe Zuordnung, die, bloß von der Naturseite gesehen, ein „Eines fürs andere" erscheint,[258] wird, vom letzten Zweck aus gesehen, ein „Jedes für sich selbst". Die kreatorische aber zugleich zeitlose ποίησις konsumiert die τρῶξις. Und jene Doppeldeutung des למענהו, der Zweck im Geschaffenen und im Schöpfer, die, wie wir sahen,[259] nebeneinander gut bestehen können, erweist sich uns jetzt als mehr, als voneinander abhängig, wenn nicht gar als identisch. Denn der Selbstzweck der Kreatur ist der kreatorische Gott-Zweck von einer anderen Seite gesehen. Und ein Schritt weiter: die Unmöglichkeit eines dinglichen Einheitszweckes, in III 13 dargelegt, da er ja nur in einer Über- und Unterordnung relativer Zwecke bestehen müßte, ist begründet durch die Setzung jenes göttlich-immanenten Zweckes, der alle relative Zuordnung als Teleologie nicht zuläßt. Daß im Lichte dieses letzten Zweckes die Unterschiede von Einfachheit und Differenziation in der dinglichen Funktion alle Relevanz, die sie bei Aristoteles haben, verlieren, ist nun auch selbstverständlich.

Hier, in der göttlich-immanenten Teleologie, ist der Punkt gegeben, wo Weltschöpfung und Weltordnung zusammenkommen und Eins werden — der Punkt, wo nun von der aristotelischen Teleologie nichts mehr zurückgeblieben ist. Die immanente Funktionsteleologie, die Maimonides akzeptiert,[260]

auch nicht gerecht wird.) Beide zugleich sind begründet in der Erkenntnis von כל נמצא כפי מה שהוא.

[258] Siehe oben Anm. 235.

[259] Siehe oben Anm. 76.

[260] *Moreh* III 25 kommt der aristotelischen Naturteleologie außer im bereits erwähnten Gleichnis vom Auge auch in der Formulierung am nächsten, wenn dort als Teleologie beschrieben wird שחלקי הפעולות הטבעיות כלם מתוקנות וסדורות נקשרות קצתם בקצתם וכלם סבות ומסובבות. Wenn auch der Ausdruck חלקי הפעולות (נואשאת אלאפעאל) nicht diese Betonung hat, die ihm Munk III S. 201 — jusqu'aux moindres détails — gibt, so soll doch das Zusammenstimmen der natürlichen Teilfunktionen im Kausalen als Teleologie verstanden werden; die Grenze zwischen Kausalität und Teleologie wird verwischt. (Vgl. Cohen, *Logik*, S. 356). Bezeichnend ist auch das weitere כש״כ בשבע הגלגלים שהם יותר מתוקנים ומסודרים כפי מעלת החומר שלהם, als ob die Sphären mehr Zweckmäßigkeit infolge ihrer höheren Ordnung aufzuweisen hätten, was zwar hier als עין פילוסופי angeführt, aber auch vollständig akzeptiert wird, während gerade in diesem Punkte in

erweist sich als bloß unumgänglicher Argumentationsbehelf, um die Teleologie vor der Gefährdung durch die ascharitischen absurden Konsequenzen zu schützen, d. h. Maimonides führt die empirische Naturzweckmäßigkeit ins Treffen, um nicht, auf dem Boden der Natur, von ihr bedroht zu werden — um sich aber gleichzeitig die eigentliche Teleologie für eine andere Basis zu retten. Denn für seine eigentliche Philosophie war auch das Weltgeschehen von derselben Zweckmäßigkeit getragen wie das Weltentstehen. Denn da die Schöpfung nicht zeitlich gedacht ist, im Anfang, hört sie auch nicht auf in der Dauer. Die Vereinigung vollzieht sich im Terminus שפע. Die Separatheit des Willens, durch die der Zweck als göttlich-immanent in der Kreation ermöglicht wurde, wird als kontinuierlich gesetzt. In diesem Terminus scheint all das zusammengefaßt zu sein, was das Spezifische der maimunischen Teleologie ausmacht.

Wir haben bereits gesehen,[261] daß Maimonides die Bezeichnung Agens auch aus dem Grunde zurückstellt, da daraus nicht die Kontinuität der göttlichen Führung, im Sinne der Teleologie, eindeutig ersichtlich wäre. In diesem Zusammenhang wird nun diese Kontinuität als Emanation bezeichnet.[262] Diese Emanation aber wird an anderer Stelle so bestimmt, daß sie nicht Ausstrahlung, sondern eine Handlung bedeutet, nicht etwa eine Funktion, eine πρᾶξις, Gottes, sondern eine ποίησις.[263] Somit ist das Agensmoment auch im שפע er-

III 14 die Darstellung so ist, als sei der הם־ש בטעלת דעצם der Sphären in bezug auf die Teleologie wohl ein Argument der Philosophen, mit dem wir uns aber nicht identifizieren. (Vgl. oben Anm. 47.)

[261] Siehe oben Anm. 247.

[262] *Moreh* I 69: במציאות הכורא הכל נמצא והוא מתמיד עמידתו בענין אשר יכונה בשפע, worauf am Schluß Bezug genommen wird: אמנם בהיותו יתע׳ צורת העולם ג״כ כמו שבארנו והוא ישמרנו העמידה והתמדה תמיד.

[263] *Moreh* I 58: ואין זה כהשפע החום מן האש ולא כהיוב האור מן השמש אבל השפע ימשיך להם תמיד עמידה וקיום וסדור בהנהגה מתוקנת Munk, I S. 244 übersetzt hier שפע (סיץ) durch „action divine" (sonst gewöhnlich: épanchement), dadurch ist die beabsichtigte Kontrastierung deutlicher gemacht, doch müßte vielleicht dieses Moment der „action" zugleich mit dem der Emanation festgehalten werden. Die Interpretation Narbonis (und ebenso Ephodi und Schem-Tob): ובכלל כהיוב השישכל מהשכל hebt dieses Moment der Aktion auf und relativiert das abgelehnte כהיוב האור מן השמש (worin wieder Narboni und Ephodi auseinandergehen). —

halten. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch von dieser Emanation, verbunden besonders mit dem Willen, der Bestand und die ordnende Führung der Welt abgeleitet.[264] Fügen wir noch hinzu die Hauptstelle über die Emanation, wo sie als die einzig mögliche Verbindung zwischen Gott und Welt bei Aufrechterhaltung der absoluten Separatheit bezeichnet wird — da ja alles räumliche Nah und Fern ausgeschlossen bleiben muß[265] — so schließt sich der Kreis, den wir bei der Kreation gesehen haben: Wille — Separatheit — Handlung — Teleologie. Weshalb denn auch Maimonides zusammenfassend sowohl Kreation als auch Führung als Konsequenz der Separatheit und der Kontinuität auf diese Emanation zurückführt.[266]

Über den Zusammenhang dieses Moments der Handlung mit dem des sittlichen Grundes (und auch der Negation der Privationen) s. Cohen, *Charakteristik*, S. 102.

[264] *Ibid.* וענין אמרנו לא נבהל ולא עוכב, כי כל אלה הנמצאות הולכות כל מה שינהגהו הרוצה בכוונה ורצון (nach Munk, *ibid.*, n. 3) כהיות... על סדר והנהגה.

[265] *Moreh* II 12: ויכונה לעולם פועל הנבדל בשפע und dann הפועל החוא הנמצא על התמידות אשר יכונה בשם שפע. Emanation besagt aber nicht nur Permanenz. In diesem Bilde findet Maimonides die einzig zulässige Verbindung von Separatheit und Aktion: מפני שלא ימצא להדמות פעולת הנבדל יותר נאה מזה הלשון, רצוני לומר השפע, שלא נוכל על אמתת שם שתסכים לאמתת הענין, כי ציור פעולת הנבדל כבד מאד ככבדות ציור מציאות הנבדל. Wiederum also wird das Moment der Handlung durch die Emanation nicht nur nicht aufgehoben (was schon I 53), sondern geradezu erst gerechtfertigt.

[266] *Ibid.*: נאמר שהעולם נתחדש משפע הבורא ושהוא המשפיע עליו כל מה שיתחדש בו. Zu beachten ist die unmittelbar vorangehende Begründung dafür: כן הבורא יגדל שמו, כאשר התבאר שהוא בלתי נוף והתקיים שהכל פעלו ושהוא סבתו הפועלת כמו שבארנו וכי. Es sind hier drei Voraussetzungen gegeben (daß die dritte nicht bloß eine nichtsagende Wiederholung der zweiten ist, wird schon wahrscheinlich durch die Anwendung eines wiederholten אן — statt der bloßen Verbindung mit waw und Pronomen — והנה אן אלכל פעלה ואנה סבבה אלפאעל). Soll daher das dritte Glied ein neues Moment, daß im שהכל פעלו nicht enthalten ist, hinzufügen, so muß man, wenn man, mit Munk, dies mit cause efficiente übersetzt, doch den Hauptton auf cause legen, d. h. daß Gott nicht bloß der פועל der Welt ist, was ja in הכל פעלו gesagt wurde, sondern auch סבתו. Dies im Sinne der Erörterung in I 69, wonach im סבה auch schon der Zweck enthalten ist. (Auch Ephodi erklärt das כמו שבארנו mit dem Hinweis auf א' ס"ט). Schon im Wort allein, auch ohne Hinweis, schwingt ja die Bedeutung von Zweck mit, am deutlichsten in III 26, wo wiederholt עלה (bei Tibbon auch סבה) im Sinne von Zweck gebraucht wird, auch: שיש להם עלה רצוני לומר תכלית כוונתם. Wenn nun auch III 26 durchgängig עלה gebraucht wird, während hier, II 12, סבב, so bedeutet das sicherlich

Hier, im שפע, das wir auch bei der leitenden Funktion der Sphärenintelligenzen verwendet sahen,[267] kommt nun die göttlich-immanente Zwecktätigkeit am konzentriertesten zum Ausdruck — hier sind vereinigt, in der wahren Teleologie, Schöpfung und Erhaltung der Welt. Von hier aus ist die Kreation eben nicht abgeschlossen, sondern kann — auf dem Gebiete des Sittlichen, das ja das Gebiet der Teleologie ist — immer wieder manifest werden wie in der Prophetie.[268] Das ist der Sinn der maimunischen planvoll handelnden Emanation; es ist die Sicherung der Dauer des letzten Zweckes. Die Natur und ihre immanente Zweckmäßigkeit ist nicht ein Zustand, der nach Abschluß des Schöpfungsaktes diesen abgelöst hat, wie Maimonides vielleicht einmal gedacht haben mag;[269] sondern alles mechanisch-funktionell Zweckmäßige, mit Vielheit und Relativität belastet, wird vom letzten Zweck getragen, im ewigen Schöpfungs-Führungsakt, und hat in ihm seinen Sinn. Es ist dies analog der sittlichen Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, die doch im Akt des göttlichen Urwillens verankert ist.[270] Der gegebene Natur-

nichts nach dem abwechselnden Gebrauch und der vollkommenen terminologischen Gleichstellung von סבב und עלה zu Beginn von I 69. (Ibn Roschd erklärt: הסבה והעלה שני שמות נרדפים; s. Munk, I S. 313, n. 1.) Demnach wäre man beinahe berechtigt, das סבב hier, II 12, von vornherein mit Zweck zu übersetzen und das סבתו הפועלת etwa: „der in der Welt wirkende Zweck." Aber das ist für den Sinn gar nicht nötig, denn auch als Causa wird es sicher nur mit Rücksicht auf den mitenthaltenen Zweck gebraucht. Für die schöpferische und erhaltende Emanation Gottes sind demnach die drei Prämissen angeführt: Die Separatheit, das Handeln, die Stellung Gottes als Zweck. (Der Einwand, den Wolff, *Acht Kapitel*, 2 Aufl. S. 10, Anm. 2 gegen die Identifizierung von סבה und עלה macht, ist durch den Gebrauch in I 69 widerlegt.)

267 Siehe oben Anm. 156.

268 Vgl. meine Abhandlung *Proph.* S. 124 ff.

269 So noch in den *Acht Kapiteln* VIII.

270 *Moreh* III, 17: שטרצונו הקדום מאין תחלה, שיהיה כל בעל חי מתנועע לרצונו ושיהיה האדם בעל יכולת על מה שירצהו או יבחרהו מטה שיוכל עליו. Diese doppelte Verwendung des יכל, am Anfang und am Ende, bringt klar den Charakter der hier betonten יכולת zum Ausdruck. Daß der Mensch die Macht hat — בעל יכולת (לא אסתטאעה) — über alles, was er will oder wählt von den Dingen, die in seiner Macht sind מטה שיוכל עליו (מטא יסתטיע עליה), kann sich auf nichts anderes beziehen, als auf das dem Willen noch übergeordnete Entscheidungsvermögen, während der Wille unter den Dingen wählt, die dem Ausführungsvermögen des Menschen entsprechen. Es handelt sich also um die sittliche

zweck ist aufgegeben vom letzten Zweck. Die transzendente Teleologie ist immanent — von einer höheren Warte gesehen.

Entscheidung, die im göttlichen Urwillen verankert ist. Klärend ist ein Vergleich mit I 73, Präm. VI, auf die Munk, III 124 n. 1, offenbar als identisch mit unserer Stelle, hinweist. Dort handelt es sich um die Sicherung der Kausalität, hauptsächlich gegen die Ascharia. Beim Beispiel der Bewegung der Feder und den vier anzunehmenden Akzidenzen ist die Reihenfolge: der Wille zur Bewegung, die Fähigkeit (אלקדרה) zu bewegen, die Bewegung selbst etc. Es wird also nur vom Ausführungsvermögen, das dem Willen folgt, gesprochen; von den drei Momenten, die III 17 behandelt werden — Entscheidung, Wille, Ausführung — sind hier nur die letzten zwei verwendet. Für die Kausalität war ja auch nicht mehr nötig; dagegen war bei der Behandlung der gerechten Providenz, die Herausarbeitung des Moments der verantwortlichen Enscheidung von wesentlicher Bedeutung. An I 73 erinnert wohl die unserer Stelle vorangehende Erklärung von יכולת beim Menschen, doch mit anderem Schwerpunkt: I 73 soll die Kausalreihe begründet werden, die Fähigkeit der Ausführung ist vom Willen nicht mehr abhängig als etwa die Bewegung von der Fähigkeit; hier aber liegt der Schwerpunkt im Moment der Wahl: שהוא בטבעו ובבחירתו וברצונו יעשה כל מה שיוכל האדם לעשותו, also ein besonderes Moment in der Beziehung Wille — Ausführung. — Freilich wird hier die Entscheidungsmacht, die rein sittlichen Charakters ist, auf eine Stufe gestellt mit der freiwilligen Bewegung der Tiere; auch das früher erwähnte בטבעו könnte angeführt werden, daß diese יכולת als bloße Naturfunktion zu verstehen wäre. Daß aber dies nicht der Fall ist, kann mehrfach belegt werden. Vor allem, ganz allgemein, die Hervorhebung der menschlichen individuellen Vernunft als Gegensatz zum טבע bei den anderen Lebewesen in I 72, worüber oben Anm. 88. Dann II 25, wo der notwendige Zusammenhang zwischen Kreation und Torah behandelt wird, da wird als eine nur durch die Kreation lösbare Frage auch die angeführt, daß das von Gott beabsichtigte moralische Gesetz nicht in die Natur des Menschen verlegt wurde: ולמה לא שם אלו הענינים המצווה בהם והמוזהר בהם בטבענו אם היתה זה כונתו (vgl. auch Munk, II S. 198 n. 4). Wozu Narboni, *Komment.* S. 36b: כי התורה ואם יש לה מבוא בענין הטבעי אינה טבעית; was aber offenbar Schem-Tob z. St. zur Übertreibung angeregt hat: כי כל התורה נסים (vgl. oben Anm. 176). So ferner III 19: אינם ענינים (sc. של בני אדם) אשר רוב עניניהם טבעיים לבד אבל נמשכים ג"כ להיות אדם בעל יכולת והשתכלות. Da ist also die Eigenschaft als בעל יכולת — הא אסתאעה (Ephodi: מצד בחירתו) der bloß natürlichen entgegengesetzt. Oder III 11, daß die sittliche Einsicht mit der natürlichen Funktion nicht vereinbar ist: ואילו היה שם חכמה אשר יחסה לצורה האנושית כיחס הכח הרואה אל העין, היו נספקין נוקיו כלם. Diese Stelle ist wohl nicht anders denn als allgemeine Bemerkung zu interpretieren, u. zw. so: gäbe es eine Weisheit, die sich zur menschlichen Form als so notwendig eintretende Funktion verhielte wie die Sehkraft zum Auge, dann wären alle Schäden behoben; in Wirklichkeit aber verhält es sicht nicht so. Allgemein wird der Satz so aufgefaßt: gäbe es dort, d. h. besäßen sie (sc. בתות בני אדם) die Weisheit, die sich zur Form so

Die aristotelische Teleologie, die in ihrem Wesen Funktionsvollkommenheit und Ökonomie der Mittel bedeutet, hat

verhält etc. So Munk, III 65: „S'ils possédaient la science, qui est à la forme humaine", etc. Ebenso Scheyer, III S. 46. Diese auf den ersten Blick auch naheliegende Auffassung würde dann das genaue Gegenteil von unserer Interpretation besagen: die Gleichheit der Relation zwischen Weisheit — menschlicher Form und Sehkraft — Auge wäre als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt. Nun empfindet schon Scheyer *ibid.*, Anm. 1, daß „dieses Gleichnis etwas Auffallendes hat"; die darauf bezogene Belehrung von Weiß, III S. 50 Anm. 4, kann die feingefühlte Bemerkung Scheyers nicht entkräften (daß doch die Sehkraft das Wesen des Auges ist, was die Weisheit zur menschlichen Wesenheit nicht ist). Aber abgesehen von diesem Einwand, sprechen für unsere Interpretation folgende Momente: 1. Schon in III 8 wurde der Zusammenhang zwischen der sittlichen Weisheit und der menschlichen Form und die Tatsache, daß alle sittlichen Mängel von der Materie herrühren, sehr ausführlich behandelt und belegt; dies im Zusammenhange mit der der Materie inhärierenden Privation. Es wäre demnach das ganze Kap. 11 nichts anderes als eine matte Wiederholung dessen, was schon in Kap. 8 gründlicher nachgewiesen wurde. 2. Um zu sagen, die menschlichen Parteien besäßen keine Weisheit, wäre der Ausdruck ולו כאן תם — אילו היה שם (*Guide* III, יז b) sehr verschwommen und dies könnte viel einfacher und prägnanter durch ein Personalpronomen ausgedrückt werden. Dagegen gibt es eine Menge von Belegen im Sprachgebrauch Maimonides', daß er שם — תם dem verbum anfügt, nicht um „dort" auszudrücken, sondern daß etwas überhaupt ist oder nicht ist (wie das engl. there is). Ich greife aus der Fülle der Beispiele nur einige heraus: II 18 g. E. שאין שם ראיה — אין ליט תם דליל (*Guide* II, לט b) Munk, (II 144): qu'il n'y a pas de preuve; II 39 Anf. לא הייתה שם תורה ולא תהיה — לם תכן תם שרישה ולא תכון (II מג b) Munk II 301: il n'y a jamais eu et il n'y aura jamais; *ibid.* später: שיהיה שם שופט — אין יכון תם קאץ (II מה a); II 43 שאין שם גזרה — ליט תם אשתקאן (II צא a); III 18: ולים תם מא יקוהם — ואין שם מה שישטרם (III לח b), besonders *ibid.* weiter unten: ליט תם מוגד באיז אלדהן — שאין שם נמצא הוץ לשכל (III לט a), die auch Munk alle im Sinn von „es gibt" übersetzt. Interessant ist, daß Maimonides diese Wendung auch im hebräischen gebraucht; so z. B. *Hil. Jesode-Hatorah* I, 1: ליש יש שם מצוי בזמן הזה שאין בית המקדש קיים ראשון (vgl. *Kesef Mischneh* z. St.); *Hil. Teschubah* I, 3: ואין לנו מזבח כסרה אין שם אלא תשובה וכי. 3. Wäre von der bereits wiederholt behandelten Weisheit, deren Beziehung zur Form als so bekannt vorausgesetzt wird, die Rede, so müßte sie ja den bestimmten Artikel haben: besäßen sie die Weisheit, die usw. Es heißt aber דבמה עלם — ohne Artikel; (Munk, freilich, fügt, logisch genötigt, aus eigenem hinzu: *la* science). All dies scheint unsere Interpretation der Stelle zu rechtfertigen. Dann bekommt aber auch das Kapitel einen richtigen Sinn. Vorher, III 10, wurde der Begriff der Privation an der Blindheit illustriert; dieses Gleichnis wird auch zu Beginn von Kap. 11 wiederholt, die Unwissenheit, eine Privation, richte ebensoviel Schaden an wie die Blindheit. Während aber der Blinde ein vereinzelter Ausnahmsfall ist, ist es bei der Unwissenheit Regel, daß כתות כני אדם כל איש כפי סכלותו יעשה בעצמו ובזולתו רעות גדולות. Der

ihren treffenden Ausdruck in der vielfach variierten Formel gefunden, daß die Natur nichts umsonst mache. Wenn dieser Satz, aus der Erfahrung induktiv gewonnen,[271] das Verbum ποιεῖν enthält, so darf das nicht als Anerkennung der ποίησις für die Natur aufgefaßt werden,[272] sondern eher als Anspielung auf den Technikvergleich, mit dem ja die aristotelische Teleologie eng verbunden ist. Dieser Satz war späterhin sehr verbreitet[273] und je nach Bedarf angewandt. Bei Ibn Zaddik z. B., der, wie gesehen, eine Planmäßigkeit der Schöpfung aus Furcht vor der Teleologie nicht zulassen konnte, findet sich dieser Satz in Verbindung mit der göttlichen Güte und in der Form, Gott hätte nichts fehlerhaft gemacht,[274] was ja auch einmal bei Aristoteles als Variation vorkommt,[275] aber sicher nicht mehr jenes ökonomisch-funktionelle Moment rein enthält, dessen Sinn doch ist, das nichts da ist, das nicht seinen Funktionszweck hätte. Nun hat auch Maimonides den Satz verwendet, und zwar einige Male, von denen aber zwei nur

Vergleich stimmt also nicht. Dazu ist die einschränkende Bemerkung nötig, daß es eben keine Weisheit oder Wissen, עלם, gibt, die mit derselben Naturnotwendigkeit aus der menschlichen Form folgen würden wie das Sehen aus dem Auge. Die sittliche Weisheit ist eben keine πρᾶξις. — So zeigt uns diese Stelle, ebenso wie die vorher angeführten, daß die Sittlichkeit des Menschen, sowohl als Entscheidungsvermögen als auch als Wissen, nicht zu seinen „natürlichen" Funktionen zu zählen sind; wenn auch die Weisheit, wo sie vorhanden ist, nur in Verbindung mit der Form bestehen kann. Daß aber auch selbst die „Natur" des Menschen von der allgemeinen Natur in wesentlicher Beziehung abweicht, wird ja III 32 erklärt.

271 Siehe oben Anm. 209.

272 Siehe Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 369 f., S. 374, Anm. 2. Bei der Gottheit werden besonders die πράξεις ἐξωτερικαὶ abgelehnt, die der יוצאת תכלית entsprechen.

273 Siehe Dieterici, *Die Lehre von der Weltseele*, S. 140: „Die Gelehrten haben ein allgemeines wahres Wort geredet, ‚die Natur schafft nichts Unnützes', das heißt, keines der vorhandenen Dinge ist ohne Nutzen und ohne Vorteil."

274 Siehe Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 322, Anm. 183 und S. 302, Anm. 138. Neben der Formulierung שהבורא לא ברא שום דבר הסר findet sich, allgemeiner gehalten, auch ופעל הבורא שלם כמו שראוי לא בתוספת ולא בגרעון ולא יעבור שיהיה העולם חסר שום דבר מטה שהוא, *Mikrokosmos* S. 57, vgl. auch S. 62 u. a. Auch Halevi erwähnt den Ausspruch zweimal. Das eine Mal, *Kusari* I 76, um die in dem Ausspruch irreführende Identifikation von טבע mit בורא zurückzuweisen, das andere Mal V 12, ganz allgemein: והחכמה לא תתן דבר להבל וריק.

275 Z. B. *Pol.* 1256 b 20: ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην; *de anima* 432 b 21. Vgl. oben Anm. 117.

im Sinne Aristoteles' und für ihn angeführt wurden.[276] Wo sich aber Maimonides dem Satz anschließt und ihn für sich anführt, da ist dieser modifiziert im Sinne seiner eigenen Auffassung.

Einmal betont Maimonides, daß die natürlichen Dinge nicht sinnlos seien, schaltet aber ausdrücklich die künstlichen, also den Technikvergleich, aus, offenbar wegen des Nachsatzes, daß bei den natürlichen Schöpfungen ein Zweck anzunehmen ist, auch wenn er für uns nicht ersichtlich ist.[277] Ohne also eine Zweckabsicht bei der technischen Tätigkeit bestreiten zu wollen, soll doch der Charakter beider Zweckmäßigkeiten auseinandergehalten werden, da Zweck eben nicht Funktion ist.

[276] *Moreh* II 14 (VII); III 13: ואריסטו אומר תמיד בסירוש שהטבע לא יעשה דבר לבטלה.

[277] *Moreh* III 25: שאין בענינים השבעיים כלם דבר ע"צ ההבל, רצוני לומר שכל מה שאינו מלאכותי הם כלם סעולות שבוקש בהם תכלית אחת, אין הפרש בין שנדע התכלית ההוא או לא נדע. Den Vergleich mit der Technik für dem geordneten Ablauf des Naturgeschehens hat Maimonides wiederholt angewendet, außer den bereits erwähnten Vergleichen in bezug auf die Erzeugung eines Gegenstandes in II 4 und III 19 (vgl. oben Anm. 149), hat er es auch in diesem Sinne formuliert. So III 19: אבל זאת ההנהגה הדומה למלאכת מחשבת (אלתדביר אלמהנ) (oder genauer nach Falaquera, *Moreh* Ham. S. 157: ההנהגה האומנית mit der Erklärung: וקוראים "מהני" לפעל האומנות הנעשית בידים) oder II 10: הכם מנהיג משגיח בהמצאת החי שהוא (sc. השבע) במלאכת מחשבית (בצנאעה באלמהנ). Allerdings auch dies nicht ganz ohne Reserve; III 19 kann der Vergleich gut als nur für die philosophische Anschauung, die bloß eine התהלה שכלית annimmt, geltend betrachtet werden, deutlicher noch als II 10, wo das Ganze unter יַעֲקֹב — יקאל (Munk II 89: dont *on dit*; vgl. übrigens n. 2 daselbst) angeführt wird. Daß Maimonides diese Lehrmeinung in II 10 nicht vertritt, geht ja schon daraus hervor, daß hier auch vom טבע ausgesagt wird, daß er הכם מנהיג ist, während doch III 19, gerade die „Parallelstelle", als wichtiges Glied in der Ableitung den Satz hat: ואין השבע בעל שכל והנהגה וזה מוסכם מן הפילוסופים כלם. Ganz klar auch II 7 von den כחות נפשיות als Charakteristikum אשר הם טבע ולא ישיגו סעולותיהם — im Gegensatz zu den גלגלים (vgl. oben Anm. 155). Auf jeden Fall aber geht der Technikvergleich bei Maimonides nur so weit, als es sich um die Vorstellung handelt, nicht um den Zweck. Vom Techniker kann wohl eine Zwecksetzung a minori erschlossen werden, aber der technische Zweck kann mit dem in der Natur waltenden nicht verglichen werden — zunächst schon aus dem Grunde, da letzterer nicht immer ermittelbar ist, aber auch noch aus anderen Gründen. *Schem-Tob*, zu III 13, berührt einen anderen Punkt: ואינו דומה מציאות העולם למציאות הדברים מהמלאכה, כי מציאות הדברים מהאומן... הוא זולת האומן וזולת הדבר הנמצא... אבל העולם... השם יתעלה הוא עלתו והוא המציאו למציאותו אינו לתכלית אחר. Darnach hängt also die Unvergleichbarkeit zwischen einem Werk der Technik und der Welt mit der Immanenz des Weltzweckes in Gott zusammen.

Ein Hinweis auf die Ablehnung jedes mechanisch-ökonomischen Gesichtspunktes ist ja auch jene Paranthese im Gleichnis mit den schweren Maschinen zum Zwecke der Erzeugung einer Nadel, die Maimonides als zwecklos nach einer „gewissen" Ansicht, nämlich der Philosophen, für die das Gleichnis gilt, bezeichnet, wozu er aber als eigene Ansicht parenthetisch hinzufügt: es wäre auch dies nicht völlig sinnlos.[278] Da für die Zweckmäßigkeit nicht quantitative Momente ausschlaggebend sein können — das ist der nicht ausgesprochene Grund. Noch charakteristischer aber ist die Heranziehung des aristotelischen οὐδὲν μάτην das zweite Mal. Hier wird es geradezu als Beleg für die spezifische maimunische Teleologie angeführt, wird besonders bei den Sphären hervorgehoben[279] — wo doch von sichtbarer Funktion sicher nicht viel die Rede sein kann — und als Stützpunkt benützt für die vorhergehende Betonung der planvollen Schöpfung ex nihilo und die darauffolgende Erwähnung der wichtigen Erkenntnis der „ersten Endabsicht".[280] Daß dies eine Umdeutung des aristotelischen Ausspruches bedeutet, ist klar. Bemerkenswert ist nur noch, daß, im Gegensatz zu den früheren Stellen, diese beiden Male der Ausspruch nicht im Namen Aristoteles', sondern als allgemein gültige philosophische Ansicht zitiert wird.[281] In Wirklichkeit stammt ja der Ausspruch wesentlich von Platon,[282] und Aristoteles hat ihn seiner Lehrmeinung angepaßt.

[278] *Moreh* III 14: ואילו היה בעבור טחט אחד היה זה בהפסד ההנהגה לפי איזה עיון (בחסכ נעזר מא) ולא היה הפסד ההנהגה לנמרי (statt לנמרי wäre auch richtiger מוחלט). Zur Korrektur des Tibbonschem לפי עיונו, vgl. Munk III, S. 102 n. 1.

[279] *Moreh* III 25 g. E.: שאין שם דבר הבל... ולא דבר בטלה בכל פעולות הטבע כל שכן בטבע הגלגלים שהם יותר מתוקנים ומכוונים.

[280] *Ibid.* Den Beginn des Abschnittes bildet die Auseinandersetzung über die Kreation mit dem Satz שנמצא והחכמה ההיא בעצמה אשר לא תשתנה חייבה ההעדר קודם העולם und den Abschluß, die Erwähnung der drei Irrtümer, darunter der vom הטבעון הראשון. Diesen Gedankengang hält Maimonides für ein Gemeingut sowohl unseres Glaubens als auch der Philosophie: כן אמונת השם חכמי תורתנו וכזה בארו נביאינו und später יהיעין הפילוסופי יגזור כן.

[281] Siehe vorige Anm. Auch das erste Mal III 25 wird der Satz angeführt: וכן הוא נ"כ דעת הפילוסופים. In II 14 und III 13 wird der Ausdruck als ein von Aristoteles immer wiederholter angeführt.

[282] *Tim.* 30 a: βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μεν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν; auch 33 d. Allerdings gibt es auch bei Leukipp Fr. 2: οὐδὲν

Und wie das οὐδὲν μάτην aus der Relativität des Funktionellen herausgehoben, so ist auch der Begriff des Guten für die Schöpfung ein absoluter bei Maimonides. Aristoteles, der nur das relative Gute kennt, kann auch die Komparation von besser und bestes gebrauchen, wobei allerdings die Natur immer „das Beste" will,[283] wobei jedoch ein logisch notwendiger wesentlicher Zusammenhang zwischen Gott und dem Guten doch nicht zu finden ist.[284] Diese Komparation kennt Maimonides nicht. Es gibt nur ein Gutes, das mit dem zweckmäßigen Dasein identisch ist. Gut ist bei ihm nicht ein Wort wie die anderen, sondern ein Terminus, den er hebräisch gebraucht, in Anlehnung an das טוב der biblischen Schöpfungsgeschichte. Der Terminus wird wiederholt behandelt, hauptsächlich im Zusammenhang mit der Teleologie. Es erweisen sich auf den ersten Blick manche Diskrepanzen zwischen den verschiedenen Stellen, wovon zunächst folgende erwähnt sei: Während an einer Stelle die Anwendung des טוב nur für Dinge, die Selbstzweck sind, als berechtigt bezeichnet wird, ist das andere Mal gerade für die Dinge, die dem Zwecke von anderen dienen, sogar das טוב מאד in seinem wahren Sinn in Anwendung gebracht.[285] Da Maimonides diesen Terminus niemals ohne besonderen Nachdruck einführt, kann eine Widersprüchlichkeit in seiner Anwendung unmöglich bloß Folge einer Nachlässigkeit sein. Dieser Punkt muß daher näher besehen werden.

Maimonides unterscheidet terminologisch zwischen טוב und טוב מאד. Dies ist klar durchgeführt an den Stellen III 10 und 13, wo beide Termini in einem Zusammenhang erklärt werden, bestätigt sich aber auch durch die anderen. Unter טוב ist zu verstehen das Gute, das dem Dasein zugrundeliegt, ja mit ihm identisch ist.[286] Es drückt auch die Selbstzwecklichkeit der

χρῆμα μάτην γίγνεται, doch kann dies mit dem teleologischen Gebrauch dieses Satzes nichts gemeinsam haben. Vgl. Theiler *loc. cit.* S. 75, 1.

283 Vgl. oben Anm. 227. 284 Siehe Zeller *loc. cit.* S. 371, 1: S. 361, 2.

285 Das erstere in *Moreh* II 30, das letztere III 25.

286 *Moreh* III 10: אבל פעולותיו כלם טוב גמור, שהוא אינו עושה רק מציאות וכל מציאות טוב, während es hier nur prädiziert wird, ergibt sich durch die Umkehrung, später: תהיה אם כן אמתת פעולת השם כולו טוב, אחר שהוא מציאות. Munk übersetzt das ganz substantivisch: le bien.

Kreaturen aus,[287] weshalb am Schöpfungstage derjenigen Dinge, die keinen Selbstzweck haben oder ihn nicht sichtbar haben, nicht כי טוב gebraucht wird.[288] Ist aber טוב Dasein im Gegensatz zum Nichtsein, so bedeutet טוב מאד die höhere teleologische Ordnung der Welt und die Kontinuität dieser Zweckmäßigkeit.[289] Dieses umfaßt zugleich das Dasein und das Nichtsein, ja gerade der mit der Materialität der Dinge notwendig verbundene Untergang soll darin als ebensolche Wohltat, fürs Ganze gesehen, wie das Dasein ausgedrückt werden.[290]

[287] *Moreh* III 13: שלא באר כלל בדבר מהם שיהיה בעבור דבר אחר אלא כל חלק וחלק... והזו אמרו וירא אלהים כי טוב... והטוב אצלנו יאמר לטה שיאות לכוונתנו.

[288] *Moreh* II 30. Diese Stelle ist sehr aufschlußreich über die Beziehung zwischen טוב und מציאות. Behandelt wird die Bildung des Firmaments (und Trennung der Gewässer) am zweiten Schöpfungstage, und warum an diesem nicht כי טוב gesagt wird. Als erste Erklärung wird die Unsichtbarkeit des Nutzens dieser Schöpfung angegeben; deren wahrer Sinn zu den סודות התומים ואטנם ענין כי טוב שהוא גלה התועלת ומבואר במציאות זה המציאות (ובלשון אי וגוד הלא אלוגוד) והתדתו, אבל הדבר שנעלם ענינו אשר משומו בלתי נמצא כן — אי זה נראה לבני אדם עד שיאמר בו כי טוב? Dann aber wird dieser Grund durch ein zweites Moment vertieft: durch den Mangel an Selbstzwecklichkeit; והוא שזה, ואם הוא חלק גדול מאד מן הנמצאות (ואן כאן גזא כבירא גדא מן אלמוגודאת) אינו תכלית מכוונת להמשך המציאות (לאסתמראר אלוגוד) שיאמר בו כי טוב. Bei Munk, II S. 243, wird das Terminologische an diesen Stellen insoferne verwischt, als er das הלא אלוגוד der ersten und das אלוגוד der zweiten mit „univers" übersetzt (das erste וגוד der ersten Stelle mit „existence"), ferner das אלמוגודאת der zweiten Stelle mit création. Dadurch wird die feste Relation zwischen טוב und וגוד gelockert und auch die Bedeutung der Sichtbarkeit des Zweckes geschwächt. Den zweiten Grund sieht auch Munk als einen anderen, verschiedenen vom ersten an: Il faut que je t'eu donne encore une autre explication (so auch Ephodi z. St.: רדמז"ל מוסיף עכשו טעם אחר), was aber in der Verbindung (ולא בד לי אן אזידך ביאנא) וא"א לי בכלתי שאוסיפך באור durchaus nicht enthalten ist. Vielmehr zeigt es auf eine Vertiefung des ersten Grundes hin. Durch diese beiden Gründe zusammen, ist das Gebiet des טוב vollkommen abgesteckt: es ist die Verbindungsformel, ja die Verbindungsmöglichkeit zwischen dem Wirken Gottes und dem empirischen Dasein. Darum ist sowohl das Manifeste der Zweckmäßigkeit — im Gegensatz zu allem Esoterischen — als auch das Eigenzweckliche Grundbedingung. Die Erörterung III 13 begründet dies, von einer noch prinzipielleren Seite, vom zweiten Momente hier, der Eigenzwecklichkeit, ausgehend.

[289] *Moreh* III 13: אמר... והנה טוב מאד, כלומר התחדש (ועל הכל (ען אלגמלה) כל מתחדש נאות לכונה (ולא יפסק) ולא יפסד כלל, והוא אמרו טוב מאד (Zur Lesung vgl. Munk, III S. 94 n. 3). Dann weiter: ולא סרו מהמשך כפי מה שכיון בהם.

[290] *Moreh* III 25 zweimal. Einmal, Anf.: אמנם לפי דעתנו אנחנו... פעולותיו כלם (פאפעאלה כלהא) הם טובות מאד, אמר... והנה טוב מאד שראו להאמינו שאין הרהקה באמרנו שכל אלו הפעולות מציאותם והעדרם ist. Dann g. E.: כלם zu legen

Es ist dies die Weltordnung in ihren Zusammenhängen, die Ordnung der Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit.[291] Nun haben wir bereits oben gesehen,[292] daß, obwohl Maimonides die Selbstzwecklichkeit der Dinge lehrt, er es dennoch so versteht, daß das notwendige Antecedens einer Sache, wenn es auch als solches keinen Eigenzweck hat, sich doch mit dem Zweck der übergeordneten Sache vereinigt und dieser Sache Zweck auch der des Antecedens wird. Für diesen, im übetragenen Sinne gebrauchten, aus dem teleologischen Zusamenhange sich ergebenden Zweck einer Sache gilt nun auch die Formel von טוב מאד — was auch damit begründet wird, daß nicht immer der Zweck gleich bekannt ist.[293] Wenn daher am zweiten Schöpfungstage כי טוב nicht gebraucht wird, da das darin Erschaffene nicht Selbstzweck hat, dafür aber am dritten Tage zweimal כי טוב steht, da sich erst jetzt der Zweck der Schöp-

(ונודהא ועדתהא) נמשך אחר הכתוב יתע'... ועל זה הדעת יוסדה תורת משה רבנו כלה, בו התחילה ויראּ אלהים את כל אשר עשה והנה טוב מאד וכו השלימה הצור תמים פעלו. Noch deutlicher III 10; während sich das טוב auf den העדר nicht beziehen kann, heißt es dann g. E. ואטר וירא אלהים... והנה טוב מאד עד שכטציאות זה החיטר השפל לפי מה שהוא עליו מהכור מן מקארנה אלעדם אלטוב ללטות (Vom המחייב לטות ולרעות כלם, כל זה ג"כ טוב להתטדת החויה ואלשרי־ מהכורו hat Tibbon das אלעדם unübersetzt gelassen und es müßte heißen: עם ההעדר). Dann wird noch herangezogen: ולזה פירש ר' טאיר, והנה טוב מאד טוב טות: Das מאד ist es, das beides, Dasein und Privation, vom Ganzen aus gesehen, einschließt.

[291] *Moreh* I 54; hier wird die Verbindung von מציאות und עולם im טוב מאד durchgefürt. אטנם אטרו כל טובי הוא רטז להראות אותו הנמצאות כולם הנאטר עליהם ויראּ אלהים את כל אשר עשה והנה טוב מאד... וידע הנהגתו להם איך היא בכלל ובפרט (כיך הו אלנטלה ואלתציל) ואל זה הענין רטז באטרו בכל ביתי נאטן הוא כלופר שהוא הבין מציאות עולמי הבנה אמתית קיטת כלו (וגוד עאלטי כלה). (Munks Übersetzung II S. 218, des letzten Satzes: il a de tout mon univers, etc. berücksichtigt nicht das וגוד, das, wie gesagt, für unsere Stelle charakteristisch ist). Hier ist auch der Punkt, wo sich das כלל ופרט der göttlichen Weltführung treffen. Diese Erkenntnis — formuliert in הודיעני נא את דרכך — ist die einzige dem Menschen gewährte, wenn er auch auf die Erkenntnis des Wesen Gottes — הראני נא את כבודך — ausgeht. Vgl. auch I 37 über סנים אל סנים.

[292] Siehe oben Anm. 39, 41.

[293] *Moreh* III 25, im Anschlusse an die erste oben (Anm. 290) zitierte Anführung von טוב מאד heißt es וכל מה שעשאהו ית' בכלל דבר — המעשה ההוא הוא הכרחי בטציאות הדבר ההוא הסכון או מועיל מאד. Wenn auch Munks, III S. 198, par conséquent, für das סבל, als Einleitung dieses Satzes sicherlich als Übersetzung eine zu starke Unterstreichung ist, so ist es doch sachlich klar, daß dieser Satz von der allgemeinen Auffassung des טוב מאד logisch durchaus abhängt.

fungen des zweiten Tages zeigte[294] — so umfaßt eben das טוב מאד beide Schöpfungstage sozusagen, d. h. die Gesamtordnung der Welt.

Es sieht dies beinahe wie die genaue Umkehrung der aristotelischen Auffassung[295] aus, indem hier das das Nichtsein Mitumfassende als טוב מאד bezeichnet wird im Gegensatz zum Dasein, das bloß טוב ist. Doch ist es in Wirklichkeit nicht so; Maimonides kann nicht die Graduierung des Aristoteles umkehren, weil er eine solche überhaupt nicht kennt. Das טוב מאד heißt auch nicht „besser"; es ist in Wirklichkeit nur eine extensive Erweiterung des טוב. Als letztes und absolutes bleibt ja doch das טוב. Nur dies wird in seiner Identität mit dem Dasein vom Wesen Gottes notwendig abgeleitet.[296] Das טוב ist es, das den Weltzweck ausdrückt. Es ist daher begreiflich, daß es immer, so oft dessen Weg in die Welt beschrieben wird, im Zusammenhang mit der Emanation auftritt. Jenes zweckwollende שפע, in dem Weltschöpfung und Weltführung sich begegnen — es hat zum Inhalt das טיב. Dies wird von Gott ausgesagt, aber auch von den Sphären, aber auch von den untereinander teleologisch zusammenhängenden Dingen.[297] Sahen wir früher die wesentliche Verknüpftheit von Willen — kontinuierliche Emanation — Zweck, so kommt jetzt noch dazu das Gute.

[294] Siehe Ephodi z. II 30; am zweiten Tag fehlt das כי טוב — אחר שהטטר ביום השלישי הניע התכלית ונראתה הארץ, או אמר בו הפסוק כי dann aber אינו מכוון מצד עצמו טוב זולת הכי טוב הנאמר בסוף היום ההוא. Damit soll erklärt werden die Wendung im Text כדי שתגלה הארץ.

[295] Siehe oben Anm. 226.

[296] *Moreh* III 10 am Schluß: (מן פעל אלאלאה באלדאת) שהטוב כלו מפעולת השם בעצם. Munk, III S. 64 hat, schwächer, de l'action *directe* de Dieu. Scheyer, III 46, („daß alle Werke Gottes an sich gut seien") verbindet das בעצם mit den Werken (ähnlich scheint auch Ephodi verstanden zu haben) — doch ist diese Fassung, wo dann טוב das Prädikat bildet, das Gegenteil von der im Original.

[297] *Moreh* II 4: תמיד (פאיץ) והטוב מצנו שופע (אפאצ) ובאלו הפנים אשר שניע השם הגלגל... II 11: ושהנהגה שופעת (יפיץ) מהבורא ית'... ומן השכלים ישפעו מים... טובות ואורים... ויפפעו מן הגלגלים כחות וטובות. Und später wieder in Verbindung mit dem Dasein: ומן הענין במציאות (מי אלוגוד), שהשפע (אלפיץ) המגיע... להמציא שכלים נפרדים (אלגר מא) ישפע מן השכלים נ"כ להמציא... ומל נפרד תשפע מצנו נ"כ המצאה אחת. Ferner II 12 g. E. שפע החיים כלומר המציאות, dann שפע המציאות (פיץ אלוגוד). Schließlich III 13: מדבר על דבר אשר שבארתי לך מטבע שפע הטוב תמיד (מן מביעה אפאצה אלגיר דאימא) כמו שבארתי לך מטבע שפע הטוב תמיד (מן מביעה אפאצה אלגיר דאימא) מדבר על דבר.

Wiederum zeigt sich in der Stellung des Guten eine entscheidende Hinwendung zur Lehre Platons. Doch ist dies nicht der einzige wesentliche Punkt in der maimunischen Teleologie, der, ausgehend von Aristoteles, zu Platon zurückführt. Es kann nicht eine Teilansicht sein, wenn es nicht die ganze Lehre wäre. Die Verbindung der Zweckidee mit der Schöpfung und dem Schöpfer, die sittliche Grundlegung der einheitlichen Teleologie für die einheitliche Welt, kurz, der Zweck als sittliches Weltprinzip — das ist ja alles echt platonisch, und wir können uns die Durchführung von Nachweisen im einzelnen ersparen. Ebenso erläßlich für unsere Aufgabe hier erscheint die Erörterung, inwiefern diese Rückkehr zu Platon von Maimonides bewußt geschehen ist. Auf jeden Fall war es das Judentum, das ihn auf diesen Weg geführt hat.

Wir kommen nun noch zum letzten Punkt. Der Zentralbegriff der aristotelischen Teleologie war die Natur. Das ist der Terminus, der durch das ganze System geht — der allerdings auch seine innere Bedeutungsentwicklung durchgemacht hat. Platon, noch in seiner letzten Periode, wehrt sich entschieden dagegen φύσις, als Mechanismus verstanden, etwa mit Seele oder Gott oder auch Kunst gleichzusetzen.[298] Und wenn er den Begriff dann doch zuläßt, so gibt er ihm seine eigene, richtige Bedeutung, wo sie fast mit ψυχή zusammenfällt. Er mußte diese terminologische Operation durchführen, um das Gute gegen die materialistisch-sophistische Entgegenstellung von νόμος — φύσις erfolgreich zu verteidigen.[299] Aristoteles

[298] Schon *Soph.* 265 c wird der Gegensatz φύσις — θεός in seiner ganzen Schärfe herausgearbeitet: τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ (sc. ζῷα πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ) γεννᾶν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης ἢ μετὰ λόγου τὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης. Vgl. *Tim.* 48 a, wo für die vernunftlose Natur ἀνάγκη gebraucht wird. Die Hauptpolemik aber gegen die materialistische Naturauffassung ist *Nom.* 889 a ff., da wird zusammengefaßt (c): οὐ διὰ νοῦν, φασὶν, οὐδὲ διὰ τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλὰ, ὅ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. Welche Polemik, nach Pohlenz (Hermes 1918, S. 416 f.) wohl hauptsächlich gegen Demokrit gerichtet war.

[299] So gleich *Nom.* 892 b: καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ. Worauf er dann eben die notwendige Verbundenheit der ψυχὴ mit der φύσις nachweist. Über die ersten Regungen der positiven Beziehung zur φύσις, verbunden mit Gott als ἀγαθός, vgl. meine Schrift, *Struktur und Charakter des plat. Phaidros*, bes. S. 52 ff.

nun, der sich im Anfang dieser spätplatonischen Ansicht angeschlossen haben mag, gebrauchte ursprünglich auch φύσις im Sinne des Bewegungsursprunges[300] und konnte so noch methaphorisch Prädikate wie ποιεῖν usw. anwenden; konnte es auch mit Gott parallelisieren — dem allerdings auch nicht besondere systematische Bedeutung beizulegen ist.[301] Später aber wandelte sich die Stellung der φύσις, nahm verschiedene Bedeutungen an, auch die der Materie,[302] um endlich den prävalierenden Sinn von Form-Zweck zu behalten. In diesem Sinne, von φύσις als Zweck, ist die Teleologie gehalten, und der Belegstellen gibt es unzählige.[303] Worauf es uns hier ankommt, ist die Feststellung, daß sich die Wandlung des φύσις-Begriffes in der Richtung der funktionellen Auffassung bewegt hat. Die φύσις ist erweiterte, verallgemeinerte, zum Kriterium erhobene πρᾶξις. (Dies zeigt sich besonders da, wo, wie etwa bei den Sphären, eine besondere πρᾶξις schwerer feststellbar ist.[304]) In diesem Sinne wurde schließlich auch der

[300] Vgl. darüber Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 85 ff.

[301] Wenn er auch *de coelo* 271 a 33 (*de anima* I 4 Schl.) ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις in einem Atem nennt, so ist die Beziehung der beiden zueinander nicht feststehend. Das κύκλῳ σῶμα wird wegen seiner ewig gleichbleibenden Bewegung θεῖον genannt, *de coelo* 279 a 32 f. Dann heißt *de part. anim.* 656 a 7 vom Menschengeschlecht μόνον μετέχει τοῦ θείου, wegen seiner Vernunft. (So auch 686 a 27 und *Eth. Nic.* 1177 a 13 f.) Dem entspricht auch der zwischen Tier und Mensch gemachte Unterschied *de div. in somn.* 463 b 14: ἡ γὰρ φύσις δαιμονία ἀλλ' οὐ θεία. Und in diesem Sinne wäre auch *de gen. anim.* 762 a 18 zu verstehen, daß alles irgendwie beseelt sei. Dagegen steht der vielzitierte Ausspruch *Eth. Nic.* 1153 b 32: πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Wozu auch *Pol.* 1326 a 32 f. anzuführen wäre und über das Streben aller Lebewesen am göttlichen teilzunehmen *de anim.* 415 a 26 f., *de gen. anim.* 731 b 31 f.

[302] So *Phys.* 193 a 29 als ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη; *Met.* 1014 b 32, 1015 a 7.

[303] *Phys.* 194 a 28: ἡ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. Ferner haben alle Stellen, die Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 424 Anm. 3 für die Teleologie anführt, φύσις zum Subjekt. Bezeichnend auch *de coelo* 291 a 24: ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως. (Vgl. die πρόνοια τοῦ θεοῦ bei Platon *Tim.* 30 c, 44 c.) Als τέλος (= οὐσία) ist auch das ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν zu verstehen, *Phys.* 193 b 13; auch 193 a 30. Ferner *de part. anim.* 687 a 10 φύσις verglichen mit ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, *de gen. anim.* 744 b 16 verglichen mit οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός. Siehe ferner die Belegstellen bei Eucken, *Methode*, S. 88 Anm. 1.

[304] Bei den Sternbewegungen löst der Begriff der φύσις die Ursprüngliche der πρᾶξις ab. In *de coelo* 284 a 34 wird vom grausamen Schicksal der Sterne

Begriff der Seele, da sie ja Zweck des Körpers ist, zur Physis[305] — also der entgegengesetzte Weg als früher bei Platon gezeigt. Die φύσις aber als Zweck hat dennoch auch ihre ursprüngliche etymologische Bedeutung als Werden nicht verloren.[306] Nimmt man nun einerseits φύσις als Zweck-Wesen und wiederum als Werden, gleich der γένεσις, so wird der Satz, daß das Werden vom Wesen bestimmt ist,[307] jener Grundsatz der aristotelischen Teleologie, zu einem wenig besagenden Zirkel. Es ist dies nicht bloß eine eristische Konstruktion: die Grundauffassung eines Zweckes als Endpunkt einer Bewegung, als antizipiertes empirisches Resultat, kann zu nichts anderem führen als zum Mithineinziehen des Endpunktes in die Dynamik des zu ihm führenden Weges, so daß sich der Zweck, gerade infolge seiner Immanenz, auflöst.

Dies zeigt sich besonders im Ethischen. Das Kriterium ist wieder die Natur, die aber nur empirisch aus dem Gegebenen ermittelt werden kann;[308] die Norm, auch die sittliche, kann nur aus den erfahrungsgemäß bekannten Verhaltungsweisen als ideal zu betrachtender maßgebender Vorbilder abzuleiten sein.[309] Da aber dieser normgebende ideale Normalmensch

gesprochen, da sie sich nicht nach ihrem Willen, sondern mit dem Äther, infolge ihrer φύσις bewegen. Daß ihnen nach 292 a 20 πρᾶξις zugeschrieben wird, ist ein Rest alter platonisierender Anschauung (vgl. Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 373, 1), indem πρᾶξις καὶ ζωή die Beseeltheit der Himmelskörper bedeuten.

[305] *de gen. anim.* 741 a 1 ist die vorher besprochene θρεπτικὴ ψυχή, die auch ἡ γεννῶσα ist, zugleich die φύσις des Lebewesens. Über die Höherstellung des Menschen, infolge seiner geistigen Differenziertheit und die Rolle der φύσις darin, siehe *de part. anim.* 655 b 37 ff.; *hist. anim.* 608 b 6 f., wo es vom Menschengeschlecht infolge seiner seelischen relativen Vollkommenheit heißt: τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτετελεσμένην. Vgl. auch Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 425 Anm. 4, S. 479 f. S. 488 Anm. 2.

[306] Zu Beginn von *Met.* Δ 4 wird an der Spitze der drei Bedeutungen von φύσις angeführt 1014 b 16: φύσις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ τῶν φυομένων γένεσις. Auch in den anderen zwei klingt wohl noch diese Grundbedeutung mit.

[307] Siehe oben Anm. 200.

[308] *Eth. Nic.* 1135 a 3 ist die Rede vom φυσικὸν δίκαιον; ferner 1099 b 20: εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ... εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. *de inc. anim.* 704 b 17: εἰ βέλτιον ὧδί, οὕτως καὶ ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν. *Phys.* 260 b 22.

[309] *Eth. Nic.* 1113 a 31; 1166 a 12: ἔοικε ... μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι; 1170 a 21: τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. (Vgl. dagegen

wiederum, um ein solcher zu werden, nur so definiert werden kann, daß er das „schlechthin Gute" annimmt,[310] so tritt hier der Zirkel wieder auf. Das menschliche Sollen wird auf ein erfahrungsmäßig gegebenes Sein zurückgeführt, dieses aber, um Norm zu werden, muß wiederum sich auf irgendein nicht zu definierendes Sollen zurückführen lassen. In dieser Kreisbewegung ist das πρῶτον κινοῦν unauffindbar. Ein planendes Wollen wird der Natur — und hier wieder unter Benützung des Technikvergleiches — abgesprochen.[311] Ebenso muß es, berücksichtigt man die Stellung desWillens zum Intellekt in der aristotelischen Psychologie, Gott durchaus abgesprochen werden.[312] Es gibt also keinen festen, ersten Punkt, von dem aus das sittliche Postulat in die Welt gesetzt werden könnte.

Bei Maimonides hingegen finden wir den Naturbegriff nur an einer Stelle ohne Reservation im Sinne Aristoteles' verwendet[313] — dies aber in der frühesten aristotelischen

Platon *Nom.* 716 C: ὁ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα.) *Phys.* 246 a 13: ὅταν λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον· τότε γὰρ μάλιστά ἐστι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν *Top.* 142 a 9; 145 a 25. *Pol.* 1254 a 36.

310 *Pol.* 1332 a 22: τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά. Vgl. *Eth. Nic.* 1157 a 29 f.

311 Es handelt sich zunächst um die bewußte Tendenz. *Phys.* 199 b 26: ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον, καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται. (Bei Platon, *Nom.* 897 a wird der Weltseele βουλεύεσθαι zugesprochen, vgl. auch *Epin.* 982 b.) Allerdings gibt es auch bei Aristoteles *Pol.* 1254 b 27 sogar ein βούλεσθαι für die φύσις — doch kann diesem vereinzelten Gebrauch keine prinzipielle Bedeutung beigemessen werden.

312 Siehe den ausführlichen Nachweis bei Zeller, *loc. cit.*, S. 370. Vgl. ferner Siebeck, *Lehre des Aristoteles vom Leben etc.*, S. 16 f., Boehm, *loc. cit.*, S. 101 f. Über die Unvereinbarkeit von Intellekt und Willen in der aristotelischen Ethik (und Psychologie) siehe Eucken, *Über die Methode etc. der aristotelischen Ethik*, S. 22 f.

313 Hauptsächlich *Moreh* II 4, wo טבע von נפש strenge unterschieden wird; und vom טבע לא נפש als Bewegungsprinzip rührt her die Bewegung כתנועת האבן הישרה למטה או כתנועת האש למעלה. Dies entsprechend der aristotelischen Lehre für die Elemente in *de coelo* (vgl. Munk II S. 52 n. 2), wird dann auch für das Lebewesen, schon im übertragenen Sinne, verwendet, wenn sich dies bewegt לכון אל הנאות ולברוח מטה שהוא כלתי נאות. Dieser Auffassung entspricht auch III 19, wo wohl von einer כוונה מן הטבע die Rede ist, dabei als unbestrittene Lehrmeinung angeführt wird טבע שיכון אל זה הענין אשר אין השבע בעל שכל והנהגה und dann zusammenfassend: אין ידיעה לו כו. Vgl. oben Anm. 158.

Fassung,[314] wo φύσις noch ausschließlich den Zug der Elemente nach oben und unten bedeutete. Sonst aber wird der Terminus nie ohne einschränkende Bemerkung gebraucht. In der Darstellung der vernünftigen Planmäßigkeit des Kosmos als Organismus wird nur gesagt, daß diese von manchen auch Natur genannt wird.[315] Daß aber Maimonides selbst keinesfalls die Natur mit den für ihn wesentlichen Willen und Weisheit identifiziert, geht klar hervor aus der Stelle, wo er das Zurückführen der Weltordnung auf Willen oder Weisheit oder Natur als voneinander verschiedene Parallelen anführt.[316] Daß wiederum seine Auffassung nicht die dritte war, hat er wiederholt in allen Zusammenhängen dargelegt. Ohne auf die Unveränderlichkeit der Naturordnung verzichten zu können — dies auch, wie oben gezeigt,[317] aus teleologischen Gründen —, hat er aber der aristotelischen Hypostasierung der Natur die Spitze genommen, indem er diese mit dem göttlichen Willen unlösbar verbindet, und die Vereinbarkeit von Willen und Natur durch die Formel zu erreichen gesucht, Gott wolle nur das Mögliche.[318] Er geht mit Aristoteles nur auf halbem

[314] Im Dialog περὶ φιλοσοφίας in der Sammlung von Val. Rose (Fr. 24). Über Stellung der Schrift s. Jäger, *loc. cit.*, S. 125 ff., zum φύσις-Begriff darin vgl. Theiler, *loc. cit.*, S. 86.

[315] *Moreh* I 72 wird zunächst bei den vier Elementen das טבעי als im eigentlichen Sinne verwendet — והם גופים מתים אין חיים בהם ולא השגה ולא יתנועעו מעצמם — und ausschlaggebend für sie ist der מקום טבעי, welcher Ausdruck (οἰκεῖος τόπος) in drei Zeilen fünfmal gebraucht wird. Also wiederum טבע im Gegensatz zu רשגה. Später wird nur beim הכח המכוין בנוף החי in Parenthese hinzugefügt ורבה סעמים יקראוהו טבע (worunter unmittelbar Galenus gemeint sein mag, vgl. Munk I S. 363 n. 5; die Ansicht aber ist gut aristotelisch) — womit sich Maimonides offenbar nicht identifiziert. Dieses יקראוהו hier erinnert an das bereits besprochene (s. Anm. 277) יֵאָמֵר von II 10, wo ja auch הנהגה von טבע ausgesagt wird. Zum Sprachgebrauch vgl. auch oben Anm. 83 über במאמר אחרים. Vgl. Halevi, *Kusari* V, 11: הנקראת אצלם טבע לחכמה הנפלאה...; dann weiter: הוא אשר ינהיגהו השבע על דברי הפילוסופים.

[316] *Moreh* III 17 g. E. כי טענה זאת השאלה... כן רצה ד' או כן גזרה חכמתו או כן גזר השבע, לפי שלשת הדעות הקדומות (Ephodi z. St.: לפי אריסטו — כן גזר השבע, da ja auch Aristoteles' Providenztheorie, in הדעת הב', sich nach טבע המציאות richtet).

[317] Siehe oben Anm. 232.

[318] *Moreh* III 25: Die Notwendigkeit, die im Willen Gottes verankert ist, hat ihr Korrektiv im Möglichen, das aber wiederum von der Weisheit herkommt: שהדברים אשר ירצה השם יעשו בהכרח ואין שם טוענ ישנע בהעשות (über das שם vgl. Anm. 270) רצונו, אלא שהוא יתע' לא ירצה אלא אפשר ולא כל אפשר אלא מה שגזרה חכמתו להוות כך. Auf

Wege mit, indem er die auf dem Wege der Induktion erreichbare Naturordnung nun noch allein vom göttlichen Willen deduzierbar sein läßt.[319] Deswegen muß er auch, wenn er von der Unveränderlichkeit der Natur spricht, noch

diese Eigentümlichkeit in der Beziehung zwischen Willen und Weisheit insbesondere zum Wesen des Möglichen, das auch an anderer Stelle dieses Kapitels berührt wird, kann hier des näheren nicht eingegangen werden.

[319] *Moreh* II 29: שאנחנו נאות לאריסטו בחצי מדעתו ונאמין שזה המציאות לעולם נצחי על זה הטבע אשר רצהו יתעלה. Diese „halbe" Übereinstimmung bezieht sich nicht allein, wie Ephodi z. St. meint, darauf, daß wir נודה לאריסטו במה שאמר שהעולם נצחי בעתיד, ihm aber entgegensetzen das פתח והתהלה der Schöpfung, d. h. daß wir von ihm die Ewigkeit der zukünftigen Dauer (das II 27 als nur zulässig bezeichnet wird: ולא יסכיד עלינו דבר מאמונתנו בהאמנת התמדתו) annehmen, aber nicht die Ewigkeit der vergangenen Existenz. Denn, wenn wir auch glauben, שלא יעדר זה אשר המציאו ולא ישתנה לו טבע, so ist dies wiederum doch nicht absolut im aristotelischen Sinne, nach der vorher gemachten Reservation; שיש יכולת יתע' לשנותו כלו או להעדירו או להעדיר איזה טבע שירצה מטבעיו. Demnach ist also auch die Zukunft nicht in dem absoluten Maß gewährleistet, als bei Aristoteles. Dazu müßte ja auch das פתח והתהלה rein zeitlich verstanden werden, was nicht die Lehrmeinung Maimonides' war (vgl. oben Anm. 180). Das „Kompromiß" besteht vielmehr wesentlich in der Kombination vom aristotelischen טבע mit unserem רצון. Wie es auch weiter ersichtlich ist, wo er die aristotelische Meinung der Ewigkeit der Welt als Gegensatz anführt, diese aber wiederum auf das Moment der Notwendigkeit zurückführt שזה לא יסודר אלא על דרך החיוב ושהחיוב יש בו מדבור סרה על השם. Also in der Ablehnung des חיוב liegt der Schwerpunkt und in der Begründung der permamenten Naturordnung im רצון; denn dies ist das wesentliche in der Lehre von der Kreation. Vgl. II 20. In diesem Sinne wird der Gedanke des חדוש von dem des טבע, soweit er sich auf חיוב gründen will, bedroht. Dies deutlicher II 23, wo auch der Zweifel an der Kreation als סתירת יסוד הדת ודבר סרה על השם bezeichnet wird, und dann weiter: ולא תטה מדעת חדוש העולם כ"א בטופת וזה בלתי נמצא בטבע. Klarer wird unsere Stelle durch Heranziehung von III 15 Anf.: לנמנע טבע קים קיום עומד אי־אפשר השתנותו כלל ומפני זה לא יתואר השם ביכולת עליו ואין חולק על זה אחד מאנשי העיון כלל. Hier ist unter dem נמנע das logisch-mathematische gemeint, das eben absolut ist und dem gegenüber keinerlei יכולת Gottes angenommen werden kann. Das Physische hingegen, wovon II 29 die Rede ist, hat wohl auch die Unveränderlichkeit zum Merkmal (wie bei Aristoteles) dies aber nicht absolut, denn hier ist der göttlichen יכולת, wie oben gesehen, noch immer die Möglichkeit des Eingreifens prinzipiell vorbehalten. Im Unterschiede also zwischen dem mathematisch und dem physikalisch Möglichen und Notwendigen, in deren verschiedenen Beziehung zur יכולת — darin liegt der wesentliche Gegensatz zu Aristoteles: die Abhängigkeit des Physischen vom רצון, was, in seiner letzten Konsequenz, den חדוש ausmacht. Das ist auch der Sinn von II 19 Einl., wo wohl אפשר שישנם המכון gelehrt wird, aber eingeschränkt durch הנמנעות טבע.

hinzufügen, daß sich auch kein Willensakt erneuern würde.[320] Denn die Natur ist nicht bloß durch den Willen entstanden, sondern beharrt noch immer in Abhängigkeit von ihm. Und darum ist, wo reiner Wille tätig war, wie bei der Schöpfung, eine Beweisführung von der Natur aus unmöglich.[321] Was also in der Natur als zweckmäßig zu finden ist, kann nicht in ihr und aus ihrem Werden erklärt werden, sondern aus ihrem Ursprung, dem Willen.

Diese unbedingte Unterordnung der Natur unter den Willen war es, die Maimonides ermöglicht hat, das Sein und die Sittlichkeit in ihrem Ursprung zu identifizieren. Er verzichtete auf die schöne Lehre der Präexistenz der Torah, lehrte ihre Kreation ebenso wie die der Welt,[322] nicht weil er am Primat des sittlichen Gebotes zweifelte, sondern gerade um den sittlichen Charakter der gesamten Kreation zu sichern. Darum hängt für ihn die ewige Dauer der Torah, verbunden mit der des jüdischen Volkes, letzten Endes mit der Schöpfungslehre zusammen.[323] Es ist dies der Zusammenhang, der im Willen hergestellt ist, und der daher beides, die Schöpfungen der Natur und die Gebote, in gleichem Sinne „Werke Gottes" nennt, da sie aus einem ersten Willensakt (derselbe, der auch die menschliche Freiheit festlegte[324]) hervorgingen.[325] Dieser „erste Wille" korrespondiert mit dem „letz-

[320] *Moreh* II 29: היות קשה בעיניו מאד שישתנה טבע אחר טעשה בראשית או יתחדש רצון [אחר] אחר שהונחו כן. Die Auffassung Munks, II S. 225 n. 3, daß das אסתקרת sich auf beides, sowohl טבע als auch רצון bezieht (wie auch Tibbon: שהונחו), ändert nichts an der inneren Abhängigkeit des טבע vom רצון, auch wenn letzterer als nunmehr fix angesehen wird. Einer Änderung im רצון könnte die Unabänderlichkeit der Natur nicht standhalten.

[321] So *Moreh* II 23 (vgl. oben Anm. 319) und insbesondere II 17 (s. oben Anm. 173, 233).

[322] *Moreh* I 65: להיות המאמר ההוא אשר שמעו משה רבנו ע"ה השם בראו וחדשו כמו שברא כל מה שבראו וחדשו. Daß aber Maimonides trotz der Betonung des kreatorischen Moments von der herkömmlichen Anschauung über das קול נברא abweicht, vgl. meine Abhandlung *Proph.* S. 130 Anm. 210.

[323] *Moreh* II 29: וזה ג"כ הערה על נצחות התורה, dies in Fortsetzung der Auslegung von Jes. LXV, 17—18, wo ברא wiederholt und *ibid.* LXVI, 22, wo עמד, die Dauer, betont wird.

[324] Vgl. oben Anm. 270.

[325] *Moreh* I 66, der Grund, daß die Gesetzestafeln מעשה אלהים genannt werden, ist, שמציאותם טבעית לא מלאכותית, כי כל הדברים הטבעיים יקראו מעשה ה'. Dann

ten Zweck", begründet ihn. Darum ist der letzte Zweck, der für die Welt der Gott der Kreation ist, auch derselbe für die Sittlichkeit — als das Wissen um den letzten Zweck der Welt, wozu das Wissen von der Naturordnung die notwendige Vorbereitung ist und die Liebe bedeutet.[326] Diese Verankerung beider letzter Zwecke im Willen besagt nichts anderes, als daß das Dasein des sittlichen Gebotes nicht weniger Realität besitzt als das Dasein „der Sterne in der Sphäre",[327] daß aber anderseits auch das Dasein der Welt nicht weniger im sittlichen Prinzip wurzelt als das des Gebotes.

Der sittliche letzte Zweck aber in der Form des Gebotes wendet sich an den M e n s c h e n. Auch er ist Teil der Natur, soweit er ein Genus darstellt, und das menschliche Individuum ist ein Teil seines Genus. Wir haben aber bereits gesehen, daß die sittliche Tat der Erkenntnis das menschliche Individuum aus seinem Genus herausheben und ihn der Sphäre gleichstellen kann. Dies erhebt ihn nun auch ü b e r d i e N a t u r. Denn während die Natur, in der Form von Wundern,[328] prädestinierte Veränderungen ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeit in einzelnen Teilen

wird באצבע אלהים gleichgesetzt ב ד ב ר אלהים, was aber bedeutet בהסיז אלהים, כלומר ברצונו וחפצו (dies im Sinne von I 65, wo jedes אמירה als Willen gedeutet wird: שאלו המאמרות כלם אמנם הם רצוניים לא מאמריים). Für beide, sowohl für die Naturschöpfungen als auch die Tafeln gilt dieselbe Entstehungsart: ברצון ראשון לא בכלי. Ephodi nimmt die Stelle allzu wörtlich (שהלוחות כמדתן ושעורן נמצאו מציאות טבעי בהר ובאותן הלוחות היו נמצאות כל צורות האותיות וכ'), welche Auffassung Schem Tob noch weiterführt und ausschmückt; (auch Narboni schien diese Vorstellung zu haben, worauf er die etymologische Verwandtschaft von פנה und פיני zurückführt; merkwürdigerweise aber schließt sich dem auch Salomon Maimon im *Gibeat Hammoreh* z. St. an und sieht sich zu einem längeren Exkurs über die Geschichte der Schrift, insbesondere über die Hieroglyphen veranlaßt, um dies Phänomen zu „erklären"). Crescas z. St. weist all dies zurück als טה שלא יעלה ברשת הדמיון והשכל לא ישער אותו ולא יקבלני.

[326] *Moreh* III 28; unter Berufung auf *Jesode-Hatorah* II, 2 heißt es: שזאת האהבה לא תתכן אלא בהנשת המציאות כלו כפי טה שהוא אשר הם, welches Erfassen: — nur dazu dient החכמות העיוניות כלם אשר בהם יתאמתו הדעות ההם אשר הם התכלית האחרון — מציאות השם... ויכלתו ורצונו וקדמותו, jene תכליות אחרונות, zu verstehen sind, worunter.

[327] *Moreh* I 66: היתכן מציאות הכתב בלוחות יותר טופלא מטציאות הכוכבים בגלגל. Dann, unter Berufung auf den *Mischnah-Kommentar, Aboth* V, 6: שמכתב הלוחות כשאר מעשה בראשית כלי. Vgl. Munk I S. 296, n. 1. Ephodi, in seiner wörtlichen Auffassung befangen, fügt hier, offenbar ablehnend, hinzu: והו לפי דעתו.

[328] *Moreh* II 25, 29; III 31.

in sich tragen kann, ist das menschliche Individuum von einer solchen Veränderung ausgeschlossen. Denn würde der göttliche Wille diese individuelle, geistige „Natur" ändern, so wäre die Basis für das sittliche Gebot erschüttert.[329] Das ist vom selben רצון קדום festgelegt, der die sittliche Wahlfreiheit gewollt hat. Das Neue, das sich dem Menschen ereignen kann, muß, wenn es nicht schon von der ersten Kreation herrühren soll, wiederum auf eine gleichartige Weise, durch Kreation, unmittelbar vom göttlichen Willen ausgehend, geschehen.[330]

Anderseits aber — wenn auch das menschliche Individuum berufen ist, den sittlichen letzten Zweck zu erfüllen — darf dies nicht so verstanden werden, daß das Gebot an den empirisch individuellen Menschen gerichtet ist. Dies würde die Relativität des Gebotes und seine Veränderlichkeit nach Zeit und Raum mit sich bringen — was bei der ersten Endabsicht der Torah nicht sein darf.[331] Hier wiederum ist die Parallele mit der Natur am Platze, deren Teleologie auch nur aufs Gesamte gerichtet ist, ohne Rücksicht auf den Nachteil mancher Einzelteile; so ist auch der Mensch von Haus aus an die Folgen seiner natürlichen Genushaftigkeit, d. h. seiner individuellen Unvollkommenheit gebunden.[332] Das Gebot richtet

[329] *Moreh* III 32.

[330] Vgl. meine Abhandlung über *Proph.* S. 127 u. Anm. 197.

[331] *Moreh* III, 34: אי אפשר שיהיו התורות נתונות לפי ענייני האנשים והזמנים המתחלפים was später begründet wird: כי אלו היה לפי האנשים היה נופל ההפסד בכל ונתת דבריך לשעורים ומפני זה אין ראוי שיקשרו העניינים המכוונים כונה ראשונה מן התורה לא בזמן ולא במקום אבל יהיו החוקים והמשפטים מוחלטים מתם וכוללים. Zu Beginn des Kapitels wird das empirisch Individuelle als ein דבר הוה, ein Exzeptionelles bezeichnet. Statt האנשים wäre für אלאשכאץ natürlich האישים richtiger.

[332] *Ibid.*: ועליך לבחון העניינים הטבעיים אשר התועלות ההם הכוללות הנמצאות בהם יש בכללם ויתחייב מהם נזקים סרטיים. Munk III S. 265 n. 1, findet die Stelle dunkel, inhaltlich sowohl als auch grammatisch; diese „obscurité" scheint aber in einem unrichtigen Erfassen der Stelle von vorneherein begründet zu sein. Die Stelle lautet: (לאן אלשריעה הי אסר אלאזי) ולך אן תעתבר באלאמור אלטבעיה אלתי תלך אלמנאפע אלעאמה usw. Dies ist vollkommen klar ausgedrückt, wenn man, wie Tibbon, das סיה auf אלאמור אלטבעיה bezieht und dann das סי צמנהא (יש בכללם) prädikativ zu אלמנאפע אלעאמה (התועלות הכוללות) auffaßt, bezogen auf אלאמור אלטבעיה. Munk aber findet aus einem unerklärlichen Grunde das סיהא „évidemment" auf das im vorigen Satze stehende אלשריעה bezogen (obwohl es sich, ebenso wie צמנהא, auf den gebrochenen Plural אלאמור אלטבעיה beziehen kann), will also das Tibbonsche בהם auf ein בה (sc. בתורה) umändern — woraus sich dann

sich daher an die Menschheit. Das menschliche Individuum ist es, das das der Menschheit aufgegebene Gebot ver-

ergibt, daß das מי צמנהא appositiv steht zu אלאמור אלטביעיה, was aber der gegebenen Wortstellung widerspricht, weshalb er als die „natürliche" Wortstellung die annimmt: (i. e. אלתי מי צמנהא תלך אלמנאפע אלנאצבה אלמוגודה סידא (מי אלשריעה, um die Apposition vom Subjekt doch nicht so weit entfernt zu haben. Bei Auflösung der Konstruktion wird es nun zu einem Relativsatz, in dem אלאמור אלטביעיה das Subjekt wird und אלמנאפע אלנאצבה das Objekt, mit dem logischen Schwerpunkt im אלמוגודה סיה. Und so ergibt sich für Munk die Übersetzung: mais il faut considérer les choses de la nature *qui embrassent* ces avantages généraux *existant dans la loi*. Diese syntaktisch gewaltsame Umstellung wäre nur dann gerechtfertigt, wenn sie zumindest das Inhaltliche mehr klären würde. In Wirklichkeit aber erzeugt eben diese unbegründete Auffassung des סידא und der Stellung des מי צמנהא die Unklarheit im Inhalt. Nach dem Wortlaut, wie er gegeben ist, handelt es sich um eine Analogie zwischen den Naturdingen und der Torah. Der erste Teil dieser Analogie, d. i. unsere Stelle, lautet: „Man muß betrachten die Naturdinge, deren allgemeinen, bei ihnen (sc. den Naturdingen) vorfindbaren Vorteile in ihnen dauernd enthalten (immanent?) sind." (Auch wenn für die Individuen daraus Schaden erwachsen mag.) Ebenso ist es bei der Torah.... Nach der Auffassung Munks hingegen ist hier kein Vergleich mit den Naturdingen gegeben, sondern ist gleich hier von den in den Naturdingen enthaltenen, in der Torah existierenden Vorteilen die Rede. So aufgefaßt, wird nicht allein die etwaige Unklarheit in diesem Satze nicht behoben, sondern dieser wirkt noch verwirrend auf das weitere. Denn was soll dann die Fortsetzung bedeuten: ולסי זאת הבחינה גם כן אין להטות — ובחסב הדא אלאעתבאר איצא לא תעגב מהיות כונת התורה לא תשלם בכל איש ואיש wenn die Generalität der Torah schon im vorigen Satz enthalten war? Und diesen Satz muß auch Munk, *ibid.*: S. 266 n. 1, als „zweiten Teil" einer „comparaison entre la loi révélée par Dieu et les lois de la nature" auffassen. Es ist daher sicher dem Gedankengang des ganzen Kapitels gerechter, wenn man die gegebene Wortstellung und ihren natürlichen Sinn beibehält; dann ist der Vergleich vollständig. Der Grund der Vernachlässigung des empirischen Individiums durch die Torah ist freilich in der ersten Hälfte des Vergleiches mitgegeben: כי הצורת השבעיות הסיניות לא יתנו כל מה שראוי בכל איש ואיש. Doch ist hier eben die Hauptabsicht, zu zeigen, wie sehr das Naturmoment auch die Realisierbarkeit des Gebotes mit beeinflußt, nicht aber, wie nach Munks Auffassung der ersten Vergleichshälfte, daß die natürlichen Vorteile im Gebote verankert sind. Das würde hier zu einem Zirkel führen. — Allerdings ist der Naturvergleich nicht bis zu Ende geführt; zunächst durch die spätere Ablehnung des Vergleichs mit der Heilkunst, die ja doch individualistisch vorgehen muß, dann auch durch die Erhebung dieser Unmöglichkeit der individuellen Rücksichtnahme zu einem jener prinzipiellen logisch-mathematischen Unmöglichkeiten, jenes unabänderlichen נמנע, das in III 15 behandelt wurde, worauf mit dem gleichen Wortlaut ausdrücklich verwiesen wird: וכבר בארנו שלנמנע שבע קיים לא ישתנה לעולם.

wirklichen kann und soll. Das Individuum wird nicht außerhalb seines natürlichen Genus geboren, kann aber durch Erfüllung des der Gesamtheit auferlegten Endzweckes durch die letzte Vervollkommnung[333] sich über seine Natur erheben.

Das ist die Sonderstellung des Menschen in der Kreatur, und in dem Sinne ist die Auslegung zu verstehen, wonach das Versetzen des Menschen ins Paradies die Erhöhung seines Grades über alles geschaffene Vergängliche bedeutet.[334]

Dieser letzte Zweck der Sittlichkeit, dem Menschen aufgegeben, besteht wohl in dem auf der Liebe basierenden Wissen des Endzweckes der Welt — aber er ist damit nicht erschöpft. Dies Wissen muß, wie die ποίησις Gottes, eine tätige Wandlung im Menschen, zum Göttlichen hin, herbeiführen. Dieser Gedanke in seinem ganzen Umfang ist in Moreh I 54 durchgeführt. Die Einleitung preist das Wissen gegen das bloß werktätige „Fasten und Beten";[335] das Wissen bezieht sich auf Gott und seine Gesamtgüte — לב טובי — unter der wir, wie bereits gesehen, die kontinuierliche Zweckmäßigkeit der Welt zu verstehen haben (der „letzte Zweck" im Kosmischen); daran schließt sich an die Hervorhebung der Bedeutung der Handlungsattribute Gottes, die aber wiederum auf den „letzten Zweck" des Menschen führt, der nun vom Wissen aus über es selbst hinausführt: zur tätigen Angleichung an Gott.[336] Und so erst ist uns der Sinn erschlossen jenes

[333] Das ist eben der Sinn von השלטות האחרון in III 28 im Gegensatz zum תקון ענייני המדינה der, wie III 27 dargelegt, zum שלטות ראשון gehört, d. h. zum תקון הגוף (vgl. oben Anm. 93); von welch letzterer שלטות ausgesagt wird, daß sie קודמת בטבע ובזמן ist. Hierher gehört auch der Unterschied von טבע und sittlicher יכולת in III 19, worüber ausführlich Anm. 270.

[334] *Moreh* II 30; vorher wird vom עץ הדעת erklärt, daß ihn Gott dem Menschen nicht zeigte: שטבע המציאות כן הייב. Dann wird der Vers Gen. II 15 ausgelegt: ויקח ח' אלהים את האדם, עלה אותה, ויניחהו בנ"ע, הניח לו; לא אטר זה הלשון להעלותו מטקום ולהניחו בטקום, אלא דעלות טדרגת טציאותו באלו דנמצאות ההוות הנפסדות וישבי על ענין אחד (עלי חאלה מא) (Munk: et qu'il l'établit dans une certaine position).

[335] *Moreh* I 54 Anf.: מורה על שטי שידע הבורא הוא אשר יטצא הן בעיניו לא טי שיצוים קריבת טדע כלומר ויתפלל לבד, אבל כל טי שידעהו הוא הנרצה המקורב השגה טדעית. Vgl. dazu I 18 über die

[336] *Ibid.* g. E.: כי תכלית טעלת האדם ההדטות בו יתעלה כפי היכולת, כלומר שנדטה בפעולתנו כפעולותיו.

in seiner Zusammensetzung sonst unerklärbaren dreifältigen Satzes, der alle drei Grundmotive — Weltzweck, Menschenzweck, Gotteswille — in Eins zusammenschließt; der Satz in I 69: „Und also ist Gott der letzte Zweck von allem, und der Zweck von allem ist die mögliche Angleichung an seine Vollkommenheit, und so ist zu verstehen sein Wille, der sein Wesen ist.... In dem Sinne sagen wir, er ist der Zweck der Zwecke.“ [337]

Wir sprachen vorher von drei Fällen: von einer abgelehnten dinglichen Teleologie und von der Setzung eines Zweckes im Kosmischen und Sittlichen. Nun hat sich uns die Zweckmäßigkeit des einheitlichen organischen Kosmos und die des sittlichen Gebotes als in ihrem letzten Ursprung, im kreatorischen Gotteswillen, identisch erwiesen. Und diese Teleologie, nicht natürlich-funktionell, sondern sittlich-postulierend, muß daher von vornherein alle Dinglichkeit ausschließen.

Es bleibt nur noch übrig die in diesem Zusammenhange wesentlich notwendige Klärung des Verhältnisses der Attribute, insbesondere der des Willens und der Weisheit, untereinander und in ihrer Beziehung zur Teleologie. Doch dieser Frage muß, auch aus raumtechnischen Gründen, eine besondere Abhandlung gewidmet werden.

[337] *Moreh* I 69 g. E.: ואם כן הוא ית' תכלית כל דבר האחרון ותכלית הכל גם כן ההדמות בשלמותו כפי היכולת והוא ענין (יהי ביעני) רצונו אשר הוא עצמו.

WAR NACHMAN KROCHMAL HEGELIANER?

Von SIMON RAWIDOWICZ, Berlin

I. Das Problem

Nachman Krochmal, der Autor des *Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman* ("Guide of the Perplexed of the Time"), ist bekanntlich einer der stärksten Exponenten jüdischer Wissenschaft und jüdischen Denkens. Er, der die Linie von Maimonides, Ibn Esra und Asariah de Rossi fortsetzt, bildet einerseits den Abschluß des jüdischen Denkens des Mittelalters und leitet andererseits die Zeit der neuen jüdischen Wissenschaft ein. Daß auch wir heute dem Stande unserer Wissenschaft gemäß und aus dem Bewußtsein unserer Zeit heraus nicht umhin können, uns mit Krochmals Werk auseinanderzusetzen, ja, daß es auch für uns das sein kann, was es für Steinschneider, Zunz, Graetz, Jost, Frankel, Rosin, Rapoport, A. H. Weiß, I. B. Löwensohn und viele andere war, unterliegt keinem Zweifel.

Wenn wir die Grundlagen des Krochmalschen Denkens und Philosophierens näher untersuchen, so stoßen wir zunächst auf drei wichtige Faktoren, die im Werden und Schaffen Krochmals wirksam waren. Es sind: 1. die jüdische Tradition und die gesamte jüdische kritische Forschung bis zu seiner Zeit; 2. die moderne allgemeine Wissenschaft, wie sie sich seit etwa dem 17. Jahrhundert entwickelt hat; und 3. der deutsche Idealismus, d. h. die Systeme der deutschen Philosophie von Immanuel Kant an bis zu Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Die Quellen des Krochmalschen *M. N. H.* (*Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman*) sind bisher kaum exakt und von einem immanent-kritischen Standpunkte aus untersucht worden. So hat man z. B. auch häufig — um nur beiläufig auf einiges hinzudeuten — die vielen Anregungen, die Krochmal u. a. aus den kritischen Partien des Talmuds und anderen älteren jüdischen Quellen gewonnen hat, ganz übersehen. Und obgleich einige

Forscher ganz allgemein auf die innere Abhängigkeit Krochmals von Maimonides, Ibn Esra, Asariah de Rossi und manchen anderen hingewiesen haben, ist noch nie der Versuch gemacht worden, genauer zu prüfen und festzustellen, welche Resultate diese und andere Beziehungen bei Krochmal gezeitigt haben. Von all diesen Einflüssen auf Krochmal ist nur derjenige Hegels stets in ganz besonderem Maße hervorgehoben worden, ohne daß das Problem, inwieweit Krochmal wirklich Hegelianer war, historisch-genetisch genügend geprüft worden ist. Unseres Erachtens, um es vorwegzunehmen, kann diese Hypothese von Krochmals Hegelianismus bei genauerer geisteswissenschaftlicher Betrachtung, wie aus dem Späteren ersichtlich werden soll, auf keinen Fall aufrechterhalten bleiben. Sie ist schon deshalb abzulehnen, weil sie dazu angetan ist, das Charakteristische an Krochmals Philosophie, sein ganzes Philosophieren in ein falsches Licht zu rücken. Abgesehen davon ist diese These auch sonst zum Schaden Krochmals aufgestellt worden; denn der Zusammenbruch der idealistischen Philosophie in den dreißiger und vierziger Jahren, der Sturz der Hegelschen Philosophie in Deutschland zog auch eine große Mißachtung des „Hegelianers" N. Krochmals nach sich, und so konnte Krochmal bisher niemals zu der richtigen, ihm gebührenden Geltung kommen.

Wir wollen zunächst einen kurzen historischen Überblick über die Entstehung dieser Hegelianismus-These und ihre Verbreitung geben. Von N. Krochmals Zeitgenossen und Jüngern sind in diesem Punkte die Bezeugungen von M. Letteris und Salomo Jehudah Rapoport,[1] die einen jahrelangen Umgang mit dem Meister gepflegt haben, von besonderem Belang. In seiner Krochmal-Biographie zählt Letteris verschiedene Werke und Autoren auf, die Krochmal in seiner zweiten Periode, in der für die Gestaltung seiner geistigen Persönlichkeit entscheidenden Epoche, beschäftigt haben.[2] Unter ihnen finden

[1] Graetz bezeichnet Rapoport als den „empfänglichsten und begabtesten" Jünger Krochmals. Vgl. *Geschichte der Juden*, Leipzig 1900, S. 441.

[2] Auf das Leben und Werk Nachman Krochmals im allgemeinen kann ich hier nicht eingehen. Es sei mir daher gestattet, auf die Ausführungen, die in meiner hebräisch abgefaßten, 226 Seiten umfassenden Einleitung zu der von mir

wir verschiedene jüdische und nichtjüdische Philosophen: Maimonides, Ibn Esra, Jehuda Halewi, Nachmanides u. a., Spinoza, die Aufklärungsphilosophen Moses Mendelssohn, Garve, Lessing, ganz besonders Kant wie auch die ersten jüdischen Apostel des Kantianismus: Salomo Maimon und Bendavid.[3] Aus diesen Angaben Letteris' und auch aus Rapoports Aussagen,[4] der Krochmals Beschäftigung mit Kant, Fichte, Schelling und Hegel besonders hervorhebt, läßt sich nichts entnehmen, was erlauben würde, Krochmal als einen orthodoxen Hegelianer zu bezeichnen.

Der erste, der von einem Hegelianismus Krochmals sprach, war eigentlich Leopold Zunz. „Um jene Zeit (1826)" — sagt Zunz in seinem Nekrolog auf Krochmal — „war es, wo er fast zufällig[5] mit den Schriften Hegels bekannt und ganz hingerissen wurde von dem Tiefsinne dieses Forschers, dessen System er die ‚Philosophie der Philosophien' nannte und für näher dem essäischen Judenthum als dem Christenthum verwandt hielt. Ja, es reizten ihn die Werke des genannten Meisters zu dem Versuche, die Grundlage zu dessen Ideen im Judenthume aufzusuchen und die Harmonie zwischen der jüdischen Theologie und der wahren Philosophie, wie sie zu seiner Zeit Maimonides dargestellt, aufs neue zu versuchen, und zwar nach einem Bedürfnisse der heutigen Wissenschaft mit durchzuführender Entwicklung der Erscheinungen des Judenthums."[6] In bezug auf diese Worte Zunz' müssen wir uns an die alte talmudische Regel אליגין דבורא halten. Daß Krochmal „fast zufällig" auf Hegel kam, daß er sich später eifrig mit Hegel wie mit Kant, Fichte, Schelling u. a. befaßt hat, ist zweifellos richtig. Was aber Zunz weiter über Krochmals Versuch, das Judentum mit Hegel zu „versöhnen", sagt, ist keine historische Aussage, sondern subjektive nachträgliche Konstruktion. Es

besorgten Neuherausgabe der Krochmalschen Werke (*N. Krochmals Werke*, erste vollständige Ausgabe, durchgesehener Text, nebst einer Einleitung, Anmerkungen und Register von S. R., Ajanoth, Berlin 1924) dargelegt sind, hinzuweisen.

[3] *Zikaron Basefer*, S. 44, 45 ff.

[4] *Kerem Ḥemed*, Heft 6, S. 42 ff.

[5] Von uns gesperrt.

[6] *Gesammelte Schriften*, 1875, II, S. 155—156.

muß auch darauf hingewiesen werden, daß Zunz — im Gegensatz zu Letteris und Rapoport — nicht als Freund oder Jünger eine Lebensbeschreibung Krochmals, sondern eine allgemeine Würdigung geben will. Es muß streng unterschieden werden zwischen der historischen Bezeugung Zunz', die er im Namen des jüngeren Krochmal macht, und seiner Deutung derselben. Ich kann mich allgemein des Eindruckes nicht erwehren, daß etwas „Apologetisches" in dieser Zunzschen These lag, als ob Zunz dadurch dem damals in Deutschland noch wenig gekannten Krochmal eine Ehre antun wollte, daß er ihn zum Nachfolger Hegels, zum Jünger des großen sogenannten „preußischen Staatsphilosophen" zu stempeln versuchte. Vielleicht ist manchem auf diese Weise der Name unseres Philosophen etwas geläufiger geworden, aber gewonnen hat Krochmal dadurch absolut nichts.[7] Ganz im Gegenteil. Durch diese Hegelianismus-Hypothese ist das Bild des historischen Krochmal, des Mannes, wie er in Wirklichkeit war und was er in Wirklichkeit lehrte, ganz verfälscht worden. Und gerade weil wir den historischen Krochmal suchen, weil wir die wahren Wurzeln der Gedankenkräfte, die ihn bewegten, das Genuine an seinem Werk unter Ausschaltung alles Nebensächlichen, ermitteln wollen, gerade darum dürfen wir uns nicht mit so allgemein gehaltenen Urteilen über Krochmal zufrieden geben, wie sie bisher üblich waren. Wir sind dies der jüdischen Wissenschaft und Krochmals Stellung in der jüdischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft schuldig.

Von Zunz ab begann die Verwirrung in der Beurteilung der Krochmalschen Philosophie. Nur wenige Forscher waren vorsichtig genug, um ohne eine genaue Gegenüberstellung von Krochmal und Hegel sich diese inzwischen üblich gewordene Hypothese nicht ganz zu eigen zu machen. Wir finden diese Vorsicht z. B. Shechter (der Krochmal in eine Reihe mit

[7] Nebenbei bemerkt, Zunz' Behauptung, daß Krochmal die Hegelsche Philosophie für besonders verwandt mit dem Essäertum hielt, erscheint uns nicht begründet. Wir können uns schlecht vorstellen, in welchen entscheidenden Punkten dieser Zweig des deutschen Idealismus, Hegels philosophisches System, mit dem „praktischen" Essäertum „verwandt" sein soll. Abgesehen davon spricht doch Krochmal mehrfach in seinem *M. N. H.* über die Essäer, ohne daß er je den geringsten Hinweis auf diesen angeblichen Zusammenhang gemacht hat.

Rabban Jochanan ben Sakkai, Saadja Gaon und Maimonides stellt), der sich folgendermaßen äußert: "Zunz somewhere remarks that Krochmal was inspired in his work by the study of Hegel, just as Maimonides had been by the study of Aristotle. I give this statement solely on the authority of Zunz, as I myself have never made a study of the works of the German philosopher, and am therefore unable to express an opinion on the question."[8] Aber diese Vorsicht im Beurteilen unseres Problems hat leider wenig Nachahmung gefunden.

Inwiefern nun Krochmals eigentliche philosophische und wissenschaftliche Einstellung formaliter und materialiter als von Hegel abhängig gekennzeichnet werden darf, dieses Grundproblem unserer Abhandlung wird im folgenden behandelt werden. Zunächst wollen wir aber die Frage nur kurz beantworten: Besitzen wir Aussagen oder irgendwelche Hindeutungen von Krochmal selber, die auf seinen Hegelianismus schließen lassen? Man hat sehr gern und sehr oft die Parallele zwischen dem Verfasser des klassischen *Moreh Nebukim* und dem Autor des *Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman* gezogen, wonach sich Krochmal zu Hegel wie Maimonides zu Aristoteles verhält, als ob Krochmal in dem Maße Hegelianer gewesen wäre, in dem Maimonides Aristoteliker war. Ist aber diese äußerlich wohl plausible Gegenüberstellung im geringsten gerechtfertigt? Könnte man sich Maimonides ohne Aristoteles denken und kann man sich den wirklichen Krochmal m i t Hegel vorstellen? Ist der *Moreh Nebukim* ohne wiederholte Bezugnahme auf Aristoteles und den Aristotelismus denkbar? Und wo finden sich die Hindeutungen auf Hegel im *M. N. H.*? Flavius wird hier 35mal, Maimonides 30, Raschi 20 und ebenso werden mehrere Male Nachmanides, Ibn Esra, Asariah de Rossi, Rabbi Jacob Emden, Chajes, Luzatto u. a. erwähnt. Krochmal scheut sich in keiner Weise, die Namen auch nichtjüdischer Denker und Forscher, wie Gesenius, Eichorn u. a., zu erwähnen,[9] aber nur ein einziges Mal wird auf Hegel hinge-

[8] N. K. and the "Perplexities of the time," *Studies in Judaism*, II, London 1896, p. 79.

[9] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 140, 166 u. a.

wiesen und ohne daß sein Name ausdrücklich genannt wird: „Auch der große deutsche Philosoph, der in unserer Generation lebte, ... hat bemerkt, ...“ [10] Dieses „auch“ ist sehr zu beachten. Denn Krochmal spricht an dieser Stelle von Ibn Esra, und Hegels Meinung wird nur herangezogen zur Bekräftigung einer These Ibn Esras. Immer, wenn Krochmal von der neuen deutschen Philosophie spricht, tut er es ganz allgemein. Nie hat er Hegel als Gegensatz zu Kant und Fichte auszuspielen versucht und nie hat er das eigentlich Neue und Epochemachende am Hegeltum hervorgehoben. Mehrfach hätte Krochmal Gelegenheit gehabt, seinen angeblichen Meister Hegel in den Vordergrund zu rücken, so z. B., wenn er die wichtigsten philosophischen Systeme, wie z. B. das des Plotinos, Proklos, Spinoza u. a., aufzählt, und auch noch an manchen anderen Stellen.[11]

Auch Krochmals Briefe (zumeist an einzelne seiner Jünger streng vertraulich gerichtet) [12] lassen nichts von seinem Hegelianismus erkennen. Die Tatsache, daß er in einem seiner Briefe den in der Geschichte der Philosophie bekannten Kampf des Antihegelianers Leo gegen die Hegelsche Schule bedauert, daß er die Methoden, mit denen der deutsche Idealismus nach Hegels Tode bekämpft worden ist, mißbilligt, erlaubt uns nicht, besondere Schlüsse zu ziehen. Und in diesem Zusammenhange dürfte es nicht als überflüssig erscheinen, darauf hinzuweisen, daß Krochmal auch nach dem Tode seines angeblichen Meisters nie die Gelegenheit ergriffen hat, um auf irgendeine Weise seine Verehrung für Hegel und seine Abhängigkeit von ihm zu dokumentieren. Auch seine beiden, der Form und dem Inhalte nach klassischen Briefe an seinen Sohn Abraham [13] — den späteren Freund von Abraham Geiger und Schorr —, der eine drei Jahre vor seinem Tode, der andere in seinem letzten Lebensjahre abgefaßt, Briefe, die ich als das Testament Krochmals bezeichnen möchte, zeigen deutlich, wie weit entfernt

[10] *N. K.s W.*, S. 290.
[11] *Ibid.*, S. 167.
[12] *Ibid.*, S. 444.
[13] *N. K.s W.*, S. 449 ff.

sein von der alten jüdischen Tradition und der neueren deutschen Aufklärung herkommendes Moralisieren, seine Postulate des reinen aufklärerischen Glaubens, des gesunden Menschenverstandes und des sittlichen Ideals, wie weit entfernt all dies vom panlogistisch-dialektischen Idealismus Hegels war. Daß aber Krochmal Hegels Philosophie gekannt hat — um dies schon hier beiläufig vorwegzunehmen —, daß er von ihr vielleicht in manchen Punkten sogar beeinflußt worden ist, halten auch wir für möglich. Aber man weiß zu genau, was es hieß, ein „Hegelianer" zu sein, wie die Hegelianer ihre philosophischen Systeme im Sinne ihres Meisters geschaffen haben, um auch den Autor des *Moreh Nebuke ha-Zeman* als Hegelianer zu bezeichnen. Wenn sich auch mehrere Links- oder sogar Rechtshegelianer gegenüber ihrem Meister größere Gedankenfreiheit erlaubten,[14] so gibt es doch auch hier eine Grenze, die niemand überschreiten kann, ohne den eigentlichen Zusammenhang mit dem Hegeltum zu verlieren. Unser Philosoph aber stand immer außerhalb dieser Grenze.

Nach diesen kurz angedeuteten äußerlich-formalen Argumenten wenden wir uns zum Hauptpunkte unseres Problems: Läßt sich das uns vorliegende historische und philosophische „System" Krochmals als ein hegelianistisches ansprechen? War Krochmal als Historiker, Kritiker und Philosoph Hegelianer?

In seiner Abhandlung über Ibn Esra warnt uns Krochmal eindringlich vor subjektiver Beurteilung, vor übereiltem Schließen aus beiläufigen Hindeutungen,[15] und fordert uns zur Untersuchung desjenigen auf, was Ibn Esra mit „klarem Bewußtsein" und mit Absicht gelehrt hat. Dies mag auch für uns eine Mahnung sein, nichts von außen in Krochmal hineinzutragen. Krochmal selbst, der *M. N. H.*, wie er uns vorliegt, soll das von uns aufgerollte Problem lösen. Die exakte genetisch-kritische Untersuchung zur Beantwortung unserer Frage

[14] Von dem bedeutendsten Führer des Linkshegelianismus und späteren Gegner des Hegeltums überhaupt, Ludwig Feuerbach, und seiner Stellung zu Hegel, Kant, Fichte u. a. handelt mein in Kürze erscheinendes Buch *Ludwig Feuerbach und die deutsche Philosophie* (Berlin, Verlag Reuther & Reichard).

[15] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 283.

kann uns nicht nur Aufschlüsse über Krochmals Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaft allein liefern, sondern auch mancherlei Aufklärung über die Auffassung des gesamten jüdischen Denkens seiner Zeit vermitteln.[16]

II. Krochmals Geschichtsphilosophie

Der Ausgangspunkt für Krochmals Philosophieren war weder ein Ringen um das Problem des Sittlichen noch um irgendeine rein logische oder erkenntnistheoretische Frage, sondern das Problem des Glaubens, das Problem der jüdischen Religion, des Judaismus überhaupt, das Verhältnis zwischen Glauben und Wissen.[17] Aber von vornherein bestand bei Krochmal eine innere Unausgeglichenheit zwischen dem rein Abstrakt-Philosophischen und dem Historischen, zwischen dem Systematischen und dem Kritischen, zwischen metaphysischer Spekulation und historisch-empirischer Betrachtungsweise. Manches auf den ersten Blick Unverständliche und sich Widersprechende im *M. N. H.* — äußerlich methodisch wie auch inhaltlich — würde bei Berücksichtigung dieses Zusammenspielens der heterogenen Motive in ein ganz anderes Licht gerückt werden können. So kam Krochmal nicht zu einem allgemein umfassenden spekulativen System, da er es als seine erste Pflicht betrachtete, Wesen und Geschichte des Judentums kritisch zu durchforschen. Äußerlich betrachtet scheint der Historiker den

[16] Bei der Konfrontierung der Systeme Hegels und Krochmals können wir selbstverständlich nicht auf die Einzelheiten des Hegelschen Systems eingehen. Ebenso können wir hier nicht eine Gesamtdarstellung der Hegelschen Philosophie in extenso geben. Wir müssen uns auf diejenigen prinzipiellen Hauptpunkte — und zwar in möglichst komprimierter Form — beschränken, die für die Beleuchtung unseres Problems unentbehrlich sind, und deswegen können manche Punkte nur allgemein gestreift werden. — Um unsere Abhandlung nicht allzusehr mit Einzelheiten zu belasten, muß von vielen hierhergehörenden Parallelstellen, Exkursen und manchen wörtlichen Quellennachweisen abgesehen werden. In meinem, wie ich hoffe, demnächst erscheinenden Buche über N. Krochmal, sein Leben, Werk und seine Zeit wird man manche weiteren Ergänzungen finden können.

[17] Über den Dualismus von Glauben und Wissen in der deutschen Philosophie siehe Hegel, „Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität" usw., *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, Bd. II.

Philosophen nach und nach verdrängt zu haben, aber tiefer gesehen hat erst im Historischen das Spekulativ-Philosophische seinen richtigen Ausdruck gefunden. Die Geschichtsphilosophie und die Geschichte sind eigentlich diejenigen Geistesgebiete, auf denen sich Krochmal am meisten mit den allgemeinen philosophischen Systemen seiner Zeit berühren müßte. Wenn irgendwo eine dominierende Abhängigkeit Krochmals von einem philosophischen System nachgewiesen werden könnte, so müßte es hier der Fall sein. Denn gerade bei Hegels großer und tiefer Hinneigung zum Geschichtlichen und der Schöpfung seiner epochemachenden Geistesphilosophie — die, um mit dem italienischen Neuhegelianer Benedetto Croce zu sprechen, das „Lebendige" an Hegels System ist — wären bei einem Hegelianer doch vorwiegend auf diesem Gebiete die Spuren seines Hegelianismus zu suchen.

Vier Momente sind es, die Krochmals Geschichtsphilosophie bestimmen: die Geselligkeit, die Entwicklung, der Geist, der absolute Geist. In mehr als in einer Hinsicht aber sind die beiden letzten Momente als eines zu betrachten, so daß es eigentlich nur drei sind. Daß der Mensch ein ζῶον πολιτικόν ist, ist eine seit dem Altertum her (Aristoteles) geläufige Ansicht. Keine Gemeinschaft wäre möglich, wirkte nicht der Geselligkeitstrieb im Menschen als die bewegende Kraft. Auch die Geschichtswissenschaft muß daher von dem Geselligkeitstrieb, als von dem familien-, gesellschafts- und staatenbildenden Element, ausgehen. Dieses Geselligkeitsmotiv wirkt seit dem klassischen Altertum in vielen ethischen, politischen und rechtlichen Systemen als dominierender Faktor mit. Aber als Ausgangspunkt auch der Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsphilosophie scheint es doch in der Neuzeit zuerst von dem italienischen Philosophen („Philosophus italicus") Giambatisto Vico verwendet worden zu sein, um dann durch ihn die späteren Reflexionen über die Geschichte völlig zu beherrschen. In seinem epochemachenden Werke *Principj d'una scienza nuova d'intorno alla commune natura delle nazioni*, das als die Grundlage der modernen Geschichtswissenschaft angesehen werden muß, finden wir den Hinweis auf den Geselligkeitstrieb der menschlichen Natur, mit

dem Krochmals Ausführungen im Abschnitt 7 (oder „Pforte" 7, denn Krochmal benennt die Abschnitte mit der älteren Bezeichnung שער) des *M. N. H.* eine verblüffende Ähnlichkeit aufzuweisen haben.[18] Wir können noch viele andere Anlehnungen Krochmals an Vico nachweisen, so daß daraus auf alle Fälle klar hervorgeht, daß, sei es direkt oder indirekt — über Johann Gottfried Herder u. a. —, Krochmal in der Aufstellung des ersten Momentes in seiner Geschichtsphilosophie von G. Vico abhängig ist. Daß also hierin Krochmal mit dem panlogistischen Idealismus nicht das geringste zu tun hat, erübrigt sich hinzuzufügen.

Was das zweite Moment der Krochmalschen Geschichte anbetrifft, so müßte hier Krochmal Hegelianer sein, wenn er es wollte und seiner philosophischen Einstellung gemäß könnte. Wird doch Hegel von manchen Historikern — und mit Recht, wenn es richtig verstanden wird — als der Philosoph der „Entwicklung" gekennzeichnet, ist doch dieser Gedanke der Entwicklung metaphysischer Grundgedanke in seinem System. Aber gerade hier, wo Krochmal an die Hegelsche Fassung des Entwicklungsgedankens anknüpfen müßte, zeigt sich deutlich, daß Krochmal seine eigenen Wege geht oder, vorsichtiger ausgedrückt, daß er auf alle Fälle nicht in die Bahnen Hegels einlenkt. Auch der Begriff der Entwicklung hat seine Entwicklung, seine eigene Geschichte, die noch nicht in erschöpfender Weise geschrieben worden ist. Augustinus (354 bis 430) wird im allgemeinen gewissermaßen als der erste Geschichtsphilosoph betrachtet, der den Begriff der Entwicklung

[18] Dieses Werk von Vico ist bereits 1822 ins Deutsche übersetzt worden (also 18 Jahre vor dem Tode Hegels) unter dem Titel: *Grundzüge einer neuen Wissenschaft über die gemeinschaftliche Natur der Völker*, Leipzig. Vgl. ebenda, S. 1, wo Vico auf die Grundtendenz seines Werkes hinweist, die darin bestehe, zu beweisen, „wie Gott den von der inneren Gerechtigkeit durch die Ursünde abgefallenen Menschen durch seine eigenen Bedürfnisse leitet, aus dem irren Zustande tierischer Vereinzelung sich zu einem geselligen Leben und somit erst zum eigentlichen Menschensegen zu erheben, als dessen Grundbedingung eine gesellige Natur ist". Vgl. hierzu *N. K.s W.*, S. 34: „Wir sehen, daß es der Wille (עצה) der göttlichen Vorsehung war, das Menschengeschlecht nicht absolut von einander zu trennen wie die anderen Lebewesen, denen die Vereinzelung eigentümlich usw."

als die Grundlage für seine Geschichtsphilosophie aufgestellt hat. In seinem klassisch gewordenen *De civitate Dei* stellt er Gott an die Spitze der Entwicklungsreihe. Der Mensch und das individuell-gesellschaftliche Geschehen ist nach ihm nur Mittel und Stufe für das Endziel der Entwicklung, die Civitas terrena Vorstufe für die Civitas Dei. Diese mit dem christlichen Erlösungsgedanken verbundene Entwicklungsidee in ihrer älteren mystischen Form involvierte in sich die Negation des Diesseits, die Mahnung zur Erkenntnis der Minderwertigkeit der Wirklichkeit, den Glauben an ein Jenseits. Gott — als Gegensatz zum Menschen, als das Ens perfectissimum und realissimum — ist als die innere Triebkraft der gesamten irdischen Entwicklung anzusehen. Das war der heteronome oder theonome Entwicklungsgedanke im Gegensatz zu dem modernen immanent-autonomen Evolutionismus. Die Entwicklung der Geschichte geht vor sich, getrieben durch ihre eigene autonome Gesetzlichkeit, durch die Notwendigkeit der Bedingungen, der Interessen, Bedürfnisse usw., aber nicht nach einem jenseitigen, von einer höheren Vorsehung ausgearbeiteten Plane.

Aber auch der moderne Entwicklungsgedanke für sich genommen ist kein einheitlicher Begriff. Heinrich Rickert zählt z. B. sieben verschiedene Entwicklungsbegriffe auf.[19] Man könnte von einem anderen Standpunkte aus noch weitere Differenzierungen des Begriffes der Entwicklung konstatieren. Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wortes „Entwicklung" ist so ungeheuer, daß man nicht zwei Philosophen miteinander identifizieren darf, weil der Entwicklungsgedanke bei beiden eine dominierende Stelle einnimmt. Richtig ist es, daß Krochmal fast der erste originelle jüdische Denker der Neuzeit war, der am historischen Entwicklungsgedanken mit einer besonderen Zähigkeit festgehalten hat. Der Evolutionismus war die Grundlage seines historischen Systems. Das war seine Waffe gegen den starren Traditionalismus, gegen das „Kleben am Buchstaben" einerseits und gegen die Skepsis und Verachtung des historischen Judentums andererseits. Mit Hilfe des Entwicklungs-

[19] *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, Tübingen 1921, S. 298 ff.

gedankens gelang es Krochmal, das Judentum dem Raume und der Zeit einzuordnen, und diesem Moment verdanken wir die Entstehung der modernen jüdischen Wissenschaft. Es ist ganz unzulässig, Krochmal deshalb zum Hegelianer zu stempeln, weil auch er den Entwicklungsgedanken wegweisend zu handhaben verstanden hat. Bei Hegel ist doch Entwicklung das Produkt der dialektischen Bewegung, Resultat des ewigen, unaufhörlichen Streites der Gegensätze und Widersprüche. Die eigentliche Triebfeder der Entwicklung ist die Negation. Ohne Negation und Privation gibt es keine Entwicklung. Denn — worauf wir später zurückkommen werden — die Gegensätzlichkeit ist nach Hegel gerade dasjenige, was das Wesen der Wirklichkeit ausmacht. Ganz anders bei unserem Philosophen. Entwicklung ist für ihn nicht das, was aus der Heterogenität der Ziele resultiert. Entwicklung ist vielmehr ein Naturgesetz, ein Gesetz wie „alle anderen Gesetze der göttlichen Vorsehung". Die göttliche Vorsehung hat bestimmt, daß in der allmählich werdenden menschlichen Gesellschaft eine arterhaltende Ordnung zustande kommt. Die Gesellschaftsordnung entsteht auf entwicklungsgeschichtlichem Wege von selbst, aus einer immanenten Notwendigkeit, nicht aus dem Kampf von Geist und Stoff, Subjekt und Objekt oder anderen Urgegensätzen. Nacheinander entstehen auf natürliche Weise, nach erfolgter, den verschiedenen Individuen angemessener Arbeitsteilung, die Rechtsordnung und Rechtsprechung, Gefühle der Liebe und des Mitleids, die moralische Ordnung, dann später in einer sinnvollen sukzessiven Ordnung alle möglichen Arten von Gewerben, zuerst die unmittelbar notwendigen, dann die verschiedenen Künste und zuletzt erwacht in der so allmählich gereiften Gemeinschaft die religiöse Erkenntnis, die als idea innata aufzufassen wäre. Die religiöse Erkenntnis und die allgemeinen metaphysischen Begriffe bilden zusammen die Krönung am ideellen und materiellen Wachstum der Gesellschaft, sie sind die höchste Stufe der Entwicklung.

Betrachtet man dieses hier kurz skizzierte Schema der Entwicklung, wie es im *M. N. H.*[20] dargestellt wird, so tritt

[20] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 34 ff.

die Unabhängigkeit von Hegel für jeden Hegelkenner klar zutage. G. Vico[21] und Herder sind hier die Vorgänger Krochmals und nicht der ganz anders orientierte Hegel, der Schöpfer des panlogistischen Idealismus. Dem Entwicklungsgedanken Krochmals haftet etwas besonders Naturhaftes,[22] Biologisch-Historisches an. Entwicklung ist ihm ein Steigen vom Niederen zum Höheren, vom Minderwertigen zum Wertvolleren. Hierin folgt Krochmal Herder, der die Evolution als eine ununterbrochene Wertsteigerung angesehen hat.[23] Entwicklung ist auch innere Entfaltung, Enthüllung der keimhaft angelegten Kräfte. Auch die Periodisierung der jüdischen Geschichte in drei Zyklen, die Krochmal vorgenommen hat und die noch später unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf sich lenken wird, deutet auf eine immanente Entfaltung und auf ein Fortschreiten hin. Die Blüteperiode des zweiten Zyklus z. B. beginnt nicht ab ovo, sondern knüpft an die beiden ersten Perioden des ersten Zyklus an und steigert alle in diesem entstandenen Güter und Werte ins Höhere. Genau so verhält es sich mit der Blüteperiode des dritten Zyklus. Diese Krochmalsche Fassung der Entwicklung steht im schroffsten Gegensatze zu derjenigen Entwicklung, die Entwicklung des Begriffes ist, zu der logisch-dialektischen Entwicklung, die von Haus aus eine Entwicklung a priori ist — zu der Entwicklung im Sinne Hegels. Denn das muß noch einmal betont werden, Hegel war aus seiner ganzen philosophischen Einstellung heraus ein prinzipieller Gegner der naturhaften Auffassung der Entwicklung. „Die Natur", sagt Hegel, „ist als ein System von Stufen zu betrachten, deren eine aus der anderen notwendig hervorgeht und die nächste Wahrheit derjenigen ist, aus welcher sie resultiert, aber nicht so, daß die eine aus der anderen natür-

[21] Vgl. zu dieser im Texte ausgeführten Skizze folgende Stelle im genannten Werke von Vico, S. 143: „Die Menschen empfinden zuerst das Notwendige; dann achten sie auf das Nützliche; darauf bemerken sie das Bequeme; weiterhin erfreuen sie sich des Gefälligen; alsdann schweifen sie zum Luxus aus, und zuletzt verfallen sie in wahnsinnigen Mißbrauch der Dinge. . . ."

[22] Vgl. z. B. *N. K.s W.*, S. 54 u. a., wo sich Krochmal einiger Analogien aus der Natur bedient, um verschiedene historische Erscheinungen erläutern zu können.

[23] Vgl. Herders *S. W.* (ed. B. Suphan, Berlin 1877, Bd. XIV, S. 238 u. a.).

lich[24] erzeugt würde, sondern in der inneren, den Grund der Natur ausmachenden Idee. Die Metamorphose kommt nur dem Begriffe als solchem zu. Da dessen Veränderung allein Entwicklung ist." [25] Hegel kannte nur die Entwicklung des Begriffes, der immer einer ist, der die verschiedenen Entwicklungsmomente als bloße Durchgangsstufen benutzt.[26] Mehr als einmal ergreift Hegel die Gelegenheit, um auf die große Kluft hinzuweisen, die zwischen seinem Entwicklungsgedanken und dem organischen Entwicklungsgedanken, wie er sich dem Stand der geistes- und naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung entsprechend im 18. Jahrhundert herausgearbeitet hat, besteht. „Die Entwicklung", sagt Hegel, „ist auf diese Weise nicht das harm- und kampflose bloße Hervorgehen, wie die des organischen Lebens, sondern die harte, unwillige Arbeit gegen sich selbst, und ferner ist sie nicht das bloß Formelle des Entwickelns überhaupt, sondern das Hervorbringen eines Zweckes von bestimmtem Inhalte. — Diesen Zweck haben wir von Anfang festgestellt: Es ist der Geist, und zwar nach seinem Wesen, dem Begriffe der Freiheit...." [27]

Das Charakteristische an der empirischen Auffassung des Entwicklungsgedankens im Gegensatz zur dialektisch-begrifflichen Hegels ist auch darin zu erblicken, daß Krochmal den Entwicklungsgedanken nie als Basis eines metaphysisch-philosophischen Systems benutzt hat. Er diente ihm nur als Grundlage für die streng kritisch orientierte Geschichtswissenschaft. Unter dem Gesichtswinkel der Entwicklung betrachtete er das gesamte Geschehen in der jüdischen Geschichte, das Wesen der Halachah und Aggadah, viele biblische Probleme usw. Hier

[24] Gesperrt von Hegel.

[25] Gesperrt von mir. Vgl. Hegels *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft im Grundrisse* (ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1911). Vgl. auch die folgenden Ausführungen: „Der dialektische Begriff, der die Stufe fortleitet, ist das Innere derselben. Solcher nebuloser, im Grunde sinnlicher Vorstellungen, wie insbesondere das sogenannte Hervorgehen z. B. der Pflanzen und Tiere aus dem Wasser und dann das Hervorgehen der entwickelteren Tierorganisationen aus den niedrigeren . . . ist, muß sich die denkende Betrachtung entschlagen." Ebenda, S. 209—210.

[26] Vgl. *Enzyklopädie*, S. 209 ff.

[27] Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 132 ff.

blieb er sich selber treu. Lessing z. B. betrachtete die Geschichte als den Erziehungsweg des Menschen zur Vernunft,[28] Herder erblickte darin das Vorwärtsschreiten zum Humanismus, Hegel — das Fortschreiten im Bewußtsein der Freiheit.[29] Auch hierin folgt also Krochmal Hegel keinesfalls.

Was die beiden letzten Momente der Krochmalschen Geschichtsphilosophie anbetrifft, den Geist und den absoluten Geist, so würde sich einem Hegelianer gerade hier die ergiebigste Gelegenheit bieten, sich ganz im Sinne seines Meisters zu geben. Ist es aber hier der Fall?

Der Begriff des „Geistes" ist einer der reichhaltigsten Begriffe aller Religionen und der verschiedenartigsten philosophischen Systeme. Seine vollständige, erschöpfende Geschichte wäre beinahe die Gesamtgeschichte des Suchens und Irrens, der Ideen und Systeme des Menschengeschlechtes. Auch die neuere deutsche Philosophie, aus der Krochmal für sein System geschöpft hat, kennt eine Fülle von Auffassungen und Deutungen des Begriffes „Geist".[30] Charakteristisch für die Entwicklung des deutschen Idealismus ist die Tatsache, daß während bei Kant der Begriff des Geistes gar keine Rolle spielt (in der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* wird z. B. das Wort „Geist" nur zweimal, und zwar beiläufig, gebraucht), dieser bei Hegel zum Zentralbegriff seines Systems erhoben worden ist. Im Unterschiede zur Seele, die als eine sinnvolle Abstraktion aufgefaßt werden kann, ist der Geist für Kant eine sinnlose Negation der Körperlichkeit. Nur in die Ästhetik hat Kant den „Geist" aufgenommen, dort war er für ihn „das belebende

[28] Vgl. *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*, 1870, S. 84 ff.

[29] Vgl. *Vorlesungen usw.*, S. 150: „Es gilt in solchem Verfahren des wissenschaftlichen Verstandes gleichfalls, daß das Wesentliche von dem sogenannten Unwesentlichen geschieden und herausgehoben werden müsse. Um dieses aber zu vermögen, muß man das Wesentliche kennen, und dieses, wenn die Weltgeschichte im Ganzen betrachtet werden soll, ist wie früher angegeben worden das Bewußtsein der Freiheit und in der Entwicklung desselben die Bestimmtheiten dieses Bewußtseins. Die Richtung auf diese Kategorien ist die Richtung auf das wahrhaft Wesentliche." Ebenda, S. 148, 150.

[30] Vgl. Hans Dreyer, *Der Begriff Geist in der deutschen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel*, Berlin 1908 (*Kantstudien*).

Prinzip im Gemüthe".[31] Fichte hingegen hat den „Geist" ins Metaphysische erhoben. Ausgehend von der transzendentalen Apperzeption Kants schuf Fichte seinen monistischen Geistesbegriff. Auch Schiller betrachtet den Geist metaphysisch als die sittliche Einheit des Menschen, aber von einem anderen Standpunkte aus, als einen zusammenfassenden Allgemeinbegriff oder ein ästhetisches Anschauungsmittel. Für Herder ist Geist identisch mit Kraft, Leben; er hat bei ihm einen menschenvereinigenden Charakter, er ist Gemeingeist, Kategorie des historisch-kulturellen Denkens. Wilhelm v. Humboldt betrachtet den Geist als die Harmonie zwischen Sinnlichkeit, Phantasie und Vernunft. Bei Schelling war Geist ein Attribut des Absoluten, dessen anderes, entgegengesetztes Attribut Natur ist. Erst Hegel hat den Geistesbegriff in der Philosophie so heimisch gemacht, daß später Schopenhauer sich polemisch dagegen wandte.[32] Geist ist für Hegel das „Allerkonkreteste", das Substantielle, die Totalität, die unreflektierte Unmittelbarkeit in möglichster Ungetrübtheit durch den Begriff oder die Abstraktion.[33] Ihm ist Geist das Weltprinzip, das in dialektisch-begrifflicher Bewegung die drei Stufen des An-sich, Außer-sich, An- und für-sich durchläuft. Geist ist „die unendliche Subjektivität der Idee". „Der Geist", sagt Hegel an einer anderen Stelle, „ist wesentlich Resultat seiner Tätigkeit; seine Tätigkeit ist Hinausgehen über die Unmittelbarkeit, das Negieren derselben und Rückkehr in sich."[34]

Was aber unseren Philosophen anbelangt, so war ihm der Begriff des Geistes, lange bevor er Hegel kannte, vertraut. Er kannte sicherlich den Begriff des Geistes aus den verschiedenen Strömungen des Judentums.[35] Krochmal ist hier wie auch

[31] Vgl. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, ed. Vorländer, S. 167.

[32] Vgl. *Parerga*, I, S. 185: „Gegen die plumpe Unverschämtheit, mit der die Hegelianer in allen ihren Schriften ohne Umstände und Einführung ein Langes und Breites über den sogenannten ‚Geist' reden, wäre die geeignete Sprache: ‚Geist, wer ist denn der Bursche?' . . ." Vgl. auch *Grundprobleme der Ethik*, S. 386 ff.

[33] *Philosophie der Religion*, *S. W.* XI., S. 13 u. a.

[34] *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, Einleitung, S. 50 ff.

[35] Die vielfältigen Entwicklungen des Geistesbegriffes im *Judentum* seit der Bibel und durch das ganze Mittelalter hindurch bis in die Neuzeit hinein zu

in manchen anderen Punkten synthetisch vorgegangen, indem er den traditionellen jüdischen Geistesbegriff mit manchen Nuancierungen des deutschen Idealismus zu durchdringen versucht hat. So ließe sich hier teilweise der Einfluß der Geistesauffassungen von Herder und Fichte auf Krochmal nachweisen, aber derjenige Hegels kaum. Zwar finden wir hier bei Krochmal und Hegel eine ähnlich lautende Terminologie, die aber nur eine Ähnlichkeit im Ausdruck ist. Der Geistesbegriff Krochmals kennt die ganze panlogistische Dialektik Hegels ganz und gar nicht. Von der triadischen Entfaltung des Geistes („Hinausgehen"—„Negieren"—„Rückkehr") wußte Krochmal sehr wenig. Der Geist im allgemeinen ist ihm vielmehr Sinnbild des Idealismus im Gegensatze zum Materialismus, der Geist symbolisiert das Siegen des Guten über das Böse, Geist ist ihm manchmal gleichbedeutend mit dem Ethos,[36] mit der sich nie irrenden Ratio, mit der Ewigkeit im Gegensatze zum Zeitlichen und Vergänglichen. Wenn man auch in der sechsten „Pforte", in der Krochmal über Geist und Religion spricht, einige Hindeutungen auf Berührungspunkte mit Hegel erblicken könnte[37] — aber keineswegs auf absolut zuverlässige und entscheidende —, so zeigt sich die Unabhängigkeit Krochmals von Hegel aufs deutlichste überall da, wo Krochmal über den Geist im Zusammenhang mit dem Geschichtlichen spricht. Hier ist ihm der Geist nie etwas Substantielles, keine höhere Einheit, sondern eine Zusammensetzung aller intellektuellen

verfolgen, wäre eine Arbeit für sich und eine sehr lohnende, die viel Licht auf manche Erscheinungen im Judentum werfen könnte.

[36] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 32 u. a. Hier könnte man Fichtes Einfluß auf Krochmal konstatieren. Vgl. *Fichtes S. W.*, Bd. V, „Appellation an das Publikum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus".

[37] Vgl. J. L. Landau, *N. K., ein Hegelianer*, Berlin 1904, S. 26—32. Der Autor erblickt an vielen Stellen des Krochmalschen Werkes eine Abhängigkeit von Hegel, wo sie tatsächlich kaum nachweisbar ist. So glaubt er z. B., daß Krochmal an einer Stelle nur deswegen eine Bibelstelle zitiert, weil er dazu von Hegel den Hinweis bekommen hat. Eine genaue Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Buche würde uns hier zu weit führen. Unsere prinzipielle Erfassung des Problems, wie sie hier zum Ausdruck kommt, enthebt uns unseres Erachtens einer ins einzelne gehenden Kritik der erwähnten Schrift.

und emotionalen Eigenschaften des Volkes, aller sittlichen Tugenden, des Rechtlichen wie des Ästhetischen usw.[38]

Zwar spricht Krochmal klar und deutlich vom „Volksgeiste", woraus manche Forscher eine unmittelbare Anlehnung an Hegel feststellen zu können glaubten. Aber Krochmal selbst betont, daß bei den „neueren Philosophen" („אחרוני החכמים") diese Gesamtsumme der Volkseigentümlichkeiten als Volksgeist bezeichnet wird.[39] Wohlgemerkt, bei den „neueren Philosophen" — und nicht ausschließlich bei Hegel. Denn auch in diesem Punkte konnte Krochmal aus seiner philosophischen Einstellung heraus Hegel nicht folgen. Hegel gelangt zu der Aufstellung seines Begriffs des „Volksgeistes" durch seine spezifisch logistisch-dialektische Methode — ein Weg, den Krochmal nie betreten hat. „Die Entwicklung führt es mit sich," sagt Hegel, „daß sie ein Stufengang, eine Reihe weiterer Bestimmungen der Freiheit ist, welche durch den Begriff der Sache, d. i. hier der Natur der sich bewußt werdenden Freiheit, hervorgehen. Die logische und noch mehr die dialektische Natur des Begriffes überhaupt, daß er sich selbst bestimmt, Bestimmungen in sich setzt und dieselben wieder aufhebt und durch dieses Aufheben selbst eine affirmative, und zwar reichere, konkretere Bestimmung gewinnt — diese Notwendigkeit und die notwendige Logik der reinen abstrakten Begriffsbestimmungen wird in der Logik erkannt. Hier haben wir nur dies aufzunehmen, daß jede Stufe als verschieden von der anderen ihr bestimmtes eigentümliches Prinzip hat. Solches Prinzip ist in der Geschichte Bestimmtheit des Geistes eines Volkes. In dieser drückt er als konkret alle Seiten seines Bewußtseins und Wollens, seine ganze Wirklichkeit aus; sie ist das gemeinschaftliche Gepräge seiner Religion, seiner politischen Verfassung, seiner Sittlichkeit, seines Rechtssystems, seiner Sitten, auch seiner Wissenschaft, Kunst und technischer Geschicklichkeit, der Richtung seiner Gewerbstätigkeit...." [40] Vergleicht man Krochmals Charakteristik des „Volksgeistes" mit diesen Hegelschen Ausführungen, so ist leicht einzusehen, daß das Gemein-

[38] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 34.
[39] Ebenda, S. 35 ff.
[40] Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, Einleitung, S. 148—149.

same zwischen Krochmal und Hegel nur in denjenigen Momenten liegt, die Hegel mit der gesamten Philosophie seiner Zeit teilt, dagegen aber Krochmal nichts vom eigentlichen Hegeltum, von demjenigen, was nur für Hegel allein charakteristisch ist, in seine Auffassung aufgenommen hat. Die Eigenart des Volksgeistes hat Krochmal akzeptiert, aber dieser Geist entfaltet sich nicht auf dem Wege der logischen Trias: These—Antithese—Synthese, nicht dialektisch-begrifflich, sondern sukzessiv, rein empirisch evolutionistisch im Laufe der historischen Entwicklung. Das Volk prägt sich seinen Charakter nicht aus logischer, sondern aus natürlicher, naturhaft-biologischer Notwendigkeit. Abgesehen davon ist der Begriff des „Volksgeistes" viel älter als die Hegelsche Philosophie. Bereits Montesquieu hat diesen Begriff mit besonderem Nachdruck in die historisch-wissenschaftliche Diskussion geworfen.[41] Und wenn hier Krochmal von einem Philosophen abhängig gewesen sein soll, so wird es wohl eher Fichte als Hegel gewesen sein; und in der Tat ist dieser dialektikfreie „Volksgeist" Krochmals Fichteschen Ursprungs.[42] Fichte war derjenige, der dem Atomisierungsgeist der europäischen Aufklärung, der ins Uferlose getriebenen Individualisierung mit aller Wucht entgegentrat.

[41] In Montesquieus *Esprit des lois* finden wir mehrere Definitionen des „Volksgeistes", die Krochmals Auffassung vom „Volksgeist" direkt oder indirekt beeinflußt haben mögen. (Vgl. a. a. O., Buch I, XIX u. a. Auf Einzelheiten dürfen wir hier nicht eingehen.) Montesquieus Theorie vom „Volksgeist" hat auch Herder (vgl. R. Haym, *Herder nach seinem Leben und Wirken*, 1880, I) und die deutsche Romantik sehr stark beeinflußt (vgl. auch Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 1908, S. 245, 267 u. a.). Über Hegels Theorie vom „Volksgeist" siehe S. Brie, *Der Volksgeist bei Hegel und in der historischen Rechtsschule*, 1909.

[42] Vgl. z. B. folgende Ausführungen Fichtes: „Die geistige Natur vermochte das Wesen der Menschheit in höchst mannigfaltigen Abstufungen an Einzelnen und an der Einzelheit im großen und ganzen, an Völkern darzustellen. — Nur in den unsichtbaren und den eigenen Augen verborgenen Eigentümlichkeiten der Nationen, als demjenigen, wodurch sie mit der Quelle ursprünglichen Lebens zusammenhängen, liegt die Bürgschaft ihrer gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Würde, Tugend, Verdienstes; werden diese durch Verreibung abgestumpft, so entsteht Abtrennung von der geistigen Natur, aus dieser Flachheit, aus dieser die Verschmelzung aller zu dem gleichmäßigen und einander hängenden Verderben." — Auf manche Berührungspunkte zwischen den hierfür in Frage kommenden Ausführungen Krochmals (*S. W.*, S. 34 ff.) und der achten Rede der Fichteschen *Reden an die deutsche Nation* können wir hier leider nicht eingehen.

Er war es, der im Staate die „Nation" entdeckte. Er bekämpfte den Kosmopolitismus und Rationalismus und drückte so der späteren Wissenschaft und der historischen Forschung das Gepräge auf.[43] Der Fichtesche Begriff der „Nation" läßt sich bei Krochmal nachweisen, dagegen kann von einer Übereinstimmung bei ihm mit dem in der Hegelschen Philosophie zentralen Begriffe des „Staates" ganz und gar nicht die Rede sein.

Nicht nur in der Erklärung des Werdens des Volksgeistes oder des Volkes zeigt sich Krochmal als völlig unabhängig von Hegel, sondern auch in der Auffassung des Problems des Unterganges eines Volkes, obwohl sich Krochmal hier mit Hegel in manchem berührt. Aber das ist ja gerade das Entscheidende, daß sogar in denjenigen Punkten, in denen Krochmal sich zwar mit Hegel berührt, er doch nicht in seinen Bahnen wandelt. Nach Hegel ist der Untergang eines Volkes folgendermaßen zu verstehen: „Überhaupt liegt das in der Forderung von Gründen; indem solche Gründe, d. h. etwas ganz abstrakt Allgemeines, als Basis für jene Gesetze nicht gefunden wurden, so wird die Vorstellung von der Tugend schwankend, das Absolute gilt nicht mehr als solches, sondern nur, indem es auf Gründen beruht. Damit tritt zugleich die Isolierung der Individuen voneinander und vom Ganzen ein.... Denn das Bewußtsein ist Subjektivität, und diese hat das Bedürfnis in sich, sich zu vereinzeln. So erscheint dann die Eitelkeit, Selbstsucht; so treten die Leidenschaften, eigenen Interessen losgebunden, als Verderben hervor. Dies ist dann n i c h t d e r n a t ü r l i c h e Tod des Volksgeistes, sondern die Zerrissenheit in sich."[44] Auch Krochmal unterscheidet zwischen dem partikularen und universalen Geist. Das Geheimnis der Existenz des Judentums ist sein Verbundensein mit dem Universalgeiste. Nicht ein Volk wird und vergeht, sondern sein Geist. Wenn ein Volk zugrunde geht und von der „Bühne der Geschichte"

[43] Vgl. E. Lask, *Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte*, Note 22, 3. Teil, besonders v. S. 240 ff.

[44] Gesperrt von mir. Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 161.

verschwindet, so wandert der Partikulargeist des betreffenden Volkes zu einem anderen räumlich oder zeitlich benachbarten Volke hinüber. Auch Krochmal scheint über den Untergang des Volkes im Sinne Hegels zu sprechen, aber das genuin Hegelsche, das Charakteristisch-dialektische verschwindet bei ihm auch hier. Die Ursachen, die den Untergang eines Volkes herbeiführen, sind nicht dialektisch-logischer, sondern natürlich-menschlicher Art. Genußsucht, Eitelkeit, Herrschsucht und Aberglaube, das ist bei Krochmal dasjenige, was eine Gemeinschaft zur Auflösung und Selbstvernichtung führt — aber nicht das dem Bewußtsein als Subjektivität innewohnende „Bedürfnis, sich zu vereinzeln". Hierin begegnen wir wieder dem Vico-Herderschen Einfluß auf Krochmal.[45] Jene vier Laster sind als natürliche, zeitlich und räumlich bedingte Krankheiten eines Gemeinschaftslebens aufzufassen, als eine physische und psychische Degeneration, die bei den einzelnen Individuen beginnt, um dann die Gesamtheit zu verseuchen. Nach Hegel kann ein Volk nicht mehr bestehen, wenn seine Besonderheit aufgehoben wird: „Wenn also durch den Gedanken bei einem Volke, wie z. B. bei den Athenern, die Besonderheit aufgehoben wird, wenn der Gedanke sich dahin entwickelt, daß das besondere Prinzip dieses Volkes nicht mehr wesentlich ist, so kann dieses Volk nicht mehr existieren; es ist ein anderes Prinzip entstanden. Die Weltgeschichte geht dann zu einem anderen Volke über." [46] Dieser Grundgedanke ist mit manchen entscheidenden Abweichungen bei Krochmal wiederzufinden.[47] Aber Krochmal müßte sich mit aller Wucht gegen ein anderes von Hegel aufgestelltes Gesetz auflehnen: „Ein Volk kann nicht mehrere Stufen durchlaufen, es kann nicht zweimal in der Weltgeschichte Epoche machen. Wenn wahrhafte Interessen im Volke neu entstehen sollten, so müßte der Geist eines Volkes dazu kommen, ein Neues zu wollen. — Woher denn sollte dieses Neue kommen? — Welthistorisch kann ein Volk nur einmal das herrschende sein, weil ihm im Prozesse des

[45] Vgl. Herder, *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*, S. 65.

[46] *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 181.

[47] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, besonders S. 37.

Geistes nur ein Geschäft übertragen sein kann."[48] Krochmals Theorie der Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes und seiner Existenz steht vom Anfang bis zum Schluß im schroffsten Gegensatz zu Hegel. Die Ewigkeit des Judentums, seine Unausrottbarkeit, seine Stellung als „Lehrer vieler Völker" und manch anderes läßt sich auf keinen Fall mit Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie vereinbaren. Denn nach Krochmal ist das „Geschäft" des Judentums ein nie endendes, ein von Zeit und Raum völlig Unabhängiges. Hegel andererseits würde nie den theologisch-rationalistisch-historischen Pragmatismus Krochmals decken. Er dürfte z. B. nie zugeben, daß der israelitisch gestempelte Monotheismus die einzige art- und völkererhaltende Kraft in sich birgt. Und daß auch Hegels Anschauung über das Altertum überhaupt, seine Stellung zu dem griechisch-römischen Kulturkreis und zum Mittelalter nie diejenige Krochmals war und sein konnte, bedarf wohl kaum einer besonderen Erwähnung.

Auch die Erörterung über den Platz, den der Begriff des „absoluten Geistes" in Krochmals System einnimmt, wird deutlich zeigen, daß Krochmal auch in diesem für das Hegelsche System eminent wichtigen Punkte seine eigenen Wege ging.

Für Hegel war Philosophie — die Wissenschaft des Absoluten. Fichte hat zuerst den Begriff des absoluten „Ich" geschaffen, der die Grundlage für seine „Wissenschaftslehre" bildete. Dieses „Ich" setzt — im Gegensatz zum teilbaren „Ich", zum subjektiven „Ich" — ein „Nicht-Ich" entgegen. Schelling erhob dieses in „Ich" und „Nicht-Ich" Zerspaltene zur absoluten Identität oder zur Indifferenz. Er erblickt in der absoluten Identität das Ursein, aus dessen Selbstbewußtsein der Urgegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt hervorgeht. Da aber diese Identität nie qualitativ aufgelöst werden kann, so führt dieser Gegensatz nur zu quantitativen Unterschieden. Schelling nennt daher auch alle Dinge „Differenzen" oder „Potenzen". Hegel wollte nun die Prinzipien der Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systeme versöhnen: das „Ich" im Kantisch-Fichteschen Sinn und die absolute Identität im Sinne Schellings,

[48] Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 162—163.

das „Ich" als Selbstbewußtsein und das Absolute.[49] Das Absolute mit dem Selbstbewußtsein zusammengedacht ergibt die Idee des absoluten Geistes, das ist das Resultat jenes Hegelschen Versuches, die Differenz zwischen Fichte und Schelling auszugleichen. Dieser absolute Geist ist Ausgangspunkt und Höhepunkt des Hegelschen philosophischen Systems. Der absolute Geist stellt die Einheit des subjektiven und objektiven Geistes dar, er erlangt seine Entfaltung in der objektiven Form der Anschauung als Kunst, in der subjektiven Form des Gefühls und der Vorstellung, in der Form der Religion und in der subjektiv-objektiven Form des Denkens in der Philosophie. Der absolute Geist ist die „sich selbst wissende Idee oder Weltvernunft".[50] Bei Hegel ist das Absolute zuerst ein gewissermaßen unbegrenztes Sein („Omnis determinatio est negatio" — Spinoza), und erst durch den dialektischen Prozeß erhält der Begriff des Absoluten — durch die Reihen der Setzungen und Entgegensetzungen — seinen „Inhalt".

Krochmal kam auf eine ganz andere Weise zum „absoluten Geist". Nicht als Dialektiker, der den subjektiven mit dem objektiven Geist im absoluten Geist versöhnen will. Erwägungen ganz anderer Natur drängten ihn in diese Richtung. Als Mann des Glaubens, als Erbe des historischen Judentums und als Schüler der abendländischen Aufklärung und der Kantischen Philosophie nahm er seinen Weg zum „absoluten Geist". Die Hegelsche Pointe fehlt auch hier bei Krochmal. Er kennt weder einen subjektiven noch einen objektiven Geist, er kennt nur einen partikularen und universalen Geist. Der partikulare Geist oder die partikularen Geister sind die „Heere des Himmels und der Erde" („צבאות השמים והארץ"), die „Götzen" der alten Völker, der universale oder absolute Geist — ist der Gott Israels. Er ist die „Quelle alles geistigen Seins und dessen Resultat". Dieser „absolute Geist" trägt die Garantie für die Ewigkeit und Überzeitlichkeit des Judentums in sich. Im Gegensatz zu Hegels „absolutem Geiste", der vorwiegend christlich gestempelt ist (denn die Trias subjek-

[49] Vgl. hierzu *S. W.* Hegels Bd. I, S. 159—269: „Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie."

[50] Vgl. *Phänomenologie*, S. 33 ff. u. a.

tiver—objektiver—absoluter Geist entspricht der Dreieinigkeit von Vater, Sohn und Geist), ist Krochmals „absoluter Geist" extrem monotheistisch gedacht, als Gott des jüdischen Monotheismus. „Absoluter Geist" ist bei Krochmal kein Resultat, kein Zusammengesetztes. Dieser ist ein Totum, eine Totalität sui generis. Die partikularen Geister (hier nicht die „Götzen"), die an ihm Anteil haben, sind keine mitformenden Teile eines Zusammengefügten, sondern unvollkommene Abbilder der höchsten Einheit. Der „absolute Geist" nimmt die partikularen Geister nicht dialektisch-resultierend auf, sondern er ist über sie erhaben, ein völlig in sich ruhendes, unabhängig höheres Wesen. Wenn selbst die partikularen Geister nicht da wären, so wäre doch der „absolute Geist" allein da. Der „Geist" ist Produkt des Menschen und der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Der „absolute Geist" ist in bezug auf den Menschen, den Schöpfer alles historischen Seins, ein Primäres und ein Letztes. Tiefer gesehen ist dieser „absolute Geist" Krochmals die mittelalterliche „causa prima" (עלה ראשונה) der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie, etwas nuanciert — wenn auch rein terminologisch — in der Richtung des deutschen Idealismus. Dieser hat nichts Gemeinsames mit der logisch-dialektischen Dynamik und auch nichts mit der Schellingschen Indifferenz. Der „absolute Geist" ist eine in der Geschichte überall wirksame Kraft, ja noch mehr eine die Geschichte mitschaffende Kraft. Was die jüdische Geschichte anbetrifft, so ist der „absolute Geist" nicht nur „Schutzengel" des Judentums, sondern auch die Garantie für seine Identität, Einheit und Überzeitlichkeit.

Aus dem Angeführten ist klar ersichtlich, daß, wenn auch Krochmal den „absoluten Geist" als Grundpfeiler in sein System aufgenommen hat, er deswegen doch nicht zum Hegelianer gestempelt werden kann. Es kommt nicht auf die Terminologie allein an, nicht auf den Gebrauch von gewissen Ausdrücken oder auf die sogenannte „Einbettung" usw., sondern auf die Inhalte und Ideenzusammenhänge, die hinter der Terminologie stehen. Das allein ist geistesgeschichtlich und begriffsgeschichtlich von Belang. Und von hier aus gesehen könnte man vielleicht sagen, daß die eminent wichtige Stellung, die der Begriff des „absoluten Geistes" in den philo-

sophischen Systemen Fichtes, Schellings und Hegels eingenommen hat, Krochmal an den originär jüdischen Begriff des „absoluten Geistes" erinnert hat, daß ihn der deutsche Idealismus ermahnt hat, ein System des religiös-ethischen jüdischen Idealismus zu schaffen. Aber nie hat sich dieser Krochmalsche Idealismus mit dem dialektisch-panlogistischen Idealismus identifizieren können oder wollen.

III. Krochmal der Historiker und Kritiker

Wir wenden uns nun denjenigen Gebieten zu, auf welchen Krochmal sich besonders schöpferisch ausgewirkt hat und auf denen er für die jüdische Wissenschaft bleibende Werte schuf. In der jüdischen Geschichte, in der kritischen Analyse der Bibel, der Halachah und der Aggadah u. a. — hier war Krochmal am originellsten, formal-methodologisch wie materialiter, hier hat er der späteren jüdischen Forschung den Weg geebnet.[51] Dessenungeachtet versuchte man, auch den jüdischen Historiker N. Krochmal, den Bibel- und Halachahkritiker, zum Hegelianer zu stempeln.

Verfolgen wir historisch die Entstehung dieser nicht mehr haltbaren Auffassung, so sehen wir, daß sie auf bloßen Mißverständnissen beruht. Den ersten Anlaß für diese Mißdeutung gab die Dreiteilung, in die Krochmal die Universalgeschichte überhaupt und die jüdische Geschichte im besonderen zu periodisieren versuchte: I. Periode der Blüte und des Aufstiegs, II. Periode des Reifens und Beharrens auf der Höhe, III. Periode der Abnahme und des Verfalls. Was die Konstruktion der jüdischen Geschichte anbetrifft, so zerfallen diese drei Hauptperioden in je drei Unterperioden. Infolgedessen bekommen wir hier folgendes Schema:

[51] Wir möchten hier kurz auf S. Shechters Bemerkung hinweisen: "I may assert with the utmost confidence that there is scarcely a single page in Krochmal's book that did not afterwards give birth to some essay or monograph or even elaborate treatise, though their authors were not always very careful about mentioning the source of their inspiration. Thus Krochmal justly deserves the honourable title assigned to him by one of our greatest historians, who terms him the Father of Jewish Science." *Studies in Judaism*, S. 81.

I. Zyklus: Blüte des Volkes. (Von Abraham dem Patriarchen bis Gedaljahu b. Achikam.)
a) Blüte. (Von Abraham bis zum Auszug aus Ägypten.)
b) Höhe. (Von der Eroberung Kanaans bis zum Tode Salomos.)
c) Verfall. (Von der Teilung des Königreiches bis zur Zerstörung des ersten Tempels.)

II. Zyklus: Höhe. (Vom Babylonischen Exil bis zum Tode Bar-Kochbas und Rabbi Akibas.)
a) Blüte. (Vom Exil bis zur Eroberung Persiens durch die Griechen.)
b) Höhe. (Von der Vorherrschaft der Griechen bis zum Tode Alexander Jannais und dem Bruderstreit.)
c) Verfall. (Vom Tode Alexandras bis zu den Verfolgungen durch die Römer.)

III. Zyklus: Verfall. (Von Rabbi Jehudah Hanassi bis etwa gegen 1700.)
a) Blüte. (Vom Abschluß der Mischnah bis etwa zum Jahre 1100.)
b) Höhe. (Von 1100 bis etwa über 1300.)
c) Verfall. (Von da ab bis gegen 1700.) [52]

Wie Krochmal sich den weiteren Gang der jüdischen Geschichte vorgestellt hat, ob er das 18. Jahrhundert, das Jahrhundert Mendelssohns und der Aufklärung, als die erste Periode, als die Blüteperiode des IV. Zyklus angesehen hat, darüber läßt er uns im unklaren. Da wir hier aber, wie auch im folgenden, von Einzelheiten, mögen sie auch noch so wichtig für uns sein, Abstand nehmen müssen, können wir keineswegs darauf eingehen, wie Krochmal die geschichtlichen Prozesse der Entwicklung des Judentums in den drei schematisch skizzierten Zyklen gesehen und dargestellt hat. Worauf es uns in diesem Zusammenhange ankommt, ist die Tatsache, daß bis in die

[52] Wir haben dieses Schema hier absichtlich angeführt, da sich manche darin nicht ganz zurechtgefunden haben. Vgl. z. B. Shechter, *Studies in Judaism*, S. 77, wonach der III. Zyklus die Zeitspanne von R. J. Hanassi bis zum spanischen Exil umfassen würde, was, wie hier bereits angedeutet worden ist, nicht zutreffend ist.

Gegenwart hinein diese triadische Periodisierung Krochmals sonderbarer- und irrtümlicherweise als Hegelianismus gekennzeichnet wird.[53] Dies zeigt besonders anschaulich, wie groß die Begriffsverwirrung auf diesem Gebiete ist und wie sehr es nottut, all diese Probleme streng kritisch und begriffsgeschichtlich anzufassen. Was hat denn Hegel — der die ganze geschichtliche Entwicklung in einer Trias der These—Antithese—Synthese vor sich gehen läßt — mit dieser Krochmalschen Dreiteilung gemein? Wären diese beiden Trichotomien parallel, so kämen wir dazu, die I. Periode (Blüte) als Thesis, die II. Periode (Höhe) als Antithesis und die III. Periode (Verfall) als Synthesis zu kennzeichnen. Die Verfallsperiode — die Synthesis! Betrachten wir die Krochmalsche Dreiteilung näher: Ist sie begrifflicher Natur? Ist ihr Ausgangspunkt die Dialektik? Ist es eine logische oder panlogistische Trichotomie? Nein, sie ist eine rein empirische, keine apriorische, sondern eine aposteriorisch-konstatierende und hat weder mit Logik noch mit Dialektik etwas zu tun. Blüte, Höhe und Verfall sind für Krochmal keine Durchgangsstufen einer über aller Empirie sich entfaltenden Vernunft. Es sind rein natürliche Stufen, die man auf natürlichem Wege bei jedem Wesen, das den Gesetzen des Werdens und Vergehens untergeordnet ist, nachweisen könnte. Diese Dreiteilung kennzeichnet nur die immanente Entwicklungstendenz der Geschichte. Sie kann als Analogon zum Leben des Individuums (Jugend, Mannesalter, Greisenalter) oder zum Tage (Morgen, Mittag, Abend) aufgefaßt werden. Diese allegorisch-didaktische Trichotomie wird bereits lange vor Hegel angewandt, und zwar vorwiegend von Vico und Herder.[54] Von ihnen hat sie Krochmal auch für den Aufbau der jüdischen Geschichte übernommen. Sie ist ihm ein bloßer methodischer Griff, um in die Mannigfaltigkeit des historischen Ge-

[53] Vgl. z. B. S. Bernfeld, *Dor Ḥacham*, 1896, S. 15 ff.; ebenfalls S. Hurwitz, *Ẓiyun l'nefesh Rabenu Nachman ha Kohen Krochmal*, S. 53 ff.

[54] Vgl. z. B. Herder, *Auch eine usw.*, S. 47: „Daß kein Volk lange geblieben und bleiben konnte, was es war, daß jedes, wie jede Kunst und Wissenschaft — und was in der Welt nicht? — seine Periode des Wachstums, der Blüte und der Abnahme gehabt..." Vgl. ebenda, S. 10, 12, 23, 39. Vgl. auch Vico, *Grundzüge usw.*, S. 70 ff.

schehens der Jahrtausende Ordnung und Sinn hineinzubringen, eine Versinnbildlichung, kein an das Werden herangetragener metaphysischer Maßstab, sondern die Veranschaulichung der Innengesetzlichkeit der natürlichen Sukzession des geschichtlichen Geschehens.

Der bedeutende Religionsphilosoph Ernst Troeltsch hat sehr eindrucksvoll und präzise das Wesen der Hegelschen historischen Dialektik dargestellt.[55] Mit dem Sturze der mathematisch und naturwissenschaftlich orientierten Systeme ging der Stern der Historie auf. Teils im Gegensatz und teils als Ergänzung zu Schellings Naturphilosophie tauchte Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie auf, die nicht der historischen Forschung, sondern dem Suchen nach einer Weltanschauung und Weltbeziehung ihren Ursprung zu verdanken hat; daher ist sie von Haus aus synthetischer und nicht analytischer Natur. Die Hegelsche Dialektik hat verschiedene, teils Leibniz-Spinozistische, teils Kantisch-Fichtesche Elemente in sich aufgenommen: die Leibnizische Lehre von einem aufsteigenden Fortschritt, der den unbewußten Vernunftgehalt in bewußte Einheit überführt, wie auch die stetige Vorwärtsbewegung der Monade, die durch ihre Eigengesetzlichkeit getrieben wird; dann die Kantisch-Fichtesche Auffassung des Fortschrittes als ein Fortschreiten des praktischen, handelnden Willens, der sich und die Vernunft im Gegensatz zur Sinnlichkeit und zum Egoismus durchzusetzen versteht, wie auch den Aufbau der Wissenschaft auf Grund des Selbstbewußtseins der Vernunft und der Einheit der Gegensätze. Im Gegensatz zu der traditionellen Logik, zu der „Seins-Logik", die von den Erscheinungen nicht loskommen kann, um zur Bewegung vorzudringen, sucht die dynamische Logik das Werden zu verstehen, der Realität der Gegensätze, ihrem Sich-Ineinander-Entwickeln gerecht zu werden. (Über das Problem der Gegensätze werden wir später zu sprechen haben.) Hegel griff in seiner Dialektik diese Logik des Werdens und der Bewegung, die dynamische

[55] Vgl. *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, I, S. 243—277. Über Hegels Dialektik der Geschichte vgl. ebenso B. Croce, *Lebendiges und Totes in Hegels Philosophie*, 1909, S. 28 ff.

Logik, besonders auf. (Mit diesem Begriff des Werdens geriet Hegel in Gegensatz zum Satze des Widerspruchs und lenkte in die bekannten Bahnen des Nicolaus von Kues und der ihm gleichgesinnten Philosophen ein.) Gerade die Geschichte — die Sphäre des unaufhörlichen Werdens — demonstriert am besten, wieviel die dynamische Logik für sich hat, um wieviel mehr sie der Wirklichkeit gerecht werden kann als die gewöhnliche Logik. Das ganze historische Geschehen wird von Hegel und seiner Schule in den triadischen Fortschritt (Thesis—Antithesis —Synthesis oder: Affirmation, Negation, Negation der Negation oder Reaffirmation) hineingepreßt, den der ununterbrochen bewegte Geist, der stets von der Setzung zur Entgegensetzung, von der Position zu ihrem Gegenteil fortschreitende, seinem dialektischen Charakter und seiner Bewegungseigentümlichkeit gemäß durchzumachen hat. Auch der „Weltgeist" ist ein sich selbst Bewegender; den Anstoß zur Bewegung erhält er von einer Reihe von Gegensätzen: subjektiv—objektiv, konkret—abstrakt, endlich—unendlich, Freiheit—Unfreiheit u. a. Dies war der leitende Gesichtspunkt des Hegelianismus überhaupt für die Einteilung der Geschichte, die für ihn ein Schauplatz der Dialektik war, aus dem er sich immer das für seine Kontrastierung und Triadisierung Passende aussuchte — also auch das Ausleseprinzip.

Damit sind wir nun am entscheidenden Punkt angelangt. Der Grundunterschied zwischen Krochmal und Hegel, von dem alle anderen Differenzen nur direkte oder indirekte Ableitungen darstellen, besteht darin, daß Krochmals historische Methode genetischer Natur ist und die Hegels — dialektischer Natur. Adolf Trendelenburg, der Erneuerer des Aristotelismus im 19. Jahrhundert, war es, der besonders scharf die dialektische Methode von der genetischen unterschieden hat.[56] Die dialektische Methode kann nur ge-

[56] Siehe A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1840, hauptsächlich Kap. II („Die dialektische Methode"), S. 23—99. Man vergleiche ebenfalls Trendelenburgs Streitschrift *Die logische Frage in Hegels System*, Leipzig 1843, in der die Unwissenschaftlichkeit der dialektischen Methode Hegels besonders scharf betont wird. Eine Reihe von Zeitgenossen, wie Kapp, H. Ritter, E. Reinhold, Strümpel, Weiß, F. Exner u. a., teilten den Trendelenburgschen Standpunkt. Über

gebene Begriffe mit den ihnen entgegengesetzten vergleichen, sie in ihre Gegensätze umschlagen lassen, also Begriffe setzen und entgegensetzen. Aber diese Methode ist nicht imstande, die Ursachen und Bedingungen des empirisch-tatsächlichen, historischen Geschehens ausfindig zu machen und sie genetisch zu deuten. Ursache und Wirkung sind gewissermaßen „fremde" Begriffe für die Hegelsche Dialektik. Ja, eine der Haupttendenzen der Hegelschen Logik der Dynamik angewandt auf die Geschichte, ist doch gerade, die Kausalität durch Dialektik zu ersetzen. In seiner *Philosophie des Rechtes*[57] sagt Hegel ausdrücklich, daß der historische Ursprung des Staates für die Idee desselben ganz irrelevant ist. So versucht Hegel z. B. auch nie, den historischen Ursprung der Kunst zu erfassen. Beschreiben und Erklären sind nicht Sache dieser dialektischen Methode. Die daraus entstandene Willkürlichkeit des Hegelschen Ausleseprinzips und manche Gewaltkonstruktionen, die dialektisch notwendig, historisch-empirisch aber ganz unzulässig sind, seine Ignorierung derjenigen Tatsachen, die er nicht mit seinem System in Einklang bringen konnte — diese und ähnliche Fehlgriffe der dialektischen Methode sind mehrfach von Hegelkritikern in verschiedenster Weise besonders hervorgehoben worden.[58] Unser Philosoph hingegen kennt nur die genetische Methode allein. Mehrfach betont er, daß er kein anderes Ziel in seiner Geschichtsschreibung verfolgt als dies, den „Charakter des [jüdischen] Volkes und seines Geistes" je nach der betreffenden Periode zu ergründen.[59] Nicht nach logisch-dialektischen Prinzipien soll der „Charakter" des Geistes des Judentums festgestellt werden, sondern nach rein deskriptiv-empirischen Prin-

den Trendelenburg-Gablerschen Streit um die Methode des Meisters vgl. I. H. Fichte, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, 1843, XI, S. 43 ff. — Über Hegels dialektische Methode siehe Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, III, S. 361 ff.; vgl. auch das II. Kap. meines Buches *L. Feuerbach und die deutsche Philosophie*.

[57] § 258, Anm.

[58] Vgl. z. B. P. Barth, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und der Hegelianer*, Leipzig 1890. Vgl. ebenfalls die sehr scharfe Kritik der Hegelschen Geschichtsauffassung bei dem Neuhegelianer B. Croce, *Lebendiges und Totes usw.*, S. 108—121.

[59] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 71, 50—51, 88 u. a. („תכונת האומה ותכונת היהודי שבה בזמן זמן").

zipien der genetischen Methode. Krochmal will lediglich die historischen Tatsachen verstehen, bei ihm besteht kein Zusammenhang zwischen Logik und Geschichte, geschweige denn eine Unterordnung der Geschichte unter die Logik. Selbstverständlich ist Geschichte für ihn auch kein Schauplatz für die Entfaltung der Gesetze des Werdens, die Gesetze der dynamischen Logik.

Auch das Problem der Gegensätzlichkeit — metaphysisch und historisch gesehen — kann uns beweisen, wieweit Krochmal von Hegel entfernt war. Das Problem der Gegensätze ist ein Kardinalproblem in der Philosophie. Nach manchen Richtungen hin versuchten die Philosophen aller Zeiten mit diesem Problem fertig zu werden. Besonders heiß und scharf ist über dieses Problem gegen Ausgang des Mittelalters debattiert worden. Nicolaus Cusanus, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Böhme versuchten, ein jeder auf seine Art, diese Frage zu lösen. Cartesius wollte die beiden Substanzen Denken und Ausdehnung, cogitatio und extensio, in Gott aussöhnen. Spinoza hat sie als Einheit in der allumfassenden Substanz vereinigen wollen. Für Leibniz waren die Gegensätze „Verdunkelungen" der realiter bestehenden logischen Kontinuität, und er suchte seine Zuflucht bei einem philosophischen Optimismus. Die Popularphilosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts — abgesehen von wenigen Ausnahmen — erblickte in Gott die Lösung aller Widersprüche, den Sammelpunkt aller Antithesen. Für Kant z. B. bedeuten die Gegensätze den Streit zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, Sinnlichkeit und autonomer Sittlichkeit. Hegels Fassung des Problems der Gegensätze ist ganz anders ausgefallen: er kennt kein Zusammenfallen der Gegensätze in ein Drittes, Höheres, das unbekannt ist, keine ruhende Schellingsche Identität, sondern die Einheit und die Verschiedenheit bestehen beide zugleich, die Gegensätze sind real. Für ihn macht also die Gegensätzlichkeit das Wesen der Wirklichkeit aus, die Gegensätze sind die treibenden Kräfte des historischen Geschehens, Bedingungen für das Werden, ja, die lebendigen Ausdrucksformen eben dieses Werdens.

Ganz anders Krochmal. Darin ist er Wolfianer, Schüler der jüdisch-mittelalterlichen Philosophie und der Mendelssohnschen Aufklärungsphilosophie zugleich. Krochmal will das Problem der Gegensätze durch ein Zurückführen derselben auf den Ursprung lösen. Geht man den jeweiligen Gegensätzen auf den Grund, so erweisen sie sich immer als bloße Scheingegensätze. Gegensätze sind bloße Abweichungen vom Geraden, als Extreme sind sie nur „schädlich" und „gefährlich". Die „Antinomien", die Krochmal in der vierten „Pforte" entwickelt, sind vorwiegend religiös-traditioneller und nicht logisch-metaphysischer Natur. Wer hier eine Anlehnung an Hegels Dialektik erblicken will,[60] scheint den wirklichen Tatbestand ganz außer acht zu lassen. Charakteristisch ist die Jeruschalmi-Stelle, die Krochmal als Motto der zweiten Pforte des *M. N. H.* voranschickt: „Diese Thora gleicht zwei Pfaden: der eine ein Feuerweg, der andere ein Schneeweg. Geht man den ersten — verbrennt man im Feuer, geht man den andern — erfriert man im Schnee. Was tun? Die Mitte einschlagen." [61] Während Hegel, der Dialektiker, um die Gegensätze ringt, um die Setzung der Entgegengesetzten, müht sich Krochmal allein um die kompromißmäßige Versöhnung. Um mit Krochmal zu sprechen: Hegel sucht die „zwei Pfade", Krochmal aber sucht die „Mitte", sie ist sein Ideal. Hegel erfreut sich am Kampf der Gegensätze (den Krochmal als bloße „Verwirrung" — מבוכה — betrachtet), an dem Herakliteischen „alles fließt", dieser ewige Kampf ist ihm keine „Krankheit", keine „Verwirrung". Hegel lebt von den zwei Pfaden, von dem „Feuer" und dem „Schnee". Sein ganzes Philosophieren nährt sich von der Dynamik des Werdens, vom stetigen Kampf der Extreme, die Krochmal nie zugesagt haben.[62]

[60] Vgl. J. L. Landau, *N. K. usw.*, S. 25.

[61] Talmud Jeruschalmi, Ḥagigah, II. Kap., Halachah 1, ed. Wilno, S. 9a; gemeint ist dort „מעשה מרכבה".

[62] In der vierten „Pforte" des *M. N. H.* widerspricht sich K. selber, indem er einerseits von Extremen spricht, von denen ein jedes an sich „schädlich" und „gefährlich" ist, andererseits von solchen, die nur in ihrer Entgegensetzung „Verwirrung" anstiften müssen, aber von denen jedes an sich weder „schädlich" noch „gefährlich" ist. Das Durcheinanderbringen dieser verschiedenen Arten der Extreme

Ebenso — um zu einem weiteren Punkt überzugehen — kann David Neumarks Ansicht, wonach Krochmal, den Fußstapfen Hegels folgend, sein historisches System auf der Annahme aufgebaut hat, daß man die Ordnung des historischen Geschehens nach apriorischen Ideen feststellen könnte, nicht akzeptiert werden.[63] Krochmal kannte weder ein a priori in seiner Geschichtsschreibung noch in seinen wissenschaftlichen Forschungen überhaupt, er war durch und durch aposteriorischer Geschichtsschreiber. Noch Asariah de Rossi, der Begründer der kritisch-jüdischen Geschichtsschreibung, entschuldigte die historischen Ungenauigkeiten „unserer Weisen", ihre Gleichgültigkeit in bezug auf die Geschichte mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß erstens die Juden überhaupt keine Geschichte brauchten, denn alles wäre schon in der Thora angedeutet, und daß zweitens die Beschreibung des Verflossenen an sich gegenstandslos und irrelevant für sie gewesen sei, denn מאי דהוה הוה.[64] Gerade mit diesem מאי דהוה הוה wollte Krochmal endlich kategorisch aufräumen. Er will die Dinge sehen, wie sie waren. Geschichtsforschung ist für ihn vorwiegend Analyse, Zergliederung des historischen Geschehens, dessen Klärung und Ergründung. Krochmal strebt danach, zu einer geschichtlichen Synthese zu gelangen, aber nicht auf Kosten der empirisch-historischen Tatsächlichkeit. Wenn er auch die Totalität des historischen Prozesses erfassen will, so ist er doch immer auf der Hut, nicht die geringsten Einzelheiten außer acht zu lassen. Krochmal vergewaltigt nie die Tatsachen, damit das allgemeine, apriorische Prinzip recht behalten kann. Er hat nie aus einem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang nur diejenigen Tatsachen ausgewählt, die in sein vorgefaßtes System hineinpaßten. Hegel dagegen glaubt, der Historiker müsse nur einen Teil der geschichtlichen Tatsachen berücksichtigen, er müsse nur diejenigen Tatsachen als historisch behandeln, die Durchgangsstufen und -momente für die dialektische Entfaltung des

hindert auch, die richtige Lösung zu finden. Diese und manche ähnlichen Widersprüche im *M. N. H.* haben wir in einem anderen Zusammenhange ganz ausführlich behandelt.

[63] Vgl. R. Nachman Krochmal, *Hashiloaḥ*, XV, 1905, S. 268—272.

[64] Vgl. *Me'or 'enayim, imre binah*, Kap. 27, S. 254 ff.

Geistes sind und die direkte Beziehung auf den Staat haben.[65] Alle anderen Tatsachen sind nach Hegel nur ein „Ballast" der Geschichte, eine überflüssige Stoffüberbürdung, die der Geschichtsforschung nur hinderlich sein kann. Er hält es daher für richtiger, diesen ganzen „Rest" der Geschichte — und dieser „Reststoff" ist die überwiegende Mehrheit der Mannigfaltigkeit des historischen Geschehens — den Romanschriftstellern und Künstlern als Stoff für ihr Fabulieren und Dichten zu überlassen. Auf Grund dieser Hegelschen Auffassung haben bekanntlich manche seiner Jünger (wie z. B. der Hegelianer Eduard Gans) eine Reihe von Unterscheidungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte vorgenommen, wie zwischen Geschichte und Nicht-Geschichte, wichtigen und unwichtigen Tatsachen, innerlich notwendigen Tatsachen und überflüssigen Äußerlichkeiten, großen und kleinen Perioden, wichtigen und unwichtigen Völkern. Und sehr zutreffend hat der italienische Neu-Hegelianer B. Croce gesagt: „Bevor Hegel Daten der Tatsachen aufsucht, weiß er schon, welche es sein müssen; er kennt sie im voraus, wie man die philosophischen Wahrheiten kennt, die der Geist in seinem universalen Sein findet, und er nimmt sie nicht aus den Tatsachen", denn Hegels Geschichte ist eine „fix und fertige Geschichte, die nur noch mit Namen und Daten bekleidet zu werden braucht".[66] Von Hegel, der in mehr als einer Hinsicht

[65] Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, S. 146: „Erst im Staate mit dem Bewußtsein von Gesetzen sind klare Taten vorhanden und mit ihnen die Klarheit eines Bewußtseins über sie, welche die Fähigkeit und das Bedürfnis gibt, sie so aufzubewahren." Vgl. ebenda, S. 150, über Hegels Apriorismus: „Dies zu leisten [die bestimmten Besonderheiten als das eigentümliche Prinzip eines Volkes ausmachend zu erweisen] setzt nicht nur eine geübte Abstraktion, sondern auch schon eine vertraute Bekanntschaft mit den Ideen voraus; man muß mit dem Kreise dessen, worin die Prinzipien fallen, wenn man es so nennen will, a priori vertraut sein." Ebenfalls S. 137: „Dieses alles (die Gegensätze und die Versöhnung zwischen dem subjektiven und objektiven Geist) nun ist das Apriorische der Geschichte, dem die Erfahrung entsprechen muß."

[66] Vgl. *Lebendiges und Totes usw.*, S. 114—115. Gesperrt von mir. E. Troeltsch versucht zwar Hegels Apriorismus in Schutz zu nehmen (*Der Historismus usw.*, S. 253, 265 ff.). Dieser scharfsinnige Versuch scheint mir aber doch die unzähligen „Sünden" Hegels in bezug auf die empirische Geschichte nicht ganz aus der Welt schaffen zu können. Übrigens gibt Troeltsch selber im Laufe seiner Abhandlung zu, daß Hegels Dialektik „der Komplexität, der materiellen Bedingtheit und den

der Geschichtswissenschaft neuen Schwung verliehen hat, ist allzusehr bekannt, welche geringschätzige und feindliche Haltung er den Historikern von Fach gegenüber eingenommen hat, wieviel Ironie und überhebliche Verachtung er den Forschern entgegenbrachte, die sich rein deskriptiv und genetisch auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte betätigt haben. Diese Ironie galt nicht allein den Männern dieses Gebietes, sondern zum Teil auch der Geschichte, der materialen Geschichtsforschung selber. Denn die Idee der Hegelschen Geschichtsphilosophie hebt gewissermaßen die Selbständigkeit der Geschichtsschreibung zugunsten der reinen Philosophie auf. Die Philosophie der Geschichte verneint direkt die Geschichte; sie ist für Hegel die „denkende Betrachtung der Geschichte", woraus zu ersehen ist, wie schon B. Croce angedeutet hat, daß die Geschichte als solche entweder kein „Gedanke" oder aber ein „unvollkommener Gedanke" ist. Daß Krochmals Einstellung zur empirischen Geschichtsschreibung ganz andere Art war, brauchen wir kaum zu erwähnen. Wie freute sich z. B. Krochmal, daß er es noch erlebt hat, Männer in seinem Zeitalter zu sehen, die sich der Erforschung der jüdischen Wissenschaft widmeten, die sich der empirischen Kritik und sachlichen Arbeit auf dem Gebiete des Judentums zuwandten.[67]

Auch über den Nutzen der Geschichtsforschung überhaupt gehen die Ansichten Krochmals und Hegels völlig auseinander. Nach Krochmal ist das Ziel der Historiographie ein rein didaktisches.[68] Diese seine Auffassung kommt der allgemeinen Auffassung über den Sinn der Geschichte sehr nahe, nach der man Geschichte treibt, um durch die Vergangenheit die Gegenwart zu verstehen und die Zukunft vorauszusehen. Hegel aber mußte von der hohen Warte des panlogistischen Idealismus alle diese didaktischen Tendenzen und pädagogischen Sinndeutungen völlig ablehnen. Das einzige, was man nach Hegel

wirklichen und mannigfaltigen Interessen des geschichtlichen Lebens nicht gerecht wird", daß diese gewaltsame monistische Tendenz alles „verwischt" (ebenda, S. 266, 275). Aber das ist nicht die Schuld des Monismus allein, ja hieran ist der Apriorismus der „Hauptschuldige".

[67] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 248 u. a.

[68] Vgl. ebenda, S. 112, 167.

aus der Geschichte lernen könnte, wäre, daß niemand aus der Geschichte je irgend etwas gelernt hat.[69]

Was also die großen metaphysischen Probleme wie auch die Methoden des Forschens anbetrifft, ist Krochmal darin nicht im geringsten als Hegelianer zu bezeichnen. Sehen wir nun von der Krochmalschen Geschichtsschreibung ab und wenden uns seinen Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Bibelkritik, der Halachah und Aggadah zu. Selbstverständlich können wir hier in diesem Zusammenhange auf die Methodik und die Resultate dieses Krochmalschen Schaffens nicht eingehen.[70] Daß diese Forschungen Krochmals aber bahnbrechend und wegweisend für die spätere Generation der jüdischen Forscher geworden ist, könnte man vielleicht hier nur kurz angedeutet aus dem Munde des Verfassers des *Dor dor wedorshaw*, A. H. Weiß, entnehmen, der in seiner Autobiographie den bleibenden Eindruck, den der *M. N. H.* auf die Ausbildung seiner Halachah-Forschung gemacht hat, besonders hervorhebt.[71] Daß ferner seine bibelkritischen Untersuchungen noch bis auf den heutigen Tag ihre Aktualität nicht verloren haben, ist eine feststehende Tatsache. Der Bibelkritiker Steuernagel[72] und manche anderen Bibelkritiker greifen in vielen Punkten auf Krochmal zurück. Aber all dies würde uns in einem anderen Zusammenhange viel mehr interessieren. Worauf es uns hier ankommt, ist doch nur die Feststellung, ob in der Krönung des *M. N. H.*, der Bibel-, Halachah- und Aggadah-Kritik, irgendeine Abhängigkeit von Hegel nachzuweisen wäre. Schon die Frage allein scheint mir gerade in diesem Falle absolut unzulässig. Aber wir waren gezwungen sie aufzuwerfen, weil es immer wieder Forscher gibt, die ohne irgendwelche Grundlagen von Hegelschen Einfluß in Krochmals Abhandlungen

[69] Vgl. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, I, S. 179.

[70] Vgl. hierfür unsere genannte Einleitung zu Krochmals sämtlichen Werken von S. 99 bis 159.

[71] Vgl. A. H. Weiß, *Zikronotai*, Warschau, S. 123. Vgl. auch S. Shechter, *Studies in Judaism*: "He it was who taught Jewish scholars how to submit the ancient Rabbinic records to the test of criticism and the way in which they might be utilised for the purpose of historical studies . . ."

[72] Vgl. *Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Tübingen 1912, S. 720.

über Bibel, Halachah und Aggadah sprechen.[73] Aber was hat denn eigentlich Krochmals Anlehnung an Ibn Esra in bezug auf das Jesaja-Problem, sein Aufsuchen der verschiedenen „Hallel" in den Psalmen, seine Forschungen über Kohelet, Esra, Daniel u. a. mit metaphysischen Problemen überhaupt und mit Hegels Philosophie insbesondere zu tun? Was hat die grandiose Halachah-„Pforte" („Pforte" 13), die methodisch wie inhaltlich eine Glanzleistung Krochmals ist, die die Richtlinien für eine weitere, streng historisch sachliche Behandlungsweise geliefert hat, mit dem panlogistischen Idealismus gemeinsam? Was könnte Krochmals sehr scharfsinniger Versuch über den Sinn und Wert der Aggadah, die Klassifizierung der verschiedenen Gattungen derselben, die Unterscheidung zwischen Aggadah und Aggad'ta (אגדתא) usw. mit einer dynamischen Dialektik überhaupt zu tun haben? Was die Bibel, Halachah, Aggadah, Philos Philosophie, das Essäer-Problem usw. anbelangt, so war Krochmal da ein streng empirischer Historiker, der, geleitet von der Liebe zur Wahrheit, mit vielen feststehenden Ansichten gebrochen und eine Bresche in die Mauer der kritiklos überlieferten und unantastbaren Grundsätze geschlagen hat. Es besteht also nicht der geringste Zusammenhang zwischen Hegels Philosophie oder irgendeinem anderen metaphysischen System und Krochmals Ausführungen auf den obengenannten Gebieten. Wenn man hier nach Einflüssen fahndet, so kann man sie nur bei Maimonides, Ibn Esra, Asaria de Rossi einerseits und bei der neueren historisch-kritischen Schule andererseits suchen. Nur diesen Einflüssen haben Krochmals genannte Abhandlungen ihren Ausgangspunkt und teilweise auch ihre weitere Gestaltung zu verdanken.

IV. Der fragmentarische Versuch der Logik

Überblicken wir kurz zusammenfassend den gesamten *M. N. H.*, so sehen wir: Die ersten vier „Pforten", die gewissermaßen die Einleitung zum Krochmalschen Werke bilden,

[73] Vgl. z. B. Soloweitschik-Rubaschow, *Toldot bikoret hamikra*, S. 150, wonach Krochmal als „frommer Schüler Hegels" an die Deutung der Bibelprobleme herangegangen sein soll.

weisen gar keine Spur des Hegelschen Einflusses auf. Im Gegenteil, in der Behandlung des Problems der Gegensätzlichkeit steht Krochmal, wie bereits oben angedeutet, im schroffsten Gegensatz zu Hegel. Die fünfte „Pforte" — „Die Absicht und das Ziel" —, die sich mit dem Problem der teleologischen Naturerklärung befaßt, knüpft teils an Maimonides' Auseinandersetzung mit Galenus,[74] teils an Kants *Kritik der Urteilskraft* an.[75] Die kurze sechste religionsphilosophische „Pforte" erinnert zwar in einigen ihrer Ausdrücke an Hegel, aber die hier betonte Gleichheit zwischen Religion und Religionsphilosophie, zwischen dem „Gebildeten" („משכילים") und Gläubigen ist in dieser Nuancierung nicht Hegelschen (Hegel hat doch bekanntlich die Religion mit der Philosophie gleichgesetzt, denn was die erste in Vorstellungen erfaßt, denkt die andere in Begriffen), sondern Wolffschen und Kantischen Ursprungs. Analog dem von Hegel für seine Trias gebrauchten Verbum „Aufheben" — im dreifachen Sinne des conservare, negare und elevare — spricht Krochmal andeutungsweise vom hebräischen Verb אבל, das auch die dreifache Bedeutung der Affirmation, Negation und Negation der Negation besitzen soll. Aber Krochmal beruft sich in diesem Zusammenhange nicht auf Hegel, sondern auf den *Moreh Nebukim* des Maimonides. Über die geschichtsphilosophische „Pforte" (7) („Völker und ihre Götter") haben wir bereits gesprochen. Die „Pforten" 8 bis 10 stellen eine Skizzierung der gesamten jüdischen Geschichte dar, die wir oben kurz analysiert haben. „Pforte" 11 dient als Ergänzung zu den drei letzteren. Hier wird auf viele bibelkritische wie auch auf verschiedene historische Probleme eingegangen. Daß auch diese nicht den entferntesten Zusammenhang mit Hegel haben, erübrigt sich wohl besonders zu erwähnen. In der zwölften „Pforte", die die alexandrinisch-philonische Philosophie analysiert — unter besonderer Verwertung des Werkes von A. F. Dähne: *Geschichtliche Darstellung der Jüdisch-Alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie* und des Buches von A. Neander: *Genetische Entwicklung*

[74] Vgl. Maimonides, *Pirke Mošeh*, Ma'amar 25, ed. Lemberg, 1804, S. 54.

[75] Von einer genaueren Besprechung des Zusammenhanges dieser „Pforte" mit Kant muß hier leider wegen Raummangels abgesehen werden.

der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme —, und für sie eine Reihe entsprechender Stellen aus dem Talmud und den Midraschim anführt, hätte Krochmal eigentlich eine Anlehnung an Hegel suchen können. Denn Krochmals Interesse für die Gnostiker könnte überhaupt dem Einfluß Hegels zugeschrieben werden. Bestand doch eine der originellsten Leistungen Hegels auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte der Philosophie darin, daß er die alexandrinische Philosophie wieder zu Ehren gebracht hat, im Gegensatz zu den meisten Historikern seiner Zeit, die in ihr nur Eklektizismus sahen, daß er sich sehr eifrig mit dem Neuplatonismus befaßte (wofür er von manchen als der „deutsche Proklos" bezeichnet worden ist, von anderen auch als der „deutsche Aristoteles"), und daß er ebenfalls eine positive Stellung zu Philo einnahm.[76] Aber Krochmals Ausführungen in diesem Abschnitt lassen nichts in dieser Richtung erkennen. Krochmal interessierten in diesem Zusammenhang keine allgemeinen metaphysischen Probleme. Er befaßt sich hier lediglich mit Philo als dem jüdischen Religionsphilosophen, mit Philo als dem Bibelkritiker, mit den Berührungspunkten zwischen Philo und den Essäern. Krochmal hat einige Auszüge — nach Dähne — aus Philos Werken in diesen Abschnitt mit aufgenommen, diese sind aber nicht allgemein metaphysischer, sondern rein ethischer Natur. Wenn Krochmal durch eine Anregung auf das Philo-Problem aufmerksam geworden sein sollte, so ist es sicher durch seinen großen Vorgänger Asariah de Rossi geschehen, der sich in seinem *Me'or 'Enayim* sehr ausführlich mit Philo befaßt und dessen Ausführungen sich sogar teilweise bei Krochmal mit manchen Abweichungen wieder auffinden lassen.[77] Auch die beiden folgenden „Pforten" — die 13., die Halachah-„Pforte", und die 14., die Aggadah-„Pforte" — sind bereits kurz erörtert worden. In der 15. „Pforte", in der von der Kabbalah und verschiedenen früheren und späteren gnostischen Systemen die Rede ist, tritt Krochmal als der alte aufklärerische Rationalist

[76] Vgl. Bäumler, *Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1923, S. 35.

[77] Von dem Verhältnis zwischen Krochmal und Asariah de Rossi handelt ein besonderes Kapitel in unserem bereits oben erwähnten Buche über Krochmal. Vgl. meinen Aufsatz in *Ha'olam*, 1927, Nr. 6 ff.

auf, der sich mit dem Hegeltum sicherlich sehr wenig berührt. Der einzige Vorwurf, den Krochmal den Gnostikern wie auch den Anhängern der Sekte des Sabbatai-Zwi macht, ist der, daß sie den Weg der klaren, einsichtsvollen, sich selbst begrenzenden Vernunft verlassen haben. Abgesehen davon bestand auch hier Krochmals Interesse hauptsächlich darin, gewisse Talmudstellen mit der Geschichte dieser Sekten in Zusammenhang zu bringen, da Krochmal überhaupt vor allem Wege zeigen wollte, wie man die ältere jüdische Literatur für die moderne wissenschaftliche Forschung verwerten kann, was bereits oben angedeutet worden ist. Die 17. „Pforte" — „Die Weisheit des Armen" — ist völlig der Erläuterung der Gedankenwelt des Ibn Esra gewidmet, mit der man sich in einer besonderen Abhandlung beschäftigen müßte.[78] Denn Krochmal war es, der zuerst darauf hingewiesen hat, daß man den Philosophen Ibn Esra viel höher einschätzen müsse, als es bisher üblich war, und der mit seinem Zeitgenossen Samuel David Luzatto einen harten und schweren Kampf um die Ehrenrettung Abraham Ibn Esras geführt hat, der entscheidend geworden ist für das Verständnis der Religionsphilosophie Ibn Esras; er ist der erste, der es gewagt hat, von einem System Ibn Esras zu sprechen, und versucht hat — lange vor Rosin, Steinschneider u. a. — dieses System des Ibn Esra zu rekonstruieren.

Nun aber kommen wir zu einer „Pforte", die aus dem bisher gezeichneten Rahmen herausfällt, und zwar ist es die aus nicht ganz 15 Seiten bestehende 16. „Pforte", die betitelt wird: „Definitionen und Grundlagen zu einer Religionsphilo-

[78] Siehe unsere Abhandlung „Rabbi Abraham Ibn Esra usw." in *Hashiloah*, Jerusalem 1925, Heft 2—3. David Rosins Abhandlung „Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Esras", die nach seinem Tode von David Kaufmann in der *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* (1898—1899) veröffentlicht worden ist, hat Krochmals Untersuchungen auf diesem Gebiete sehr viel zu verdanken, wenn auch der Verfasser aus unerklärlichen Gründen nicht ein einziges Mal Krochmals Namen erwähnt. Siehe z. B. *MGWJ.*, 1898, S. 200, 204, 205, 243, 248, 252, 358, 396—397, 400, 447, 449, 450—453, 455, 481, 492, 497, 499; 1899, S. 30, 132, 170, 172—173, 175, 180—181, 231—232, 235. Vgl. dazu die entsprechenden Stellen in Krochmals *Hokmat hamisken*. Hingegen nimmt Steinschneider in seinen Arbeiten über Abraham Ibn Esra (*Abraham Ibn Esra als Mathematiker* u. a.) Bezug auf Krochmal.

sophie, geschöpft aus der philosophischen Logik." [79] Wenn man nun diesen Abschnitt überhaupt als „Pforte" bezeichnet, so ist das übertrieben; denn die uns vorliegende „Pforte" ist ein bloßes Fragment, das entweder Krochmal durch seinen frühzeitigen Tod nicht beenden konnte, oder das er als unbefriedigenden Versuch noch vorher vernachlässigt hat. Was in diesem Fragment vorgetragen wird, sind die Anfänge der Hegelschen Logik, die in die Lehre von Sein, Wesen und Begriff zerfällt. (Auf die weitere Einteilung und die verschiedenen Kategorien dieser drei Hauptteile können wir hier leider nicht eingehen.) Krochmal ist hier nicht einmal mit der Darstellung der Grundlagen der Hegelschen Logik fertig geworden; er hat nur einige Kategorien vom Sein und vom Wesen behandelt, aber auch diese nicht vollständig. — Daß Hegels Logik einen großen Reiz für Krochmal haben mußte, unterliegt keinem Zweifel. Die „traditionelle" Logik hat die Männer der Religion und die Mystiker nie ganz befriedigen können. Das rationale Erkennen stellt Relationen im Bereiche des Gegebenen fest, aber es kann nie zum Unendlichen vordringen. Der Satz des Widerspruches, von Aristoteles her als einer der unumstößlichen Grundsätze der Logik bezeichnet, ist nur ein Hindernis, wenn man der Veränderung, der Dynamik des Werdens gerecht werden will, wovon bereits die Rede war. Der Satz des Widerspruches kann ungeheuer große Dienste im Endlichen leisten, aber er kann nichts anfangen mit dem Unendlichen, denn hier finden wir A und Non-A zugleich. Daher rangen die Mystiker aller Zeiten um eine höhere Logik, um eine „göttliche" Logik, die nicht auf dem Satze des Widerspruches aufgebaut ist. Diese religiöse Logik hat das Unendliche zu ihrem Ausgangspunkt; sie basiert auf dem Prinzip der coincidentia oppositorum, der Einheit der Gegensätze des Nicolaus von Kues und Giordano Bruno. Wenn man nun aus dem Unendlichen ein Bestimmtes, ein Endliches (A) herausgreift, so kann man doch nicht umhin, zu gleicher Zeit auch alles andere (Non-A) mitzusetzen. Auf diese Weise wird die Unselbständigkeit des A ganz klar de-

[79] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 272—283.

monstriert, so daß, wenn man A setzt, man Non-A mitsetzen muß, wenn man A denkt, man Non-A mitdenken muß. Diese „höhere" Logik fand ihren prägnantesten Ausdruck in Hegels Philosophie, der diese Dialektik (zu der er seitens der Dynamik des Werdens wie seitens des Gedankens der Unendlichkeit getrieben worden ist) am virtuosesten gehandhabt hat.

Für Krochmal, den Religionsphilosophen, war die Aufstellung einer solchen „höheren" Logik von eminenter Bedeutung. Sicherlich war für ihn der Begriff des Unendlichen das Ziel seines logischen Denkens, er bedeutete ihm viel mehr als das ganze Rüstzeug der gesamten Logik, als die Reflexion über die Quantität, das Zählen und Rechnen, das extensive und intensive Quantum usw.[80] Das Problem des Verhältnisses von Glauben und Wissen, Gott und Welt sollte von hier aus angefaßt und gelöst werden. Diese religiöse Logik mit ihrem Prinzip des Unendlichen schien Krochmal wahrscheinlich sehr geeignet, die Philosophie des Ibn Esra und der Kabbalah[81] in ein ganz neues Licht zu rücken. An einer Stelle spricht Krochmal davon, daß die neuere „Philosophie der Logik" ein sehr geeigneter Schlüssel für die Attributenpartien und manche anderen „dunklen" Abschnitte des *Moreh Nebukim* wäre.[82] Der deutsche Idealismus, nicht nur Hegels allein, sondern auch Schellings, in dessen Naturphilosophie Krochmal Berührungspunkte mit Ibn Esra feststellen zu wollen schien, war nur ein „Mittel" zur Erläuterung mancher metaphysischer Grundanschauungen einiger jüdischer Denker des Mittelalters. Aber wollten wir mehr darüber sagen, so hieße das, den Boden der kritisch-historischen Betrachtungsweise verlassen. Diese „Pforte" ist nicht nur Fragment geblieben, sondern sie ist auch völlig ungeordnet, nicht durchgearbeitet, mit einer Fülle von Wiederholungen und Unklarheiten, wie ich das an anderer

[80] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 274 u. a.

[81] Die von A. H. Weiß in die Welt gesetzte Meinung (*Zikronotai* a. a. O., S. 123), der zufolge Krochmal ein Gegner der *Kabbalah* ist (eine Ansicht, die sich dann bei den meisten späteren Historikern wiederfindet), entbehrt jeder Grundlage. Die Frage über Krochmals Stellung zur Kabbalah haben wir in einem anderen Zusammenhang behandelt. Vgl. meinen Aufsatz in *Ha'olam*, 1927, Nr. 9 ff.

[82] *N. K.s W.*, S. 274, 282.

Stelle nachgewiesen habe. Wir wissen nicht, was aus diesem „Fragment" unter Krochmals Händen geworden wäre, inwiefern Krochmal auf der Grundlage der Hegelschen Logik seine weitere Religionsphilosophie aufgebaut hätte. Vielleicht wäre es nur ein äußerliches Anlehnen an Hegel geblieben. Es ist nicht völlig ausgeschlossen, daß, wie auf dem Gebiete der Geschichtsphilosophie und Geschichte, Krochmal auch auf dem Gebiete der Religionsphilosophie seine eigenen Wege gegangen wäre.

Und daß Krochmal die meisten Hegelschen religionsphilosophischen Anschauungen nicht teilen konnte, beweist schon eine ganz oberflächliche Betrachtung einiger religionsphilosophischer Sätze Hegels. Hegel kennt drei Stufen der historischen Entwicklung der Religion: a) Naturreligion des Orients (Gott — Natursubstanz); b) die jüdische Religion (Religion der Erhabenheit), griechische Religion (Religion der Schönheit), römische Religion (Religion der Zweckmäßigkeit). In all diesen Religionen wird Gott als Subjekt angeschaut; c) die absolute Religion, die Gott als dreieinigen Geist vorstellt. a) und b) akzeptiert Krochmal teilweise, wenn auch anders nuanciert, dagegen kann Krochmal doch mit c) absolut nichts zu tun haben. Abgesehen davon weicht er doch jeder Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum aus. Nach Hegel expliziert sich die göttliche Idee in drei Formen: 1. Gott in seiner eigenen Idee, das Reich des Vaters. 2. Die ewige Idee Gottes im Elemente des Bewußtseins und Vorstellens, das Reich des Sohnes. 3. Der Prozeß der Versöhnung, das Reich des Geistes.[83] Hat auch Krochmal diese drei Explikationen mitmachen können? Es erübrigt sich wohl, die Kluft zwischen Krochmals und Hegels Religionsphilosophie[84] weiter darzutun. Man braucht übrigens nur etwas in Hegels Jugendschriften[85] nachzulesen,

[83] Vgl. *Phänomenologie* (*S. W.*, 1832), S. 561 ff.; ebenfalls *Enzyklopädie*, ed. Lasson, S. 480 ff.

[84] Über Hegels Gottesbegriff vgl. aus der Fülle der Hegel-Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts u. a. besonders Carl Schwarz, *Das Wesen der Religion*, Halle 1847, S. 130 ff., Ludwig Nowak, *Die speculative Religionswissenschaft im encyclopädischen Organismus ihrer besonderen Disciplin*, Darmstadt 1847, und *Mythologie und Offenbarung* von demselben Verfasser.

[85] *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, herausgegeben von H. Nohl, 1907.

in denen er auch über den „Geist des Judentums" manches sagt, um sich davon zu überzeugen, wie himmelweit entfernt Krochmal von Hegel in der Gesamtauffassung des Judentums war.[86]

Zu ganz anderen Resultaten müßte Krochmal kommen, wenn er Hegelianer wäre, ganz anders müßte dann der *M. N. H.* aussehen. Ein richtiger Hegelianer — um nur einige Beispiele aus einer ungeheuren Fülle hier anzuführen — war z. B. ein Mann wie Christian Kapp, der auf der Grundlage der Hegelschen Logik eine besondere Geschichtsphilosophie aufgebaut hat, in der der Orient das Prinzip des Seins repräsentiert, die Griechen und Römer — das Prinzip des Wesens, die neue Zeit — das Prinzip des Begriffes (analog der Hegelschen Dreiteilung der Logik in Sein, Wesen und Begriff).[87] Ein Hegelianer war ebenso z. B. A. v. Cieszkowski, der gleichfalls die Hegelsche Trias in die Geschichte hineingetragen hat und sie folgendermaßen einteilte: die Antike — Reich der Kunst, die moderne Welt — Reich der Philosophie, die Zukunft — Reich der Sittlichkeit.[88] Aber auch jüdische Hegelianer gab es, (die ohne Hegels Auffassung vom Judentum zu akzeptieren, doch seine philosophische Methode übernommen haben), und die Geschichte des Hegelianismus im Judentum könnte uns ein sehr lehrreiches Bild eines überaus wichtigen Zeitabschnittes des jüdischen Denkens liefern. Ein jüdischer Hegelianer war z. B. — wir können da gleich in der Familie Krochmals bleiben — der Sohn unseres Philosophen, Abraham Krochmal. Schon auf den ersten Abschnitt des Buches Genesis versucht Abraham Krochmal das Hegelsche dialektische Schema anzuwenden. „Tag" (יום) — „Nacht" (לילה) — „Tag" (יום) des fünften Verses des ersten Kapitels der Genesis sind für Abraham Krochmal identisch mit dem dialektischen Dreitakt These—Antithese—Synthese. Auch seine Stellungnahme zu dem Problem der Gegensätze steht unter Hegelschem Einfluß, nicht wie

[86] Vgl. besonders *Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, S. 243—260, über Noah und Nimrod (die nach Hegel beide in die jüdische Geschichte hineingehören); S. 247 über Abraham, S. 252 über die mosaische Gesetzgebung und den Sabbat; S. 260 über „das große Trauerspiel des jüdischen Volkes" und viele andere Stellen.

[87] Vgl. *Das concrete Allgemeine der Weltgeschichte*, Erl. 1826.

[88] Vgl. *Prolegomena zur Historosophie*, Berlin 1838.

bei seinem Vater. Ja, Abraham Krochmal versucht manchmal, gewalttätig das Hegeltum in das Judentum hineinzuinterpretieren, so schließt z. B. Abraham Krochmal aus Rabbi Jochanans Liebe zu Resh Lakish, der gegen jede von ihm geäußerte halachische Ansicht 24 Einwände zu machen pflegte,[89] daß „unsere Weisen" das Problem der Gegensätzlichkeit bejaht hatten, daß sie die dialektischen Gegensätze als für die Wirklichkeit notwendig gehalten haben.[90] Abraham Krochmal spricht vom „Ich", vom „absoluten Geist", von Logik und Dialektik wie ein orthodoxer Hegelianer. Ein jüdischer Hegelianer — um auf noch einen kurz hinzuweisen — war auch Samuel Hirsch, der Autor des Buches *Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden oder das Prinzip der jüdischen Religionsanschauung und sein Verhältnis zum Heidentum, Christentum und zur absoluten Philosophie*.[91] War denn aber Nachman Krochmal ein Hegelianer dieser Art? Hat denn Krochmal z. B. jemals versucht nachzuweisen (um noch auf eines der vielen Beispiele hinzuweisen), daß die Zahl der uns bekannten Kometen logisch notwendig und demzufolge auch unveränderlich ist, so wie es Hegel getan hat, der dann auch nach der Aufstellung dieser Hypothese durch eine neue Entdeckung Lügen gestraft wurde?

Man könnte Krochmal z. B. als Viconianer, Lessingianer, Herderianer, Fichteaner bezeichnen — auf Grund der verschiedenen Berührungspunkte, die wir oben kurz streifend angeführt haben. Aber vor allem müßte er doch als Kantianer bezeichnet werden. Denn abgesehen von der fünften „Pforte" — „Die Absicht und das Ziel" —, in der sich Krochmal ganz offensichtlich in den Bahnen der *Kritik der Urteilskraft* Kants bewegt, finden sich bei Krochmal noch an anderen Stellen eine Reihe von Entlehnungen aus Kants philosophischen Werken, die mindestens auf einen ebenso starken Einfluß von

[89] Vgl. Baba mezia, 84 a.

[90] Vgl. *Da'at elohim ba'arez*, S. 84, 85 ff. (Eine wissenschaftliche Edition der Gesamtwerke Abr. Krochmals, über den eine besondere Abhandlung erscheinen soll, wird von uns vorbereitet.)

[91] Leipzig 1842. Vgl. z. B. Kap. 3 „Die aktive Religiosität"; § 41 „Abraham"; § 47 „Die absolute Religiosität Abrahams", S. 514 ff.

Kant schließen lassen wie auf denjenigen von Hegel — wenn nicht auf einen viel intensiveren. Ich will hier nur beiläufig noch z. B. darauf hinweisen, daß Krochmals Aufzählung (in der ersten „Pforte" des *M. N. H.*) der drei Schäden: Schwärmerei, Aberglaube und Werkheiligkeit und deren Analyse[92] teilweise wörtlich von Kant herstammt.[93] Wenn man aber so vorgeht, wird man nie zu einer gerechten Auffassung eines Denkers gelangen können. Das Hegelsche Element — so dürfen wir wohl auf Grund des bisher Ausgeführten kurz zusammenfassend sagen — wirkte neben den Einflüssen des Judentums, der Aufklärung und des deutschen Idealismus, vorwiegend Herders und Kants, mitformend auf die Gestaltung der späteren Krochmalschen Ideenwelt. Dieser Einfluß war aber durch die anderen Einwirkungen und durch Krochmals Originalität so „neutralisiert" und in Schranken gehalten, daß von einem Hegelianismus bei Krochmal nicht die Rede sein kann. Wohlverstanden, bei dem uns vorliegenden Krochmal — aber wir wissen nicht, wie Krochmal weiter philosophiert hätte, wenn er nicht im 55. Lebensjahre abberufen worden wäre. Wir können nicht mit Sicherheit behaupten, was er im zweiten Teile des *M. N. H.* — denn dieser vorliegende *M. N. H.* ist nur ein Teil und meines Erachtens wahrscheinlich der erste Teil des geplanten, nicht fertig gewordenen Krochmalschen Lebenswerkes — gelehrt hätte. Auf das ungewisse Feld der vagen Vermutungen wollen wir uns aber nicht begeben. Der *Moreh Nebuke Hazman*, die Krochmalschen Briefe, das ist das einzige, was für die Lösung unseres Problems in Betracht kommen kann.

Und — um am Schluß noch einen bereits oben beiläufig berührten Punkt zu erwähnen — wie steht es mit der von vielen Krochmal zugeschriebenen Tendenz der „Versöhnung" des Judentums mit dem Hegeltum?[94] Krochmal selbst spricht lediglich von seinem Ideal der Harmonisierung der Vernunft

[92] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 7—9.

[93] Vgl. *Kants S. W.* (Cassirer-Ausgabe), Bd. 2, 1912: „Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen", S. 294.

[94] Vgl. Zunz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, S. 151 ff.; Mieses, „Das Judentum der Vergangenheit", *Hamizpeh*, Heft 3, S. 2 u. a.

mit der mündlichen und schriftlichen Lehre.[95] Für Krochmal handelt es sich vorwiegend um die historisch-kritische Beleuchtung der jüdischen Tradition, um die Sicherstellung des Judentums auf einer festen und kritisch fundierten Basis. Für diese seine Lebensaufgabe brauchte er Hegel wirklich nicht. Um dieses Ideal hat er jahrelang gerungen, bevor er Hegel überhaupt kannte. — Wir deuteten bereits oben auf die so oft gezogene Parallele zwischen dem Aristoteliker Maimonides und dem „Hegelianer" Krochmal hin. Abgesehen davon, daß sie an sich historisch nicht zutrifft, lag es doch bei Maimonides ganz anders. Maimonides wollte bekanntlich Glaube und Wissen aussöhnen, die Offenbarung mit der Vernunft harmonisieren. Aristoteles war für diesen mittelalterlichen Kreis gewissermaßen die Vernunft, die Philosophie, die Wissenschaft. Judentum und Aristotelismus waren die gegebenen Gegensätze, daher auch die Notwendigkeit der Auseinandersetzung und der Versöhnungstendenz. Das trifft aber nicht für Krochmals historische Situation zu. Fehlte doch bei Krochmal der ganze mittelalterliche Rahmen, eine Komponente, die für das hier behandelte Problem von eminenter Bedeutung ist. Man könnte vielleicht manche isolierten Probleme oder Erscheinungen im Judentum mittels verschiedener philosophischer Systeme der neueren Zeit erklären oder deuten. Aber wie könnte man in der Neuzeit das Gesamtjudentum auf ein ganz extrem logisch-dialektisches System, wie es das Hegels ist, aufbauen, ohne das Judentum zu vergewaltigen? Zwar hat sich Krochmal innerlich sehr nahe verwandt mit Maimonides gefühlt, weist er doch stets auf diese Verwandtschaft hin.[96] Aber daraus ist nicht zu schließen, daß die genannte Parallelisierung, durch die Krochmals Hegelianismus betont werden soll, irgendwie gerechtfertigt ist.

Hingegen wäre die Gegenüberstellung der beiden Philosophen Maimonides und Krochmal an sich wohl am Platze, nur kann hier nicht darauf eingegangen werden. Andeutungsweise sei hier aber gesagt, daß Krochmal nicht nur im Prinzip

[95] Vgl. *N. K.s W.*, S. 202, 209 u. a.: „שכל כוחנו וסגנתנו... ולעשות שלום בין השכל ובין שתי התורות... לצרוף ולברר דברי אמונה... בבחינה שכלית...".

[96] *N. K.s W.*, S. 209 und in vielen anderen Stellen.

des Sittlichen über Maimonides[97] hinausgegangen ist, indem er das Prinzip der Aristotelischen „Mitte" — μεσότης — ablehnte, sondern auch im Grundproblem des Judentums. Krochmal genügt es nicht zu beweisen, daß das Judentum mit der Vernunft identisch ist, es genügt ihm nicht, das Judentum auf der Basis der Vernunft zu fundieren, es muß auf der Grundlage der Wahrheit aufgebaut werden. Nicht auf der Basis einer abstrakt-metaphysischen Vernunft, sondern auf der Grundlage einer wirklichkeitsdurchdrungenen historisch-realen Wahrheit. Das Judentum muß nicht nur vernünftig sein, nicht nur der Vernunft entsprechen, sondern auch kritisch-wahr sein, d. h. mit den Kategorien des historisch-kritischen Denkens übereinstimmen. In dieser Richtung wäre dann Krochmals Eigenleistung zu suchen.

[97] Vgl. *Mishneh Torah*, *Sefer Hamada*, *Hilkot De'ot*, Berlin 1922, S. 22ff.; siehe ebenfalls a. a. O., Note 157, S. 90ff.

DIVINE HELP AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

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THAT the idea of divine help has been the very nerve and fiber of Judaism is a truth so palpable as to be a truism. For this reason, the considerations advanced in the present essay should justify its inclusion in a volume devoted to Jewish studies even though the treatment adopted may be psychological and sociological rather than philological. Quotations from Hebrew literature will be few and allusions to Jewish history will be scant. Yet where has the thought of divine help received more striking expression than in Hebrew literature and where have the experiences illustrative of divine help received more thrilling exemplification than in Jewish history?

Moreover, in an age and among a people with whom scientific advance and institutional changes have led to a discard of many ancestral convictions, it can hardly be a matter of indifference how far and in what sense, that divine help so copiously affirmed by the fathers can still be predicated intelligently and conscientiously.

Nor need the citation of non-Jewish writers call for any apology in a publication which would not hesitate to cite Wellhausen, Cheyne, Haupt, Stade, Nowack, Duhm or Marti in the Biblical field, Wuensche, Herford, Fiebig, Holzman, the elder Delitzsch, Baer or Billerbeck in the Talmudic field and Schürer, Hausrath, Ewald, Niese and Moore in the historical field.

The present study, as already indicated, belongs to the domain of psychology as readily as to that of sociology. The sociological analysis of our second part needs as its basis the psychological analysis of the first part. We shall take the affirmation of divine help as it is familiarly voiced and shall

first inquire: "Precisely what do the affirmants mean?" We shall discover that here, as so often elsewhere, the apparently simple is bewilderingly complex. The help of God means a diversity of things not only among different people and on different occasions but also within one and the same mind upon one and the same occasion. As the meanings of divine help vary, the sociological implications of those meanings vary; not the least important of these variations being the status of these several meanings as topics of controversy. Theological dispute, we shall find, concerns not all of the meanings but only some of them. Seemingly a proposition upon which theist and atheist hopelessly divide, "God helps" is in reality an intricate bundle of propositions some of which are challenged by the atheist and some of which are no more subject to difference of opinion than the proposition "Water freezing becomes ice" or "The sun is more luminous than the moon."

PART ONE

Psychological Bearings

I. THE NOUN "HELP"

Among the things referred to by affirmations of divine help are certain events or occurrences which are taken to be manifestations of such help—recovery from sickness, rain terminating a spell of drought, escape from danger, victory in war, enhancement of finances, acquisition of friends, the worsting of enemies, reconciliation with opponents, the abatement of mental turmoil, progress in ethical endeavor or whatever other happenings, physical or psychical, have prompted people to say, "God helped."

It must be noticed that the need involved is always one ranking exaltedly in a hierarchy of needs. The needs that figure in affirmations of divine help are never the trivial but always the important ones. No one ever says: "God helped me smoke that cigar," "God helped me tip my hat," "God helped me pass the dessert," "God helped me powder my nose." Yet, how promptly those absurd words would cease

to be absurd in the mouth of one long afflicted with paralysis and suddenly cured! The occasion has then ceased to be trivial and has become momentous.

We smile at the athlete who claims that God did help him or will help him to victory. Prof. Pratt, in one of his books on the psychology of religion, amuses the reader with the story of a woman who, on the morning of a day on which she was to give a reception, found herself with a disfiguring cold in the head but who, thanks to God's help, was well enough in the afternoon to make a good facial impression by the time the guests had assembled. The old Sunday School teacher who forgot to bring the large package of application blanks and had on hand only the 101 blanks contained in the smaller package and then ascribed it to providential dispensation that exactly 101 persons applied in the matter requiring the blanks, may seem queer to the sophisticated listener. Yet that listener himself needs only a situation which is to him as important as that registration was to the old Sunday School teacher and he will himself perhaps predicate divine help. It is said that *in extremis* even atheists sometimes "call upon the Lord."

This circumstance of need characterized by extraordinary urgency should account for the pronounced rôle played by the factor of unexpectedness in most affirmations of divine help. Not the expected recovery but the unexpected, not the expected financial assistance but the unexpected, not the expected vindication but the unexpected is likely to be attributed to divine help. "The Lord of heaven and earth, out of darkness, out of silence, by ways that thou understandest not, shall redeem thy soul" says the poet, Edward Carpenter, "to one in trouble." This may probably be accounted for by observing that the very lack of knowledge which occasions the need will also occasion the unexpectedness of the help.

Nor is help something purely negative. Most salutary experiences are an advance as well as a deliverance, an attainment of higher good as well as the restoration of a prior good. Out of misfortune comes wisdom. Financial reverses may spur to financial reorganisation not merely recovering

the loss but securing a stability not previously enjoyed. Sickness may prompt measures which not only cure but actually induce a level of health higher than that which preceded the sickness. A political upheaval may not only pass away but also pass *into* arrangements marking an improvement upon the earlier period of tranquility. Sociologists remind us of the stimulating rôle in social progress played by social crisis. One emerges from adversity not merely into one's former well-being but into a more estimable well-being. "They that came up through great tribulation stood nearest the throne of God." With characteristic unexpectedness, the very troubles calling for help can be part of the process of producing the help.

II. THE ADJECTIVE "DIVINE"

Among the affirmations of divine help, there may be discriminated at least three different senses in which the adjective "divine" is applied:

(1) "Divine" refers to the alleged cause of the salutary events and means "supernatural."
(2) "Divine" refers to the ideal which is advanced toward realization in the salutary turn of events and means "valuable, important, significant."
(3) "Divine" refers to the psychological expedients employed to bring about the favorable turn of events—hope, prayer, aspiration, &c.—and means "religious." [1]

It is generally assumed that, except among the intellectual *élite*, the first use of the adjective prevails exclusively. But is this assumption correct? What if scrutiny were to show that, on the whole, idealistic elements exceed the supernatural in the commonly prevalent God conceptions? There are many indications that, even with the "common" people, the word "God" means a supreme ideal or means that more extensively than it means a first cause or any kind of cause. The following

[1] That the divergent meanings of religion are legion will be overlooked at no point in this paper. Religion is not a thing but a history. The word will be used for any point in that changing continuum which reaches back to magic and totemism and forward to Emerson and Felix Adler.

are some of the facts that can be adduced to substantiate this view:

I.

First we must draw the distinction between the God of worship and the God of customary theology—a distinction which should impress even the casual observer. A loving Father is one thing; a First Cause is something much different. The theological God who contrives miracles is hardly the same as the saint's "Light Within." Contrast also the moods involved —in the one case, a God in Whom we trust; in the other, a God about Whom we debate: in the one case, a God "Whom alone we will serve in reverence"; in the other, a God of argument and disputation. Is it not precarious to apply to the one meaning of "God" reflections pertinent to the other?

Or contrast the hymn books of any church with its theological books and both with its prayer books which occupy a kind of way station between hymns and theology. In the hymn books, God is "Love Divine," "Sun of my soul," "Rock of Ages," "A Fortress strong," "A Banner high," "My Light and my Salvation," "The King of Love," &c. How different from a "First Cause," a "Great Hypothesis," an "Underlying Substance" or whatever else the theological phraseology may be?[2] Even the "Creator" of the hymn books can hardly be the same as the "Creator" of the theological books. In a context in which "Rock," "Banner," "Light," "Fortress," are obviously figurative, "Creator" can hardly be otherwise than figurative. The metaphorical character of hymnology alone forms a significant contrast to theology with its literalisms.

The usual non-theological sense of the word "God" is, in brief, what the philosophers call evaluative as contrasted with descriptive. It is a usage which serves not to communicate

[2] "The Scholastic philosophers describe the deity as 'Ens a se extra et supra omne genus, necessarium, unum infinite, perfectum, simplex, immutabile, immensum, eternum, intelligens.'"—Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, New York, 1926, p. 558. Durant adds waggishly, "This is magnificent; what deity would not be proud of such a definition?" The Scholastics, like many who preceded and many who followed them were unconscious of the fact that their language was evaluative and consequently fraught with bearings different from those of language that is descriptive.

something but to indicate something in the user's state of mind. As such, the word refers not to a thing but to the excellence of things, the blessedness of things, the ideal embodied or approached in things rather than the source or cause of things.[3]

2.

Historically, the gods have always been invented and invoked for what they could supposedly do. In situations involving the gods, various types of important, tangible benefits such as crops, health, herds, victories have been the vital concern. People never invent *faineant* gods.[4] The gods themselves are less important than these ulterior values with which they are associated. The gods, regarded as causal factors, amount to certain hypotheses touching the ceremonial means of securing these values.

We can even admit a certain effectiveness in these ceremonial expedients: not, to be sure, the physical effectiveness ascribed to them but a psychological effectiveness which, though unintended and unnamed, may have been sufficiently pronounced to buttress the belief in physical effectiveness. There are modern parallels to this phenomenon. Thus a familiar hymn has the words:

[3] The distinction receives extensive treatment in Royce, *The World and the Individual*, and more recently in Ogden and Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (London, 1925). On the one hand there is, according to Ogden and Richards, "the use of words to express or excite feelings or attitudes" and, on the other, the use of words for purposes of statement, that is, "the recording, the support, the organisation and the communication of references" (p. 257). The terms "symbolic" and "emotive" employed by Ogden and Richards are, though marking essentially the same contrast, not so well suited to the present discussion as the older expressions "descriptive" and "evaluative." Emotiveness is, after all, not something peculiar to words but is also characteristic of non-verbal situations. "Symbolic" is especially inept because of its customary use for the very opposite of what Ogden and Richards mean by "symbolic." Issue is taken, however, only with the nomenclature of Ogden and Richards. Their discussion elucidates the distinction involved most adequately.

[4] The gods of Epicureanism, non-participant in human affairs, represent not an invention but a criticism. Epicureanism is a philosophy challenging the popular religion whose gods were originally and persistently concerned with the affairs of men.

"I love to tell the story
Because I know it's true;
It satisfies my longings
As nothing else will do."

That the longings are satisfied by the story, there is no occasion to deny. The error lies, of course, in the use for non-emotional, i.e. for historical purposes of a story whose effectiveness is purely of the psychological type. Similarly, in primitive times, the psychological effectiveness of various rituals and beliefs may long have blinded their devotees to their ineffectiveness on the physical plane.

Anthropologists tell us that men once worshipped their ancestors, sometimes in the guise of totem animals. Some worshipped stones; some the luminaries. Crude as these beliefs may have been, they are not devoid of a certain selective aspect. Ancestors, stones and luminaries could never have been chosen as objects of worship had they been entirely without an emotional appeal, an appeal which, in its turn, must have emanated from certain actual benefits or injuries associated with ancestors, stones and luminaries.

Thus, even in primitive times, the essence of divinity must have been less a matter of causation than a matter of value, importance, significance, in a word, a matter of relation to some momentous good.

The same point of emphasis is betrayed in the familiar modern arguments about the moral and civic interests at stake in the maintenance of religion. These arguments, whether valid or not, also stress effects rather than causes—effects regarded as fraught with a high degree of value, importance, urgency.[5]

[5] "The idea that man needs salvation depends, in fact, upon two simples ideas whereof the main idea is constituted. The first is the idea that there is some end or aim of human life which is more important than all other aims, so that by comparison with this aim, all else is secondary and subsidiary; and perhaps relatively unimportant, or even vain and empty. The other idea is this: that man as he now is, or as he naturally is, is in great danger of so missing this highest aim as to render his whole life a senseless failure by virtue of this coming short of his true goal."—Josiah Royce, *Sources of Religious Insight*,

Would we then be entirely wrong in asserting that the phraseology about a supernatural cause is largely a matter of faulty expression? Are not instances extremely common in which a person, meaning one thing, says something else owing to an imperfect comprehension of his own mental bearings?

We may, in this connection, well take admonition from a notable recent work on the subject of meaning from which the following passages may be culled:

"In all discussion we shall find that what is said is only in part determined by the things to which the speaker is referring. Often without a clear consciousness of the fact people have preoccupations which determine their use of words. Unless we are aware of their purposes and interests at the moment we shall not know what they are talking about." [6]

"We only know for certain what is said when we know why it is said." [7]

"The meaning of A is that to which the mental process interpreting A is adapted. This is the most important sense in which words have meaning." [8]

3.

Closely relevant here is what has already been noted about a hierarchy of needs which corresponds to a hierarchy of values. How extensively religion discriminates between the sacred and the profane, the more important and the less important, the higher and the lower! Religion does not, like every day life, content itself with saying that one thing is better than another. It goes beyond this and says that one set

New York, 1912. "It is no new thing to say that what men call religion is, at its focal points, a reaction, solemn or joyous, in which the individual or the group concentrates attention upon something so important that it is, for the consciousness of the moment, life itself." George Albert Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago, 1916, p. 69. Also pages 70 and 89 on religion as importance.

[6] Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 193 foot note.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

of interests or one set of tastes is better than another.[9] Such comparisons plainly invoke or come nearer than every day life to invoking an ideal which is ulterior to all other ideals —a supreme ideal, as we must say for want of any better terminology.[10]

4.

The tendency of religion to become spiritualized or, as President Hall says, "inwardized" fully accords with this interpretation. In religious contexts, the word "spiritual" is, like the word "God," an evaluative term. Spiritual good, the good of the soul, &c. with which God gets to be identified is only another way of saying the highest good, the superlative satisfaction, the ampler embodiment of the supreme ideal. We shall be misled if we take the word "spiritual" in the sense of "mental" or "emotional." Give the word that sense and all satisfaction becomes spiritual. The satisfactions that issue from the most degrading indulgences would then be spiritual: all satisfactions involve "mind" and emotions. "Spiritual" in the religious sense is not the opposite of material but the opposite of inferior, less satisfying, less acceptable, less approximate to the supreme ideal.[11]

[9] Prof. Coe reminds us that "human desires come thus to include the desire to have desires," *op. cit.*, p. 67, and that "purposes, as contrasted with impulses, and the increasing organisation of life through ideas are achievements. They require redirection of old desires," p. 221.

[10] The inadequacy lies in the fact that the language of our discussion is descriptive while that to which reference is made is something emotive—something of a nature that requires evaluative language and that finds its consummate expression not in language at all but in art and in conduct.

[11] The use of a generic term for eulogistic purposes is a common linguistic phenomenon. "Social" which means descriptively any relation between human beings, gets to mean evaluatively the desirable or satisfactory relations. "Christian" which means primarily the adherent of a certain creed is, often to the irritation of non-Christians, used to designate the exemplary type among those adherents.

> "Nature might stand up
> And say to all the world *This was a man!*" (*Julius Caesar* V, 5)

The word "man" in this context obviously does not signify merely an adult human male but an excellent specimen of that genus. Similarly the word "spiritual" which, in some connections, means the emotions and volitions or even the cognitions comes, in religious contexts, to mean the highest type of such manifestations.

The notable literary outbursts of spirituality will sustain these conclusions:

> With Thee is the fountain of life,
> In Thy light shall we see light.
>
> As the hart panteth after the water brooks,
> So panteth my soul after Thee, O God.
>
> My good is not beyond Thee.
>
> Whom have I in heaven but Thee?
> And beside Thee I desire none upon earth.
>
> My soul longeth for God, for the living God.
>
> The Lord is my light and my salvation.
>
> My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God.
>
> O that I knew where I might find Him!
>
> Seek ye the Lord while He may be found.
>
> Thy love it is my heart desires...
> Thou art all my soul's delight.
>
> Thou hast made us for Thee, O Lord, and restless
> is our heart until it find its rest in Thee.

One would have to be blinded by the prepossession that "God" never means anything except a supernatural cause in order to miss seeing in passages such as these the predominance of the idealistic over the causal-supernaturalistic implications of deity. God ceases here to be the alleged means toward an end and becomes Himself the end. God is no longer the supernatural origin but the idealistic goal. Similar utterances are countless in the literature of religion, particularly, as already noted, in the hymns and prayers. Here again we see the error of the assumption that people are always successful in formulating the contents of their own minds and that when they assert that their God is a cause, they necessarily mean what they say or mean it exclusively. We might profit by imitating the physicians who regard it almost as matter of course that a patient's ailment is not located where the patient thinks it is.

5.

Yet another specimen of religious phraseology will go to strengthen our conclusion. This is the use of the adjective "personal" as connected with the deity. A purely causal deity might as well be impersonal. Nothing is so typical of the mechanical i. e. the impersonal as the cause-effect relation.

However, the word "personal" has a number of meanings. One meaning is "corporeal"—having a body like a man or like a totem animal. This, unquestionably, is the sense in which the deity has at times been understood to be personal.

Yet "personal" does not always mean "corporeal." Of this, we are reminded by an eminent sociologist. Says Prof. Cooley:

> "Facial expression, tone of voice, and the like, the sensible nucleus of personal and social ideas, serve as the handle, so to speak, of such ideas, the principal substance of which is drawn from the region of inner imagination and sentiment. The personality of a friend as it lives in my mind and forms there a part of the society in which I live, is simply a group or system of thoughts associated with the symbols that stand for him... And his presence does not consist in the pressure of his flesh upon a neighboring chair, but in the thought clustering about some symbol of him, whether the latter be his tangible presence or something else." [12]

The historical tendency of religion has been, while retaining divine personality, to repudiate divine corporeality. "Personal" has come to mean "manlike" in an ethical and not in a physical sense. God, while not having hands, feet and eyes, does presumably have love, justice and mercy,—be it observed, evaluative terms, all of them.

[12] Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), p. 81. At a later point in this same volume (p. 281) occurs this reflection: "The ideal persons of religion are not fundamentally different psychologically or sociologically, from other persons... The fact that they have attached to them no visible or tangible material body, similar to that of other persons, is indeed an important fact, but rather from the psychological point of view; mentally and socially regarded it is of one sort with other personal ideas, no less a verifiable fact, and no more or less inscrutable."

Still does not even such a conception preclude identification of deity with supreme value? Is not such a deity likewise a causal instrument rather than the ideal finality?

The reply is: Not necessarily and not altogether. People can *mean* supreme value even though they say: "just, loving, merciful God." It is extremely common for two closely related things to appear as merged into one—like the sight of both eyes, the colors of a composite, the taste of a mixture, the vibrations forming one sound.[13] Analogously, the supreme ideal becomes fused with the paramount way of realizing that ideal. The ideal may not literally possess the qualities love, justice and mercy. But the path toward the ideal lies through the human relations exemplifying love, justice and mercy.[14] Phrasing it otherwise: God is related to certain human qualities—related, however, not as object to attribute but as end to means. Popular theologizing can not but confuse the two relations. And yet, while language may allude to the inapplicable relation, devoutness utilises the real one; just as people may digest their food perfectly though their theories regarding digestion may be entirely unscientific.

Language is, after all, not man's only way of responding to his environment.[15] "The flower is red," we say. We mean that the light emanating from the flower is red. "I hear the bell," we say. What we do hear is the air vibrations proceeding from the bell. "I see the sun." We do not see the sun but the aura surrounding the sun. "The sun is setting." No, it is the earth that is rotating. "The picture is on the screen." The picture is really in the stereopticon. Countless instances can illustrate how our meaning may be correct even though our wording be incorrect. That is why the meanings of words must be sought not in the words themselves but

[13] To the same class of phenomena belong the various "complexes" and constellations of associations: loving the flag because loving the country symbolized by the flag, hating a dogma because hating the person who espouses the dogma, fearing a horse because fearing the parent associated with the horse, &c.

[14] This point will concern us extensively in the second part of this paper.

[15] Perhaps the latest word on this subject is by John B. Watson in *Behaviorism* (New York, 1925), especially pages 130, 131, 213.

in the total reaction accompanying the words. Again let us recall Ogden and Richards:

> "A symbol refers... not necessarily to what it... is intended by the user to refer to." "In all discussion we shall find that what is said is only in part determined by the things to which the speaker is referring. Often without a clear consciousness of the fact people have preoccupations which determine their use of words. Unless we are aware of their purposes and interests at the moment, we shall not know what they are talking about." "We only know for certain what is said when we know why it is said." "The meaning of A is that to which the mental process interpreting A is adapted. This is the most important sense in which words have meaning."[16]

An endeavor to make language conform more exactly to the reality can be discerned in the tendency of theological affirmations to substitute abstract nouns for adjectives. "God is love," "God is truth," "God is justice," are modes of expression which come somewhat nearer to saying that God is *the value realized when human interactions exemplify* love, truth or justice. So closely intertwined are the human interactions on the one hand and the superlative value on the other that they inevitably appear to coalesce.

Nor have we yet exhausted the meanings of the word "personal." We have considered its descriptive applications. But, like "God," "spiritual" and much other religious usage, the word has also its evaluative sense. Personal can mean "significant," "impressive," "important." Human beings do not become persons (in this sense) until they become significant. A human being may have a body and still lack personality. Human beings are persons in so far as they are the embodiment of some ideal. The supreme person is the surpreme ideal and human beings are persons in so far as they partake of the supreme ideal. God, we might say, is not a person (in the

[16] *Op. cit.*, pages 201, 229, 193 foot note, 325 respectively.

sense of exalted value) because He resembles men but men are persons because they resemble God.

Personality is somehow related to the Kantian ends in themselves. Kant, it will be recalled, would have us treat our fellow men not as mere means but as ends. The supreme ideal is necessarily such an end in itself. A cause is a means toward an end. In short, the prepossession among theists for the personality of God adds to the indications that supreme ideal rather than supreme cause is the real even if imperfectly articulated meaning.

6.

The very controversies on this point between science and theology prove that a cause can not be all that people mean when a divine cause is what they profess to mean. If the sole purpose of affirming God were to account causally for phenomena, why the protracted quarreling with science when science comes with its manifestly superior account of causation? If causes are the object of search, why not an invariable welcome for the improved methods of the scientific men? The fact is that we have here again what the psychoanalysts call a "displacement." People say "cause" when they mean or partly mean that value which chances to be associated with and consequently confused with cause. The confusion results from a tendency described by Prof. Dewey:

> "From the standpoint of control and utilization, the tendency to assign superior reality to causes is explicable. A 'cause' is not merely an antecedent; it is that antecedent which if manipulated regulates the occurrence of the consequent. That is why the sun rather than night is the causal condition of the day. Knowing that consequences will take care of themselves if conditions can be had and managed, an ineradicable natural pragmatism indulges in a cheap and short conversion, and conceives the cause as intrinsically more primary and necessary. This practical tendency is increased by the fact that time is a softener and dignifier; present troubles lose their acuteness when they

> are no longer present. Old times are proverbially the good old times, and history begins with a Garden of Paradise or a Golden Age. Good, being congenial, is held to be normal; and what is suffered is a deviation, creating the problem of evil. Thus the earlier gets moral dignity as well as practical superiority."

Elsewhere, Dewey speaks of "the common philosophic fallacy of converting an eventual function into an antecedent force or cause." [17]

7.

The identical characteristic of the God idea is manifest also in the various other attempts to defend theism such as that of harmonizing the old beliefs with modern science or, as in the instance of this paper, that of unreservedly accepting the positions and the consequences of science, definitely abandoning supernaturalism, and identifying theism with that idealism to which science and art as well as religion jointly subscribe. Why do we trouble to talk about God at all? And why are people so easily satisfied with fragile and inconclusive arguments in this connection? Why their toleration of glaring inconsistencies? Why their naïve addiction to flimsy rationalizations? How, in short, account for the persistent desire to conserve theism, if theism is nothing but a superannuated theory of causation? The truth is that not the supernatural causation which science has invalidated but an idealism the renunciation of which would be a bewildering self contradiction is the real point involved. As the invisible part of an iceberg greatly exceeds the visible part, so are the inarticulate idealistic meanings of "God," more than the articulate causal ones.

8.

Our contention gains further strength when we look into the validity of the claim that people "believe" in God. "Believe" can mean:

[17] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 109. *Ibid.*, p. 308. Also Felix Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*, which speaks of "the superstition of causality." "The prejudice of causality is probably ineradicable, just as the illusion that the sun revolves around the earth persists" (p. 141).

a) Affirming the existence of something.
b) Affirming one's approval of or loyalty to something.

An example of the first sense is: "Some astronomers believe in the canals on Mars." An example of the second is: "I believe in the policies of Mr. Coolidge." In the Old Testament and perhaps largely in the New, "believe" carries the second sense, while current theology both professional and amateur takes the word in its first sense.

Now, it is precisely to the most devout that God is conspicuously other than an object of belief in the first sense. Belief, in this sense, implies less than absolute certainty. As James showed in his famous essay, it involves the taking of chances. It embraces the possibility of disbelief on the part of others and eventually on the part of the believer himself. It is the acceptance of a conclusion on less than clinching evidence. It is the adoption of a hypothesis which, like any hypothesis, is subject to supercession by a better one.

But when people commit themselves to "The Rock of Ages," "The Everlasting Arms," "The Eternal Refuge" can they mean anything so uncertain? Certainty is the very essence of their attitude. For religious fervor, the alternative to certainty is atheism; *tertium non datur.* Something absolutely certain must be found to which to attach the word "God" or the word must remain unattached. People no longer worship ancestors, stones and planets because these objects do not satisfy the needs that a God is expected to satisfy. Anything uncertain, hypothetical, debatable, similarly can not satisfy the needs of those who need a "Rock That is high." People may rightly use the word "believe" in their less religious moments when nothing of consequence is at stake. But, in times of tremendous earnestness, the word can only carry the Biblical significance of loyalty, steadfastness, approval. How inept, at such times, is "believing" with the import of "favoring a certain hypothesis"!

And there is an absolute certainty. The very need of distinguishing between certain and uncertain, true and false, satisfactory and objectionable can be denied only at the cost of denying that one is denying. *That need is the irrefragible*

certainty.[18] That need presupposes a criterion (though not necessarily a clearly articulated criterion), a supreme ideal, a *summum bonum*, an ultimate reference hovering over all trends, judgments and discriminations. Men may have infused many meanings into the word "God." The supreme ideal is surely one of those meanings—a meaning which can exist even if dimly and confusedly, in minds hospitable to other and incompatible meanings. That supreme ideal, the goal of all longing and striving, approximation to which constitutes goodness, truth and beauty, recession from which constitutes evil, falsehood and ugliness; that ideal which is itself not a cause but in our advance toward which we are obliged to study and utilise causation; which is not a matter of belief but toward which all believing and disbelieving are alike a groping; which is neither subjective nor objective but the occasion for the entire discrimination between subjective and objective; which is the incentive and direction of science no less than of religion—that supreme ideal is one of the meanings in fact one of the most vital meanings of the "common man's" God.

9.

Finally we should notice that, as soon as the word "God" becomes divested of its idealistic implications, the result is atheism. An atheist is merely a person for whom the word "God" has lost or has never acquired any idealistic implications. The modern atheist usually associates the word with anti-scientific world views or with distasteful ecclesiastical or economic policies. The purely supernatural (and consequently non-existent) God is thus an atheistic rather than a theistic concept. The God of the theist is supernatural only incidentally and by misinterpretation. Essentially the God of the theist is not a supernatural cause but a supreme ideal.

The question often arises regarding the permissibility of using the word "God" to mean "supreme ideal," considering

[18] "Values are values, things having certain intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are."—Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

the fact that people do use the word in the causal supernaturalistic sense. In rejoinder it must be borne in mind that the problem of what constitutes the "right" to use a given word in a given way is by no means simple. Words have arisen and their meanings have multiplied because people have thus desired. Why then should not the mere desire to use a given word for a given object constitute the "right" to such usage? Why should desire which is right in the one case be wrong in the other?

Desires, be it remembered, are not spontaneously generated. There must be something in the old meaning of a word which begets the desire to extend the word's application. Ogden and Richards surmise that it may depend upon emotive qualities.[19] The "right" of an object to be called by a certain name may well be grounded upon the sheer ability of the object to get itself called by that name.

It may be argued that, inasmuch as the word "God" has so frequently meant a supernatural cause, misunderstanding may arise if a different sense is intended. But the danger of being misunderstood is one against which it is necessary to be on guard no matter what the word used or what the subject discussed. Precautions against misunderstanding are imperative always. In gatherings such as those for prayer and inspiration where the word "God" rarely possesses other than its evaluative sense, what peril can there be in employing its evaluative sense? On the other hand, in theological discussions, where the causative sense is likely to prevail, the evaluative use of the term may need express asseveration.

To abandon the term entirely is to be deprived of the finest evaluative expedient that language possesses. The word serves to identify the aspirations of all the myriads living and dead who have used it. And the identification of aspiration, as we shall notice later, is an extraordinary social device for strengthening aspiration. The word should, of course, be abandoned when addressing people for whom it has lost its favorable connotation. In the presence of the atheist, the word had best be omitted except under circumstances per-

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

mitting the elucidation of its evaluative import and favoring the conciliation of atheistic or agnostic idealism with that of the theist.

When, therefore, people affirm divine help, the adjective "divine" does not necessarily or exclusively designate the source of the help. It indicates rather the significance, the importance, the value of the help; in short, the relation both of the need for the help and of the help itself to a supreme ideal.[20]

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPEDIENTS

The additional sense in which help can be divine is something entirely psychological. As stated above: "Divine" refers to the psychological expedients employed to bring about the favorable turn of events—hope, prayer, aspiration, &c.[21]

Art, science and every day life are, no less than religion, an outreaching for a goal, an attempt to win satisfactions by winning higher satisfactions. The unique thing about religion is its aptitude for being explicit about the ultimate goal. Art, science and every day life presuppose the supreme ideal but content themselves with presupposing. Religion goes beyond this inarticulate presupposing. Religion is, in some unique way, concerned with the goal itself. The benefit of religion is the benefit inherent in the fact that the consciousness of the ultimate aim will enhance the pursuit of that aim. We go better when we know whither we are going. We seek better when we know what we are seeking. In biological evolution, intelligence has supervened upon automatism because intelligence which implies activity with an end in view surmounts difficulties to which automatism succumbs. Similarly, to realize that it is a supreme ideal that

[20] Prof. Adler and his associates of the Ethical Culture Movement have a predilection for the adjective "divine" though shying at the affirmative use of the noun "God." This may be due to the fact that the more reserved use of the bisyllabic Latin adjective makes it less suggestive of the causal supernatural than the more commonly employed Anglo-Saxon monosyllabic noun.

[21] *Supra* page 586.

we are striving after will predispose us to side-step many an obstacle.

But this conscious or almost conscious reference to an ultimate goal, while the distinctive feature of religion, is not its only feature. Religion has many additional expedients, among them a rich repertoire of imagery. Religion familiarly lays under contribution the resources of the various arts—music, drama (including ritual), pictorial and plastic representations, architecture, as well as poetry, fiction and mythology. Religion also has its wealth of impressive phraseology, "Heavenly Father," "Rock of Ages," "King of Kings," "Everlasting Light" and the like, the power of which lies in the capacity of imagery to influence the emotions and the will.

By imagery is meant those elements of experience which are detached from the rigid time-space order which we call the outer or objective world. It is made up largely of memories, among them the so-called unconscious memories of Psychoanalysis, these memories possessing an unlimited fluidity, being amenable to any number and kind of displacements going on "inside the head." [22]

Now images are instruments precisely like knives, drugs, locomotives and electric currents. Like any instrument they are good or bad according to the purpose for which they are used and according to their suitability for that purpose. Many images are serviceable for handling the so-called outer world, those experiences belonging to the objective time-space order. The various formulae of the sciences belong to this class of images—the earth that is round, the electric current which requires a closed circuit, the stress to be borne by a

[22] By this admittedly crude definition of imagery, no prejudice is intended against Behaviorism or any other school of Psychology which may employ different interpretative language. We may as readily say "verbal conditioning" or "retinal stimulation" (Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 213). The phenomenon itself is under consideration: the interpretative positions respectively adopted by the several schools of Psychology will not effect our conclusions. Indeed a better word than "imagery" appears to be needed. The salient thing is not the image but certain forms of mentation to which the image is but accessory. The point is treated in Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 148–151, 157, 328.

bridge not yet built, the organs of some paleolithic monster —all of these are uses of imagery by which external events are to be controlled. Then there is a class of imagery which is impotent for the control of external events but highly effective for the control of the emotions and volitions—for visceral rather than manual responses, if the Behaviorist so prefers.[23] Art derives its material from imagery of this type.

Falsehood results when imagery which is suitable for affective-volitional control is used as though it were also suitable for external control. Myth used as though it were history and fancy used as though it were fact give results much akin to those that might be expected if a lily were used as though it were a furnace or a jewel as though it were a shovel. Bosanquet has put it: "Everything is Real so long as we do not take it for what it is not." A myth is never false so long as it is taken as a myth and not mistaken for history. Drama is not false so long as it is understood to be drama but becomes hopelessly deceptive for the child visiting the theater for the first time and confusing dramatic incident with life off stage.

The imagery of religion can not possibly be false as long as it fulfills its function of affective-volitional control.[24] The moment the same imagery gets to be used for other purposes, the result is all of the theological missteps over which atheism gloats and on which scepticism thrives.

Much religious imagery has the distinction of having consistently escaped misuse. "Rock of Ages" has not, since the days of stone worship, given rise to the supposition that the deity is a lapidary specimen nor has "The Lord is my shepherd" misled any one into insisting that the deity is a cattle breeder. Less fortunate has been the phrase "Heavenly Father." In Christianity, at least, it has created the burdensome need of defending the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. The affective-volitional benefits of the word "Creator" have been obtained perhaps at the greatest cost of all. The use of

[23] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[24] "So far as words are used emotively, no question as to their truth in the strict sense can directly arise." Ogden and Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

the word "Creator" for other than affective-volitional purposes has saddled the ages with the task of "reconciling" science and Genesis or of combatting science in the interests of Genesis.

Some writers, particularly of the psychoanalytic schools, have a way of stressing the father image as though it were the sole specimen in the repertoire of religion.[25] The rock image descending from the days of stone worship, the light image from the days of sun worship, the shepherd image from the days of pastoral life, the king image from the days of monarch worship are perhaps no less affective for stirring the emotions than the father image surviving from the days of ancestor worship.

Yet this oversight is trivial compared with another. There should be no overlooking the fact that imagery by itself does not constitute religion. Art also and even psychoneuroses revel in imagery. The vital thing about religious imagery is that it is *religious*. It is imagery used for a unique purpose, the purpose namely of creating situations which are judged to embody the utmost value. Even when harmfully or ineffectively applied, the imagery of religion is applied with the intent of infusing into life the presence of the supreme ideal.

This then is the sense in which God is a Heavenly Father: the father image can be used for creating affective-volitional states which are highly conformable to ultimate ideals.

Some psychologists regard the father image as nothing but a device for awakening certain infantile attitudes of trust

[25] Sigmund Freud, *Leonardo da Vinci*, Translated by A. A. Brill, New York, 1916, p. 57; C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, Translated by Beatrice M. Hinkle, New York, 1916, p. 254; Georges Berguer, *Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus*, New York, 1923, pp. 40, 247; Johann Kinkel, "The Problem of the Psychological Foundation of the Origin of Religion," *Imago*, Vol. 8, No. 1; Everett Dean Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*, New York, 1924, p. 127; Cavendish Moxon, "Religion in the Light of Psychoanalysis," *Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1; Pierre Bovet, *Le Sentiment Religieux et la Psychologie de l'Enfant*, p. 25; Chas. Baudouin, *Studies in Psychoanalysis*, Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, London, 1922, p. 420; Ernest Jones, *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis*, London, 1923, p. 426.

and of freedom from care—attitudes persisting into adult life but none the less infantile. But is this all that there is to the father image? Why only infantile tendencies? Why not also parental? "Heavenly Father" calls to mind not only the trust which we, as infants, felt toward our parents but also the trust which we, as parents, awaken in our children. And, not only that. Into the web of association, why may not affection for all childhood enter and, still farther expanding, why may not all altruistic sentiments have a part in the father complex, sometimes fainter, sometimes stronger? Everything reported by Kropotkin and by Nasmyth[26] on the subject of mutual aid—habits, sentiments, traditions, customs of mutual aid—may, by a familiar psychological process, share in the father image.

The psychoanalytic writers have also much to say about the rôle of sex in religion. Speaking psychoanalytically, this can only mean that certain associations or complexes of associations having to do with the procreative process are identical with certain ones that appear in the religious. Or, speaking behavioristically, we would have to say that procreation and religion have certain neural reflexes or combinations of reflexes in common.

Points of identity, however, do not exclude points of difference. Roses contain nitrogen: refuse also contains nitrogen. Yet it hardly follows that roses and refuse are the same thing. The most crucial difference in the world is that of purpose or function. Religion, at least in its more attractive registers, uses sex associations as it does everything else, for the purpose of realizing the supreme good. Religion quotes: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love," "Thy love it is my heart desires," "Let me to Thy bosom fly."[27] Shall we say that there is no difference between these attitudes and those of libertinism? All the distance from zenith to nadir lies between sex responses functioning toward one end and sex responses tending toward another.

[26] Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid as a Factor in Evolution*; George Nasmyth, *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory*, New York, 1916.

[27] A striking passage in Succah 54a asserts that divine love is like sexual love.

God is then a helper in the sense that the thought of God with its attendant imagery has the effect of dispelling undesirable states of mind and substituting desirable ones.

The world must have known long before the advent of Psychoanalysis what a compelling rôle memory plays in human life. Most, perhaps all of our emotions are due less to the prevailing situation than to the memories aroused by that situation—often unconscious memories as the psychoanalyst would say (unverbalized responses as the behaviorist prefers to say).[28] Not our present predicaments but our memories are the chief object of our hostilities and fears. Our failure to notice this belongs to life's dominant illusions. The bigot, for instance, who directs his shafts at new ideas has his quarrel in reality not with the new ideas but with certain earlier experiences, possibly forgotten childhood experiences, which those new ideas resuscitate. The cardinal task of religion is to substitute solacing and edifying memories for torturing and degrading ones.

Even hope, though it refers to the future, achieves in the present by utilizing the past. *Now, this very moment*, I possess the desirable state of mind owing to the mental suggestions which my hopes afford. But what is mental suggestion if not a process based on memory? Gratifying experiences of the past are imaginatively revived wherever hope can be said to function. Before condemning the otherworldliness of some religions, it may be well to inquire how far the otherworld imagery is indispensable as a device for crowding out foul memories and substituting fair ones.

PART TWO

Sociological Bearings

Having analysed the meaning of the affirmations regarding divine help, we proceed now to consider the social factors which those several elements of meaning involve.

[28] Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 130, 190, 205.

We shall let an outstanding sociologist provide us with this definition of the word "social": "of or pertaining to a group of individuals who carry on a common life by means of mental interaction."[29] The question then before us is: What actions of human beings upon one another can we find displayed in those situations to which people refer when they affirm divine help?

Since we have thus far considered divine help affirmations from the standpoint of needs, causes, gradations of value, and expedients, let us observe a parallel procedure now that we are probing into the related social interactions.

I. NEEDS

The needs which are the occasion for the help receiving the appraisal "divine" can be social in at least five different ways:[30]

(1) Many if not most human troubles consist of unhappy relations between human persons. Poverty, oppression, war, strife, humiliation, neglect, contempt, envy, physical or financial injury, tyranny, insults, lawlessness—the entire gamut of woes which men inflict upon one another and which led Schopenhauer to exclaim, "*Homo homini lupus*," belong to this category. How inveterately all utopian literature assumes that when social maladjustments will have ceased, all maladjustments will have ceased! Then "will the threshing reach unto the vintage and the vintage unto the sowing,"[31] then "the earth shall answer the grain and the new wine

[29] Charles Ellwood, *Social Psychology*, foot note p. 7. For this reference I am indebted to my friend, Prof. Eubank of the University of Cincinnati.

[30] Prof. Eubank advises reference to the "four wishes" of W. I. Thomas, *The Persistence of Primary Group Norms in Present Day Society*. These wishes are (1) Security, (2) New Experience, (3) Recognition, (4) Response. Prof. Eubank points out that my numbers 2 and 3 belong by "sympathetic identification" to the desire for security and that my number 4 is essentially a desire for response and number 5 a form of the desire for recognition. Prof. Eubank farther suggests comparison with the "sixfold interest" of Albion W. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 425 ff. These interests are: (1) Health, (2) Wealth, (3) Knowledge, (4) Beauty, (5) Sociability, (6) Righteousness.

[31] Leviticus 26. 5.

and the oil."[32] Utopias are strikingly free of droughts, storms, floods, infections—all bold psychological testimony to the dominance of social troubles in the catalogue of human miseries.

(2) Needs may furthermore be social in the sense that human beings, by sympathetic identification, partake of one another's sorrows. The illness of a dear one can be a greater tribulation than our own, the knowledge of another's anguish more poignant than our own. This appropriation of others' reverses attains its maximum within the family circle yet readily spreads beyond the family into the broader domains of neighborhood, community, nation and the world. The sinking of the Titanic, the burning of the Iroqois theater, the earthquake in Japan, the famines in China and Russia can harrow the souls of millions who will never look upon the slightest physical vestige of those disasters. From every human calamity the suffering, transmuted into the type called mental, radiates over vast areas. This obviously is a sense in which some of our acutest needs are social.

(3) Likewise social are those needs which we commonly designate as moral—the struggle with the surge of primitive impulse, otherwise called "the battle with temptation," the travail, often futile, to carry out in conduct the requirements of accepted moral standards. In so far as moral standards are matters of social inculcation and utility, these needs also must be listed as social. It should be added that not only our own moral success but also that of others can be with us a matter of ardent concern.

(4) Furthermore, companionship has its place in the list of human needs. Loneliness can be a dire scourge. Protracted periods of solitary confinement are said to have had insanity as their result.

(5) Account must finally be taken of Prof. Cooley's reflection: "In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self ... appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the

[32] Hosea 1. 24.

attitude toward this attributed to that other mind."[33] The good opinion of others, crudely stated, is thus among our needs. Real or supposed lack of that good opinion can be agony. The battlefield is not the only place where death is preferred to social disparagement.

Any or all of these needs can acquire transcendant importance and their satisfaction become a matter of such extraordinary value as to evoke the characterization "divine."

II. CAUSES

The causative factors in a vast amount of help which is momentous enough to be regarded as divine are other human beings. "*Nihil homini homine utilior*" says Spinoza. Help which is divine as to its importance can thus be social as to its cause. We have already noticed the psychological "displacement" which precipitates the impression that the cause is divine.

We can not maintain, of course, that *all* important help is socially caused. Biological, meteorological and psychological factors falling outside of the social domain are constantly operative in the healing of sickness, the saving of crops, and the relief of depression. Still, the rôle played by human beings in most instances of human deliverance is enormous. Very often, biological, meteorological and psychological factors are socially supplemented. The physician and the weather prognosticator, the agricultural consultant, the engineer, the experimenter, the psychiatrist, even the artist, without whose direction we might have missed finding sunsets and landscapes glorious, represent social augmentations of extra-social boons. In the last analysis, our very bodies, with their organs of sense and sensibility responsive to nature's blights and blessings, are social products.

Where the needs are of the five social types listed above, the help must necessarily be social. On social predicaments, how can any but social agents operate, whatever may be the indirect effect of such non-social factors as floods, storms,

[33] *Op. cit.*, pp. 151, 152. Also the discussion of the Social Self by Willliam James in *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1899, Vol. I, pp. 293–296.

crops, fire, droughts, rain, sunshine, landscapes and sunsets in the production of human amenities, enmities and conciliations.

Everything which falls within the domain of mutual aid, so notably celebrated by Kropotkin and Nasmyth, applies in this connection. Three types of mutual aid require discrimination:

(1) Aid against the hostile forces of nature outside of human life.
(2) Aid against hostile human beings.
(3) Spiritual aid.

(1) The volumes of Kropotkin and Nasmyth deal largely with the aid of the first type. Men rush to one another's rescue from hunger, flood, fire, wild beasts, exposure and disease—not only men but infra-human forms of animal life down to the tiniest insect.

(2) No less important for our purpose is the second type of mutual aid where men rescue men from men. This phenomenon must be invoked to explain some outstanding specimens of religious parlance such as the assertions which put God, the helper, on one side and man, the foe, on the other.

"If it had not been the Lord Who was on our side,
When men rose up against us;
Then they had swallowed us up alive,
When their wrath was kindled against us." [34]

"They compassed me about; yea, they compassed me about:
In the name of the Lord I will cut them off." [35]

Yet, even here our thesis holds that the divinity really meant lies not in the cause but in the value of the help and that the cause of the help, even in the face of formidable human hostility, is still something human.

It was, after all, not "men" that "rose up against me" but a restricted group of men—the group to which I do not

[34] Psalm 124. 2, 3.
[35] Psalm 118. 11.

belong arrayed against the group to which I do belong. Exegetically, of course, the "me" in the Biblical passages quoted happens to be the group, that is, the nation or the faithful faction of the nation and not any individual. Yet, even taking the passages homiletically and acknowledging their adequacy as expressions of individual experience to which they have doubtless been applied countless times, we still have a social causation for the rescue from social hostility. My enemies are before me but elsewhere are my friends. They will rescue me if they can. Even if they fail to rescue me, the thought of them is a spiritual factor of great beneficence —as we shall notice presently. Edith Cavel may be in the hands of her foes. Yet, beyond her foes is the wider circle of her own. It is for them that she is struggling and suffering. It is from them that she derives the spiritual help pending the arrival of the physical help which will save her cause although too tardy to save her life. Theirs are the hymns and prayers and the religious tropes which comfort her last hours. "They that are with us are more than they that are with them." Elisha may have referred to the gleaming angels on the surrounding heights. But even without the mythical angels, his words would have been true. Social presence is something vaster than physical presence. Social presence is unbounded in time or space. The remotest regions and the remotest generations can belong to it. Beyond the hostile Syrian cordon, is the infinite and eternal social situation wherein Elisha has the victory.

Nor are human friends, when foes overwhelm, altogether absent even physically. How many a foe is a potential friend! Pocahontas need not have been Captain Smith's only protagonist in that dreadful hour. Song and story are fond of the theme. It is not impossible for enemies to become admirers and even helpers. What we noticed at the outset about unexpectedness finds striking illustration in the devious ways of social interaction.

(3) The third type of aid which we must consider is the spiritual which has already obtained some incidental illustration. What do we mean by the spiritual? In a previous

connection, we have asserted that spiritual is an evaluative term, a eulogistic appraisal of situations highly approximative to the highest ideal. We declined to identify the spiritual with the emotional or volitional because emotional and volitional aspects belong also to situations which do not merit that encomium. Still, there is a sense of the word "spiritual" in which affective-volitional experiences do have a dominating place. That place appears to be this: The spiritual is the important. The important elicits closer scrutiny than the unimportant. Affective-volitional factors which are ignored or lightly heeded in unimportant situations gain their due measure of attention when the significant situations arise. This capacity of momentous situations to win closer scrutiny than the non-momentous will account for the rôle played by the "soul," the "heart," the "inner life," &c.—or their behavioristic equivalents—in conjunction with spirituality.

Spirituality, of course, does not and can not dispense with "outer" elements. There can be no response except there be a situation to which to respond: there can be no volition without something to be willed. The "outer" is as inseparable from spirituality as the "inner" and the "inner" as inseparable from the *un*spiritual as the "outer." The difference is apparently due to the amount of attention elicited by affective-volitional occurrences in situations of high value and of low value respectively.

The correctness or incorrectness of this explanation however need not effect the salient point which is the part that fellow human beings assume in generating that "inner life of the soul." Can anything even remotely approach in its potency the influence which human beings exert upon one another? Here belong example, impression, imitation, suggestion, congeniality, persuasion—phenomena, in their turn no doubt, reducible to the associations, conscious or unconscious, of Psychoanalysis and the conditioned responses of Behaviorism.

How enormous this potency is becomes revealed in the frequency with which people "find God" in their human relations.

"World, how it walled about
Life with disgrace!
Till God's own smile came out;
That was thy face!" [36]

"In thine eyes, my darling," said a dying man to his wife, "have I beheld the Eternal." [37] Who has not seen in the face of a beloved child the face of God? How commonly is the voice of an inspiring prophet, teacher or companion the voice of God! These statements are indeed misleading if the word "God" is taken in its causal sense. But they are literally true when the word carries its usual non-theological sense of value, high value, supreme, superlative value. This is the sense in which God is the comforter of sorrow, a strengthener against temptation, a cleanser of the heart and the essence of that moral rehabilitation which is traditionally called the forgiveness of sin. The circumstance that human contacts can be shown to have been operative in the causation of these benefits does not make them a whit less divine so far as their value is concerned.

And, in its spiritual ranges, mutual aid is how signally mutual! Each aids the other by becoming an object of aid for the other and eliciting from that other the proclivity for aiding.[38] Herein lies the sense in which irrefutably "God is love," love being that relation in which human beings supremely influence one another toward that state in which supreme values are approximated if not realised. The joy of service, the comfort of self-effacement, the peace that comes with humility, and the blessedness of self-renunciation belong here, the individual, like Sir Galahad, finding himself by losing himself. Here also is exemplified the great doctrine of the intrinsic and indefeasible worth of the individual. The highest good of others is the highest good of each and this is what

[36] Robert Browning, "The Two Poets of Croisic."

[37] Coe, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[38] Felix Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 171: "The category of interdependence implies that the lines of energy between A and B cross, so that A is subject to B's influence, B subject to A's influence simultaneously. The simultaneity of the relation distinguishes the category of interdependence from that of causality."

the intrinsic worth of the individual implies. In vain will any highest good be sought by any one person which is not at the same time the highest good of everyone else.

III. GRADATIONS OF VALUE

The very gradation of good into higher and lower which we have found to be so distinctly inseparable from religion is deeply saturated with social presuppositions. The mere fact that the good is matter of discussion, argument and debate betrays this character. Both the attack and the defence of any line of conduct start from the assumption that the good to be sought is the good of all and not merely a good which, benefitting one, excludes another. Anything is bad which fails to realise this assumption; anything is good which does realise it.

By far the most frequent use of the words "good" and "bad" is that of relative positions in the line of social interaction. "Bad" is that which is being socially transcended, supplemented, corrected, left behind. "Good" is the prospective outcome of such transcending, supplementing and correcting. "Bad" is an earlier stage of the same journey whereof "good" is a later stage. At any given time, the earlier stage is represented by some persons and tendencies and the later stage by others.

Genetically viewed it is plain why this should be so. The individual is *ipso facto* a member of that larger unit, the race. The individual's activities can be understood only as phases of racial activity. The preservation of the individual is of moment because upon it depends the preservation of the race. When the preservation of the race calls for the sacrifice of the individual, then the sacrifice of the individual becomes of moment whether gloriously on the battle field or ignominously on the gallows. Social pressure tends incessantly to make the mental habits of the individual reflect the interests of the race. To this proposition everything thus far said regarding mutual aid is but the corollary.[39]

[39] Coe, *op. cit.*, p. 39: "The justification, not to say necessity, for recognizing a simply social function of mind exists not alone in the social presuppositions of several recognized values but also in a long series of genetic studies which, from one angle after another, have revealed the fundamentally social nature of consciousness."

Behind this racial character of the individual may perhaps be traced the ultimate mystery of the one and the many. Individuals are the many whereof the race is the one. This brings us to the farthest bounds of human thought, the mystery of the one and the many, the eternal and insoluble, bidding the mind of man: "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." In this sense, the good becomes linked with the infinite and the ineffable.

IV. EXPEDIENTS

We have already enumerated among the senses in which help can be divine the circumstance that it is at times something psychological obtained through various religious practices such as prayer, ritual, meditation, hope, trust.[40] These religious expedients possess the quality appraised as divine:

a) when they really help,
b) when the help is important and significant.

From the days of the ancient prophets to the days of modern anti-clericalism, these religious usages have had the defect of being resorted to long after changing conditions had deprived them of their effectiveness. Still their frequent futility does not gainsay the possibility of their being beneficial on occasion. In a world where most evils and the roots of still more evils lie in the emotions and the will, anything which creates a salutary state of the emotions and the will has every qualification for the encomium "divine."

[40] It would be customary to add "faith" but this we shall have to forego because of the misleading character of the word. The word is used in two distinct senses which have been hopelessly confused. One sense is that of the utilisation of certain mental (the Behaviorist would say "verbal") representations whose effect is deemed to be emotionally and volitionally helpful. The other sense of "faith" is that of a mental attitude in which the difference between evidence and lack of evidence is ignored, almost justifying the witticism ascribed to the school boy who is reported to have said: "Faith is when you believe what you know ain't true." Faith in the second sense is virtually the opposite of faith in the first sense. Erasure of the difference between evidence and lack of evidence produces emotions and volitions which can not be desirable.

In a previous connection, we have compared the use of imagery in religion with its use in art. We have also considered some specimens of imagery such as that involving the father experience and that involving the sex experience. We must now draw the distinction between the earlier associations of imagery and later associations.

Thus, expressions such as "Heavenly Father" have an impressiveness whose origin lies in the first years of life. The psychology of religion, whatever the school, has the function of tracing such origins. Yet these initial experiences are not the only ones contributing to the associational content of religious phrases. Much to their associational enrichment, there have been, subsequent to childhood, innumerable occasions upon which these phrases have been used. They may have been spoken by a beloved mother,[41] teacher, prophet or friend. They may have become glorified through entrancing music or aureoled in masterpieces of art. We may well question whether infantile associations are necessarily more potent than those arising at a later date.

With certain phrases, the associational content is in a state of constant growth. Expressions like "God bless you," "God will take care of you," "God give thee peace," "Holy Spirit," "The peace that passeth understanding"[42] have served so perennially to vocalize affection and good will as to have become a special vocabulary of affection and good will. The beloved persons not only by whom but also to whom these words are spoken augment their associational

[41] The immense rôle played in religion by filial respect has a bearing upon this point. Religion is still identified with piety, that is *pietas*, filial devotion. In Judaism as elsewhere numerous usages are avowedly observed for no other reason than that of honoring parents or even remoter ancestors. Some anthropologists would have us understand that ancestor worship constituted the beginning or an early stage of some or of all religions.

[42] "The peace of God that passeth understanding" admits of being understood in terms of social psychology. Various human contacts, memories, expectations, artistic and literary achievements have been psychologically instrumental in producing that peace. The peace is "of God" in the sense of its being wholesome, excellent, desirable, an exceptional embodiment of value. A more accurate phrasing would be "passeth *expectation*."

wealth. The power of this love and friendship is surely not less than that of infantile recollection or sex reminiscence.

Along these lines also the attempt can be made to account for the reputed efficacy of prayer that one person offers in behalf of another. Prayer is the manifestation of one's interest in that other, of that good will, appreciation, esteem—of that understanding, at least, which we have already listed among the urgent social needs. "Pray for me" denotes: "Take an interest in me. Be concerned about me. Influence me helpfully." The benefit of the prayer lies in the beneficence of the one who offers the prayer while the God addressed in the prayer is that supreme good which, through it all, is being visaged and approached.

Conversely, when the associations are repellent, religious phraseology becomes hateful and atheism is the result. Atheism, as we have seen, differs from theism only in the matter of nomenclature. A tyrannical parent, a bigoted teacher, a reactionary church, a mawkish or superstitious congregation can render any set of phrases obnoxious and provocative of dissent.

Finally, it should be noticed how extensively the phraseology of religion refers to inanimate objects: light, tower, fortress, rock, sea, &c. Unless we can trace these figures back to the days of fetichism when inanimate objects were anthropomorphised, we may have to regard these phrases as being without a primary social basis. By virtue of their religious appropriation and repeated usage they become social in a secondary way.

Thus help, which is divine as to its value, can be social as to its expedients in addition to being social as to its cause.

CONCLUSION

Jewish Bearings

As we began with a reflection on the Jewish bearings of our theme, it may be well to end with a similar reflection. That the God of Jewish tradition is a causative God can not be denied. Still it is significant that Theology which is responsible for the causal conception plays, in Jewish tradition,

a rôle much inferior to that of worship; and in worship, as we have seen, causation is, if broached at all, hardly more than a symbol of value. Have we not, in the preceding pages, had occasion to quote Jewish liturgic phrases when illustrating the evaluative conception of Deity?

Even in Jewish Theology, the age-long struggle against anthropomorphism may in a measure have been due to a perception, however dim, that causative categories fail to compass the Divine. A causal God must needs be an anthropomorphic God: such a vast part of observable causation is human, Divine causation could hardly be other than quasi-human. The Jewish insurgency against anthropomorphism which reaches its climax in Maimonides but which has often been traced through the Targumim back into the Massoretic text and possibly into still earlier manifestations is by no means unrelated to a feeling that not causation but value is the meaning of Divinity.

Passages can, in fact, be quoted in which the idea that the causally human can be evaluatively divine is almost explicit. There is, for instance, the passage in Leviticus Rabba 34, 2 to the effect that the benevolent person, as it were, deprives God of the merit of giving bread to all flesh.[43] There is also the passage in Leviticus Rabba 34, 16 to the effect that as a "repairer of the breach" the benevolent person is God's surrogate.[44]

Likewise how significant in this connection are the famous utterances in Abot chapter 3, paragraphs 3 and 7, asserting the presence of the Divine where human beings assemble under exalted conditions!

Nor is the conception of human beings who, like the prophets, function as messengers of God, without kinship with these views. The Shebet Musar 2, 5 has the pregnant phrase: "He imparteth unto His creatures some of the mercy which is His."[45] Human mercy is here identified with divine

[43] Leviticus Rabba 34. 2 quoting Psalms 136. 25 and 145. 15: נותן לחם לכל בשר. בא זה וחטף לו את המצוה.

[44] Leviticus Rabba 34. 16 quoting Isaiah 58. 12: וקורא לך גודר פרץ. ר׳ אבין בשם ר׳ ביביה אמר. אמר הק״בה. הפרצה הזו היה עלי לגודרה. עמדת אתה וגדרת אותה חייך שאני מעלה עליך וגו׳.

[45] Shebet Musar 2. 5: נותן לבריות מרחמיו.

mercy—which is all but saying that something which is in some ways human is, at the same time, divine evaluatively.

Then there are the Jewish affirmations that friendship is divine[46] and, above all, the vast amount said about the sacred implications of charity. Again and again is God represented in the Bible, the Midrash, the Talmud and the Ethical Writers either as enjoining charity or as rewarding charity or as both. This, to be sure, is not a clear cut assertion that charity is the causative where the divine is the evaluative. Yet, in view of what has already been said about psychological "displacements" can these charity teachings be dismissed as altogether irrelevant? How readily can "God is the commander of benevolence," "God is the rewarder of benevolence" be displacements for "God is the value to be realized through benevolence"? Considering the doctrinal background of Jewish charity teachings, could there have been any greater approximation to our doctrine of social cause, divine value?

Indeed a momentous practical inference follows. If the traditional declarations about the divinity of benevolence are to mean anything in modern terms they must mean the negation of what an ultra-progressive Jew of today calls provisionalism in social service. He writes:

> "There are two fallacies that affect the social reform movements of today. The substitution of power for right is one. What I venture to call the fallacy of provisionalism is the second. This is the fallacy of the opportunist movements. 'Lead the laboring classes provisionally up to the level of sufficiency, or of decent existence, and then we shall see.' But man does not act without ends, and unless we define the ultimate end, we give license to the proximate ends. In other words we simply cannot act provisionally. We cannot ignore our spiritual nature without offending against it. We may start with the idea of serving

[46] Jerushalmi Berakot I 3c and IV 7d: השוכן בבית הזה ישע ביניכם אהוה ואהבה שלום ורעות: שתשכן בפורינו אהבה ואחוה ושלום וריעות.

it, but without explicit definition of it we shall presently find ourselves disgraced in all sorts of idolatries." [47]

If we are right in our contention that the dominant meaning of God is supreme value, it follows that the Jewish linkage of benevolence and God calls for the realization through benevolence of supreme values and not merely proximate ones. The mere feeding, clothing and sheltering of the body is a counterfeit benevolence. Benevolence must create or, at least aim to create a strengthened, a harmonious and a beautified personality in each of the parties involved. Provisionalistic social service or reform is as much out of keeping with the spirit of traditional Judaism as it is with the spirit of the ultra-modernized Jew from whom quotation has just been made.

The great Midrash on benevolence, Leviticus Rabba, actually states, 34, 16, that peace between the suffering individual on the one hand and God on the other is one of the most significant possibilities of benevolence.[48] We need not overlook its essential *naïveté* in order to credit this passage with at least some dim perception that spiritual goals to benevolence are of profound importance.

Not trivial values, then, but superlative ones must be sought in social work if we are to translate into modern reactions the ancestral view that charity is divine. Trivial values are not divine. Only exalted values are divine. That the soul and not merely the flesh must be the aim of all social endeavor is thus a conviction in which the teachings of the past and the insights of the present strikingly coincide.

[47] Felix Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*, London and New York, 1918, p. 53.

[48] Leviticus Rabba 34. 16: א״ר יהודה ב״ר סימון, העני הזה יושב ומתרעם, מה אני מה סלוני הוא ישן על מטתו ואני ישן כאן סלוני ישן בביתו ואני כאן, ועמדת אתה ונתת לו חייך שאני מעלה עליך כאילו עשית שלום ביני לבינו

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